

The Middle East Journal

Modernization and its Discontents:

State and Gender in Kuwait

*Mary Ann Tétreault
and Haya al-Mughni*

Women's Rights and Political

Contingency: The Case of

Yemen, 1990-1994

Maxine Molyneux

Reform of Personal Status

Laws in North Africa:

A Problem of Islamic or

Mediterranean Laws?

Ann Elizabeth Mayer

Prospects for Democratizing

Foreign Policymaking:

The Gradual Empowerment

of Israeli Women

Tamar Hermann and Gila Kurtz

Conceiving the Masculine:

Gender and

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
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
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
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Editor's Note

THIS issue challenges some of our preconceptions not only about the role of women in the Middle East today, but also about the forces that are shaping that role and the direction the evolution of that role is taking

There is, first of all, a recognition that women in the region today are to be found, like many in other parts of the world, on a continuum that ranges from heading governments to being completely subjugated by ignorance, poverty, and tradition

Whereas the premise is that it is Islam that has shaped, is shaping, and will continue to shape women's roles, status, civil, and political rights in the Muslim world, the authors argue otherwise. They demonstrate that economic development, political ideologies, class interests, and traditions that transcend any one religion may have an even greater influence

Women are not at a crossroad today, as modernists or prophets of doom would have us believe. The line of demarcation is not clearly drawn between the modern Western-style woman, and the traditional, veiled, house-bound wife or daughter. Women in the Middle East have many roads to travel.

This discourse on women is woven, like a rich tapestry, with many threads of different color. It is those threads that give the shape and design and meaning to the tapestry. How bland and boring a work if it were a monochrome!

Mary-Jane Deeb

Guest Editor's Note

CREDIT for the idea of devoting an issue of the *Middle East Journal* to the topic of gender and politics in the Middle East goes to former editor, Eric Hooglund. Wanting to show Journal readers how viewing politics in the region through the lens of women's experiences highlights issues and structures that might otherwise remain obscure, Eric asked me to be guest editor of this project. The Journal's interim editor, Richard Parker, and the new permanent editor, Mary-Jane Deeb, were equally enthusiastic. Among our aims in selecting this particular group of articles was to illustrate the diversity in the methodologies and concerns that characterize the growing body of literature in gender studies. These articles discuss a variety of issues, take several different theoretical and disciplinary points of view, and, as a whole, reflect both the political culture of the region and the peculiar difficulties that women, as women, face in virtually every nation of the world.

The notion that women in the Middle East are uniquely subjugated is flatly contradicted by Ann Elizabeth Mayer's cross-national analysis of personal status laws of states in the Mediterranean region. Mayer argues that traditional laws on the northern shores of the Mediterranean, particularly France's Code Napoléon, were every bit as hostile to female autonomy as traditional laws in the Maghrib region of the southern littoral. She notes that both regions are experiencing convergent changes in personal status laws, not because of internal religious, cultural, or ideological movements, but rather as a response to modernization, a global process. Europe, which experienced the effects of modernization earlier than the Maghrib states, is simply further along in the process.

Mayer's comparison of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia also shows that Islam does not dictate a uniform approach to the regulation of such institutions as marriage any more than Christianity, the dominant religion in Europe, imposed a uniformity on the rights and responsibilities of married persons there. Indeed, personal status law has been used as a

vehicle to control female sexuality in both Islamic and Christian communities. Maxine Molyneux's comparison of personal status laws in the two Yemens seems, at first, to present a counter-example to the conclusion that women's status is substantially independent of ideology. But, on closer examination, she is, in fact, showing why modern political ideologies, including socialism with its formal commitment to gender equality, coexist so comfortably with social practices and psychological attitudes toward women that support their continued subordination to men. Tamar Hermann and Gila Kurtz reveal a similar mechanism in their examination of the influence of women on Israeli foreign policy. Together, these studies corroborate the findings of feminist scholars studying communist, socialist, and liberal regimes in other world regions that masculine gender interests usually outweigh the influence of ideological principles, regardless of the formal content of the ideology.

This observation is reinforced somewhat differently by what Haya al-Mughni and I have found in our work on Kuwait. There, Islam is both the source of ideology and a convenient justification for how the "gender card" is played in maneuvers by political and economic, as well as religious, elites for status and power in Kuwaiti society. But, despite explicit appeals to Islam as the reason for women's decidedly second-class status among Kuwaiti citizens, the examples of Tunisia and the pre-unification PDRY remind us that Islam is also compatible with legal definitions of personal status shaped by egalitarian values.

Ideologies and political cultures are themselves often built from gendered images of human relations. Joseph Massad's analysis of Palestinian nationalism, coupled with Hermann and Kurtz's description of how female participation in the foreign-policy process in Israel is politically contained, uncover similarities in the content of Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms and the dominance of gendered images in their construction. The resemblance should not be surprising. These two nationalisms were forged as mirrored metaphors describing the struggle of two nations for the same land. To Israelis, the land is a beautiful woman that Israeli men have come to possess and make fruitful. To Palestinians, the Israeli conquest of this land is rape. Both metaphors construe the land as an object of sexual domination and the two peoples as rivals to possess it.

Gendered constructions of nationalism underlie a series of psychological attitudes and social practices ranging from the idolization of militarism and the glorification of force, to the belief that gender hierarchy is necessary for national survival. The last is also an important element of Kuwaiti nationalism. There, hierarchical gender relations are part of a nested pattern of dominance and subordination that also characterizes the political regime and class relations. The unspoken assumption in all three cases is that the participation of women as equals in politics threatens the security of the nation.

In his presidential address to the members of the Middle East Studies Association last November, Rashid Khalidi urged Middle East specialists to reach out, within their institutions and in their teaching and writing, to those who study other world regions. He suggested that we occasionally leave the cloister of our area specialty, looking beyond those aspects of the countries and the region we study that make them unique, to consider what makes them similar to other countries and regions. As the articles in this issue of the

Middle East Journal demonstrate, such an approach clarifies our vision on both counts. Looking at the Middle East through the lens of gender reveals unsuspected similarities between this region and the rest of the world. At the same time, it also deepens our understanding of those aspects of the Middle East that confirm its singularity as the region we have chosen to study and, indeed, to love.

Mary Ann Tétreault



MODERNIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: STATE AND GENDER IN KUWAIT

Mary Ann Tétreault and Haya al-Mughni

Oil income launched Kuwait on a path of economic modernization, the myriad effects of which include pressure on boundaries separating Kuwaiti from non-Kuwaiti, elites from other social groups and classes, and women from men. Using gender as a lens, aspects of Kuwait's population policy, entitlement programs, employment and housing patterns, and family life are examined. Motives and strategies for maintaining traditional values are analyzed in the context of development imperatives and national security concerns. The dilemmas facing Kuwaitis and their leaders are shown to be complex and solutions often incompatible. The authors warn that policies based on the continued subordination of women often fail to provide for outcomes potentially more destabilizing than the situations they are intended to ameliorate.

THE initiation of commercial exports of oil from Kuwait in 1946 set in train a series of changes affecting not only the economy, but also Kuwaiti social and political life. Prior to the coming of oil, the mainstays of the Kuwaiti economy were trading, fishing, boat-building, and pearling.¹ Kuwaiti society was dominated by the ruling al-Sabah family.

1 Ahmad Mustafa Abu-Hakima, *The Modern History of Kuwait, 1750–1965* (London: Luzac & Company, 1983); Jacqueline S. Ismael, *Kuwait: Social Change in Historical Perspective* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1982).

Mary Ann Tétreault is a professor of political science at Iowa State University and Haya al-Mughni is a sociologist currently working at the Public Authority for Assessment of Compensation in Kuwait.

and a few important merchant families.² A tribalist ideology established and supported a status hierarchy among Kuwaiti clans,³ and a well-entrenched system of paternal and conjugal patriarchy established age and gender hierarchies within them.⁴ While most Kuwaitis accepted both hierarchies, the relatively cosmopolitan life-style of the merchant elite encouraged opposition to oppressive domination by the ruling family.⁵ A few merchants also ventured far enough beyond the boundaries of patriarchy to educate their daughters.⁶ Despite this occasional deviance, however, Kuwaiti social and political life remained remarkably stable in the face of repeated external intervention from European and regional powers, and pressures from an economy experiencing decades-long stagnation.

As oil income flowed into the state, and particularly after the accession of 'Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah as amir of Kuwait in 1950, resources were channeled to modernize the local economy and improve the living standards of the population.⁷ The relative positions of dominant groups in the Kuwaiti social hierarchy were at first undisturbed by these policies. Members of the ruling family, along with wealthy merchants and key government employees, received the lion's share of cash distributions made via the Land Acquisition Policy (LAP), which transferred lands claimed by Kuwaiti citizens to the government.⁸ Investment laws, requiring majority Kuwaiti ownership of local businesses, awarded wealthy and well-connected Kuwaiti partners direct benefits from foreign investment, while the establishment of the first Kuwaiti-owned bank in 1952 consolidated the economic dominance of five of the most powerful merchant clans.⁹ Although a small group of newly-rich families sprang up, headed by clients of the ruling family who held government jobs enabling them to claim desirable land and win lucrative contracts, for the most part the families that had dominated the Kuwaiti economy prior to the coming of oil

2 Ismael, *Kuwait*, H R P Dickson, *Kuwait and Her Neighbours* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956), H F V Winstone and Zahra Freeth, *Kuwait: Prospects and Reality* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972), Abdul-Reda al-Assiri and Kamal al-Manoufi, "Kuwait's Political Elite: The Cabinet," *Middle East Journal* 42, no. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 49–50.

3 Nicolas Gavrielides, "Tribal Democracy: The Anatomy of Parliamentary Elections in Kuwait," in Linda Layne, ed., *Elections in the Middle East: Implications of Recent Trends* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 153–223, Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb, *Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula: A Different Perspective*, trans. by L. M. Kenny (London: Routledge, 1990).

4 For an analysis of the two faces of patriarchy, see Carol Pateman, "The Fraternal Social Contract," in John Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State* (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 101–27. For patriarchy in Kuwait, see Haya al-Mughni, *Women in Kuwait: The Politics of Gender* (London: Saqi Books, 1993), and Suzi Wells and Bazza al-Batini, *Traditions: The Folklore of Women and Children in Kuwait* (Kuwait City: Kuwait Bookshop Publications, 1987).

5 Jill Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Mary Ann Tétreault, "Autonomy, Necessity, and the Small State: Ruling Kuwait in the Twentieth Century," *International Organization* 45, no. 4 (Autumn 1991), pp. 564–91.

6 Mary Ann Tétreault, "Civil Society in Kuwait: Protected Spaces and Women's Rights," *Middle East Journal* 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993), p. 281.

7 Ralph Hewins, *A Golden Dream: The Miracle of Kuwait* (London: W. H. Allen, 1963), John Daniels, *Kuwait Journey* (Luton, UK: White Crescent Press, 1971), Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf*, Mary Ann Tétreault, *The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and the Economics of the New World Order* (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1995).

8 Ghanim Hamid al-Najjar, "Decision-Making Process in Kuwait: The Land Acquisition Policy as a Case Study" (Ph.D. diss., University of Exeter, 1984).

9 Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf*, pp. 89–93. Interviews in Kuwait (by Tétreault), spring 1990.

continued to do so afterwards.¹⁰ Even the new players conformed substantially to the old rules governing the kin-based organization of state and economy.

The burgeoning oil economy, however, did affect the labor market in ways that undermined the old social and political order. Economic expansion drew a flood of foreign workers to Kuwait. These included skilled professionals such as petroleum engineers, architects, and teachers, as well as semi-skilled and unskilled labor to man the oil and construction industries and fill various occupations in an expanding service sector. The rapidity of economic growth, unconstrained by formal planning, kept demand for foreign labor very high. In 1965, Kuwait's third national census revealed that Kuwaitis had become a minority in their own country, making up only 47 percent of the population.¹¹ This unwelcome news heightened already existing concerns about the impact of foreign labor on political stability.¹²

Meanwhile, the government had already begun to move on the issue. In August 1962, in conjunction with the passage of Kuwait's first post-independence constitution, a state planning board was established to direct future growth and development by drawing up and supervising the implementation of a series of five-year plans. Recommendations from the first development plan, which covered the period from 1967–68 to 1971–72, left an indelible mark on Kuwaiti society. The recommendations encouraged Kuwaiti women to enter the labor market to limit the influx of foreign workers, advocated placing additional restrictions on foreign labor to enhance security, and urged an increase in welfare benefits and social privileges for Kuwaitis to promote social harmony and political stability. The prominence of recommendations designed to reinforce boundaries between Kuwaitis and foreigners, by limiting the number and influence of foreign workers in the country, reveals the dominance of national security concerns in the minds of Kuwaiti planners.

Kuwaiti society, however, also faced other boundary problems. Changes in the

10 Al-Najjar, "Decision-Making Process in Kuwait", Daniels, *Kuwait Journey*, p. 39, interviews in Kuwait (by Tétreault), spring 1990. The ability of the middle class to take full advantage of policies like the Land Acquisition Policy (LAP) was constrained by government responses to a critical report on the Kuwaiti economy prepared by the World Bank in the early 1960s. One result was that the government reduced funding allocated to land acquisition, and middle-class Kuwaitis, who had borrowed money to invest in land, went bankrupt. See Hassan Ali al-Ebraheem, *Kuwait and the Gulf* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 95. Wealthy Kuwaitis were also caught by this shift, but their superior resources and diversification strategies shielded them from its worst effects (interviews by Tétreault, spring 1990).

11 The figure of 47.1 percent of a total population of 467,339 persons is given in the last report prepared by the Central Statistical Office of the Kuwait Ministry of Planning prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. It appears in Table 11 of the *Annual Statistical Abstract, 1989*, on p. 27. These figures correspond to those given in earlier editions of the *Statistical Abstract*. In the first post-invasion statistical summary from this same source, the *Annual Statistical Abstract, 1992*, the percentage of Kuwaitis in the population in 1965 is reported as 36.1 percent of 467,339 persons (Table 11, p. 27). A note on p. 26 of the 1992 volume says, "It is worth mentioning that figures of Kuwaitis in this chapter do not include non-stated nationalities." That means that bidun (stateless persons—see text) were counted as part of the Kuwaiti total in pre-invasion statistical compilations, but since then appear as part of the non-Kuwaiti population. We cite pre-invasion statistics when we refer to pre-invasion perceptions and understandings of this issue.

12 Daniels decries the anti-British politics of Lebanese and especially Egyptian expatriates during the 1950s, a period he calls "the uneasy years" (see his *Kuwait Journey*, chap. 3). He notes the prominence of Arab nationalists among Kuwaitis educated abroad and expatriates from other Arab countries. Both groups were involved in efforts to push the government to end Kuwait's dependence on Britain and to support Egyptian president Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir during the 1956 Suez Crisis—see pp. 40–59.

geographic environment of home and city life were proceeding rapidly. This was the result of the destruction of the old city and the construction of new housing and workplaces according to patterns reflecting normative values at variance with Kuwaiti tradition. The spread of education to the children of subordinate groups, a necessary first step to "Kuwaitize" the workforce, promised to challenge the dominance of the merchant families, just as merchant activism challenged the dominance of the ruling family. At the same time, the education of women and, even more, their employment outside the home threatened the dominance of fathers and husbands over the women of their families. Those desiring to maintain the legitimacy of their own right to rule the state, the economy, and their families had to face a crucial problem. To reconcile the inconsistencies arising from simultaneously clinging to a tribalist ideology, while presiding over the modernization of a physical and human infrastructure pervaded by cultural diversity and political assumptions increasingly at variance with Kuwaiti tradition, was very difficult indeed.

In *Islam and Democracy*, Fatima Mernissi identifies boundary maintenance as having been a primary concern of Islamic and Mediterranean societies for centuries.¹³ Images of the veil, the walled household compound, and the walled city are images of security in these cultures, reflecting the ability of the men in charge to separate and control differences. Images of breaching boundaries are metaphors for violence and disorder. Mernissi argues throughout her book that modernization poses continual challenges to the psychological, moral, economic, and political boundaries that maintain a particular style of religious and political leadership in the Arab-Islamic world. The relevance of her observations to Kuwait is supported by analysts of the societies of the Gulf region such as Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb.¹⁴ Naqeeb notes that the primary strategy used by the Kuwaiti regime to maintain control of the state is playing social groups one against another as part of a cultural complex he calls "tribalism."

In Kuwait, the process of modernization is also a process of boundary transgression. In this article, we examine the pressures of modernization on Kuwait by analyzing its impact on women. Applying Mernissi's argument to Kuwait, women's position there is not merely subordinate to men, but under their direct control. This is not only a social reality reinforced by religious prescriptions, it is also a metaphor for social control and community security. For example, the Arabic word *fitna*, used to describe disorder and chaos, also means "civil war." The same word is used to describe the power of female sexuality to tempt men. Together with these other meanings, *fitna* places women in the position of what Elaine Pagels calls "the intimate enemy." The threat from this fearsome Other is compounded by the fact that her life is inextricably embedded in one's own.¹⁵ Thus, the boundary conflicts arise from the need to modernize to take full advantage of Kuwait's ephemeral oil wealth, and the incompatible desire to preserve a community.

13 Fatima Mernissi, *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World*, trans. by Mary Jo Lakeland (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992), esp. pp. 6–8.

14 Al-Naqeeb, *Society and the State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula*.

15 For a description of *fitna* as a gendered element in Islamic political theory, see Denise A. Spellberg, *Politics, Gender, and the Islamic Past: The Legacy of 'A'isha Bint Abi Bakr* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 140–41. Elaine Pagels discusses "the intimate enemy" in a 1995 book described by David Remnick in, "The Devil Problem," *New Yorker*, 3 April 1995, p. 64.

ideal. That ideal, not coincidentally, supports a particular distribution of power and authority in Kuwaiti society, and is likely to be most clearly defined by the struggles over women's roles and civil rights.

CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY BOUNDARIES

Under the citizenship law of 1959, Kuwaiti nationals were defined as those persons and their descendants who resided in Kuwait prior to 1920 and maintained residence there until 1959. The small size of the Kuwaiti population (113,622 persons out of a total of 206,473 in 1957)¹⁶ stimulated the adoption of a population policy aimed at increasing the Kuwaiti birth rate. This policy developed over time to include an array of financial incentives, such as monthly allowances for each child, maternity benefits, and housing loans, designed to encourage Kuwaitis to have large families. Government housing was provided for middle- and low-income families. In order to permit Kuwaiti women to reconcile family responsibilities with the state's desire that women work outside the home, nursery facilities for working mothers were also provided.

Kuwaiti nationalism is based on the concept of *al-usra al-wahida*, the single or united family, adopted as a symbol of the nation in the early 1970s to promote national cohesion. The term resonates with mythic idealizations of the old tribal families of the Arabian peninsula, in which everyone took care of everyone else and all lived securely under the protective wing of the family patriarch. The Kuwaiti media were encouraged by a new Social Policies Committee, set up by the state's planning board, to increase family members' awareness of their duties and responsibilities toward one another. They were asked to promote family values based on obedience to the male head of household, respect for the elderly, and care for the young. The Committee wanted to articulate the relations of family rights and obligations within the context of the society as a whole. It depicted the nation as a collective family characterized by reciprocal relations of rights and obligations, *al-usra al-wahida*, with the amir at its head. In this way, the values symbolic of solidarity and mutual aid among family members were used to create allegiance to the monarchic state.

The promotion of such a close identification between the patriarchal family and the patriarchal state created a close interdependence between these two institutions. Loyalty to the patriarchal family became, in the 1970s, analogous to loyalty to the ruling family, making the preservation of the patriarchal family a political issue transcending the myriad abuses of human rights inherent in the subordination of women to patriarchal control.¹⁷ The continuity of the monarchy also depended on the maintenance of specific lineage and blood ties. Restrictions on female citizens' entitlements and the imposition of penalties on Kuwaiti women who married non-Kuwaitis also became policies aimed at social control and national boundary demarcation.

16 The first national census was taken in 1957. See the *Annual Statistical Abstract, 1989*, Table 11, p 27.

17 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Strange Justice: Rhetoric and Reality of Women's Equality" (Paper presented at the third annual conference of the Carrie Chapman Catt Center, Washington, DC, March 1995).

Kuwaiti women who marry outside the group, along with their families, are marginalized. In contrast, the families of Kuwaiti men who marry non-Kuwaitis are treated no differently from families in which both spouses are Kuwaitis. Concerning citizenship as passing from father to son, Kuwaiti women married to foreigners become mothers of non-Kuwaiti children who, like their fathers, are denied political, economic, and social protections to which Kuwaitis are entitled.¹⁸ Marriage to foreigners also causes Kuwaiti women to lose some of their own rights. In 1982, Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaiti men lost their right to own government housing, their right to government housing loans was rescinded in 1993.

Discrimination against Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis appears even more unjust in cases where the non-Kuwaiti spouse is *bidun*. The *bidun* are stateless nationals, some of whom have lived in Kuwait for several generations. True *bidun* are former nomads whose nationality status was never clarified or declared by their family heads in the past. Kuwaitis suspect, however, that many *bidun* are not really stateless nomads but, rather, Iraqis or Saudis who deny their nationality as a way to gain entitlement to superior Kuwaiti economic, social, and political rights. Until the late 1980s, the settlement and participation of *bidun* in Kuwaiti life were welcomed because *bidun* men constituted a large pool of willing recruits for Kuwaiti security forces. The status of the *bidun* was so close to that of certified Kuwaiti nationals that, in census tallies carried out prior to the Iraqi invasion, the *bidun* were counted as part of the Kuwaiti population, rather than as non-Kuwaitis.¹⁹

In response to the deterioration of the Kuwaiti economy following the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s, however, the *bidun* began to be squeezed out of the domestic labor force by demands that all expatriate workers show their nationality papers. Since the *bidun*, by definition, had no such papers, they could not produce them for their employers and many were fired from their jobs. The economic and social marginality of the *bidun* increased following liberation in 1991. It progressed to such an extent that government population statistics were revised in 1992, reclassifying the *bidun* as non-Kuwaitis. The identities of the *bidun* and their families have been similarly disrupted by the decision of the Kuwaiti government to move the boundary separating Kuwaitis from non-Kuwaitis, perhaps no more poignantly than in those cases where the wives of *bidun* are Kuwaiti nationals.

In 1990, the number of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaiti men reached a total of 5,322 women.²⁰ It was not until Kuwait's liberation from Iraq in 1991, however—when their economic circumstances deteriorated sharply as the result of the government's new policy requiring formal proof of nationality for every worker—that these women decided

18 Mary Ann Tétreault and Haya al-Mughni, "Women, Citizenship, and Nationalism in Kuwait" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 1995).

19 See note 11 above.

20 Buthaina al-Makhawi, "The Situation of Kuwaiti Women Married to Non-Kuwaitis and to Stateless Individuals" (Paper presented at the First Post-Liberation Conference on Women's Role in Cultural, Social and Economic Development, Kuwait, April 1994).

to organize to improve their situation.²¹ In April 1991, a group of housewives from low- to middle-income groups, along with a few highly educated women, attempted to form an association. The government refused to grant the group a license, thus denying it the right to operate officially and to receive the state support available to recognized groups. Members used the premises of the Environmental Protection Society (EPS) as their headquarters until they were evicted by the all-male board of EPS in 1992. In February 1993, the Women's Cultural and Social Society (WCSS) added the issue of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis to their agenda.²²

CLASS BOUNDARIES AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW CLASSES

The spread of education among members of formerly disadvantaged groups in Kuwaiti society promoted the development of a new class of able and ambitious Kuwaitis who did not come from the old powerful families. Having neither the capital to start their own businesses nor the political connections to win monopolies, dealerships, or agencies, these, at first mostly male, Kuwaitis gravitated to positions that, like themselves, were also products of economic modernization. They became managers in the state's oil company and professors at Kuwait University, both non-executive positions (most executive jobs are filled by members of important families) requiring high levels of education and/or skills. The dependence of the state and the economy on high levels of technical competence created "protected spaces" from which ambitious non-elite men could challenge the economic and status dominance of the old Kuwaiti elites.²³

At the same time, demands for gender equality were made by young women from the merchant class, many encouraged by men from their own social stratum.²⁴ Most of these early Kuwaiti feminists had been educated abroad. By speaking out, they shattered the old social rules requiring women to be silent and secluded. They wrote and spoke only about the issues that mattered most to themselves, that is, the veil, and women's access to education and employment. Their protests against the veil were occasionally quite dramatic. In 1956, for example, four young merchant-class women took off their *'abbayas* (long black cloaks that cover women from head to toe that are worn outside the house) and set them on fire in their school yard. These vigorous and persistent demands for change had an important bearing on the rapid introduction of women into the public sphere and

21 Following the liberation of Kuwait from Iraq in 1991, the government both reversed a pre-war preference for Arab nationals in the expatriate labor force and campaigned strongly to reduce the overall proportion of foreign workers in Kuwait. The particular targets of the new policy were Palestinians (formerly the largest segment among Arab expatriates), Iraqis, and Jordanians. By the fall of 1992, fewer than 38,000 Palestinians remained in Kuwait out of a pre-war total estimated as being in excess of 350,000. (See Mary Ann Tétreault, "Kuwait's Economic Prospects," *Middle East Executive Reports*, January 1993, p. 10.) Because entitlement to reside in Kuwait for other than Kuwaitis depends on having a job or a sponsor whose demonstrated earnings exceed a certain amount, job losses among the spouses of Kuwaiti women amounted to threats of imminent deportation for many of them.

22 A leader of the civil rights group, however, told Tétreault, during an interview in March 1994, that the group's activities were constrained by its association with the conservative WCSS.

23 Tétreault, *The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation*, p. 172.

24 Al-Mughni, *Women in Kuwait*, esp. chap. 3.

their rise to visibility. Elite women were the first to be employed outside the home and the first to drop the veil.²⁵

Ending female seclusion served the interests of the merchant class. To maintain its own position of dominance, it was ready to change Kuwaiti social mores so that elite women of the merchant class could take over prestigious positions that might otherwise go to men from the emerging social classes. As Deniz Kandiyoti noted, educated upper-class women pose less of a threat to the status quo than upwardly mobile men from modest backgrounds.²⁶ The recruitment of such women allows the elite to fill vacancies caused by a shortage of qualified men from their own class. Elite Kuwaiti women thus play an important role in class politics. Their public activities, though undertaken in the guise of actions that benefit women as a group, serve their class interests at least as much as their gender interests.²⁷

Kuwaiti women's organizations are similarly embedded in class politics. The first two were established in 1963: the WCSS, and the Arab Women's Development Society (AWDS).²⁸ The WCSS provided a gathering place for educated merchant-class women, whose comfortable lives and well-paying jobs were not enough to save them from boredom, and who were wealthy enough to indulge in charity work. The AWDS, composed mostly of women from the new middle class, expanded the feminist struggle, demanding not only political rights but also restrictions on patriarchal authority within the family. The AWDS challenge to the interlocking systems of patriarchy underpinning state and society in Kuwait met with fierce resistance from Kuwaiti men and from the government. Their ability to check AWDS activities was assisted by disunity and rivalry between the two women's organizations.

At first, the WCSS and AWDS joined forces under the umbrella of the Kuwaiti Women's Union, which was established in 1974. Their members, however, failed to agree on common aspirations. The union lasted for less than three years, consumed by internal conflicts and protracted in-fighting over the presidency of the unified group. Shortly after, in 1980, AWDS itself was disbanded. The government subsequently encouraged the formation of a number of religiously oriented women's groups, shifting the character of women's public discourse from demands for autonomy to the advocacy of values whose practical effect is to reinforce female subjection.

These new women's groups are largely comprised of elite women—including the wife of the Crown Prince. They work closely with the government and endorse its views on women's issues. They reject what AWDS fought for, such as reforms in family law that

25. Najat Sultan, "The Professional Kuwaiti Woman vis-à-vis the Situation of Women" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association of Urban Geographers, New York, April 1976), Kamala Nath, "Education and Employment Among Kuwaiti Women," in Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie, eds., *Women in the Muslim World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978).

26. Deniz Kandiyoti, "Urban Change and Women's Roles: An Overview and Evaluation," in Helen Rivlin and Katherine Helmer, eds., *The Changing Middle Eastern City* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1980).

27. The development of the concept of gender interests comes from Maxine Molyneux, "Mobilization Without Emancipation? Women's Interests, the State, and Revolution in Nicaragua," *Feminist Studies* 11, no. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 227–54.

28. The history of these organizations is discussed in detail in al-Mughni, *Women in Kuwait*.

would promote gender equality and women's autonomy, and use religion to defend the patriarchal family and women's subordinate role within it. They do not challenge discriminatory welfare policies or other structural manifestations of female subjection in Kuwait. The WCSS, along with another elite women's group, *Nadī al-Fatat* (Young Women's Club), continue to pursue political rights for women, though so far they have had only a small impact on prevailing male attitudes toward women's roles in society and politics.²⁹ The economic and social problems of divorced and widowed women, however, have been ignored by these groups, along with even modest demands for changes that would benefit women from the middle class, such as the expansion of women's access to sports and recreation facilities. Demands that would benefit women from every class, such as the protection of women and children against domestic violence, improvement of job security, and expansion of access to vocational training are also not dealt with. Indeed, relations between the elite organizations and women from lower social strata are confined primarily to charity. For example, an early and continuing project of the WCSS is sponsoring literacy classes for adult women. Such relationships reinforce traditional class distinctions rather than help Kuwaiti society to democratize.

On balance, state and class interests appear to combine in a way that renders Kuwaiti women's groups pawns in a strategy of social control, rather than core organizations working to promote human rights. The groups' activities have conformed to official policies toward women's roles in society. They emphasize *islah* (reform) rather than social change. State charters and resource transfers encourage conformity to official policy among women's group members and their leaders.³⁰

Recognized organizations are the only legitimate forums in which Kuwaiti women can speak publicly about their concerns. Affiliation with a recognized organization, however, forces women whose agendas are at variance with the status quo to dissipate their efforts by spreading their organizational involvement to include issues less relevant to their concerns. Peer pressure within these organizations also limits the style and content of demands regarding the primary problem the dissidents came together to resolve. Thus, women's groups, paradoxically, censor and inhibit the emergence of autonomous roles for women in Kuwait by providing elite women with the power to control other women's access to the public sphere.

URBANIZATION AND SPATIAL BOUNDARIES

Old Kuwait was dominated by a group of merchant families, many descended from the Banī 'Utayb tribe that had settled Kuwait in the eighteenth century. These families lived close to one another, each in its own *farij*, or neighborhood. They evolved to become a distinct and powerful group,³¹ providing jobs for much of the community and supplying the ruling family with a regular income in the form of customs duties and excises. They

29 Tétreault, "Civil Society in Kuwait."

30 For example, it was their need for space and protection from legal sanctions that pushed Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis to seek refuge in the WCSS.

31 Abu-Hakima, *The Modern History of Kuwait*, p. 7; Ismael, *Kuwait*, chap. 1.

maintained strict endogamy, marrying only within their own lineage.³² Their women lived in their own courtyards, secluded from the outside world, and confined to a section of the house without windows opening to the outside, so that they could neither be seen nor heard. These women had slaves and servants to do the daily marketing outside the home and to perform domestic tasks inside the home. They were strictly forbidden to leave their courtyards, except to visit relatives or to picnic in the desert with their families in the spring. When they did go outside, they had to cover their bodies with their 'abbayas and their faces with a thick black cloth, the *bushiya*.³³

Women from poor and middle-income families were not entirely secluded, as most of these households could not afford servants. Some housewives had to do their own shopping and fetch the family's water supply from the port where ships brought in water from Iraq. Because of the water shortage, women had to take their laundry to the beach to wash it.³⁴ Other families were so poor that women had to work outside the home to help support them. Strict rules of gender segregation, however, confined their economic activities to the women's quarters of wealthy households, to the women's *suq* (market), and to home-based enterprises such as schools for religious instruction. Even though they were not entirely secluded, however, women from poor households were equally constrained by norms of family honor and female respectability. They had to be unquestionably chaste, marry the men chosen for them, and obey the male heads of their households.

New Kuwait rose from the shambles of old neighborhoods, the buildings of which were knocked down and pushed into the sea to make way for new construction. New housing developments were built along the modern highway system, and houses and business offices were constructed according to the plans of foreign architects. Houses and apartment blocks seldom included places to sequester women from the eyes and ears of neighbors and passers-by. Family life changed as well, when Kuwaitis began moving from houses with separate women's quarters to Western-style homes where only the men's *diwaniyya*, or reception room, was isolated, while the rest of the family quarters were integrated. Girls left these homes to go to school, and women left them to go to work. Working women from the merchant class took professional positions in private firms, government offices, and the university. Soon, other women also moved into living and work spaces that made no special provision for gender segregation. They drove their own cars, wore Western-style clothing, and lived more like their contemporaries in Beirut or Cairo than as their mothers and grandmothers had lived.

The new neighborhoods introduced new boundaries based on nationality, age cohort, and family status.³⁵ Some featured rental housing for expatriate workers where, in the early era of modernization, people congregated by country of origin. Hawalli, for example, was the neighborhood where many Palestinians living in Kuwait resided. A few neighborhoods, like Shuwaykh, are areas where merchant families have built new homes

32 Gavrielides, "Tribal Democracy," pp. 156–59.

33 Wells and al-Batmi, *Traditions*.

34 Ibid., p. 11.

35 Gavrielides, "Tribal Democracy," pp. 158–64.

Shi'ī Kuwaitis live in large numbers in Sharq, an old city neighborhood, and in the new suburb of Rumaythiya. Bedouin families are concentrated outside the center city, in Jahra, around the oil town of Ahmadī, and along the south coast. Government housing programs channel families into neighborhoods based on the age of the head of household or his occupation. Thus, there are "yuppie" suburbs, like Mishrif, and "company towns," like Ahmadī. Yuppie suburbs developed spontaneously as the result of the state's repeatedly having had to open new housing areas to accommodate succeeding age cohorts of Kuwaitis seeking to become householders, while the company towns emerged as the direct outcome of state agencies, such as Kuwait University and the Kuwait Oil Company, providing housing to some classes of employees as part of their compensation. All neighborhoods are "mixed," that is, they include families who do not conform to the mode for that area. In older neighborhoods, older dwellings remain alongside newer, modern houses. Even so, residential segregation is a fact of Kuwaiti life and both shapes, and is shaped by, Kuwaiti politics and culture.

Government housing policies also enforce segregation by family type. Unmarried men not living with their families are assigned to bachelor housing, probably to keep them from trying to establish relationships with unrelated women, almost all of whom live with their relatives in areas designated for families. Childless couples are assigned apartments rather than private houses, access to which goes preferentially to families with children. This is both to encourage child-bearing and rearing, and to provide sufficient space for children's activities. As family status changes, people are offered opportunities to upgrade their housing or are removed from desirable premises to which they are no longer entitled. If a husband dies leaving a wife alone in their house, the state may repossess the house to give it to a family with children, unless the widow can show that relatives of the deceased live there with her.³⁶ The allocation of the best housing to families is both an element in the state's pronatalist policy, and a reinforcement of traditional social norms requiring adult children, especially females, to live in their parents' home until they marry.

In recent years, Kuwait has seen an increase in the number of impoverished female-headed households. This is a new phenomenon with multiple causes, the chief of which is an increase in the number of divorces after which husbands cannot or will not support their former wives. The number of divorces involving at least one Kuwaiti partner, which had been creeping upward since the mid-1970s, rose sharply in 1980 and reached a pre-Iraqi-invasion peak in 1986.³⁷ A drop in the number of divorces—and marriages—occurred in 1991, the first year of liberation, but the number of divorces reached a new

36 This is not the case where the family owns the land and the house outright, rather than having received them from the government. It should also be noted that Kuwaiti women can purchase land and houses in their own names, though they are not entitled to free or subsidized housing distributed through government programs as Kuwaiti men are (see text below).

37 *Statistical Abstract in 25 Years*, Special Issue, 1990, Table 35, p. 62. The number of divorces reported from 1979 through 1988 (the last year reported) are 1,227, 1,494, 1,692, 1,750, 1,784, 1,827, 1,982, 2,098, 1,928, 2,005. The refined general divorce rate, based on the number of Kuwaitis 15 years and older, reached a high of 9.6 for the period 1986. In 1979, this figure was only 7.2.

high in 1992, the last year for which data are available ³⁸ Even though the law requires fathers to support their children after a divorce, the cumbersome and time-consuming procedures of the Kuwaiti judicial system create financial hardships for many lower- and middle-class Kuwaiti women

Some female household heads have appealed for support from the state, which ordinarily channels citizens' welfare entitlements through male heads of household (*rab al-usra*) Poor women living on their own or with their dependent children do not fit the categories the government has established for allocating welfare benefits If they hold jobs or have living male relatives, they are usually denied public assistance In 1992, 308 applications by women declaring a need for state support were denied on the grounds that the applicants were either employed or should be supported by male relatives ³⁹

Housing is a further problem for women requiring social assistance Kuwaiti women are not entitled to own government-supplied or subsidized housing, a privilege that goes only to male heads of households To meet the needs of female household heads, the government has constructed special apartment buildings in remote areas in which to house them One such neighborhood is the Sabah al-Salim residential area, located south of Kuwait City, on the Sixth Ring Road, where construction began in the mid-1970s As in other Kuwaiti neighborhoods, residential segregation in Sabah al-Salim includes more than one population group, although its status as a government "project" enables officials to select each family living in Sabah al-Salim individually According to officials in the Ministry of Housing, childless couples and Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis are also housed there, along with widowed and divorced women ⁴⁰ All three categories of persons are socially marginalized groups

Women on social assistance receive rent subsidies to enable them to maintain themselves in these apartments ⁴¹ Their geographic isolation is a reflection of the complete absence of a social space in which their existence is recognized as legitimate if not normal The divorced and widowed mothers in these neighborhoods are stigmatized as "unworthy" women with loose morals Their isolation makes them vulnerable to crime, and their reputations legitimize male violence against them Crimes ranging from vandalism to sexual harassment and rape are daily occurrences within these grimy residential compounds To protect themselves, women place iron bars on their doors and windows, making their buildings look more like jails than like homes Residents remain indoors most of the time, rarely socializing with their neighbors, thus intensifying the prison-like quality of their existences Both male violence and the stigma attached to residential areas

38 Marriage and divorce rates, which are calculated by the Ministry of Planning, are not yet available for the years after 1988 The Ministry of Justice records the numbers of marriages and divorces According to information from this source, the number of divorces in which at least one party was Kuwaiti in the years 1989, 1991, and 1992, were reported as 2,046, 1,560, and 2,139 respectively Beginning in 1992, statistics for bidun marriages and divorces were separated from those of Kuwaitis If the number of divorces of bidun married to non-Kuwaitis or to other bidun are added into the figures reported for Kuwaitis, the yearly totals are as follows 2,236 for 1989, 1,610 for 1991, and 2,222 for 1992

39 Interviews in Kuwait (by al-Mughni), spring 1993

40 Ibid

41 Information about the lives of divorced and widowed women living in Sabah al-Salim was gathered by al-Mughni in extensive field investigations conducted from July-September 1993

allocated to female household heads act as deterrents to many single mothers in desperate need of government-assisted rental housing, but whose willingness to live in neighborhoods like Sabah al-Salim is diminished by fears for their own and their children's safety. Post-liberation budget cuts that curtail welfare programs threaten even this precarious refuge for highly marginalized and discriminated-against Kuwaiti women.

CONCLUSIONS

The Kuwaiti state is caught between two opposing forces. One is the relentless pressure of modernization with its disruption of every aspect of settled life from patterns of land usage to personal relationships.⁴² The other is an intense longing to maintain "tradition." This force is also complex, arising from fear and disenchantment with the problems that modernization inevitably brings. Preserving tradition is also important to those whose positions are dependent upon maintaining the old social order to hold onto their privileges. Women are a pivotal group, symbolically and in reality, in strategies that the state devises to manipulate and balance these forces.

The conceptualization of women as "the intimate enemy" makes their control by men a primary focus of concern, especially for men whose status and power are threatened by modernization. As a result of the imperative to control them, Kuwaiti women are denied an independent civil status. They are barred from receiving their full entitlements as citizens in the absence of mediation by male family members who must be citizens themselves. This is most clearly demonstrated in the case of women who marry non-Kuwaitis. They incur civil penalties from, as well as rejection by, those among their fellow citizens who see such marriages as a sign of disloyalty. The denial of independent civil status is also visible in the treatment of Kuwaiti women who fail to conform to social norms in other ways. Divorced and widowed Kuwaiti women are unable to claim their full rights as citizens, and some cannot even remain in their local communities. Vulnerable and powerless, they, along with their children, are marginalized socially, economically, and geographically. Symbolically, in both cases, the "lesson" of gender is that those who stay within traditional boundaries are rewarded. If this lesson is taken to heart, it promotes social stability and protects the beneficiaries of the status quo—that is, the political regime, economic elites, and male heads-of-households. The articulation and defense of an identical male gender interest, both within and across other social hierarchies, is a key stabilizing element in this system.

Gender is also a strategic card in power plays where men's interests conflict. Elite women participate along with elite men in the reproduction and preservation of class and status hierarchies. They can do this as the result of their status advantages over new men in the competition for top jobs in the state sector, and by acting as gate-keepers in the gender-segregated organizations they populate and lead by thwarting those ambitions of non-elite women who threaten the status quo. The alliance of upper-class women with the

42 These pressures on land, cultures, and persons, and the countervailing movements mounted against them, are described in Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944).

men who dominate Kuwait's political economy has obstructed the improvement of women's status nation-wide. It has also prevented an effective organization of women whose interests lie in normalizing the status of boundary crossers rather than leaving it as it is today, a legitimate target of economic and social sanctions. Yet, although the gender card helps to preserve the status quo, it also contributes to the rapid growth of an underclass of women and children. Their existence rends the façade of tradition, exposing an ugly reality at wide variance with the myth of *al-usra al-wahida*.

The weak economy and the population growth resulting from forty years of pronatalist social policies aggravate tensions created by the unfinished business of modernization. Competition within and between classes for desirable jobs, or for employment of any kind, as well as widespread dissatisfaction with the regime, have produced various kinds of disaffection. Economic modernization multiplies the channels through which this disaffection can be expressed and spread across the community. Strikes, unemployment, and reduced levels of social services pit Kuwaitis against one another for crumbs from a shrinking economic pie, whose largest pieces continue to feed the ruling family and traditional elites. Despite its apparent harmony with traditional values, Islamism among young Kuwaitis may be understood as both a measure of their thwarted ambitions and an indication that the status quo is breaking down.

As Mernissi notes with respect to other Arab societies, Islamic fundamentalism occurs hand-in-hand with feminism because both are products of the same social forces:

[T]here are two groups that have profited from modern education: men from the countryside and lower classes [who make up a disproportionate part of fundamentalist movements] and city women of the middle and upper classes. The problem is that the fundamentalists act with the complicity of the state, while women struggle alone.⁴³

Kuwait is also marked by a conflict of interests between the newly educated sons of urban workers and bedouin fathers, and the women who, both literally and figuratively, out-class them. The government, with its fear of *fitna* resulting from women escaping male control, has forgotten that *fitna* also refers to civil war between men. Thus, it has accepted and, according to some observers, even aided Islamist forces, while the petitions of Kuwaiti women for full civil and human rights have been ignored. Yet, as the experiences of Algeria, Egypt, and Iran make clear, fundamentalists with their veneer of traditional values are at least as dangerous to the survival of autocratic regimes as female autonomy. The thoughtless abandonment of a growing underclass composed of Kuwaiti women and their children is another example of a social situation where symbolic solutions ignore a potentially explosive reality.

Concentrating on the competition between themselves, rulers and merchants became blind to the changes that oil money brought to social groups whose political weight had been negligible throughout most of Kuwait's history. A new middle class and a variety of national and non-national underclasses have gradually begun to emerge, crossing the boundary insulating elites from subordinate groups and making demands of their own. The

43 Mernissi, *Islam and Democracy*, p. 160

traditional manipulation of women as counters in competition between Kuwaiti men has become problematic as women themselves increasingly compete against men, or join with some men to compete against others

Kuwait's peculiar blend of dependencies, especially its dependence on external labor and externally generated income, makes it difficult to force any of these upstart groups back into its former subject status. The unwillingness of the old elites to face this new reality is expressed by redrawing boundaries in the hope that the old technique of divide and rule can be made to work again. Our examination of the position of women in Kuwait shows that this primarily symbolic politics has been ineffective in moderating the pace of change.



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WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND POLITICAL CONTINGENCY: THE CASE OF YEMEN, 1990–1994

Maxine Molyneux

In the period before Yemeni unification in 1990, both the northern and southern states had enacted laws with regard to the status of women, embodying the distinctive ideological orientations of the two countries and their attitudes to Islamic law and Yemeni custom. Following unity, a single code has been promulgated. Yet, this unified code involves diverse legal and political principles. In a broader sense, policy on women's rights has continued to be the site of competing political ideologies in a society riven with conflict.

PRIOR to unification in 1990, the difference between the two Yemeni states was graphically reflected in, among other domains, legislation pertaining to the family and to women's rights. The laws of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), or "North" Yemen, embodied a relatively conservative legislative approach toward the family with both secular Arab nationalist and religious elements. By contrast, in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), or "South" Yemen, despite certain concessions to Islam, a secular code was adopted, arguably the most egalitarian in the Arab world. The discussion that follows examines the different fates of these two bodies of legislation. It begins by considering their initial, separate codifications, and then the changes that were introduced

Maxine Molyneux is a senior lecturer in political sociology at the University of London. She would like to acknowledge many people, not all of whom are possible to name, who assisted with the preparation of this study. Particularly, she would like to thank the many Yemenis who, over the past two decades, provided information on the legal process and the political background. Thanks also go to Anna Wurth, Susanne Dahlgren, Eric Watkins, and Gabrielle vom Bruck for help with sources, and Lu'ayy al-Rimawi and Fred Halliday for assistance with translation.

during the period 1990–94, i.e., during the “transitional period,” running from unification in May 1990 through the war of May–July 1994.¹ The “transitional period,” in particular, illuminates the relationship between gender issues and politics in contemporary Yemen. It shows how legislation on the family and on women’s rights was affected by the conflicts of the unification process and the subsequent civil war.²

The implications of this “transitional period” for the study of family law and women’s rights are evident. A common legal code, far from representing a new national system based on shared values, or the capacity of the state to impose a new pattern of family relations, was predicated on the political divisions being resolved. The evolution of legislation on the family and on women’s rights in Yemen, during the four-year “transition period,” was as much a microcosm of the overall shifts and conflicts in Yemeni politics as it was a reflection of a strictly jurisprudential process itself.³ It was a measure both of the relative weakness of women as a distinct social and political force and the importance that some parties attributed to this question. The dominant trend during this period was the narrowing of the division between the two political and legal systems, in effect, by the northern code prevailing over the southern. After parliamentary and some press debate, a new Decree on Personal Conditions was adopted by presidential decree in March 1992.⁴ Although subject to ratification by the parliament, this decree was, under the new Yemeni constitution then in force, legally binding. It reflected the balance of influence and power within the new state. Yet, precisely because there was widespread disagreement about where power lay in the new state, the drafting, introduction and, even more so, the implementation of the new law were themselves subjects of dispute and conflict in the society. The family law, itself, was, therefore, both a reflection of the changed situation in Yemen and part of this political process, both prior to and subsequent to its promulgation.

1 On the elections themselves, see Sheila Carapico, “Elections and Mass Politics in Yemen,” *Middle East Report* No. 185, Vol. 23, No. 6 (November–December 1993), pp. 2–6, and Renaud Detalle, “The Yemeni Elections Up Close,” *ibid.*, pp. 8–12. Technically, the “transitional period” ended with the election of a new coalition government. In effect, the transition lasted until the outbreak of war in late April 1994.

2 On the development of the crisis in late 1993, see Eric Watkins and Patrick Makin, “Yemen’s Crisis Threatens the Country’s Unity,” *Middle East International* 19 (November 1993), pp. 18–19; Mouna Naim, “Yemen Nordistes et Sudistes tentent de surmonter leurs divisions” (Yemen Northerners and Southerners attempt to overcome their divisions) *Le Monde*, 9 December 1993.

3 On the background and the events of 1990–94, see, for example, Charles Dunbar, “The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects,” *Middle East Journal* 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 456–76; Siobhan Hall, *Yemen: The Politics of Unity* (London: Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, October 1991); Ursula Braun, “Ein anderer Fall von Vereinigung: Jemen” (Another Case of Unification: Yemen) *Aussenpolitik, Zeitschrift für internationale Fragen* 43, no. 2 (1992), pp. 174–84, and Fred Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen 1967–1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chapter 4, “The Enigma of Yemeni ‘Unity.’”

4 Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Legal Affairs, *Al-Qirar al-Jumhuri bi al-Qanun Raqm 30 Sana 1992 bi-Sha’n al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya* (Republican Decree on Law Number Thirty of 1992 with Regard to Personal Status) (Mu’assasa 14 October [14 October Foundation] 1992). The text also appears in *Al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya* (The Official Gazette) Number 6, Part 3, pp. 1–64, 31 March 1992, corresponding to 27 Ramadan in the Muslim calendar. It is probable that the decision to introduce the decree during Ramadan was deliberate, reflecting the hope that its promulgation would not attract undue hostility, especially in the South.

FAMILY LAW PRIOR TO 1990

Prior to 1990, the two Yemeni states had two distinct, indeed contrasting, sets of family laws and constitutional positions vis-à-vis women. In the YAR, there had been no national family law until 1979. Legal matters pertaining to the family were settled in accordance with a variety of authorities and interpretations of *shari'a* (Islamic law). In the Zaydi areas (in political terms the more conservative part of the country), *ijtihad*, or interpretation of *shari'a*, was, in broad terms, more favorable to women than in the Shafi'i regions, where more orthodox constraints, mediated through the Sunni interpretation of the law, applied. This variety of legal practices was compounded by the prevalence in tribal areas—the majority of the country—of elements of tribal law, known elsewhere as *'urf* (tradition), but in Yemen also as *akham al-aslaf* (rules of the ancestors).⁵ The codification and interpretation of law in the YAR followed a pattern found throughout the history of Islamic societies: in the absence of a strong central state, local legal practices and interpretations varied. As Gabrielle vom Bruck has shown so well in regard to Zaydi marriage law and practice, the legal system was characterized above all by heterogeneity, and, during the modern era, by considerable pragmatism with regard to interpretation.⁶

With the end of the civil war, in 1970, and the subsequent consolidation of the republican regime, measures were taken to devise a constitution and legal codes based on the *shari'a*. The constitution was promulgated in 1970, followed by laws in 1976 on inheritance, wages, endowments, evidence, and compensation. The family law was passed in 1979. The drafting process took several years and reflected conflicts both between Zaydi and Shafi'i schools of jurisprudence on the one hand, and between religiously oriented Shafi'is and more secular legal experts on the other. In the words of one constitutional authority closely involved in the process, "We [secular experts] got half of what we wanted."⁷ Thus, although the law permitted polygyny and the male right to unilateral divorce (*talaq*), it also introduced some element of protection for women. The constitution made vague references to the equality of men and women, but within a framework of respect for the authority of Islam and the *shari'a*. *shari'a* was "the source of all laws" (Article 4), where no clear codified law existed, the courts were enjoined to pass their judgments in accordance with the general principles of *shari'a* (Article 153). In contrast to the PDRY, the YAR made little effort, formal or practical, to alter the social and economic position of women.

In the PDRY a very different situation prevailed.⁸ With the adoption of "scientific socialism" by the regime that came to power after the British withdrew from the region

5 On this and many other aspects of North Yemeni law, see Hassan A. al-Hubaishi, *Legal System and Basic Law in Yemen* (Worcester, UK: Billing & Sons Ltd., 1988), Martha Mundy, "Women's Inheritance of Land in Highland Yemen," *Arabian Studies* 5 (1979), pp. 161–87, and Susan Dorsky, *Women of 'Amran: A Middle Eastern Ethnographic Study* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1986). For more general background, see Paul Dresch, *Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).

6 Gabrielle vom Bruck, "Enacting Tradition: The Legitimation of Marriage Practices Amongst Yemeni *Sadah*," *Cambridge Anthropology* 16, no. 2 (1992/1993), pp. 54–68.

7 Interview with a Yemeni legal expert, London, 4 December 1993.

8 Naguib al-Shamiry, "The Judicial Background in Democratic Yemen," in Brian Pridham, ed., *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background* (London: Croom Helm, 1984).

in 1967, a new, secular constitution was adopted in 1970. In 1974 a family law was introduced, and in 1978 the constitution was revised and Islam recognized as "the state religion" (Article 47). The legal and constitutional legitimacy of the state, however, was not based on religion but on "the people" and, in particular, on "the interests of the working class" as expressed through the Yemeni Socialist Party, the YSP (Articles 1, 2, 3, and 6).⁹ Under this framework the equality of women was spelled out. Article 35 stated that "All citizens are equal in their rights and duties irrespective of their sex, origin, religion, language, standard of education or social status. All persons are equal before the law. The state shall do whatever it can to realize this equality by means of providing equal political, economical, social and cultural opportunities."¹⁰ Article 36 went further, asserting that "The state shall ensure equal rights for men and women in all fields of life, the political, economical, and social, and shall provide the necessary conditions for the realization of that equality. The state shall also work for the creation of the circumstances that will enable the women to combine [sic] between participation in the productive and social work and her role within the family sphere. It shall render special care to the vocational qualifying of the working women. The state shall, further, ensure special protection for the working women and the children and shall establish kindergartens and nurseries for the children and all other such means of care as to be specified by the law."¹¹ Further articles enjoined the right to employment, social security, free education, free medical care, and accommodation.¹²

The family law of 1974 took this implicit secularization further. The principle of free choice in marriage was established. A minimum legal age for marriage was fixed at 16 for women and 18 for men. Polygyny was generally prohibited, but allowed in exceptional cases, such as when a wife was sterile or had an incurable disease. The bride-price, or *mahr*, was reduced to 100 Yemeni dinars, equivalent to around twice the average white-collar monthly salary. Article 17 of the code stipulated that both spouses should bear the cost of supporting the family.

Some of the most controversial elements in the family code related to divorce. *talaq* was banned. All divorces were required to go through the courts. Men no longer had the automatic right of custody. Male children were normally to remain with their mothers until the age of 10, and daughters until the age of 15, with the courts retaining the right to make decisions in terms of the best interests of the children.¹³

9 *Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen*, approved by the Supreme People's Council, 31 October 1978 (Aden: 14 October Foundation, 1979). This is the official translation from Arabic by the PDRY.

10 This translation from Arabic of the family law is the official one issued in pamphlet form by the Information Department, Ministry of Information (Aden, 1976), pp. 18–19.

11 *Ibid.*

12 For a fuller discussion of government policies, see Maxine Molyneux, *State Policies and the Position of Women Workers in the PDRY 1967–1977* (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1982), and Molyneux, "State Policy and the Position of Women in South Yemen," *Peuples Méditerranéens* 12 (July/September 1980), pp. 33–49.

13 I have discussed this at greater length in my article, "Legal Reform and Social Revolution in Democratic Yemen: Women and the Family," *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 13 (1985), pp. 147–72, reprinted in abbreviated form in "The Law, the State and Socialist Policies with Regard to Women. The

In many respects, this law resembled the most radical legislation hitherto introduced in the Arab world, namely, the family codes of Syria and Tunisia. The influence of these countries resulted more from the participation of Syrian and Tunisian legal experts in the South Yemeni drafting process than from direct political contacts with these states.¹⁴ But the PDRY's family code was introduced in a political situation far more radical than that which had prevailed in these states, by a regime committed to a program of socialist modernization. The law, as was the case in other socialist states, reflected a different view of gender relations and of women's place in society. The family law was an instrument—one of several linked to other mechanisms, such as mass campaigns, changes in education and employment, and a reduced role for religion—that was designed to alter social relations.¹⁵ This context is important to bear in mind when examining what happened to family law after the 1990 unification, for the apparent abandonment of the policies embodied in the law of 1990 can only be understood in the much broader context of political change in Yemen, North and South, during this period.

LEGAL CHANGE DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD

When the two Yemens entered the "transitional period" in May 1990, the new unified government and regime proceeded to enact a single legal system. In it, most of the specific elements originally from the South—socialist and secular—were displaced in favor of the laws, and customs, prevailing in the North. The new constitution already had been drawn up in 1981 by a committee from both states.¹⁶ This document reproduced the position of the northern constitution, and Islam became "the religion of the state" (Article 2),¹⁷ while shari'a was designated "the main source of legislation."¹⁸ Article 18 guaranteed "to all its citizens, equal political, economic, social and cultural opportunities",¹⁹ Article 20 stressed that work was "a right, an honour and a necessary tool for the advancement of society",²⁰ and Article 27 restated the commitment to equality before the law. The constitution allowed for the equality of men and women, established a legal framework tied to the shari'a, and omitted many of the commitments to state intervention on behalf of women contained in the PDRY constitution of 1978. The joint constitution was, in the main, a secular document. It embodied the modified Arab nationalist consensus the YAR had

Case of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 1967–1990,' in Deniz Kandiyoti, ed., *Women, Islam and the State* (London: Macmillan, 1991).

14 There was, within the ruling party of the PDRY, a small group of pro-Syrian Ba'athists, led by Anis Hassan Yahya. Their *Hizb al-Tali'a* (Al-Tali'a Party) had allied with the National Liberation Front (the movement of Arab Nationalists) and the even smaller *al-Ittihad al-Dimukrati al-Sha'bi* (pro-Moscow communists) in 1972. The three were finally to merge into the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) in 1978.

15 For comparative observations on the role of Islam in the PDRY and Afghanistan, see Fred Halliday, "‘Islam’ and Soviet Foreign Policy," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 217–33. In Afghanistan, the decree on reforming marriage was one of the major catalysts of rural opposition, not least because of its implications for property and inheritance.

16 "Draft Constitution of the State of Unified Yemen," in Hall, *Yemen*, pp. 22–39.

17 Ibid., p. 22.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., p. 24.

20 Ibid.

derived from its Nassirist origins in the 1960s.²¹ A similar perspective informed the joint political Program of National Construction and Reform of the two ruling parties, the General People's Congress (GPC) and the Yemeni Socialist Party, which was issued after unification and was intended to outline a broad political program for the transitional period.²² The program's discussion of women, coming under a section on "Social Problems" and preceded by discussions of illiteracy, tribal vengeance, and the narcotic *qat*, made generic modernist pronouncements. Leaving aside the commitment of the new state to putting these into practice, the policies enjoined were markedly less radical than those that had been called for and, to some extent, implemented in the PDRY.

The Program of National Construction and Reform declared "Support for the development of women's participation in political, economic, social, and cultural life, by means of

- 1 Promoting the emancipation and freeing of women from traditional customs and traditions in order to enhance their effective participation in society,
- 2 Providing opportunities for women to study and work,
- 3 Promoting the work of women's associations, especially in the fields of developing motherhood and care for children, training for household work, acquiring certain skills, and involving educated women in literacy work amongst other women, in consideration of this as a national, human and religious obligation,
- 4 Vigilance with regard to the high level of bride-prices, the organization of lavish marriages, in connection with which the government will convene national conferences to deal with this social phenomenon."²³

The outline of women's social and economic roles was significantly altered in this political document. Yet, even had it represented a realistic state commitment to promoting women within the limits identified, the program would have marked a definite contrast with the policies to which the PDRY had hitherto been committed.

The codification of a new family law is best understood in the context of the broader changes taking place in Yemen during this period. On the one hand, it appeared as if the PDRY law of 1974 had simply been abandoned and the YAR laws of 1979 applied to the whole of Yemen. The new law, embodied in the Decree of March 1992,²⁴ reproduced the 1979 northern law, but with a few changes. These changes were not concessions to the PDRY law, but, rather, elements from the League of Arab States' Unified Model Arab Personal Statute Law (*Mashru' Qanun al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya al-'Arabiyya al-Muwahhid*).²⁵ Chapter One, Section Two of the new Yemeni law laid out general principles regarding marriage. Article 12 permitted the marriage of one man to up to four wives "on

21 Interview with a Yemeni legal expert, London, 4 December 1993.

22 Republic of Yemen, Chamber of Deputies, San'a, *Barnamaj al-Bana' al-Watani wa al-Islah al-Siyyasi wa al-Iqtisadi wa al-Mali wa al-Idari* (Program of National Construction and of Political, Financial, and Administrative Reform) (Office of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 15 December 1991).

23 Ibid., p. 83.

24 *Al-Qirar al-Jumhuri bi al-Qanun Raqm 30 Sana 1992*.

25 Information from a Yemeni legal expert.

condition of equitableness (*'adl*), otherwise only one."²⁶ Four conditions of equitability were laid down: that there be "legitimate benefit", that the husband be financially able to support more than one wife, that the woman be told that the man who wants to marry her is married to another, and that the existing wife be told that her husband wishes to marry again.²⁷ The minimum age for marriage, by men or women, was set at 15 years (Article 15). Marriage by compulsion (*ikrah*) of either a man or a woman is invalid (Article 10). When it comes to specifying what constitutes "consent" by a woman, however, a distinction is made between a woman who has already been married, who has to give explicit consent, and a woman for whom this is the first marriage, for whom silence constitutes consent (Article 23). The third section of Chapter One includes a detailed discussion of the bride-price (*mahr*).

Chapter Two of the new law discusses the ending of marriage, either by dissolution through the court (*faskh*), pronouncement of divorce by the man (*talaq*), or death (Article 43). The section on dissolution allows the woman to petition for divorce on the traditional grounds of the husband failing to practice *kafa'a*, or equal treatment of his spouses. In addition, she may offer other grounds, including her husband's addiction to drugs or alcohol, or refusal to work when capable of doing so (Article 51). Prolonged absence, without providing support or indicating his whereabouts, is also grounds for divorce—a significant factor in a country with large-scale male out-migration (Article 52). *Talaq*, defined in conventional terms, is an utterance repeated three times (Articles 58 and 59). The husband, however, has the right to return to his wife during *'idda*, the legally prescribed period after divorce when a woman cannot remarry. The divorced woman is not entitled to reverse this unilateral divorce in the courts, but she is entitled to compensation if the judge considers the *talaq* to have been conducted unfairly (Article 71). In regard to custody of children, this is normally given to the woman, provided that she remains Muslim and does not work outside the home unless there is somebody to take care of the children. A husband with two wives may transfer children from one wife to another, the condition being that the second wife is "equal or better in the level of caring and culture," and that the first wife requests more money than the normal amount (Article 144).²⁸

This initial impression that northern Yemeni family law prevailed over that of South Yemen needs to be set in the context of at least three other factors. The first is that the PDRY law, enacted in 1974 at the height of the Aden regime's commitment to a "transition to socialism," had already provoked some opposition within the country, especially outside Aden.²⁹ Enthusiasm for the law among the leadership had eroded long

26 *Al-Qirar al-Jumhuri bi al-Qanun Raqm 30 Sana 1992*, p. 3.

27 *Ibid*.

28 *Ibid*, p. 65.

29 Some policies, too, were opposed. In 1974, as part of the United Nations' International Women's Year, the regime had set up a number of residential training colleges for women where they lived apart from their families. Protests had, in some governorates, forced the government to send the women home (author's interviews in the PDRY, 1977 and 1984). See Molyneux, *State Policies and the Position of Women Workers in the PDRY*.

before the PDRY had united with the YAR.³⁰ The limit on the bride-price was not enforced, the attendance of girls at school in the Hadramawt and elsewhere had been allowed to fall to negligible levels, and support for the legal requirement for husbands to provide divorced wives with housing had also declined. The law was being circumvented in numerous other ways. For example, while the law now forbade taking more than one wife, a man who wanted to marry a second wife, and had secured the agreement of his first wife to do so, could achieve this by the subterfuge of divorcing the first, marrying the second within the period of 'idda relevant to the first, and then revoking his initial divorce.³¹

As part of its overall conflict with the PDRY, Saudi Arabia backed exile radio stations based in the kingdom that attacked the "atheistic" legal reforms in South Yemen, making particular mention of the appointment of women judges in family courts.³² By the early 1980s, the family law, along with other "socialist" laws, had come under diverse pressures. The new government set up a committee to review it and to propose changes. There was talk of introducing a period of 'idda for men, but this was never implemented. No changes were actually introduced into the 1974 family law. It can therefore be said that, to a considerable extent, the leadership of the YSP had lost confidence in the PDRY family law before the unification process began in 1990.

The loss of support for the 1974 PDRY family law was compounded by a much broader loss of confidence in the "socialist" orientation of the regime in South Yemen. This led the YSP to yield to negotiators from the North on a number of issues after May 1990. In its broadest context, the PDRY had lost faith both in its own ability to maintain socialism and in the whole socialist transformation project as exemplified in the USSR and East Germany under the influence of *perestroika*. In the aftermath of the 1986 Yemeni civil war, PDRY leaders revised their positions on a range of issues.³³ The state's control of the economy was loosened, allowing a greater role for private ownership of industry and agriculture. Emigration was permitted, and the role of Islam was enhanced. By 1990, when unification occurred, a measure of political pluralism had been introduced and much of the regime's claim to a socialist revolutionary authority had been abandoned.³⁴

This process, a precondition for the 1990 unification agreement, was taken further during the transition period. Property expropriated after 1967 was restituted, political exiles returned safely to Aden, while some of the two dozen or so sultans, who had formed the ruling families in the South prior to independence and who had been ousted in 1967, came back to their tribal areas, sometimes to warm welcomes. Foreign businesses, mainly in the oil sector, were active in Aden. After the 1990 unification, the southerners yielded

30 Information from interviews with Yemeni legal experts (London, 4 December 1993) and Anna Wurth.

31 I am grateful to Anna Wurth for information on this point.

32 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4, "The Middle East and North Africa," (ME/35681/A5) 21 12 1970.

33 See, for example, The Yemeni Socialist Party, "Al-Wathika al-Naqdiyya al-Tahliliyya" (The Critical-Analytical Document) (Aden, 1987).

34 "Pluralism" (*ta'addudiyya huzbiyya*) involved allowing a variety of parties to organize, publish newspapers, hold meetings, etc., but not to have access to power.

ground across the board on the social policies that had been its distinctive mark: the narcotic qat, whose consumption had been limited to two days a week by a 1977 law, became, as it had always been in the North, freely available. The public sale of alcohol, however, was now banned, although informal distribution networks continued to operate and the beer factory at Sira Island off Aden continued to function (allegedly for export only).³⁵ In the rural areas, tribes that had been largely disarmed after 1967 rearmed with enthusiasm, and the country as a whole was flooded with cheap weapons following the end of the wars in Ethiopia. The retreat on the family law was, therefore, part of a much broader process. Reform of the position of women had always been part of a broader social and political project of the PDRY to intervene in society through the state. Once that project, and the state's interventionist capacity, foundered, policies designed to promote greater equality for women foundered too.

The YSP retreat was only part of the overall political process in the now-unified Yemen. For if the regime in the YAR had succeeded in prevailing over its former rival in the South, as far as social legislation was concerned, it was allied with the YSP and other secular forces against an Islamist challenge on its right, the Islah Party. The Islah is a coalition of tribal forces, committed urban Islamists, and conservative merchants. The party presented itself as a challenger to both the partners in the pre-electoral coalition government, the GPC and the YSP, and was able, as a result of the elections of 1993, to gain a place in that ruling coalition.

Prior to the elections, the Islah Party had opposed the unified state's constitution and legal system on the grounds that they were not Islamic. Among other social questions, it paid considerable attention to women: it had a women's organization associated with the party and a corresponding analysis of the "Islamic" solution to the woman question.³⁶ It blamed Western influence for fostering inappropriate ideas of conflict between the sexes, and for promoting identical social roles for men and women. The Islah stressed the need for women to achieve equality with men by playing their role in the home. While most Islamists did not, in principle, oppose the right of women to go out to work, they regarded this as acceptable only with the permission of the husband and as an activity subordinate to the domestic duties of women. Another target of the Islah was co-educational schooling, or what they termed "social mixing" (*takhallut al-ta'lim*).³⁷ Overall, the Islah blamed social problems on Yemen's deviation from the path of true Islam.

While the Islah articulated a neo-traditionalist position on women, it was not on this question that the most overt disagreements with the unified regime occurred. These were centered on two other related issues. First, the Islah wanted the draft constitution amended

35 It was only finally closed during the dying days of the southern regime, in June 1994.

36 I am especially grateful to Anna Wurth for background information on this question.

37 *Takhallut* (from *khalata*, to mix, co-mingle or confuse) has a suggestion of disorder. Later, at a conference of 'ulama' (religious scholars) held to celebrate the defeat of the YSP in July 1994 (see also note 51), the communiqué issued a call for "the end of co-education in schools and the beginning of the process of changing the school curriculum (amending the curriculum in a way which can form a basis for religious belief, correct concepts, and eradicate all the effects of cultural invasion). The cultural invasion was a key cause behind the recent destruction and crisis." Katherine Roth, "What Saudi and Yemeni Religious Authorities had to Say about the Yemen War" (Occasional Paper) (Hanover, NH: Institute of Current World Affairs, July 1994), p. 11.

so that shari'a, instead of being the "main source" (*al-masdar al-ra'isi*), would become the "sole source" (*al-masdar al-wahid*) of legislation. Its campaign, backed up by demonstrations and press articles, paralleled that of Islamists in other Arab countries at the time. Second, the Islah supported state funding for religious schools, the "learned institutions" (*al-ma'ahid al-'ilmiyya*), that had been set up in the 1980s, and through which, in part via the Egyptian Islamist teachers working in them, the party exercised considerable influence. This latter issue was the most controversial one before the joint parliament that sat from 1990 to 1993. More than any other question, it polarized opinion within and outside the parliament, not least because the schools (and by implication the Islah) were seen as acting in some way as collaborators of Saudi Arabia. The significance of these two issues—the revision of the constitution and the funding of the schools—is that on both of them the Islamists lost. In other words, the process of policy formation in the new republic was not entirely one-sided. The southerners did give way to the northern regime on a range of sensitive matters, but both combined to achieve a successful rejection of the Islamist option by the transitional state. As a result, in the field of legislation, including that of the new family decree, the Islamists did not become dominant. The legal code depended, as had previously been the case, on contingency, on the interpretation put on the law by the courts, and, more broadly, on political responses to the new laws.³⁸

POLITICAL FACTORS DRAFTING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FAMILY CODE

This general political context determined to a large extent the actual formulation and implementation of the new Family Code. During the transitional period, the authority of the old PDRY law was already being undermined. Men entered into polygynous unions in the South, without being prosecuted, and were able to get divorces from their southern wives more easily by going to northern courts. In a parallel process, state support for the employment of women declined. Many of the women employed at the textile factory in Aden, the largest factory in the South, were dismissed.³⁹ The legal revision process itself, conducted by the Constitutional Committee and the Shari'a Committee of the unified parliament, saw the northern representatives divided between a secular group, who wanted a real compromise between the two family law codes, and a group of supporters of shari'a. What was crucial in the victory of the latter was the fact that the representatives from the YSP made no significant effort to defend their own law. Instead, they abandoned the 1974 code on the family much as they had other distinctive, secular, and socialist laws regulating social practices. The result was a victory for the northern position, based on shari'a, despite claims that the result represented a compromise.⁴⁰

³⁸ I am grateful to a member of parliament during the transitional period for background on these events.

³⁹ For my earlier research on women workers in this and other factories, see Molyneux, *State Policies and the Position of Women Workers in the PDRY*.

⁴⁰ Interview with a Yemeni legal expert, London, 5 March 1994.

Popular reaction was somewhat more mixed. In the North there was virtually no public discussion of the change in the law, either in the press or by political parties.⁴¹ In the South, on the other hand, there was considerable outcry. A demonstration in Aden, joined by hundreds of women, was held on 27 April 1992, under the auspices of the recently formed Organization for the Defense of Democratic Rights and Freedoms.⁴² This umbrella organization of around 5,000 members, some of them active in San'a, included many lawyers opposed to both the new law and other reversals of hitherto prevailing norms in the PDRY.⁴³ The demonstrators denounced the new law and there was a stream of correspondence in the press (i.e., in the press of the former PDRY).⁴⁴ Also, in contrast to cases of thorough re-Islamization of the law (e.g., in Iran after 1979), some women continued to work in the judicial system as judges and lawyers.

Despite signs of opposition, the new law was enacted and enforced by the courts. Although within the Supreme Court there is a constitutional division to which anyone may file an application against the constitutionality of legislation, no case of an appeal regarding the new law was recorded. Within the legal system itself, divorce cases were heard at the local level by the courts of first instance. Appeals were then possible, first to an appeals court in one of the 18 provinces, and then to the Supreme Court. Of the five judges in the Personal Status Division that handled divorce appeals, four were from the North, the president was a traditional northern shari'a judge. According to this judge and others from the North, the pre-1990 northern law was consistent with shari'a, while that of the South was not.

The results of this shift in law, and in the overall political and social context, were predictable. There are no statistics on either divorce or polygynous marriages, but informed opinion holds that the incidence of unilateral divorce by men rose substantially. It became more common for men to divorce a first wife by the device of marrying a second, moving her into the home, and then divorcing and expelling the first, thus circumventing the problem of custody.⁴⁵ There was also a significant rise in the level of bride-prices. Fixed by the 1974 law at 100 dinar, the average reached between 2,500 and 5,000 dinar by the mid-1980s, topping 25,000 dinar in some cases.⁴⁶ The overall economic

41 One notable exception to the northern indifference on these questions was that of Dr. Ra'ufa Hassan of the Social Research and Women's Studies Unit of San'a University College of Arts, who openly called for reform in the position of Yemeni women. She also ran as a candidate in the 1993 elections, when she was denounced in the press for her deviation from Islam. In an interview with Frontline News Television (London, unaired) in April 1993, she had stated: "What I have to work for is to establish credibility for me as a woman politician capable of doing the things, and building an image. We have to work peaceably with the other world, by expressing ourselves by words and not by guns" (transcript "Yemen: Test Case for Democracy," April 1993, p. 2).

42 "'Masira Istunkar wa Ihtijaj Nisawiyya'" (Women march in condemnation and denunciation), *'Adan* (Arabic), weekly journal, 28 April 1992.

43 Information supplied by Susanne Dahlgren.

44 See, for example, the article by 'Ayda 'Ali Sa'id, a member of parliament for the YSP and president of the executive committee of the Union of Yemeni Women, "'Qanun al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya bayn al-Mitraqa wa al-Sindan'" (The Law of Personal Status between the hammer and the anvil), in *Sawt al-'Ummal*, 30 April 1992.

45 Interview with a Yemeni legal expert, London, 5 March 1994.

46 At the official rate of exchange prevailing in 1992-93, 10 dinar were equivalent to US\$1.

situation acted as a constraint on polygyny and bride-prices, but despite this, the ending of state controls spurred increases in both

The reasons for this shift in law have already been examined. They include the general abandonment by the YSP of its commitment to "progressive," secular social policies, the comparative weakness of the South within the overall unification process, and official as well as popular disenchantment with the socialist government. The decline in the local economy in Aden after unification, as a result of a deliberate diversion of aid and investment by the North, led to a significant fall in women's employment. One further factor merits notice here, namely, the relative ineffectiveness of organized opposition by women in the South in the face of this shift. Beyond organizing some demonstrations, the official women's organization, the General Union of Yemeni Women, did little in the way of legal advocacy to protect or secure women's rights. Various explanations for this inactivity are given: that the mass of the population was so preoccupied with general economic and political issues that people had little time for this question, that there was a lack of political leadership from the top of the YSP—indicating that the Women's Union was more a tool of the state leadership than an expression of support from below.

On the whole, the range of opinions on this change can be explained by political affiliations, and correspond broadly to the political positions of the person expressing his/her opinion. Those opposed to the secular legal system in the South welcomed the changes as a return to the "genuine," "traditional" situation of Yemeni women. Secular and independent observers argued that because the social reforms in the South had been imposed from above, they were bound to fail. They held that progress could only be made when initiatives came from below. More hard-line elements within the YSP argued that since southerners had not fought to acquire or defend the "revolutionary gains" of the previous regime, they deserved what they got.⁴⁷

CONCLUSION POLITICS IN COMMAND

The fate of family law during the 1990–94 transitional period in Yemen serves as much to illuminate the overall pattern of development in that country as to define the particular position of women. Women were affected not only by changes in law, but by clear shifts in state policy. They were harmed, as well, by the economic difficulties that all of Yemen endured as a result of San'a's stance on the invasion of Kuwait, and the severe economic pressure from the Gulf states and the West that it touched off. These legal changes were, however, neither absolute nor monolithic. Social and political conditions varied between North and South Yemen, and a degree of diversity prevailed, a product both of the past pluralism of Yemen and of the enduring North-South split. The continued presence of women in the judiciary in the South, and the different attitude of the press between North and South, were indices of this.

Diversity was most evident within the core organs of the state, political parties, and security forces, where, despite the creation of a unified government after May 1990, no

47 Author's interviews with YSP members, London, 1992–94

unification of state apparatuses occurred. The election of 1993, far from pushing this process forward, acted as a catalyst for a new, more overt reassertion of the different political interests and priorities of North and South. This reassertion led to the crisis of late 1993 and the war of April-July 1994. Significantly, many of those North and South Yemenis who favored a greater degree of secularism and modernity in the legal system also favored federalism. They sought to limit the power of the more conservative elements within the state and the legal system. What this suggested for the position of women and for legislation pertaining to the family was not immediately evident. Questions of this kind were simply not priorities in the political disputes that divided the country. If, however, such a decentralization had been achieved, or, even more so, if Yemen had split again into two halves, with a return to some more "progressive" legal system in the South, and to associated social policies on education and employment, then it might have been possible to envisage some corresponding improvement in the position of women in the South at least.

The victory of the northern forces in the 1994 Yemeni war led to the destruction of the remnants of the southern state and the residual space for social and political diversity that had prevailed during the transitional period.⁴⁸ The political and military subjugation of the South, coupled with the economic cost of war, siege, and looting, meant that the South as a whole lost much of the distinctive, modern character it possessed.⁴⁹ Women were doubly affected—by the cost of the war in general, and by the influence that the Islamists came to hold in the new government in Sana'a.⁵⁰ One of the first acts of the Islah after the fall of Aden was to convene a "victory conference" of '*ulama*' (religious scholars) that condemned the *mulhidin* (heretics) of the South. It called for the revision of the constitution to make shari'a its sole basis, for the introduction of Islamic punishments "corresponding to the book and tradition," and for an Islamization of the state's educational and informational policy.⁵¹ What this would mean in practice, and how far the northern regime of President 'Alī 'Abdallah Salih would now concede to the Islah remain open questions. Two almost immediate indications of the changed atmosphere were evident in the fields of women's dress and deportment, and in education.⁵² Within a few months, the constitution was duly revised. Article 3 now read, "Islamic Shari'a is the

48 On the war itself, see Fred Halliday, "The Third Inter-Yemeni War," *Asian Affairs* (London) (June 1995), pp. 131–40; Michael Hudson, "Unhappy Yemen: Watching the Slide Toward Civil War," *Middle East Insight* (May–August 1994), pp. 10–19; Human Rights Watch/Middle East, *Human Rights in Yemen During and After the 1994 War* (New York, October 1994).

49 See, in particular, the reports in *Le Monde*, "Loi de la jungle dans le sud du Yemen" (The law of the jungle in the south of Yemen), 28 September 1994, and "Nouvelles menaces sur le Yemen" (New threats over Yemen), 22 September 1994.

50 The reaction of many Adenis to the northern victory was to make plans to emigrate. This was especially noticeable among educated women, who saw little future in a society dominated by the Islah party's armed militia. At a meeting with Adenis soon after the northern victory, the US ambassador is reported to have asked what the United States could do for the South. The unanimous reply was "10,000 green cards."

51 *Al-Hayat*, 14 July 1994.

52 From the start of the 1994 school year, classes were segregated, and from 1995 onward, schools were to be single sex. Textbooks in history and other subjects were brought from the North to replace those used in the South. Instruction in English, which used to start at age 9, now begins at age 13.

source of all legislation”⁵³ The chapter on “Social and Cultural Foundations” (formerly chapter 4, now chapter 3) includes a new article on women “Women are the sisters of men They have rights and duties, which are guaranteed and assigned by shari’a and stipulated by law”⁵⁴

In the aftermath of the war, the situation in Yemen remains uncertain, with intensified economic problems and a pervasive breakdown of law and order, especially in the South As ever, the question of women’s rights in Yemen depends upon the overall destination of that country’s politics and the balance of forces prevailing within it In the words of one Arab observer familiar with the country, “For women, it is civil war every day”⁵⁵



53 *The Constitution of the Republic of Yemen*, amended on 1 October 1994 (translated from Arabic by the Information Services and Translation Center, San’a), p. 2

54 *Ibid.*, Article 31, p. 6

55 Anonymous interview

REFORM OF PERSONAL STATUS LAWS IN NORTH AFRICA: A PROBLEM OF ISLAMIC OR MEDITERRANEAN LAWS?

Ann Elizabeth Mayer

There is a tendency in the West to exaggerate the gap between the evolution of Western family laws and the evolution of family laws in Muslim countries. By comparing the changes in the legal definitions of marriage and the relationship of the spouses in French law, the secular laws of Turkey, and the laws of North African countries, this article reveals similar patterns in legal evolution on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean.

THE treatment of the marital relationship in contemporary personal status laws in North Africa, examined in this article, challenges stereotypical Western ideas about the peculiar problems of personal status law reform in Muslim countries. The degree to which Islam accounts for discriminatory features in family law tends to be exaggerated. This, in turn, leads to the incorrect assumption that the evolution of family laws in Muslim countries cannot follow the same path as legal evolution in the West. The degree to which contemporary legal systems in Muslim countries have already assimilated many features of Western legal systems tends to be minimized or disregarded. Westerners also fail to realize that aspects of family laws in Muslim countries that strike them as archaic had, until recently, counterparts in Western laws. In addition, the impact of what the distinguished Moroccan jurist Moulay R'chid Abderrazak calls "the universal secular ideal" of non-discrimination against women is

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often overlooked.¹ This ideal is best embodied in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which entered into force in 1981. As of mid-1995, it had been ratified by 139 countries, including Morocco and Tunisia, but not so far by Algeria.

Here, it is argued that French and Maghribi laws have had similar definitions of marriage and the rights of husband and wife, and that their civil codes have similar evolutionary patterns. The international legal principle of male-female equality has also recently affected both. Legal modernization of family laws in Maghribi countries is best understood within a framework of comparative legal history, rather than as belonging to a separate legal universe. The assumption that a big gulf separates problems of family law reform in North Africa, where Islamic law still plays a role, from family law reform on the northern shore of the Mediterranean is unfounded.

BACKGROUND

Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia share a common legacy of Islamic jurisprudence of the Maliki school and French legal culture. On achieving independence from France, these countries had among their initial options to follow either the French model of codified law enacted by the state or the system of decentralized jurists' law that characterized the pre-colonial period. Under the latter, control over the formulation of laws would have reverted to religious scholars. All three Maghribi states selected the French model, a choice that maximized the possibility of centralized state control over the legal system.² In the area of personal status, state control was extended to areas that had previously been governed according to customary practices or private arrangements. In general, compliance with state-mandated bureaucratic procedures became required.³

To have a modern legal system, a state needs laws that can be uniformly applied to everyone in its territory. Wanting such uniformity, all three states rejected the traditional Islamic model of separate, confessionally based family laws, adjusting their personal status laws to enable them to apply to non-Muslims,⁴ but the laws continued to be

1 Moulay R'chid Abderrazak, *La femme et la loi au Maroc* (Woman and the Law in Morocco) (Casablanca: Editions le fennec, 1991), p. 19. On the influence of international rights concepts in Morocco, see Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Moroccans—Citizens or Subjects?," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 26 (1993), pp. 63–105. See the general approach taken to issues of women's status in Tunisia in Alya Cherif Chamari, *La femme et la loi en Tunisie* (Woman and the Law in Tunisia) (Casablanca: Editions le fennec, 1991), especially the citations to international conventions on women's rights to which Tunisia is a party (pp. 153–72).

2 In Morocco and Algeria, post-independence national legislation superseded Berber customary law, which the French had allowed to persist as a quasi-autonomous legal system.

3 An odd exception to this pattern lies in the 1984 Algerian law, under which marriages contracted in traditional private ceremonies remain valid even if they are not officially recorded.

4 The most modern of the three, the Tunisian code, fully realizes the ambition of the modern state to have one uniform law that is applicable to all citizens. (It first applied only to Muslims, but in 1957 it was extended to cover all Tunisians.) The Moroccan code comes close to setting a uniform national standard, allowing exemptions only for members of the Jewish community. See Maurice Borrmans, *Statut personnel et famille au Maghreb de 1940 à nos jours* (Personal Status and Family in the Maghrib from 1940 to Our Day) (Paris: Mouton, 1977), pp. 241–42. The Algerian code applies to all citizens with some reservations, as provided in Article 221 of the 1984 law: "Sous réserve des dispositions du code civil, la présente loi s'applique à tous les

interpreted by reference to Islamic jurisprudence. Even the Tunisian code, which, unlike the other two, does not specifically state that laws are to be interpreted by reference to Islamic jurisprudence, is construed in the light of Islamic principles.⁵ Thus, although they have been systemically Westernized in terms of their content, these personal status laws are not fully secular.

The personal status laws vary in the Maghrib in terms of the degree of deference they show to *shari'a* (Islamic law) rules affecting women and the family. The civil codes of all three Maghribi states reject the practice of forced marriage, *jabr*, an institution firmly entrenched in Maliki jurisprudence.⁶ The abolition of *jabr* is a step toward accepting the philosophy of the modern family model that marriage is valid only when entered into with the free consent of both spouses. In general, Tunisia opted for progressive innovations and reforms, while Morocco chose to reinstate many principles taken from Maliki jurists. Algeria chose to temporize for over two decades, finally deciding to enact a family law similar to Morocco's.

The Tunisian Code of Personal Status was enacted in 1956, only six months after independence. Since then it has been amended several times. The code introduced dramatic reforms and signalled unequivocally President Habib Bourguiba's determination to use Tunisian law as an instrument of modernization. It also demonstrated his belief that amelioration of the status of women should be high on the national agenda. Viewed from the standpoint of comparative legal history, Tunisia's is by far the most modern of the Maghribi codes.⁷ It is unique in the Arab world for having prohibited and criminalized polygyny. It established identical grounds for divorce for husbands and wives and allowed both spouses to divorce without proof of fault. These reforms were ahead of many contemporaneous divorce laws in Western countries that, only later, would adopt similar provisions.⁸ As the decades passed, however, elements of the Tunisian code became dated

citoyens algériens et autres résidents en Algérie" (Subject to the provisions of the civil code, the present law applies to all Algerian citizens and other residents of Algeria.) See Héliène Vandeveld, "Le Code Algérien de la Famille" (The Algerian Family Code) *Maghreb-Machrek*, no. 107 (Jan-Mar 1985), p. 64.

5. An example is the interpretation of the term "empêchement légal" (legal prevention) to marriage in article 5 of the Tunisian code. The wording in the text makes no mention of religion, but it has been interpreted as incorporating the Islamic legal ban on marriages of Muslim women to non-Muslim men. Borrmans, *Statut personnel*, pp. 364-66.

6. This meant that the woman's marriage guardian could contract marriage on her behalf and force her to marry over her objections. The 1958 Moroccan law did allow a judge to compel a woman to marry where immoral conduct was otherwise to be feared, giving priority to preserving morality over the woman's right to decide if she wanted to marry. This was not, however, classical *jabr*.

7. See the analysis in Borrmans, *Statut personnel*, pp. 290-324.

8. No-fault divorce law was adopted in France in 1979. See A. G. Chloros, ed., *The Reform of Family Law in Europe* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1978), pp. 90-93. Similar reforms were adopted in Germany in 1976, *ibid.*, pp. 120-23, and in England in 1969, *ibid.*, p. 55. In the United States, the first no-fault divorce law was adopted in California in 1969, soon to be followed by no-fault laws elsewhere. See June Carbone and Margaret Brinig, "Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform," *Tulane Law Review* 65 (1991), p. 975. (This article provides an excellent introduction to the literature on family law reform in relation to ideological and economic changes.) For an examination of the pattern of reforms in divorce laws of various states, see Jed H. Abraham, *The Silent Revolution: The Transformation of Divorce Law in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

by comparison with more recently updated Western laws.⁹ Reforms enacted in 1993, discussed below, failed to close the growing gaps between Tunisian law and its European counterparts.

The Moroccan personal status code, known as the *Mudawwana*, came into force in 1958, two years after Morocco's independence. The philosophy it embodied was diametrically opposed to that of the Tunisian code. The Moroccan state signalled its independence from France by reaffirming many rules taken from the treatises of Maliki jurists of centuries past and reinforcing the traditional patriarchal order.¹⁰ Reforms adopted in 1993 increased women's rights, but did not bring Moroccan law to the level reached by Tunisian law in 1956.¹¹

Algerian independence came in 1962, but it was not until 1984 that the Algerian Family Code was enacted. Many previous drafts had been put forward and rejected, provoking much controversy. The Algerian Family Code represents the outcome of post-independence conflicts between feminists, who had hoped that Algeria's personal status law would function as an instrument of progress, and men in the government and the Islamic religious establishment, who were determined to protect the patriarchal family and preserve rules set forth in treatises of Maliki jurisprudence.¹² Resembling the Moroccan *Mudawwana*, the 1984 Family Code represented a solid victory for Algerian conservatives. The regressive family law seemed more congruent with Moroccan traditionalism than with the ideology of Algeria's ruling FLN (National Liberation Front) party and its official revolutionary socialist goals.¹³

THE EMERGENCE OF "MODERN" PERSONAL STATUS LAWS IN THE WEST¹⁴

It is easy to forget that Western laws regulating the status of women in the family only recently incorporated the modern norm of equality. Evolution in mores and behavior mostly preceded governmental initiatives to modernize family laws. Legal reforms lagged behind due to opposition from conservative forces, in whose eyes modernized family law was destructive of the family and morality.

Until the last few decades, Western personal status laws were distinctively formulated and differed from country to country. Then, suddenly, in the 1960s and 1970s, these laws converged. By 1975, this convergence was largely complete. This suggests that

9 Unlike the modernized laws in the West, the relatively progressive 1956 Tunisian law did not go so far as to give husbands and wives equal rights. Instead, it upheld male privileges, such as the husband's right to demand obedience from his wife, and continued to treat him as the primary breadwinner. See the discussion of the 1993 Tunisian reforms below.

10 See Borrmans, *Statut personnel*, pp. 193–239.

11 For sections of the amended code, see M. al-Ahnaf, "Maroc: Le Code du statut personnel" (Morocco: The Code of Personal Status) *Monde Arabe Magreb-Machrek*, no. 145 (July–September 1994), pp. 24–26.

12 For background, see Borrmans, *Statut personnel*, pp. 535–42; Hélène Vandeveld, "Où en est le problème du code de la famille en Algérie?" (Where does the problem of the family code in Algeria stand?) *Maghreb-Machrek*, no. 97 (July–September 1982), pp. 39–54.

13 The political context of this law is examined in Nouredine Saadi, *La Femme et la loi en Algérie* (Women and the Law in Algeria) (Casablanca: Editions le fenec, 1991).

14 "Modern" as used here is a descriptive categorization, it is not meant to imply that the modern model has been a panacea or that it has always been beneficial to women.

similar reactions to economic changes and related social transformations were overriding dissimilarities in legal traditions, dictating adjustments that led to unprecedented legal uniformity.¹⁵ The way Westerners thought about sexuality, marriage, and family life changed in the 1960s, creating irresistible pressures to modernize. Ultimately, governments came to realize that their laws would have to be adjusted to fit new realities and attitudes. The resulting similarities in family law reforms even transcended the deep gulf in legal culture that normally separates decentralized common-law systems from the civilian tradition of continental Europe.¹⁶

The Code Napoléon of 1804 ensured that nineteenth-century France would become a bastion of patriarchy, just as its sponsor intended. Napoléon reportedly proclaimed on issuing his code: "Women ought to obey us. Nature has made women our slaves!"¹⁷ The gender inequalities in French civil law were matched in French criminal law, which harshly punished women's sexual transgressions.¹⁸ Legal steps to give French women their long-deferred equality were taken within the span of just one decade, the period 1965–75. Only in 1965 did a wife get the right to work without her husband's permission, and only in 1970 did husbands finally forfeit the rights that came with their status as head of the family (*chef de famille*).¹⁹ These French reforms came, be it noted, after the era of French colonialism in North Africa had already ended.

In modern family laws in countries like France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the principle of equality of the sexes is endorsed.²⁰ This principle has been internationalized in various human rights conventions, particularly in CEDAW. For the most part, rules that embody a particular set of values or religious tenets have been abandoned, and the existence of diverse value systems and a variety of lifestyles has been accommodated. The state respects the right of family and individual privacy. Working out the specifics of family relationships is left to personal preferences and the power dynamics within each family. In lieu of the traditional view of the conjugal unit as a means of reproduction and survival, marriage is treated as a means of achieving happiness for the couple. Spouses freely decide whether to marry or to divorce and also whether to have

15 See, generally, Chloros, *The Reform of Family Law*.

16 The unifying trend is seen even within the United States, where the fifty states still enjoy autonomy in matters of family law. After rejecting proposals in 1970 that all states should adopt the same model family law, The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, states subsequently moved on their own to reform their old laws in ways that have brought them close to the same modern model.

17 Mary Ann Glendon, *The Transformation of Family Law* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 89.

18 For example, penalties for a wife's adultery were severe, whereas a husband could only be punished for his adultery if he brought his mistress to the family home.

19 A fine summary of the evolution of women's status in French law can be found in Jacques Foyer, "French Law," in Chloros, *The Reform of Family Law*, pp. 75–109.

20 For example, important European reforms adjusting family laws to accommodate the new principle of equality of the spouses took place in France in the period 1965–75. See Chloros, *The Reform of Family Law*, pp. 79–88, in Germany in 1976, *ibid.*, p. 117, in England via a number of enactments and case decisions mostly in the 1970s, *ibid.*, pp. 45, 48–54, and in Italy in 1975, *ibid.*, pp. 151–61. In the United States many individual reforms adjusting state family laws to accommodate the norm of equality came in the wake of the Supreme Court decision in *Reed vs. Reed*, 404 US 71 (1971), which, for the first time, extended the Equal Protection Clause to cover sex discrimination, thereby opening all family laws according women unequal treatment to constitutional challenge.

children. Marriages can be terminated by either spouse or by an agreement between the spouses with a minimum of procedural hurdles.²¹

THE EVOLUTION IN DEFINITIONS OF MARRIAGE

To illustrate similarities in the development of laws in countries around the Mediterranean, it is helpful to compare how the concept of marriage has evolved. Under the influence of Enlightenment culture, continental European codes set forth in their texts general definitions that explained the goals of marriage, and/or principles that prescribed the nature of the husband-wife relationship. Until the most recent reforms, these marriage definitions mandated male superiority and laid down guidelines for how spouses should behave vis-à-vis each other.²² Such definitions were treated as part of the law, although to a lawyer conditioned by the practical Anglo-American approach, they seem more in the nature of ideological statements. For example, Article 212 of the 1804 Code Napoléon, a permanent feature of the French Civil Code, stated that the spouses owed each other mutual fidelity, help, and assistance (*fidélité, secours, assistance*). A noteworthy provision in Article 213 of the same code, which was not revised until 1938, stated that the husband owed protection to his wife, and the wife owed obedience to her husband. Under this provision, a married woman, whose status in the code was similar to that of a child or a lunatic, could not change her residence, travel, obtain a passport, or choose a doctor without the approval of her husband. The husband controlled his wife's contacts and could oversee her correspondence.²³ A more enduring portion of the same article established the husband as head of the family, giving him wide decision-making prerogatives.

The family is defined in similar fashion in the laws of Turkey, which, under the Ottomans, dominated Mediterranean societies from the Balkans to Algeria. Under President Kemal Atatürk, Turkey completely discarded Islamic law. The definition of marriage in the 1926 Turkish Civil Code (taken from the 1912 Swiss personal status code) was shaped by ideas of the husband-wife relationship also found in the French and German laws of the same period. The reformed Turkish law made the husband the head of the family. He was obligated to support his wife, who owed him obedience, and he had the right to decide both whether his wife might work and where the family would live.²⁴ The similarity between this model of the spousal relationship and the French model of the conjugal unit is clear, yet many Westerners seem to have missed this, wrongly assuming that the Westernization of Turkish family law would make men

21 For background, see Chloros, *The Reform of Family Law*, and Glendon, *The Transformation of Family Law*, pp. 144–45.

22 Glendon, *The Transformation of Family Law*, pp. 86–87.

23 See Foyer, "French Law," pp. 79–80, and Dorothy Stetson, *Women's Rights in France* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 83–84.

24 Siegfried Boschan, *Europaisches Familienrecht* (European Family Law) (Munich: Fanz Vahlen, 1972), pp. 544–45.

and women equal. Thus, in his classic study, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Bernard Lewis writes

Polygamy, repudiation—all the ancient bars to the freedom and dignity of women—were abolished. In their place came civil marriage and divorce, with equal rights for both parties.²⁵

In reality, the adoption of Swiss law did not begin to provide equal rights for women, it merely had the effect of substituting inequalities ensconced in European laws for those mandated by Islamic law. In some areas, Turkish law did give spouses similar rights and obligations. Echoing elements in the French Civil Code, the Turkish Civil Code provided that the relationship between the spouses was to be based on mutuality. It included fidelity, support, and assistance as obligations incumbent on husband and wife. Both spouses had the duty to cohabit. Parity in the spouses' rights to terminate their marriage was established, liberal grounds for divorce were made equally available to both.²⁶

When definitions of marriage in Maghribi laws are placed beside those in Western laws prior to the most recent modernizing reforms or those in Turkish law after Westernization, one notices striking similarities, such as the emphasis on the husband being the head of the family and the wife owing him obedience.

Article 1 of the 1958 Moroccan Mudawwana defines marriage as a legal contract of enduring mutual union and attachment between a man and a woman under the guidance of the husband.²⁷ Its purpose is to preserve sexual morality and increase the members of the nation.²⁸ That the goals of marriage are defined legally as procreation and the preservation of sexual morality corresponds to traditional French and Arabo-Islamic values, both of which condemned non-marital sexual activity.²⁹ The Mudawwana envisages a family based on stable foundations that permit spouses to meet their mutual obligations in security, peace, affection, and respect.³⁰

The Moroccan definition of marriage and the spousal relationship shows the influence of modern ideas. Marriage ceases to be seen as a simple civil contract terminable by the husband at will, and becomes instead a secure, enduring union. Although the mutuality and the affective dimensions of the marital relationship are highlighted, the ideal of mutual obligations are not realized in the provisions of the 1958 Mudawwana. Among

25 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 267.

26 Tughrul Ansay, *Introduction to Turkish Law* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1987), pp. 145–48.

27 *Un pacte légal [mithaq shar'i] d'union mutuelle et d'attachement mutuel, entre un homme et une femme, dont le but est la création d'une famille sous la guidance [al-aya] du mari* (A legal pact based on mutual union and attachment, between a man and a woman, the aim of which is to create a family under the guidance of the husband). Borrmans, *Statut personnel*, pp. 197–98.

28 *L'exercice honnête de la sexualité et la chasteté, ainsi que la multiplication du nombre des membres de la communauté [umma] par la création d'une famille* (The honest exercise of sexuality and chastity, as well as the increase in the number of members of the community by the creation of a family). Ibid., p. 198.

29 These values relate to Mediterranean shame culture. In a longer article, one could explore the linkages between the values of shame culture and various features of French and Maghribi laws and culture. For background, see David Gilmore, ed., *Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean* (Washington, DC: American Anthropological Association, 1987).

30 *Sur des bases stables qui permettent les cocontractants d'assumer leurs obligations dans la sécurité, la paix, l'affection et le respect* (On stable bases that allow the co-contractors to assume their responsibilities in [a climate of] security, peace, affection, and respect), Borrmans, *Statut personnel*, p. 198.

other things, the Mudawwana gives husbands the privilege of having up to four wives simultaneously and the right to terminate a marriage at will. Wives are required to be monogamous and to establish grounds to obtain a divorce. The Moroccan law also provides that a wife must preserve her virtue and obey her husband.³¹ Placing the family under the husband's guidance echoes certain French and Islamic ideas.³² Similarly, the wife's duty of obedience finds support in the legal traditions on both sides of the Mediterranean. This blend of traditional and modern concepts of marriage is roughly what one might find in the laws of any society undergoing transition to economic development, bearing resemblances to what one saw in Turkish law after 1926 and French law in the late nineteenth century.

Progressive Moroccans criticized the Mudawwana for lagging behind changed attitudes and social realities.³³ In 1992, Morocco's dynamic feminist organizations pressed hard for reforms to bring the Mudawwana into conformity with international human rights norms and the gender equality provision in Morocco's constitution.³⁴ These demands outraged conservative '*ulama*' (religious scholars) and Islamists, who vehemently denounced the feminist agenda.³⁵

Because Morocco is a country where all important religious questions are decided by a conservative monarch claiming to be the defender of Moroccan Islam, one is not surprised that the reforms undertaken in 1993 were modest. Certain elements of the Mudawwana were modernized, but feminist demands for full equality for women were implicitly rejected. Husbands lost their right to unilateral extrajudicial repudiation, henceforth, they could obtain a divorce only from a judge and after an arbitration. A woman was given the right to terminate her marriage if her husband married a second wife. The revised version of Article 5 reinforced the principle that a woman give her consent to marriage.³⁶

Article 4 of the 1984 Algerian code states that marriage is a contract between a man and a woman in legal terms, the goals of which include setting up a family based on affection, kindness, and mutual assistance, morally protecting the spouses, and preserving family lines.³⁷ Thus, the Algerian drafters were specific about the reason for the strict prohibition of non-marital relations in French and Maghribi cultures and laws—to preserve blood lines. And, as in the Moroccan Mudawwana, the rights and duties set forth in the Algerian code are not mutual but are premised on the wife's subjugation.

The contours of the husband-wife relationship set forth in Article 39 of the Algerian code require a wife to obey her husband, to defer to him in his capacity as head of the

31 Ibid., p. 206.

32 See, for example, the French principle that the husband is head of the family, and the Quran 4:38 "Men are the managers of the affairs of women."

33 Al-Ahnaf, "Maroc," p. 7.

34 Ibid., pp. 9–12.

35 Ibid., pp. 12–15.

36 Ibid., pp. 24–25. As reformed, Article 5 said *Le mariage ne peut être conclu qu'avec le consentement et l'accord de l'épouse*, or that marriage could only be concluded with the bride's consent. Evidence of this is her signature affixed to the marriage agreement before two witnesses. In no case would a marriage guardian have the power of *jabr*.

37 Vandeveldt, "Le Code Algérien," p. 107.

family, and to respect his parents and relations³⁸ The first part of this article resembles Article 213 of the Code Napoléon The idea that the wife has a legal duty to respect the husband's parents and relations appears to be an innovation introduced by Algerian drafters, who chose to elevate expectations, grounded in local custom, to a legal norm One notices, as well, the absence of any emphasis on the stability and enduring character of marriage, featured prominently in the Mudawwana of Morocco Despite some differences in formulations, however, basic similarities between the Algerian definition of marriage and the definitions in the French and Moroccan codes are perceptible

Both the Moroccan and the Algerian definitions of marriage are devoid of any specifically Islamic character They mark a departure from the views of premodern Islamic jurists, who defined marriage simply as a contract under which the husband's payment of a bride-price and maintenance of the wife were exchanged for her accommodating her husband's sexual demands³⁹ The ongoing obligations of spouses reflected this juristic analysis of the marital relationship as one in which a wife's sexual services were the *quid pro quo* for her husband's financial support If a wife failed in her duty to obey her husband (a prime component of which was her sexual submission), he was relieved of his obligation to maintain her Conversely, if he failed to maintain her, she was released from her duty to obey Had the orientation of the drafters of the Moroccan and Algerian laws been fully traditionalist, that is, if they had aimed to reinstate Maliki concepts, marriage would have been defined simply in terms of these obligations

The closest approximation to the premodern Islamic jurists' definition of spousal obligations appears in Article 23 of the 1956 Tunisian code—in other respects the most modern of the three examined here The article states that the wife must fulfill her conjugal duties in conformity with customs and usages⁴⁰ By invoking customs and usages, the article implied acceptance of the premodern Islamic jurists' view that a wife must accede to her husband's sexual demands in the absence of valid excuses This provision was not softened by other counterbalancing principles For example, there was no stipulation that mutual affection should be the basis of marital ties or that cohabitation should be seen as the spouses' mutual obligation rather than simply being a legal duty incumbent on the wife (The 1993 reforms, discussed below, altered this) Article 23 included a provision requiring a wife to contribute financially to the family if she had the wherewithal, while retaining the jurists' idea that it was the wife's unilateral duty to cohabit, which destroyed the traditional symmetry in spousal obligations The provision espoused the modern idea that husband and wife should share the responsibility for family upkeep, which is a deviation from Islamic law, without adopting the modern idea that other duties should also be mutual Thus, the piecemeal introduction of "modern" principles in family laws is not always to the wife's benefit

38 Ibid., p. 110

39 See Linant de Bellefonds, *Traité de droit musulman comparé* (Comparative Treatise of Muslim Law) Vol. 2 (Paris: Mouton, 1965), p. 23

40 *La femme doit remplir ses devoirs conjugaux conformément aux usages et aux coutumes* (The wife must fulfill her marital duties according to customs and traditions) Borrmann, *Statut personnel*, p. 305

Article 23 of the 1956 Tunisian code also admonished the husband to treat his wife with kindness and to live in good relations with her, enjoining him to avoid doing her any injury⁴¹ This provision might seem to restate principles of Islamic ethics according to which the husband was to treat his wife kindly It could also be read as a reflection of uneasiness on the part of the legislators as they contemplated the real lack of mutuality in the husband-wife relationship they had structured By admonishing the husband not to mistreat his wife, legislators were effectively conceding that they had given the husband superior powers that left him in a position where he could potentially abuse these at the expense of his wife

The active role of Tunisian women in economic development has enabled them to make remarkable advances in their social and economic status and has consequently prompted rethinking of old attitudes about women's roles⁴² The Ben 'Ali regime perceives the emancipated woman as a pillar of resistance to Islamic fundamentalism⁴³ Since taking power in 1987, President Ben 'Ali, bitterly opposed to Islamic fundamentalism and feeling menaced by Islamist activists in Tunisia and in neighboring Algeria, has promoted a policy of advancing women's status⁴⁴ When a commission was set up to propose reforms to improve women's status, out of fifteen members, seven were women⁴⁵ The decision to include so many women on a commission assigned to redraft laws affecting women, a highly unusual move in the Maghrib, signaled the regime's seriousness about securing greater rights for women

The personal status reforms that were enacted in 1993 altered Article 23⁴⁶ As rewritten, the article emphasizes mutuality, enjoining both spouses to be kind to one another, to maintain good relations, and to avoid harming each other⁴⁷ They are to work together to manage the home, raise the children, and provide for the childrens' needs This language closely approximates Article 213 of the modern French Civil Code, which provides that the spouses together ensure the moral and material direction of the family, provide for the education of their children, and prepare for the future⁴⁸ In an important reform, the old language requiring a wife to respect her husband's prerogatives and show him obedience has been eliminated It is unlikely that the husband's right to forbid his wife to work outside the home will survive the elimination of the wife's duty of obedience, but, in the absence of a specific provision guaranteeing the wife's right to work, this remains uncertain

41 Ibid, pp 304–305

42 See Zakya Daoud, "Les femmes tunisiennes Gains juridiques et statut économique et social" (Tunisian women Legal gains and economic and social status) *Monde Arabe Maghreb-Machrek*, no 145 (July-September 1994), pp 31–35

43 See *ibid*, pp 33, 37

44 Ibid, pp 33–34

45 Ibid, p 36

46 For the changed provisions, see *ibid*, pp 38–48

47 *Les deux époux doivent se traiter mutuellement avec bienveillance, vivre en bons rapports et éviter de se porter préjudice l'un à l'autre* (The two spouses must treat each other with kindness, live on good terms, and avoid harming each other), *ibid*, p 39

48 *Code Civil*, 83rd ed (Paris Dalloz, 1993), p 170

Article 23 reiterates the principle that the husband is the head of the family, raising questions about what this would signify. Perhaps the husband's status as head of the household will be interpreted to mean that he retains certain decision-making authority and that his wife should defer to his wishes. Or, it might be read as simply reflecting the primary responsibility that he retains to provide for his wife and his children according to his capacity and their needs. The revised Article 23 also orders the wife to contribute, too, if she has money. The provision calling for the wife to fulfill her conjugal duties in conformity with custom was also altered in 1993. The new provision requires both spouses to fulfill their duties in conformity with custom. The likely impact of this change on the spousal relationship is also unclear, partly because it depends on one's interpretation of whether established custom or evolving custom is meant.⁴⁹ Despite its ambiguities, however, as of 1993 the Tunisian Family Code was definitely moving toward the recognition of equal rights and responsibilities for both spouses.⁵⁰

WHERE CAN PRESSURES FOR FUTURE REFORMS BE ANTICIPATED?

Given the pattern of legal changes in the West, particularly in the Mediterranean countries, one would expect that current family laws in North Africa would eventually be modernized further. Many women's groups in the Maghrib support feminist goals, and their members would like to see initiatives taken to eliminate features of personal status laws out of keeping with new lifestyles and attitudes. Indeed, pressures from energetic feminist movements were among the forces prompting the reforms in Morocco and Tunisia in 1993.

An Algerian feminist perspective on what reforms are needed emerged during controversies in 1981 about one of the proposed family law drafts. Feminists asked for laws that would establish monogamy, the unconditional right for a wife to work, equal division of the common patrimony, the same minimum age of marriage for men and women, the same conditions for divorce for men and women, and effective protection for abandoned children.⁵¹ Of course, the violent political turbulence in Algeria since the 1992 assassination of Higher State Council President Muhammad Boudiaf could end in victory for the fundamentalists, leaving the feminist agenda to be ignored or condemned. Fundamentalist ascendancy might even lead to a reversion to more regressive laws on women's status, as happened in Iran after the 1979 Revolution.

49 On the one hand, Tunisian custom, which retained patriarchal elements, gives the husband more rights and the wife more duties, which could mean a perpetuation of the privileges traditionally enjoyed by the husband under the guise of following custom. On the other hand, custom itself may be evolving away from the old model of the family in the direction of making marriage more like a partnership between equals.

50 A further symbol of the forward movement was a 1993 modification of the penal code abrogating Article 207. This had set a modest five-year sentence for a husband convicted of killing his wife or her lover after discovering them *in flagrante delicto* (in the actual act). This is not an Islamic rule, but it does relate to norms of Mediterranean shame culture. In abandoning the notion that a husband's culpability for murdering his wife was to be reduced in these circumstances, Tunisia was breaking with old French tradition and the idea that a woman should be treated as her husband's chattel.

51 Vandeveld, "Où en est le problème," p. 50.

In terms of practical needs, establishing an unconditional right for women to work outside the home deserves high priority. This would entail ending the husband's right to demand obedience from his wife, a provision cut from Tunisia's law but maintained in Moroccan and Algerian law. Economic changes in Maghribi societies have pushed living costs higher, forcing men to migrate to Europe in search of jobs. At the same time, extended family networks are eroding, leaving women to fend for themselves. In a period when the risks of female penury are growing, women need to be able to accumulate savings and acquire skills to support themselves and their children. Thus, a wife's survival is threatened if she is not permitted to work outside the home to prepare for eventualities like divorce, desertion, or widowhood. Allowing husbands to prevent their wives from working is particularly unfair in systems retaining other rules of Islamic law mandating a separate property system. Giving a husband the right to terminate a marriage at will also threatens a wife's financial security in a system where a man typically has minimal financial obligations to support a former spouse.⁵²

It is particularly disappointing that the 1984 Algerian code did not establish a wife's unconditional right to work outside the home. The issue had been squarely presented to those debating the law, and a 1973 draft provision had given women the right to practice a profession without their husbands' consent.⁵³ In its historical context, Algeria's 1984 choice seems far more regressive than Morocco's 1958 law and Tunisia's 1956 law because it was made after a wife's right to work had been recognized and established via the modernizing reforms already referred to in Europe and in CEDAW. Algeria's failure to protect a wife's right to work outside the home might have been a deliberate policy designed to create obstacles to women's employment during the dislocations of the development process. The Algerian government may have wished to try to mitigate the problems caused by the high rate of unemployment by allowing men to force their wives to remain at home, keeping them out of the job market.

The potential benefits for women from eliminating the right of a husband to bar his wife from working outside the home seem greater than those arising from adjusting Algerian and Moroccan divorce laws so that they, like the Tunisian code, give men and women the same unqualified right to divorce. Women who are financially dependent on their husbands are often intimidated from trying to terminate unhappy marriages because they cannot support themselves. Thus, having an equal right to initiate divorce may be meaningless for women, who will be penniless upon divorce.

LESSONS FROM THE TURKISH EXPERIENCE

Recent developments in Turkish family law show how the rights of wives and husbands may remain contentious issues regardless of whether one is talking about reforms of French law, Westernized Turkish law, or post-independence Maghribi laws

⁵² She ordinarily has no right to support from the husband following divorce, except during the brief period while she waits to see if she is pregnant, and, if so, for the duration of the pregnancy and then for child support after birth.

⁵³ Vandeveldt, "Le Code Algérien," p. 55.

Like Bourguiba, Atatürk saw the adoption of a modern family law as a means to encourage modernization. Under Atatürk's reforms, Turkish women's progress toward full equality with men has been noteworthy in many domains but remains uneven.⁵⁴

The bold innovations in the 1926 Turkish Civil Code were far in advance of the evolution of women's status in many areas of Turkey at that time. Today, however, the family model reflected in the 1926 law seems outdated to many Turkish feminists. For more than twenty years, they have pressed the government to enact reforms to eliminate the discriminatory features in this and other Turkish laws. In 1975, for example, 27 women's associations demanded that the 1926 law be changed so that husbands would lose their status as heads of their families and their legal right to forbid their wives from working outside the home.⁵⁵

The Turkish parliament considered a number of reform proposals but enacted none of them. In the absence of legislative action, the Turkish Constitutional Court was asked in 1990 to rule in a case challenging the constitutionality of the provision in Article 159, of the Turkish Civil Code, requiring a wife to obtain her husband's permission to work outside the home. The case centered around a marital dispute between a wife who was a nightclub performer and had refused to turn over her earnings to her husband, and the husband who had retaliated by ordering her to stop working. She then refused to obey him. In a ruling made on 29 November 1990, the Constitutional Court found Article 159 unconstitutional.⁵⁶ The court ruled that requiring a wife to obtain her husband's permission to work violated two constitutional provisions—Article 10, guaranteeing equality before the law regardless of sex, and Article 49, stating that employment was the right and duty of all citizens. The court specifically noted recent reforms of family law in countries like France and Germany that had established the equality of spouses, and Europe's repudiation of Napoleon's idea that nature had made women the slaves of men. Both economic transformations and changed attitudes were cited in support of the notion that men and women—husbands and wives—should be equal. Under these standards, the model of the husband's authority that Turkey had adopted from a 1912 Swiss law had become obsolete. Moreover, the court ruled that Turkey was bound by international human rights standards because it had proclaimed itself a "law-state" (roughly corresponding to a state based on the rule of law) in Article 2 of its constitution, and had referred to its membership in the UN in the preamble. The court also noted that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and CEDAW, to which Turkey is a party, had established the equality of men and women.

This historic Turkish ruling has implications for Maghribi systems, because the features of Maghribi laws that accord husbands superior rights are similarly vulnerable to challenge on constitutional grounds. The 1989 Algerian constitution establishes equality

54 On the evolving status of women in Turkey, see Ferhunde Ozbay, ed., *Women, Family and Social Change in Turkey* (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], 1990), Nermine Abadan-Unat, *Women in Turkish Society* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981).

55 Nermine Abadan-Unat, "The Legal Status of Turkish Women," in Ozbay, *Women, Family and Social Change in Turkey*, pp. 19–20.

56 See *Resmî Gazete: Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı* (Official Gazette: Decisions of the Constitutional Court) 2 Temmuz (2 July) (1992). I wish to thank Ahmet Evim and Selim İlkin for helping me find this decision.

regardless of sex in Article 28 and equality in rights and duties for all citizens in Article 30. Article 5 of the 1992 Moroccan constitution provides that all Moroccans are equal before the law. Furthermore, in its preface, the Moroccan constitution asserts that Morocco reaffirms its commitment to human rights as they are universally recognized.⁵⁷ Article 6 of the 1959 Tunisian constitution provides that all citizens have the same rights and the same duties and that they are equal before the law. Article 32(2) also provides that principles in international treaties supersede provisions in Tunisian law. If Maghribi countries should start taking their own constitutional equality provisions seriously, constitutional challenges to sex-based discrimination could become an important mechanism for effecting modernizing reforms.

In October 1991, in a sign that the Algerian Conseil Constitutionnel was prepared to think along these lines, it ruled unconstitutional a law that would have allowed men to cast votes for their wives in the upcoming December elections.⁵⁸ Algerian feminists had already denounced the law, protesting that it was unconstitutional.⁵⁹ Although the context was a dispute about the constitutional validity of an electoral law, the principles in the case could easily be extended to cover challenges to family laws restricting women's rights.

CONCLUSION

In their definitions of the roles of husband and wife, laws in Maghribi countries resemble laws in European countries like France before the dramatic reforms of the past few decades. More specifically, their conceptions of marriage are not very different from those embodied in earlier European models. Since the Maghribi states became independent of France, they have modified their family laws to accommodate modern ideas regarding women's rights and the nature of marriage. Faced with pressures for additional reforms, North African countries have adopted dissimilar strategies. Tunisia's has been to adjust its laws to approximate modern standards. It is important to stress that these modern standards are not Western standards but aspects of a new, international norm of equality that goes against the grain of long-entrenched discriminatory features of Western law and culture, even as it conflicts with the inherited patriarchal traditions of Muslim countries. The United States, by its refusal to ratify CEDAW, has demonstrated how the modern idea of women's equality continues to meet resistance in Western societies. Morocco's strategy has been to make gradual and cautious modernizing reforms. Algeria's has been, first, to temporize, and then to choose the road of reaction, although without fully reviving a system based on Maliki law.

Further progress toward adopting a modern model of family law seems likely in Tunisia and Morocco, but Algerian legal development is likely to be thrown off course by

57 The implications of this are discussed in Mayer, "Moroccans," pp. 87-88, 93-104.

58 See Georges Marion, "Algérie: la réforme électorale. Le vote d'un conjoint pour l'autre a été déclaré inconstitutionnel," (Algeria: Electoral reform. One spouse voting for the other has been declared unconstitutional) *Le Monde*, 30 October 1991.

59 See, for example, John Baggaley, "Algerian President Seeks Ruling on Women's Vote Dispute," Reuters Library Report, 17 October 1991, BC Cycle, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.

the explosive political situation there. If fundamentalists come to power and Algerian family law is changed in the direction of subjugating women even more, many Western observers will be inclined to ascribe this to what they imagine to be the uniquely retrograde mores of Islamic fundamentalists or of Arab culture. In reality, however, Algeria will simply be resuscitating principles that, until recently, were entrenched on the northern shore of the Mediterranean, as well.

Both in their movement toward accepting women's equality and their resistance to this same norm, societies on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean are involved in a common dynamic. In this clash of systems, patriarchal norms sanctified by religion and tradition contend with the impact of profound social and economic transformations and the influence of prevailing international norms of equality between the sexes. Although religion and tradition may seem to be potent forces militating against change, countervailing forces have been set in motion that should undermine discriminatory laws in the Maghrib, just as they have done already in Europe.



PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIZING FOREIGN POLICYMAKING: THE GRADUAL EMPOWERMENT OF ISRAELI WOMEN

Tamar Hermann and Gila Kurtz

Foreign policy is one of the best-protected domains of the elite. Social minorities, including women, therefore, find this sphere of politics virtually inaccessible. The purpose of this paper is to show that, despite particular obstacles, there are discernible signs of change in Israel. To obtain a comprehensive picture of this gradual transition, it will be examined from an historical perspective and on three different levels: the parliamentary (i.e., the Knesset), the professional (i.e., the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and the extra-parliamentary (i.e., different movements of the left and the right).

THE prestige and power foreign affairs and foreign policy convey upon its practitioners sheds light on why elites have always made it their own domain. The historical legacy that has made foreign policy the patrimony of the elite, and the prevailing perception that the external relations of a state require handling by experts (either civil politicians or military officers) has created a barrier to less-privileged groups. Thus, social, racial, ethnic, religious, and other minorities often find this realm of politics virtually closed to them. Socio-political location,¹ thus, largely determines

1 See, for example, Johann Galtung, "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position," *Journal of Peace Research* 1, no. 3-4 (1964), pp. 206-31.

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the level of engagement in foreign policymaking as well as basic attitudes toward it—a classical case of the “mobilization of bias”² that limits outgroups’ access to power

Although in most societies women outnumber men, their relative share of significant socio-political resources is disproportionately low almost everywhere. As an underprivileged socio-political minority, women’s position within the realm of foreign policy and international relations is marginal.³ Women’s disadvantaged standing, in this respect, has been widely acknowledged, but no consensus has been reached on whether it is due to physiological, psychological, structural-organizational, or cultural reasons.⁴ Nonetheless, the fact that women have traditionally been underrepresented in the “public sphere” is undisputed.⁵ Over the last several decades, however, women’s “intrusion” into the “public sphere” has gradually become acceptable. Foreign policy, on the other hand, seems to be one of the last and best-guarded bastions of men.

There are two basic arguments given to explain why women ought to be represented in the discussion and making of foreign policy. The first, a civic argument, asserts that the underrepresentation of women in the elaboration and implementation of foreign policy deprives them of a major civil right to take part in the shaping of their own future. For women to demand—and get—significant (if not numerically proportionate) representation in national decision-making bodies and processes, however, a more substantive argument must be made regarding their status as a distinct socio-political collectivity with particular features, values, and interests. Hence, the second argument, from a feminist perspective, asserts that women hold different views about the international arena and its modus operandi. As a result, women would exert a unique influence on foreign affairs if they were allowed to take part in foreign policymaking.

From the feminist perspective, it is assumed that women have a different conception of power and, apparently, a different system of collective morality than men.⁶ “Feminist standpointers argue that people in positions of social subordination—in this case women in international relations—develop different insights on how the world and its ‘rules’

2 The “mobilization of bias” notion was developed by Elmer Eric Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 71. It refers to a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain groups and at the expense of others.

3 Marianne Githens and Jewel Prestage, eds., *A Portrait of Marginality* (New York: David McKay, 1977). For a suggestive analysis of women’s status in textbooks on international relations and foreign policy, see Marilyn Myerson and Susan Stoudinger Northcutt, “The Question of Gender: An Examination of Selected Textbooks in International Relations,” *International Studies Notes* 19, no. 1 (1994), pp. 19–25.

4 For an updated analysis of the various factors, particularly the structural-organizational and cultural ones in the US foreign policy-making system, see Nancy McGlen and Meredith Reid-Sarkees, *Women in Foreign Policy: The Insiders* (New York and London: Routledge, 1993).

5 The notion of “private sphere” as opposed to “public sphere” has been discussed and used already by Friedrich Engels. See Eleanor Leacock, ed., *Introduction to the Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, by Friedrich Engels (New York: International Press, 1972). For a contemporaneous use of the term, see, for example, Virginia Sapiro, *The Political Integration of Women* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984). A recurring argument in feminist political analysis is, however, that the separation of these two spheres is both artificial and damaging because it conceals the similarity between patterns of women’s oppression at various social levels.

6 Anne Phillips, *Engendering Democracy* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), p. 4; see also Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

work⁷ Empirical findings from different socio-political contexts show that, by and large, women are more-aware of the devastation of wars than men, and, therefore, prefer peaceful solutions to inter-group and international conflicts, a feature that is clearly highly relevant to foreign policymaking⁸

Yet, if the "female" perspective is to have an effect on foreign policy, women must be represented in the decision-making process at more than a token level, a condition still far from reality in most countries Nevertheless, there are some indications of progress in this direction as, over the last few years, women's presence in the sphere of foreign policy appears to be expanding in some countries⁹ Although in most cases it is still too early to identify direct outcomes of female participation or to discern women's singular influences on the growing global delegitimization of the use of violence, it seems that the two developments sustain each other

In this article, we show that there is an increase in women's participation in the realm of foreign and security policy in Israel, as well Apart from its intrinsic significance, an investigation of the Israeli case is also of general importance Its "unpromising" features—in terms of the status of women which, in Israel, is discussed below—make it a "crucial case study"¹⁰ The delineation of such a modification in Israel may therefore yield, in addition to some new insights into the Israeli polity, a better vantage point from which to assess the prospects for expanding women's access to foreign policymaking in countries where the point of departure is more favorable

Our discussion of the Israeli case concentrates on the quantitative aspect of women's representation in different political forums It should be noted, however, that one of our postulates is that the goal is not just to have more women in politics, but that the presence of their unique perspective offers a chance of transforming the political realm in the democratic direction In addition, it is important to make clear that this paper deals only with Jewish Israeli women This is because the overall situation of Arab Israeli women is completely different and, in our opinion, requires a separate analysis

7 Christine Sylvester, "Feminist Theory and Gender Studies in International Relations," *International Studies Notes* 16, no. 3 (1992), p. 32 See, also, Joyce Gelb, "Feminism and Political Action," in Russell Dalton and Manfred Kuechler, eds., *Challenging the Political Order* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 137–55, V Spike Peterson, *Gendered States—Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1992)

8 See, for example, Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King, *Rocking the Ship of State: Toward a Feminist Peace Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) For the Israeli case, see Lili Galilee, "Nashum Notot Yoter Me'Gvarim Le'Pitronot Ha'Mevusasim Al Masa U'Matan" (Women are more prone than men to find solutions based on negotiations), *Ha'Aretz*, 28 February, 1991

9 McGlen and Reid-Sarkees, *Women in Foreign Policy*

10 A "crucial case study" is one that can help to validate a theoretical argument because it is so unlikely to uphold the theory If the theory is supported by such a "hard case," it is all the more likely to apply in "softer" cases as well

ISRAELI WOMEN AND POLITICS A BRIEF OVERVIEW

The verdict of practically all studies of Israeli women and politics is that Israeli women were, and still are, far from participating at the same level as men.¹¹ The figures on their low representation in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, strongly confirm this point (see Table 1). There are no legal obstacles in Israel that hinder women from participating fully in politics. Israel's Declaration of Independence, which, in the absence of a written constitution, is the basic document of Israel's legal and political systems, states that the State of Israel will ensure "complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants, irrespective of religion, race or sex."¹² Furthermore, the guiding principles of the first government stated explicitly that the state would guarantee women full equality—in rights and obligations—in the political, social, economic and legal spheres.¹³ The law regarding equal rights for women (enacted in 1951) declared illegal any official discrimination against women. For a variety of reasons, however, these clear-cut declarations and laws have been implemented very slowly; the political equalization of Israeli women has proceeded at a snail's pace.¹⁴

When it was established in 1948, the new state of Israel was not a *tabula rasa*. It had a considerable legacy of political institutions and modes of operation, some of which locked in women's underrepresentation. Paradoxically, another component of the same problematic legacy, originating in the era of Zionist pioneering, was the myth of women's equality. According to this myth, the Zionist movement, and especially its dominant socialist branch, gave women the same opportunities as men to be active participants in the creation and operation of the new Israeli society. Recent studies refute this myth. They show that the myth actually functioned as a smoke screen hiding the unequal role of Israeli women who, even in the early pioneering days, were excluded from positions of power.¹⁵ Notwithstanding these studies, the equality myth, reinforced by the singular political

11 For historical analyses of the political standing of Israeli women, see, for example, Sylvia Fogel-Bijaoui, *Eineha Shel Chava Ha'Isha Ba'Yishuv Ha'Yehudi Be'Eretz Israel, 1881–1948* (The Eyes of Eve: Women in the Jewish Community in Pre-State Israel, 1881–1948) (Abstract of Ph.D. diss., University of Paris, 1982), Debora Bernstein, *Isha Be'Eretz Israel* (A Woman in the Land of Israel) (Tel Aviv: Ha'Kibbutz Ha'Meuchad, 1987). For more contemporaneous studies, see, for example, Yael Azmon, "Sex, Power and Authority," *British Journal of Sociology* 32, no. 4 (1981), pp. 547–59; Dafna Sharfman, *Nashum Ve'Politica* (Women and Politics) (Haifa: Tamar Pub., 1988); Yael Azmon and Dafna Izraeli, eds., *Women in Israel* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1993); Barbra Swirski and Marilyn Safir, eds., *Calling the Equality Bluff: Women in Israel* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991). On the essential aptness of local politics to women and the reasons it is not translated into practice in the Israeli case, see Hanna Herzog, *Nashum Realout: Nashum Ba'Politica Ha'Mekomit Be'Israel* (Realistic Women: Women in Local Politics in Israel) (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1994).

12 Etia Simcha, ed., *Maamad Ha'Isha—Arbaim Shnot Chok* (Women's Status—40 Years of Legislation) No. 17 (Jerusalem: Office of the Prime Minister, Advisor on Women's Status, March 1988), p. 2.

13 Ibid., p. 4.

14 In 1986, the Knesset speaker, Shlomo Hillel, remarked that "at this rate, we'll need 500 years until the imbalance is corrected." See Philippa Strum, "Women and the Politics of Religion in Israel," *Human Rights Quarterly* no. 11 (1989), p. 496 [n].

15 See, for example, Dafna Izraeli, "Tnuat Ha'Poalot Be'Eretz Israel Me'Reshita Ad 1927," (The Women Workers Movement in Israel from its establishment to 1927), *Cathedra*, no. 32 (1984), pp. 109–40.

TABLE 1
Women's Representation in the Knesset (1948–93)

Knesset	No of Women MKs	% of Women MKs
1 (1949)	11	9.2
2 (1951)	11	9.2
3 (1955)	11	9.2
4 (1959)	9	7.5
5 (1961)	10	8.3
6 (1965)	9	7.5
7 (1969)	8	6.7
8 (1973)	8	6.7
9 (1977)	8	6.7
10 (1981)	8	6.7
11 (1984)	10	8.3
12 (1988)	7*	5.8
13 (1992)	11	9.2

Source: Data were compiled by the authors from various official and non-official sources.

* Seven women were elected, and one woman, Tamar Gozanski, joined the Knesset later, due to a rotation agreement in the communist party, Hadash.

career of Golda Meir—as the first Israeli ambassador to the USSR, foreign minister, and prime minister—still dominates the public mind.¹⁶

A second source of Israeli women's political weakness is the continued prominence of security matters on Israel's national agenda. As is typical in a "democracy in uniform,"¹⁷ role distinctions on a gender basis are quite sharp in Israel. Men bear the nation's defense burden and are rewarded for this in the form of a favorable socio-political standing. Women usually participate in the war effort only indirectly, by providing typically feminine services such as nursing, social work, and the like, and they receive only minor rewards.¹⁸ This role difference is carried over to civilian life, leaving women with second-rate socio-political resources, which are almost impossible to translate into political assets, particularly into political power.

• The ongoing external conflict also lends a special aura to the army and military service. Not only is the Israel Defense Force (IDF) one of the nation's most highly

16 As Judith Buber-Agassi correctly observes: "Unfortunately, one lone woman in a national leadership position neither signifies the high status of women in that society, nor guarantees that she will succeed in improving women's position—or even attempt to do so." Judith Buber-Agassi, "Maamad Ha'Isha Be'Israel" (The status of women in Israel), in Ariela Friedman, Ruth Shrift, and Dafna Izraeli, eds., *Nashum Be'Milkud* (The Double Bind) (Tel Aviv: Ha'Kibbutz Ha'Meuchad, 1982), p. 203.

17 The term "democracy in uniform" is often used to characterize Israel as an essentially democratic system under a constant external pressure due to which the military and security considerations take precedence over other institutions and values, but without becoming a "garrison state." See, for example, Gad Barzilai, *Democratia Be'Milchamot* (A Democracy in Wartime) (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Poalim, 1992).

18 Rivka Bar-Yosef and Dorit Padan-Eisenstark, "Role System under Stress," *Social Problems* 25 (1977), pp. 135–44; Naomi Chazan, "Gender Equality? Not in a War Zone!" *Israeli Democracy* 3, no. 2 (1989), pp. 4–7.

cherished symbols, it also acts as a springboard into the political arena. Due to their military experience and connections, many ex-high-ranking officers “skipped” the laborious climb through low- and middle-level partisan jobs, and landed directly in positions of leadership within a party and even in ministerial positions. Israeli women also serve in the army, but for a shorter period of time than men, and only in non-combat jobs. Women who do remain in the army beyond their period of compulsory service cannot rise higher in the ranks than lieutenant-general. Married women, mothers, women who declare that they adhere to strict Jewish religious practices, and women with less than 11 years of schooling are exempted from military service. The differences in the criteria for mobilization, as well as in the options available in the service itself, explain why Israeli women have not been able to establish significant military careers. As a result, they are locked out of the social networks that have proved to be so helpful to men entering and operating in the political arena.¹⁹

Another obstacle that for many years stood in the way of Israeli women’s entry into politics was the non-egalitarian legacies brought by the new immigrants from their countries of origin. During the formative years of the state, many carried with them deeply-rooted patriarchal traditions and looked disapprovingly on women entering the political arena.²⁰ A somewhat similar factor that apparently still accounts for the political underrepresentation of women in Israel is the centrality of the Jewish religion in the nation’s collective identity,²¹ even though the majority of Jews in Israel are secular. Jewish tradition draws clear-cut boundaries between the public and private spheres. Men are permitted to operate in both spheres, but women are expected to limit their activities to the private sphere, effectively blocking their access to politics.²²

Israel’s electoral system also accounts for women’s political weakness. Although the system is based on absolute proportional representation with no division into local constituencies—a formation usually considered more favorable to candidates of political minorities than a winner-take-all electoral system—the Israeli system conceals some serious drawbacks insofar as women’s representation is concerned. It invests the parties’ organizations with overwhelming power in constructing their lists of candidates for national elections. Since these organizations are composed mainly of men, the chance that female candidates will be included in the parties’ lists is not promising. Certain parties, most of them of the left, have mandated some positions in their electoral lists for women, but most of these have been the bottom slots. The primary procedures adopted recently by

19 Chazan, “Gender Equality?,” p. 4.

20 Buber-Agassi, “Maamad Ha’Isha Be’Israel,” p. 224.

21 Itzhak Galnoor, *Reshuta Shel Ha’Democratia Be’Israel* (Steering the Polity: Communication and Politics in Israel) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1985), p. 75.

22 Dafna Izraeli, “Ha’Isha Ba’Moresheet Ha’Yehudit” (Women in the Jewish tradition), *Maamad Ha’Isha* (Women’s Status), no. 24 (1990), pp. 35–40; Strum, “Women and the Politics of Religion in Israel,” pp. 483–503. In the pre-state days, the leaders of the ultra-orthodox Jewish community opposed granting women the right to vote, on the grounds that it was improper for them both to develop political views of their own different from those of their husbands, and to go to the polls and stand there side-by-side with men voters. Their position, however, was rejected by the non-religious majority, and women were granted full political rights.

certain parties have actually worsened the prospects for women candidates, as they rarely have the resources to compete on equal terms with their male colleagues

Against this background, it is not surprising that feminist politics has not become rooted in Israel. The feminist extra-parliamentary movement of the early 1970s never really took off,²³ and both feminist parties that tried to win seats in the Knesset, in 1977 and again in 1993, fell short of even approaching the 1 percent threshold.²⁴ To sum up, the Israeli "structure of political opportunities" has not been conducive to the advancement of women. Indeed, it has hindered them from becoming significant and effective claimants in the area of public policy, and from reaping political rewards.

ISRAELI WOMEN AND FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

As the following data suggest, until the late 1980s Israeli women were virtually excluded from foreign policymaking. Not only were women's interests, views, and attitudes considered irrelevant when decisions on foreign and security matters were made, but often women were not even present in the relevant forums during the debating and policy-making processes. Since the late 1980s, however, and although the Israeli political system has remained far from egalitarian, the situation has begun to improve to some degree in terms of women's participation in foreign policymaking. The modification is especially noticeable at the non-institutional level, where women's groups play a pivotal role that includes leading several campaigns regarding the regional conflict. Significant changes of attitude are also discernible at the institutional or professional level: the issue of women's status is being seriously considered in the upper echelons of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the parliamentary level, the Knesset, change is apparently slower, but even there women's participation in foreign and security matters is increasing somewhat. The modifications on these three levels and the linkages between them are described and analyzed in detail below.

The Parliamentary Level

The government is obviously the forum in which the most significant decisions regarding the country's foreign relations are made. The small size of this body, however, makes it an unreliable indicator of women's political standing.²⁵ In Israel, as in many other countries, there are only a few women politicians prominent and powerful enough to attain ministerial positions, let alone ministries related to foreign and security policy, which are

23 Marcia Freedman, *Gola Ba'Aretz Ha'Muvtachat* (Exile in the Promised Land) (Tel Aviv: Brerot, 1991).

24 In Israel's first elections in 1949, the Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO) won one seat. Although its representative, MK Rachel Kagan, was very active in women's politics for many years, the party itself did not declare women's rights to be a major aim, and is thus not considered here a feminist party.

25 Eva Etzioni-Halevi and Ann Illy, "Women in Legislatures: Israel in a Comparative Perspective," in Arnold Dashefsky, ed., *Contemporary Jewry* Vol. 7 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1986), pp. 65-77.

the most sought-after by most politicians²⁶ Women's standing in the foreign policy-making process at the parliamentary level must therefore be used, although it is clearly second in line to a cabinet position insofar as foreign and security decisionmaking is concerned

In an article on Israeli women legislators,²⁷ the author claimed that the underrepresentation of a minority group by no means necessarily implied marginal behavior by its representatives in legislative bodies Indeed, the article's major finding was that the performance of most Israeli women legislators did not reflect a pattern of marginality On the contrary, women legislators initiated many parliamentary debates and pieces of legislation, and were highly visible in the work of the Knesset Until recently, however, this was not applicable to the field of foreign policy Women Members of the Knesset (MKs) had indeed been marginal in this critical political area for years The status of female MKs in foreign policy was quite close to that of Israeli-Arab MKs, who represent a marginalized minority in the Israeli polity and act accordingly on the parliamentary level

Some gradual modifications in the status of women MKs, however, have become apparent since the early 1990s Women have become more visible in the work of the House, and are showing unprecedented professionalism and self-confidence when dealing with external relations matters One indication of women's growing presence in the realm of foreign policy on the parliamentary level is the increase in their number on the Knesset's Committee for Foreign and Security Affairs Table 2 shows women's membership on this committee from 1949 to the present The data clearly confirm the impression that the realm of foreign and security affairs has long been the almost exclusive domain of men²⁸ This is particularly evident when a comparison is made to data on women's membership in, and chairmanship of, two other Knesset committees the Labor and Welfare, and the Education and Culture Committees, both of which deal with issues widely considered to be more "feminine" Women's representation on these two committees is also well below their relative number in the Knesset (not to mention their demographic share of the whole population) It is still significantly higher, however, than on the Committee for Foreign and Security Affairs, which, unlike the other two, has never had a woman chairperson Whereas, during the first 40 years of statehood there were either no women members serving on this committee (in the 3rd, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Knessets), or only one (in the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 10th, and 11th Knessets), in the last two Knessets there has been a gradual increase in their numbers In the 12th Knesset (elected in 1988)

26 In most Israeli governments there were no women ministers In the incumbent government, however, there are two (out of 16 ministers)—Labor and Communication, and Arts and Science

27 Giora Goldberg, "The Performance of Women in Legislative Politics The Israeli Example," *Crossroads*, no. 9 (1982), pp. 27–49

28 The underrepresentation of women in parliamentary committees dealing with foreign and security matters is a worldwide phenomenon For example, in 1991, the percentage of women in such committees was France - 1.4 percent, Greece - 4 percent, Belgium - 4.3 percent, The Netherlands and Denmark - 12 percent, Norway - 22 percent, Cuba - 24 percent, and Sweden - 35 percent Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), *Survey of Women's Roles in Various Parliaments* (translated from Hebrew by the Knesset Information Service, Jerusalem, 31 October 1991)

TABLE 2
Women's Membership in Knesset Committees

Knesset	Foreign & Security		Labor & Welfare		Education & Culture	
	No of Women	% of Women	No of Women	% of Women	No of Women	% of Women
1	1	6.5	3	13	5	33
2	1	6	2	20	5	33
3	—	—	2	13	7	46
4	1	5	3	16	3	16
5	1	5	3	16	4	21
6	—	—	2	5	5	26
7	—	—	2	10.5	3	16
8	—	—	2	11.7	3	17.6
9	—	—	4	26.6	4	26.6
10	1	4.7	4	26.6	1	6.6
11	1	4.1	5	38.4	1	6.6
12	2	7.4	3	15	—	—
13	3	17.6	4	26.6	3	20

Knesset No. of Women Chairs of Committees

1	1 (Education & Culture)
2	1 (Education & Culture)
3	1 (Education & Culture)
4	—
5	—
6	—
7	2 (Labor, Civil service)
8	2 (Labor, Civil service)
9	1 (Education & Culture)
10	2 (Education & Culture, Interior & Environment)
11	2 (Immigration & Absorption, Labor & Welfare)
12	2 (Economy, Labor & Welfare)
13	2 (Woman's Status, Education)

Source: Data were compiled by the authors from various official and non-official sources.

there were two women members of the committee, in the present 13th Knesset (elected in 1993) there are three. The increase, though small, suggests a trend rather than a transitory phenomenon, especially in view of the visibility of the female members and their substantial contribution to the committee's work. Furthermore, one of the three present female committee members was nominated recently as the chair of a special sub-committee, while another serves as a member of another highly-prestigious sub-committee, also an unprecedented achievement for Israeli women politicians.

It should be noted that the party determines which MKs will act on its behalf in the Knesset's committees. Therefore, the recent increase in the number of women MKs

serving on the prestigious Committee for Foreign and Security Affairs, albeit small in absolute number, suggests that there has been a modification of the parties' assessment of women MKs' competence in foreign and security affairs. It is also likely to reflect a change in the parties' estimation of the overall political acceptability of the appointment of women to this committee.

Contrary to the prevalent argument that the parties of the right are less egalitarian than those of the left, there is no significant difference between the two camps regarding women's membership on the Committee for Foreign and Security Affairs. Although the one woman member of the committee in the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th Knessets was a member of the then-dominant socialist party, Mapai, the fact that this one woman was always the same person suggests that her position reflected her individual qualities rather than evidence of any substantial egalitarian attitude on the part of this party. The single woman member of the committee in the 10th and 11th Knessets was, in each case, a representative of the Likud party of the right, while in the 12th Knesset there was one woman member each from Labor and Likud. Of the three women presently serving in the committee, two are Labor and one Meretz, both left-of-center parties.

A second criterion for assessing women MKs' involvement in foreign and security policymaking might be their level of active participation in the Knesset's discussions of relevant matters. This, however, is another problematic indicator. Participation in such debates depends very little on the individual MK's decision to participate. In most cases, who will speak in Knesset discussions is determined by the MK's position in the party faction, or decided upon by the faction's management.²⁹ Table 3, which presents data on a number of debates of crucial foreign and security importance, shows that women MKs have rarely addressed the plenary on these issues. Still, the question of why women MKs have often avoided or refrained from participating in Knesset discussions, even when they were non-partisan or not time-limited, must be addressed. We maintain that the absence of women on the podium is caused, at least in part, by their sense of marginality in this specific sphere. This perception is reinforced by the patronizing postures of their male colleagues. A fine example of such a discouraging attitude is reported by Marcia Freedman (perhaps the only radical feminist MK) in her autobiography. Freedman mentions how, in 1976, when returning to her seat after condemning Israel's harsh policy in the occupied territories, Menahem Begin, then the leader of the main opposition Likud

29. The Knesset holds two types of parliamentary discussions: party and non-party (or personal). The House Presidium, composed of the speaker and his deputies, decides upon the character of an upcoming discussion. The timetable and limits of a party-type of discussion is set in advance by the Presidium, which also allocates the amount of time each party will be allowed to speak (which is proportional to the number of seats each has in the House, but not less than 8 minutes per party). In such a discussion, the leaders of each party speak first, and if the party is left with some time, others chosen by the faction's executive bodies speak. The duration of a non-party discussion is also determined by the Knesset's Presidium, and depends on the number of MKs who have registered to speak, regardless of their party affiliations, and the extent of intervention by the party executive bodies. The first sort of discussion is usually chosen when the matter at stake is considered highly political or partisan. The latter is chosen when the issue is either considered non-political or non-partisan (e.g., traffic accidents, environmental problems, child abuse) or as critical to the nation's future (e.g., the ratification of international treaties, such as the Camp David Accords, or the Oslo Declaration of Principles [DOP]).

TABLE 3
Participation of Women MKs in Discussions on Foreign Policy Matters

Topic of Discussion	Date	No of Women Speakers	Total No of Speakers
UN resolution on the status of Jerusalem	January 1950	1	24
Israel's demand for reparations from West Germany	March 1951	—	13
Israel's agreement to withdraw from Sinai	March 1957	—	14
The establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany	March 1965	—	15
Israel's agreement to a ceasefire with the Arabs	October 1973	1*	22
The disengagement agreement with Syria	March 1974	5	24
The interim agreement with Egypt	September 1975	2	26
The Camp David Accords	March 1979	8**	84
The Lebanon War	June 1982	—	21
Participation in an international peace conference	October 1991	—	20
The Oslo agreement	September 1993	11***	116

Source Data were compiled by the authors from various official and non-official sources

* Golda Meir was prime minister

** The total number of women MKs in the House at the time

*** Also the total number of women MKs in the House at the time Nevertheless, none of the women speakers were on the first and the last "groups of ten," which get greater exposure and attention in both the House and the media

party, said to her in a palpably fatherly manner "My little girl, you sounded like an enemy of the state"³⁰

Such incidents are apparently less frequent today than before, due to the gradual change in the overall atmosphere in Israel on women's issues. The change in the ruling coalition in 1992 and the left-of-center orientation of the parties in power, which have a stronger ideological commitment to women's equality than the parties on the right, also serve as catalysts enhancing change in this direction. Some results are already noticeable: the Knesset's protocols show that women MKs do participate in discussions on foreign and security matters more than in the past, although mainly through interim, out-of-order remarks, and not yet as representatives speaking on behalf of their parties. Insiders

30 Freedman, *Gola Ba' Aretz Ha'Muvtachat*, p. 102

confirm that these women also put forward more queries and present more suggestions for urgent discussions in the Knesset on such issues than their predecessors

Naomi Chazan, a Meretz MK and also a professor of political science, outlines three main strategies used by women MKs: aggressive, quiescent, and target-oriented or functional.³¹ In the past, quiescence was the most prevalent strategy, leading to the pushing aside of women from central areas of statecraft. More recently, the balance seems to be shifting toward the aggressive and target-oriented strategies.³² Those strategies are favored by women MKs who are involved in foreign policy matters, as they bring them closer to the center of attention, if not yet of actual policymaking. The preference for and use of such strategies seems to derive from an assertive personality, a favorable socio-political background, a well-grounded knowledge of the subject matter, and/or "being at home" in a competitive political arena. Indeed, the women MKs who are most active in foreign policy issues are either professionals in a relevant academic field, members of a politically involved family that provides them with the necessary connections at the top, or have considerable political experience, that is, they are self-made politicians who have already undergone "trials by fire" in order to get where they are. In other words, these MKs may compensate for their marginality as women by deploying other, mainly personal, assets. Although this is not an optimal situation, because success depends on individual traits, in due course it may well bring about a substantial change in the general perception of women's political competence and skills in the realm of foreign and security affairs.

The Professional Level

Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is another body in which decisions regarding foreign policy are made. Although the formal function of the ministry is to implement the decisions made by the Knesset, it is clear that while translating the policy decisions into practice, the ministry staff, in fact, take an active role in the policy-making process.³³

At present, the ministry has about 870 employees in permanent positions, of whom about 330 (37.9 percent) are women. Of the 235 top positions, however, only 22 (9.4 percent) are filled by women. One of the most conspicuous indications of women's relatively disadvantaged status in the ministry is their administrative affiliation. The ministry is divided hierarchically into three main administrative branches. The first branch consists of the local administrative staff (275 persons, of whom 182, or 66.2 percent, are

31. Personal communication, 18 January 1994.

32. The recognition of female politicians' inability to adopt what seemed to be more assertive strategies led to the publication of several "manuals" such as Simcha Levin and Abraham Alon, eds., *Politika Ze Ken Bishvilu* (Politics Is indeed for Me) (Jerusalem: Israeli Women's Network and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1995).

33. Analogies to other political contexts may be misleading when analyzing the operative code of a specific political system. For example, it is important to note that the status of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the Israeli political system is not as prominent as that of the US Department of State. Since its inception, the Israeli decision-making system has been dominated by security concerns. The Ministry of Defense and the IDF, therefore, have been given prominent positions, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was pushed to the sidelines. The latter gained higher significance only when the foreign minister was an exceptionally powerful person.

TABLE 4
Women in Top Positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Year	No of Women among the Ministry's Local Staff	No of Women among the Ministry's Staff Abroad
1950	0 (out of 23) - 0%	1 (out of 115) - 0.9%
1956	1 (out of 35) - 2.8%	7 (out of 234) - 3%
1961*	3 (out of 50) - 6%	8 (out of 356) - 2.2%
1966*	6 (out of 65) - 9.2%	9 (out of 536) - 1.7%
1971	5 (out of 95) - 5.3%	2 (out of 159) - 1.2%
1975	4 (out of 71) - 5.6%	0 (out of 145) - 0%
1981	2 (out of 52) - 3.8%	1 (out of 133) - 0.7%
1986	4 (out of 65) - 6.1%	6 (out of 146) - 4.1%
1993	6 (out of 70) - 8.6%	4 (out of 160) - 2.5%

Source: These figures are based on the annual report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared for the Israeli government's yearbook.

* The years in which Golda Meir was the minister of Foreign Affairs.

women) The second branch incorporates the administrative staff serving in diplomatic delegations abroad (188 persons, of whom 92, or 48.9 percent, are women) The third branch, the most prestigious and the hardest to join, is the diplomatic corps (407 persons, of whom 62, or 15.2 percent, are women) Most women employed in the ministry hold clerical and secretarial positions and belong to the first two, and less prestigious, branches Mobility between the branches, mainly upward to the diplomatic corps, is rather limited, but still constitutes a possible way of promotion It is, however, open almost exclusively to men, and past experience shows that the chances for women to be promoted through this channel are very slim

Table 4 presents figures on the number of women holding prominent positions on the local administrative staff alongside those serving on both the administrative and diplomatic staffs abroad³⁴ It is quite clear that in both sorts of top positions, women are underrepresented The situation for women in the diplomatic delegations is much worse the average number of women employed locally is 5.2 percent, while abroad the average is only 1.8 percent

Although the general picture has not yet changed significantly, there are signs in the ministry's upper echelons of a change in attitude regarding women's status The ministry's top officials now seem to be more aware of the need to amend the situation "The story of women in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is no longer a story of discrimination, but an

³⁴ Because we are interested in on-going trends rather than in the situation at any specific point in time, the figures presented in Table 4 pertain to every fifth year Whereas the reports for the years 1950-71 cover a wider range of positions, including, for example, deputy ambassadors and consuls, it is from 1971 that only the positions of heads of delegations are reported, a technical change that apparently accounts for the decline in the number of high-ranking positions abroad The decline is also explained by the fact that many African and East European countries broke off their relations with Israel following the June 1967 War Still, the numbers provide a fairly good notion of the proportion of women in the upper ranks

encouraging one of responsibility taking,” testifies Colette Avital, one of the few women in the ministry who, despite the difficulties, “made it” and is presently the Israeli Consul in New York.³⁵ In early 1994, several of those in charge of the ministry’s personnel and training organized meetings to analyze the hiring, training, and employment policies of the ministry, and to detect and remove potential obstacles hindering women from entering the system. Professional consultants in various fields as well as feminist activists were also invited to participate in these meetings to provide an outside perspective on the problem and its solutions.

An even more practical step was taken in cooperation with the Israeli Women’s Network³⁶ to supply the ministry with guidelines regarding interviews with candidates for admission to the diplomatic cadets course, a prestigious training program and a prerequisite for those wishing to join the diplomatic corps.³⁷ Assuming that there were no inherent differences in the relevant skills and capabilities of men and women applicants, it was difficult to explain the fact that, in the past, the average number of women admitted to the training program did not exceed 10 percent. Since the preliminary examinations for this course were taken anonymously, the selection of the candidates could not be affected by their gender. At the next stage, however, the candidates were interviewed by an admissions committee, and here the gender factor played a significant role. The policy adopted in the late 1980s of always having at least one woman member on this committee did not suffice either to solve the problem or to remove the suspicion that women had an unequal chance of being selected. The interviewers tended to emphasize both to themselves and to the women candidates the difficulties inherent in the foreign service, such as having to move one’s family from one place to another, interruption of spouses’ careers, etc. The guidelines suggested by the Women’s Network were meant to instruct the committee on how to select candidates without discouraging women applicants. The ministry openly adopted a policy of encouraging women to join the training program, which has already borne some fruit, according to unofficial information, women will constitute 35–40 percent of the cadets in the upcoming course.

In addition to the new policy regarding the training course, there are other signs of modification in other spheres of the ministry’s activities. For example, there is a growing awareness of the employment needs of the spouses of women diplomats. There is a slight improvement in the realm of nominations as well, and while only nine (14.3 percent) of

35 Colette Avital, “At Od Titbagn,” (They told me that I still had to grow up), *Ha’Aretz*, Weekend Magazine, 4 March 1994, p. 30.

36 The Israeli Women’s Network, established in 1984, is an extra-parliamentary, non-partisan association of women of various political convictions and affiliations. The Network’s main aims are encouragement of women’s participation in the public sphere and in the job market, expansion of working opportunities for women, and promotion of social and political equality between men and women.

37 Although the guidelines do not specify what questions the committee members may or may not ask, it states that “Our basic position is that every question may be egalitarian or discriminatory, according to its context. A simple criterion for the amount of sexism inherent in a question is whether it would be presented to male candidates, as well. If the answer is positive, then the question reflects the reality of the job and its demands and not widespread social stereotypical attitudes.” The Israeli Women’s Network, *Guidelines for Interviews for Admission to the Diplomatic Cadets Course of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (Jerusalem, 10 October 1993).

the 63 heads of departments are, at present, women, one should bear in mind that this is an increase of 80 percent, as four of them were appointed in 1993–94. Likewise, only five (5.1 percent) out of 97 heads of diplomatic delegations are women, but, here again, four of them were added this year.³⁸

There are several possible explanations for this change in attitude at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministry has been influenced by the general change in attitude in Israeli society, and has become more aware of its own discrimination against women employees. There has also been a generational transformation in the ministry's higher ranks. Some of the most powerful people at the top at present are in their 40s and, like many in their age group, are much more sensitive to women's rights than their predecessors. A third explanation, suggested to us by a junior woman diplomat, is that prominent politicians and diplomats are embarrassed when confronted abroad with questions about the serious underrepresentation of women in the Israeli diplomatic corps, which is worse than that found in delegations of some Third World countries. A fourth, rather functional, and even cynical, explanation is related to the renewal or the setting of new diplomatic relations with numerous countries all over the world. Because there are more and more diplomatic positions to be filled, and there is a shortage of junior staff willing to serve in remote countries in Africa, Central Asia, the trans-Caucasian zone, and other peripheral areas, it is easier for women to get appointments.

Whatever the reasons for the more intensive recruitment and promotion of women, the direction is fairly clear. A prominent woman diplomat recently assessed women's prospects quite optimistically: "It is encouraging to realize that, today, women work in almost each and every field and position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or at least compete for jobs in all areas." There is no doubt that this has been a gradual change, and that the global conditions and circumstances have changed and are still changing. Many women, singly and as a group, have contributed to it, repeatedly proving their high professional qualifications and devotion. Generation transformation has also played a role in this modification. Men and women of this generation are asking the right questions.³⁹ There are, therefore, good reasons to believe that the present increase in the number of women at the junior staff level will, in due course, be translated into higher proportions of women in the upper echelons of the ministry, and, hence, into a greater impact of women on the policy process itself.

The Extra-Parliamentary Level

Social movements, protest groups, and other associations of extra-parliamentary character can play an important role in the political empowerment of minorities and other social groups with low access to the power center. Extra-parliamentary bodies and processes are less restricted by rules and regulations and are more flexible structurally.

³⁸ There are no objective criteria or procedures for nominating diplomats. The decisions of the selection committee members are not open to the candidates nor to the public, and, therefore, it is impossible, for example, to sue them for discrimination.

³⁹ Avital, "At Od Titbagri."

Minorities and other underprivileged groups, therefore, often find these bodies easier to use to press for change in policies or socio-political norms. Indeed, the representation of Israeli women at the extra-parliamentary level has always been greater than at parliamentary and professional levels. At the extra-parliamentary level women constitute a significant proportion of the rank and file in several movements, although they have seldom occupied leading positions. In Israel, however, the extra-parliamentary pressure has been both fairly sporadic and ineffective politically, particularly in regard to the external relations of the state.⁴⁰ Thus, the relatively strong presence of women in such associations has neither had a significant effect on their overall status, nor has it been an effective substitute for the formal representation of women in the government and parliament.

Nonetheless, the status of Israeli extra-parliamentarism has significantly improved since the early 1980s. In fact, it has become a regular feature of national political modes of action even in the realm of foreign and security policy, formerly regarded as too important to be influenced by extra-parliamentary means and actors. Women's positions within extra-parliamentary movements have also improved. At present, they constitute a sizeable proportion of the leading cadres of the various peace movements, and are also highly active and very visible in the more hawkish movements.

Women's activism at the extra-parliamentary level occurs either through participation in mixed associations, in which there are both men and women members, or in women-only associations. Mixed extra-parliamentary associations that deal with foreign policy matters have existed even prior to Israel's early days as a state. Women-only associations, however, have taken root only since the early 1980s. The few embryonic women's associations that emerged earlier were subjected to so much ridicule, particularly when they dealt with "serious matters" such as foreign or security problems, that they almost immediately disappeared. An example is the case of a group of women, most of them already politically active in partisan frameworks, who joined forces on the eve of the June 1967 War and demanded that Levy Eshkol, then both prime minister and minister of defense, be replaced in the latter position by the former chief of staff, Moshe Dayan. Their demand was neither unique nor far-fetched. Many Israelis considered Eshkol incompetent to deal with the rapidly worsening security situation, and believed Dayan to be the right man at the right time for the Defense Ministry. Nevertheless, the group was sarcastically labeled by the press as "the merry wives of Windsor," insinuating that its members were frivolous and preferred Dayan because of his charisma and relative youth. This case undoubtedly served as a warning to women activists for several years. Indeed, although the extra-parliamentary Feminist Movement established in the 1970s dealt in its platform with foreign and security affairs, it refrained from declaring publicly these major targets for action.⁴¹

40 Tamar Hermann, "Grassroots Activism as a Factor in Foreign Policy-Making: The Case of Israel," in David Skidmore and Valerie Hudson, eds., *The Limits of Autonomy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 127-50.

41 Later on, however, the involvement of feminists in peace activism became open and intensive, as Marcia Freedman observes: "To my great satisfaction, in the course of the years they [the feminist movement

One of the first extra-parliamentary challenges by women to official policy in foreign and security matters was launched during the lengthy and much-disputed Lebanon War of 1982. The group, which was both visible and viable, was formed spontaneously in 1983 by mothers of IDF soldiers fighting in the war. It had a noticeable energizing impact on the public campaign advocating an Israeli withdrawal. While the fighting was still going on, the group confronted the government and called upon decisionmakers to put an end to the war and bring the soldiers back home. In keeping with the habit of belittling such women's associations, the group was immediately nicknamed "Mothers Against Silence," in spite of the activists' preference for the title "Parents Against Silence," since several fathers had also joined the activity. The feminine image of the group remained salient throughout its two years of activism and played a major role in its relations with its surroundings.⁴² Protest against official policy in wartime is definitely an unconventional act. Therefore, the group's activities demanded a great amount of devotion and self-assurance from the group members. Their non-conformist posture became particularly noticeable because most of the members were women and because they were so persistent and vociferous in their protest.⁴³ Those who opposed and denounced the group—among them MKs, journalists, and veteran military officers—all referred to these two features to substantiate their argument that the group was politically irresponsible, motivated by emotions, and uninformed of the facts. The fact that the group was not a peace or an anti-war movement, and not a feminist movement but, rather, one based on a particular interest—the parental concern of the activists for the safety of their sons⁴⁴—was a serious drawback. In certain respects it reinforced the arguments of the group's adversaries. Nonetheless, the group and the controversy it stirred up testify to the complex linkage between womanhood and foreign and security affairs in the Israeli context.

Women's extra-parliamentary activity in the foreign-policy and security realm has increased sharply since the outbreak of the Palestinian grassroots uprising, the *Intifada*, in late 1987. Particularly noteworthy is the peace group known as "Women in Black" (WIB), which emerged in 1988. From the start, it was a women-only group.⁴⁵ In addition to its call for a modification of the harsh measures taken by the army against the rebelling Palestinian population, and its advocacy of an immediate, unilateral withdrawal from the occupied territories (a position considered radical, if not subversive, by most Israelis), the strategy adopted by the activists was also non-conformist. Vigils by women, all wearing black clothes, were held every Friday from noon to late afternoon near central crossroads

and the peace camp] almost converged. Almost all Israeli feminists adopted the positions of the peace camp on this matter [the occupation of the territories], and even became a leading force in this camp." Freedman, *Gola Ba' Aretz, Ha' Muvtachat*, p. 9.

42. Nevrit Gillath, "Women Against War: Parents Against Silence," in Swirski and Safir, *Calling the Equality Bluff*, pp. 142–46.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 144. The group published 82 proclamations, issued 12 press releases, and initiated about 28 demonstrations throughout the country. In addition, it organized 10 national meetings and sent numerous letters to prominent politicians.

44. This point is proven by the fact that the group was dissolved when the government decided to start the withdrawal from Lebanon, and its members did not engage in further peace activities during the *Intifada*.

45. Gila Swirski, "Women in Black," *Present Tense* 6, no. 4 (1989), pp. 52–53.

in major Israeli cities Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa.⁴⁶ The demonstrators carried signs with strongly worded slogans opposing the occupation and supporting the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. Despite angry and insulting remarks by many passing pedestrians and drivers, and even some physical assaults, the women activists carried on their protest for more than two years, demonstrating that they not only held opinions on such matters, controversial as they might be, but also would not relinquish their democratic right to express and fight for them.

Interestingly enough, some women on the right, notwithstanding their ideological rejection of the political views of WIB, adopted its activist model. One visible example of such parallel activity was the spontaneous establishment of a women-only protest camp, Rechelim, by women settlers on the West Bank. This camp, which started as a vigil and evolved into a long-range women's seminar, was set up at the very spot where, in October 1991, a Molotov cocktail thrown by Palestinians caused the death of two Israelis. One of them was the mother of seven children—the first woman and mother casualty among the settlers.⁴⁷ The women who set up the camp protested against what they saw as the government's incompetence in protecting Jewish settlers by taking effective measures against the Palestinians, as well as against what they considered to be the government's policy of appeasement toward the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The women of Rechelim, contrary to the activists of WIB, insisted that their protest was not motivated by feminist convictions but, rather, by their identity and concerns as wives and mothers. At the same time, much like WIB, the activists in Rechelim were openly critical of the way conventional politics was conducted by men, pointing to its sterility and its failure to serve the national interests. Rechelim even went so far as to rebuke male settlers for losing their courage and readiness to fight for the supreme value of the Greater Land of Israel, and accused them of having been co-opted by the establishment. As women, wives, and mothers with heavy responsibilities for their families, and in the light of their male partners' apparent incompetence to deal with the deteriorating security situation, the activists in Rechelim claimed that there was no escape from active protest, even though this negated their view of women's natural role. Another, more striking, example of the adoption of the model set by WIB is the "Women in Green" movement. This is a small right-wing group that loudly opposes the Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP) of 1993 and its implementation. This group not only adopted a name similar to that of WIB, but also its method of holding protest vigils and wearing a distinguishing outfit (a hat in this case).

There are several reasons for the recent growth in the involvement of women in extra-parliamentary movements directed toward foreign and security policy, particularly in the peace camp, where women constitute more than half of the active decisionmakers,

46 Vigils of "Friends of Women in Black" have been held outside Israel, in New York, London, and Rome. The number of WIB vigils reached a peak of 34 in 1989. Following the 1991 Gulf War, however, a sharp decline in activity was noted. This trend has become stronger since the signing of the Oslo DOP in September 1993. Since then, only two vigils are held—and these irregularly—on Fridays.

47 Tamar El-Or, "Me'Shilo Lo Rom Et Iceland Ha'Mikre Shel Rechelim," (It is impossible to see Iceland from Shilo. The event of Rechelim) *Alpayim*, no. 7 (1993), pp. 59–81.

demonstrators, and participants. First, as already mentioned, women enjoy only a limited number of opportunities to express their views and concerns in the formal political structure and process. Second, the specific character of the Intifada has had a direct and daunting impact on all Israeli women, both of the left and the right, because it does not conform to the terms of conventional warfare from which they have usually been fairly well protected. Third, the Intifada brought to the forefront critical issues previously pushed aside, such as human rights, equality, and personal security, which are of greater interest to women, as a socio-political minority, than they are to men. Fourth, the Intifada has drawn greater attention to the connection between the occupation and the militaristic features of Israeli society that impede women's efforts to gain equal political status.⁴⁸

The intensified presence of women in mixed or women-only extra-parliamentary associations dealing with foreign and security matters on the left and on the right is, we maintain, highly instrumental in changing the widespread image of women's irrelevance in this realm. Unlike the women working at the parliamentary and professional levels, female activism at the extra-parliamentary level depends mostly on women's own initiative, rather than on the decisions of a political party or a ministerial bureaucracy. In this arena, women need not wait until mainstream views change to have their say. Not only does female activism at the extra-parliamentary level demonstrate evidence of a normative modification, it may also stimulate one. This argument is sustained by findings from other socio-political contexts, which show that the success of extra-parliamentary bodies is indeed manifested by their ability to affect concrete political decisions. In the process, these movements also alter the prevalent set of socio-political values.⁴⁹ One may, then, expect a "spill-over" from the extra-parliamentary level to the institutional one. Some empirical support for this argument is indicated by the fact that six out of the 11 incumbent women MKs are active members of the Women's Peace Network, an extra-parliamentary organization formed in 1989 that unifies women of various parties working for the consolidation of peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians.

CONCLUSIONS

We have shown that the Israeli socio-political context is apparently undergoing a gradual modification as far as women's presence in the realm of foreign policy is concerned. Admittedly, there have been serious setbacks to this course of empowerment of Israeli women, such as their noticeable absence from all teams negotiating the peace settlement with the Palestinians. Still, if the peace process succeeds in reaching its desired goals, it may well be that some major obstacles to women's entrance to the foreign policy arena will be removed, as the importance of military experience in Israeli politicians' backgrounds gradually declines. There are strong reasons to believe that as foreign policy becomes more of a "civil" matter than in the years when wars were a constant feature of

48 Naomi Chazan, "Israeli Women and Peace Activism," in Swirski and Safir, *Calling the Equality Bluff*, pp. 155–56.

49 Thomas Rochon and Daniel Mazmanian, "Social Movements and the Policy Process," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 28 (1993), pp. 75–87.

Israel's relations with its neighbors, women's access to the domain of foreign policy will be enhanced

There is, however, another and all too likely outcome of the peace process that should be anticipated in order to be forestalled. In times of peace, the increase in the relative significance of non-military political issues may result in displacing women politicians from the positions they have traditionally held in such spheres as welfare, health, and education. Therefore, if they wish to expand their activities to foreign policy and also retain their few traditional power positions, women politicians will have to guard against relinquishing any of their former "domains" in exchange for access to foreign and security policymaking. Their objective should be to enlarge the range of their influence rather than to shift it to new domains.

On a more universal level, we contend that the invisible walls that have, for ages, enclosed the domain of foreign and security affairs and secured it from non-elite segments of society, seem to be coming down slowly but surely. There are several complementary explanations for this process, which is manifested in the modification of women's standing in this realm in Israel as well as in other countries. The first and most immediate explanation is that the gradual empowerment of women worldwide has made many formerly men-only professions, including those in foreign and security policy, more accessible to women. A second explanation has to do with the ongoing global change in relations between the state and civil society. Various segments of the population, including women, have redefined their particular interests and attitudes as groups, and have organized to demand a greater say in and access to realms formerly controlled by professional politicians. A third explanation relates to the rapid rate of transformations in global politics and regional international relations, the appearance of various new types of political arrangements and actors, and the widespread blurring of lines that in the past had separated domestic affairs from foreign policy. Added to these is the unprecedented exposure in the media of the policy-making process, and its often undesired outcomes, which, to a great extent, accounts for modifications in the political cast of characters. As power bases change, once-powerful actors lose some of their power and legitimacy, while formerly less-effective and even non-legitimate actors gain influence and recognition. Following the pluralist approach to democracy, we anticipate that the greater the number of groups represented in the policy-making process, the richer, more open, less particularistic—and, hence, more democratic—will become the national political repertoire of ideas and options in the various fields, including foreign policy.



CONCEIVING THE MASCULINE: GENDER AND PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM

Joseph Massad

The article explores how masculinity as a colonial model is figured in nationalist discourse through a case study of Palestinian nationalism. It demonstrates how Palestinian nationalism conceives of nationalist agency in masculine terms. Its conclusion is that nationalist agency is constituted through performances that are said to be its results. Nationalist masculinity is shown to be a new type of masculinity, which is implicated in temporal, cultural, and class schemas that define its limitations and have little to do with "tradition."

PALESTINIAN nationalism, like other nationalisms, is influenced in its philosophy by Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment Romantic thought. Enlightenment philosophy underlies a variety of nationalisms in Europe and, through European colonialism, many parts of the world.¹ In the European political arena, nationalism is expressed through

¹ In an embattled situation, the colonized view European Enlightenment thought as the only available discourse (under the time constraints of anti-colonial resistance) for mobilizing people against colonial onslaughts. This extension of nationalist thought to the colonial world, however, was an enterprise fraught with contradictions. One of the most obvious underpinnings of anti-colonial nationalisms is the combining of modernization and tradition. While one of anti-colonial nationalism's dual goals is the achievement of technological modernization in the Western sense, its other goal is the assertion of a traditional national culture.

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gendered narratives. Although anti-colonial nationalist agency defines itself in opposition to European nationalism, it does not escape implication in the same narrative.² The metaphor of the nation as a mother- or fatherland, the practice of defending and administering it with homosocial institutions like the military and the bureaucracy, and the gendered strategies of reproducing not only the nation and its nationalist agents but also the very national culture defining it, were all constitutive of nationalist discourse.³ Kumari Jayawardena identifies the gender objectives of nationalist reformers across Asia as two-fold

to establish in their countries a system of stable, monogamous nuclear families with educated and employable women such as was associated with capitalist development and bourgeois ideology, and yet to ensure that women would retain a position of traditional subordination within the family.⁴

In putting this project into effect, the nationalists' combining of European and existing gender norms does not result in cultural syncretism, rather, it is a process whereby European norms sublate traditional ones. The new gender norms are modern inventions dressed up in traditional garb to satisfy nationalism's claim of a national culture for which it stands. These new ideals are not so much *traditional* as they are *traditionalized*.⁵

In the Arab East, as in the rest of Asia,⁶ national identity and nationalist agency were the sites of negotiating not only East and West as conceptual anchoring categories, but also, as importantly, the foundational ruse of gendered citizenship. The respective responsibilities of men and women to the nation emerged as epistemic cornerstones of nation-building. Arguing that masculinity was always the identitarian pole of European nationalist thought, I will examine how Palestinian nationalism conceives (of) the masculine in defining Palestinian nationalist agency. In so doing, the category of masculinity will be shown to have certain attributes as it is embedded within a temporal schema—that of post-Enlightenment modernity, a class schema—that of bourgeois entrepreneurs, and a geocultural schema—that of European colonial culture as a paradigm through which tradition is (re)interpreted. My objective here is not so much to describe the

2 In responding to a Western colonial discourse that negates the possibility of nationalist agency in the colonies, anti-colonial nationalists had to deal with the way Western modernization fit into their identitarian project. The nationalist project that is predicated upon the creation of a national identity posits this very identity as the locus of negotiating the relation of the traditional to the modern. See Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (London: Zed Press, 1986).

3 Nationalist agency refers to the abilities and the will to perform a set of acts and practices aimed at achieving nationalist goals as those (the abilities, the acts, the practices, and the goals) are defined by nationalist discourse. The nationalist agent is someone who identifies as, and is identified by nationalist discourse as, part of the nation, and one whom nationalist discourse considers to be a possessor of the aforementioned abilities and will, based on criteria set by nationalist discourse.

4 Kumari Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World* (London: Zed Press, 1986), p. 15.

5 On traditionalization, see Abdullah Laroui, *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

6 African anti-colonial nationalism had to confront a European colonial discourse different from its Asian counterpart. While Orientalism constructed the idea of an Orient in need of Occidental civilization, colonial discourse constructed Africa in the European imagination as the "dark continent" in need of European colonial Enlightenment.

unfolding of a masculine-based nationalism, but, rather, to show the process through which masculinity itself is lived within the modality of nationalism—indeed, how masculinity is *nationalized*. I maintain that the mobilizing metaphors of nationalist movements are not only metaphors. They also reflect the fundamental assumptions of nationalist thought, which establishes the future gender constitution and gender roles of nationalist agents. History shows that other revolutions have foundered on a “nation first, women after” strategy; it is not too soon to ask this question of Palestinian nationalism and its vision of a post-colonial future.

For a decade following the establishment of the state of Israel, in May 1948, and the subsequent expulsion of close to a million Palestinians, the Palestinian people remained without a national leadership. As a result, the majority of the Palestinians looked to Arab governments in the region to help them retrieve Palestine from the Zionists and return them to their homes. When no such development occurred, guerrilla groups began emerging in the late fifties in the refugee camps and among Palestinian university students. This development threatened Arab regimes, which by then had reached a *modus vivendi* with the decade-old Israeli state.

As a response to this rising tide of Palestinian nationalist agitation, and in an attempt to control and restrict it, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in 1964, by a number of Arab governments.⁷ In the wake of the 1967 Israeli occupation of the remainder of Palestine (and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands more Palestinians), Palestinian guerrilla groups intensified their military attacks on Israel and their ideological attacks on Arab governments. This situation culminated in a coup d'état, in 1969, when Ahmad Shuqayr was ousted from his position as head of the PLO and replaced by Yasir Arafat. Arafat, who had been the leader of the independent Palestinian Liberation Movement (Fateh), along with the leaders of other major guerrilla groups became members of the executive committee of the PLO.

This development coincided with other changes in the social and economic fortunes of the Palestinian bourgeoisie in the diaspora. In Lebanon, an alliance of the different elements of the Lebanese bourgeoisie against the rising fortunes of bourgeois Palestinians manifested itself in the 1965 successful attempt to break the Palestinian-owned Intra Bank, the largest Arab-owned bank in the Middle East at the time.⁸ By the late 1960s, Persian/Arab Gulf countries that had opened their borders earlier to the Palestinian intelligentsia and Palestinian entrepreneurs were now restricting their entry to forestall future competition between Palestinians and the increasingly better-educated national populations.⁹ In 1970, civil war broke out in Jordan between the Jordanian army and PLO guerrillas, culminating in the PLO's expulsion from Jordan a year later, after the Jordanian

7 On the history of the PLO, see Alan Gresh, *The PLO: The Struggle Within, Towards an Independent Palestinian State* (London: Zed Press, 1985), and Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

8 On Palestinians in Lebanon and on the Intra Bank debacle, see Tabitha Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987).

9 On Palestinians in the Gulf, see Laurie Brand, *The Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for a State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

army's slaughter of thousands of Palestinian guerrillas¹⁰ These developments help explain the sudden nationalist fervor emanating from the diaspora Palestinian bourgeoisie who, until the 1960s, had been quiescent¹¹ By 1974, the Palestinian bourgeoisie, backing Arafat's liberal Fateh, was successful in enlisting the support of the Arab League to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people That same year, Arafat addressed the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on behalf of the Palestinian people, a development eliciting worldwide recognition (the United States and Israel excepted) of the Palestinian struggle¹²

In the Palestinian case, as with all nationalist movements, the project of gendering inevitably starts with the establishment of a nationalist movement In their pioneering collection *Nationalisms and Sexualities*, Andrew Parker et al argue that in "the same way that 'man' and 'woman' define themselves reciprocally (though never symmetrically), national identity is determined not on the basis of its own intrinsic properties but as a function of what it (presumably) is not"¹³ Thus, the important task for anti-colonial nationalists is not only to define gender roles in relation to each other (female-male), but also to define both in relation to the nationalist project, and, in so doing, to dissociate national identity from any colonial contamination

TERRITORY VERSUS PATERNITY DETERMINING PALESTINIAN IDENTITY

The first two documents issued by the PLO were the Palestinian National Charter (Al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Filastini) and the Palestinian Nationalist Charter (Al-Mithaq al-Qawmi al-Filastini) These Charters functioned as a sort of constitution, defining Palestinian political goals, Palestinian rights, indeed "Palestinianness" itself They were the founding documents of the new generation of Palestinian nationalists An analysis of these texts gives us some indication of how post-1948 Palestinian nationalism was articulated by its architects

In the introduction to the Palestinian Nationalist Charter, the Zionist conquest of Palestine is presented as a rape of the land¹⁴ It views Palestinians as the children of Palestine, portrayed as a mother The Zionist enemy is clearly seen as masculine, and the

10 On the events in Jordan, see David Hirst, *The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Conflict in the Middle East* (London: Faber and Faber, 1984)

11 On the Palestinian bourgeoisie in the diaspora, see Pamela Ann Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians, 1876–1983* (London: Croom Helm, 1984)

12 On representations of the Palestinians in the West, see Edward Said's classic, *The Question of Palestine* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979)

13 Andrew Parker, Mary Russo, Doris Sommer, and Patricia Yaeger, eds., *Nationalisms and Sexualities* (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 5

14 The Palestine Liberation Organization, "Al-Mithaq al-Qawmi al-Filastini" (Palestinian Nationalist Charter), reproduced in Faysal Hurani, *Al-Fikr al-Siyasi al-Filastini, 1964–1974, Dirasat li-Mawathiq al-Ra'isiyya li-Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya* (Palestinian Political Thought, 1964–1974, A Study of the Principal Documents of the Palestinian Liberation Organization) (Beirut: Markaz al-Abhath, Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya, 1980), p. 228

wrong committed by this enemy against Palestinians is considered metaphorically to be of a violent sexual nature¹⁵

This view is in full concert with early Zionist discourse that viewed the role of Zionists as fertilizing the virgin land. For Zionists, Palestine was both the *mother-land*, to which Jews needed to return, and the *virgin-land*, which the Zionists needed to fertilize and fecundate. As Ella Shohat has shown, the Zionist view was in turn borrowed from European colonial discourse, especially in relation to the "New World."¹⁶ The Israeli Sabra, like the American Adam—but unlike the "feminine" diaspora Jew¹⁷—was a new masculine pioneer impregnating the virgin/motherland with new life. This pregnancy was to result in the birth of the "new Jew."¹⁸ Zionism's gendered discourse echoes Orientalist discourse—Orientalists described the Orient "as feminine, its riches as fertile, its main symbols the sensual woman, the harem, and the despotic—but curiously attractive—ruler."¹⁹

These masculine-centric discursive axioms constituted European nationalism from its inception. Both Benedict Anderson and George Mosse argue that nationalism favors a distinctly homosocial form of male bonding. Mosse argues that "[European] nationalism had a special affinity for male society and together with the concept of respectability legitimized the dominance of men over women."²⁰ For Anderson, the "nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this *fraternity* that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings."²¹ In *Imagined Communities*, Anderson observes that "in the modern world everyone can, should, will 'have' a nationality, as he or she 'has' a gender."²² This development is part and parcel of the advent of modernity and the specifically modern ways of classifying people. This naturalization of national

15 Such views are common to most anti-colonial nationalisms. Frantz Fanon, for example, spoke of the "Western penetration of native space," while Aimé Césaire spoke of the "stripping" and "raping" of Africa. Palestinian nationalism articulates itself within the same masculinist discourses. See Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1965), p. 42, and Aimé Césaire's, "Introduction," in Victor Schoelcher, *Esclavage et Colonisation* (Slavery and Colonization) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), p. 7.

16 On Zionism's gendered agency in/and relation to Palestine, see Ella Shohat, "Eurocentrism, Exile and Zionist Discourse" (Paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association Annual Conference, Washington, DC, 1991), and Shohat, *Israeli Cinema: East/West and the Politics of Representations* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989).

17 On the image of a feminine diaspora Jew, see Paul Breines, *Tough Jews, Political Fantasies and the Moral Dilemma of American Jewry* (New York: Basic Books, 1991), and Sander Gilman, *The Jew's Body* (New York: Routledge, 1991).

18 On the importance of the masculinization of diaspora Jewish men upon arrival in Palestine/Israel, see Joseph Massad, "The 'Post-Colonial' Colony: Time, Space and Bodies in Palestine/Israel," in Fawzia Afzal-Khan and Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, eds., *Dimensions of Post-Colonial Studies* (Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming, 1996). Also, see Simona Sharoni, "Militarized Masculinity in Context: Cultural Politics and Social Constructions of Gender in Israel" (Paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association Annual Conference, Portland, OR, 1992).

19 Edward Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," *Cultural Critique* 1 (Fall 1985), p. 103.

20 George Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality, Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1985), p. 67.

21 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991), p. 7 (emphasis added).

22 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

identity, however, like the naturalization of gender and sexual identities that are synchronous with it, has a history that I will try to chart in the Palestinian case

Article 4 of the Palestinian National Charter defines Palestinian identity as “a genuine, inherent and eternal trait and is transmitted from *fathers to sons*”²³ Article 5 states that “Palestinians are those Arab citizens who used to reside in Palestine until 1947, and *everyone who is born of an Arab Palestinian father* after this date—whether inside Palestine or outside it—is a Palestinian”²⁴ What is interesting in this definition is that Palestinian identity is defined differently depending on the historical period While until 1947, that is until the “rape” (which is viewed as having been legitimated by the 1947 UN Partition Plan), Palestinians were defined as those who lived in Palestine, i.e., those who lived in the motherland, after 1947, this is no longer the case In the post-1947 period, Palestinians, whether still in historic Palestine or living outside its borders, no longer fit the earlier definition This spatial-temporal prerequisite for “Palestinianness,” and its *metaphorical* stress on maternity, become directly linked, after the “rape,” to the issue of reproducing the nation In nationalist discourse, this is to be carried out through *physiological and metaphorical* paternity It is being born to a Palestinian father that now functions as the prerequisite for Palestinianness, a father, it is important to note, whose very Palestinianness is established through his residence in the motherland before the “rape” Revealing the importance of eugenics in nationalist logic, this definition carries itself to future generations, whereby it is the sons of these fathers who will continue the reproduction of the Palestinian people In sum, while the land as mother was responsible for the reproduction of Palestinians until 1947, the rape disqualified her from this role It is now fathers who reproduce the nation *Territory was replaced by paternity*

The disqualification of the land as mother in her national reproductive role, in the Charter, does not deny that the land, as mother, can produce children, but rather that, since the rape, it can no longer be relied upon to reproduce *legitimate* Palestinian children Within this metaphoric schema, women clearly cannot be agents of nationality Their role, thus, becomes secondary and supportive in the narrative of nationalism²⁵

23 The Palestine Liberation Organization, “Al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Filastini” (Palestinian National Charter), in Hurani, *Al-Fikr*, p. 236 (emphasis added)

24 Ibid (emphasis added) In 1947, Palestine was partitioned by the United Nations—a decision that was made without consulting the Palestinian people Immediately thereafter (as early as December 1947), Zionist forces began expelling the Palestinian population

25 As anti-colonial nationalism is derived from the European Enlightenment, so are the laws demarcating nationhood in the now-independent former colonies derived from the laws of European nations The PLO Charter is hardly an exception in this regard The establishment of paternity as the source of nationhood has been enshrined in British nationality laws since the nineteenth century In the exemplary case of Britain, as Francesca Klug demonstrates, “women were only allowed to reproduce the British nation on behalf of their husbands They could not pass their nationality to their children in their own right” In fact, British women who married outside the nation lost their British nationality, as did their children On the other hand, the children of British men and non-British wives would be automatically British, as would the non-British wives Some of these laws were changed in 1981 and 1985, whereby British women won the right to transfer their citizenship to their own children born abroad Francesca Klug, “‘Oh to be in England’ The British Case Study,” in Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias, eds., *Woman-Nation-State* (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 21 It is this British model which was transported to the colonies It should be noted here that all children born inside the British Empire since 1971 are considered British, regardless of parentage

In his 1974 address to the UN General Assembly, PLO chairman Yasir Arafat again uses metaphors of sexual violence to describe the Zionists' use of colonial methods to "rape the Palestinian homeland and to exploit and disperse its people"²⁶ Arafat stresses that Israel's international alliance with the colonial powers and the United States against Third World liberation and independence, gives a clearer picture of the enemy "who raped our country," and illustrates the "honor" of the struggle launched against it²⁷ The rape image is invoked again in the November 1988 Political Communiqué issued by the Palestine National Council Reasserting the continuing perception of the Zionist occupation as sexual in its symbology, it said that "Israel showed its real self to be a fascist, racist, colonial-settler country that exists through raping/usurping Palestinian land and through exterminating the Palestinian people"²⁸ Thus, liberation is staged as a transaction between men over the honor of a woman-mother whose ownership passes through paternity

This discourse has its own momentum Explaining the refusal of the Palestinian people to accept the UN partition plan of 1947, wherein the United Nations "partitioned what it had no right to divide—the land of the indivisible homeland," Arafat, in his 1974 UN address, compares the Palestinian people to the natural/true mother in the King Solomon story "when we rejected that decision, our position corresponded to that of the true mother who refused Solomon's division of her child when another woman claimed it"²⁹ This reversal of roles is interesting to note, for, in the Palestinian case, it is Palestine's *true children*, both men and women living there, who refused the UN division of their mother This indicates how Palestinian men and women were engaged in the defense of their mother against what was later referred to as "the rape" Note how the mother's agency in Solomon's story is transferred to the children by Arafat, with Palestine, as mother, retaining only the position of victim For Arafat, Palestinian nationalist agency, in 1947, was characterized by the children's defense But, unlike the mother in Solomon's story, whose stance convinced Solomon to give her back her child, the defense of their mother by Palestine's true children failed The rape took place

CONCEIVING AND MOTHERING THE MASCULINE

Twenty years after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, Palestinians revolted against colonialism for the second time in half a century More intense than the revolt which lasted from 1936 to 1939, the Palestinian *Intifada* (uprising), which erupted in 1987, has continued into the present The

26 Yasir Arafat, "Al-Harb Tandali' min Filastin, wa al-Silm Yabda' min Filastin" (Arafat's UN Address to the General Assembly), p. 8 The original Arabic text is in *Shu'un Filastiniyya* (Palestinian Affairs) (December 1974), pp. 5–19 It should be noted that the word for rape, *ighṭisab*, is more often translated as usurpation The etymological root of the word is *ghasaba*, meaning to force someone to do something against her/his will Although *ighṭisab* can be used in the context of usurpation, as in *ighṭisab al-huquq*, meaning the usurpation of rights, it always retains its double meaning and its sexual symbolism

27 Arafat, "Al-Harb," p. 12

28 The Palestine Liberation Organization, "Al-Bayan al-Siyasi" (Political Communiqué) The official Arabic text is published in *Shu'un Filastiniyya* 188 (November 1988), p. 8

29 Arafat, "Al-Harb," p. 10

Intifada led to the emergence of a new Palestinian leadership that began organizing demonstrations, strikes, and other acts of resistance to the occupation. The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) was later joined by the diaspora-headquartered PLO in providing leadership and financial support to the resisting population. Key in mobilizing the population were the UNLU- and PLO-issued communiqués and the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, issued by the PLO in November 1988 from its Tunis headquarters.

In his 1974 UN speech, Yasir Arafat had described the Palestinian people as the “trustworthy guardian” of the holy places of their homeland.³⁰ The November 1988 Declaration of Independence, in addition to bestowing the adjective “courageous” on the Palestinian woman, describes her as being “the *guardian* of our survival and our lives, the *guardian* of our perennial flame.”³¹ The way Palestinian women are perceived to guard Palestinian survival and lives is to be found in the communiqués of the UNLU.³²

Communiqué No. 29, entitled “The Call of the Wedding of the Palestinian Independent State,” which celebrates the Declaration of Independence, congratulates women in their role as mothers. The communiqué salutes “the *mother of the martyr* and her celebratory ululations, for she has ululated twice, the day her *son* went to fight and was martyred, and the day the state was declared.”³³

Communiqué No. 5 describes Palestinian mothers, sisters, and daughters as “*man-abut*,”³⁴ or the soil on which “manhood, respect and dignity” grow. Women are referred to here in biologically- and socially-relational terms to men. The communiqué calls on women to “work together side by side with their husbands, sons and brothers.” Whereas mothers, sisters, and daughters are described as the soil producing manhood, respect, and dignity, a later communiqué describes the Palestinian people, conceived in the masculine, as the “*makers* of glory, respect and dignity.”³⁵ The discrepancy is central to the concept of Palestinian nationalist agents as masculine. While men actively create glory, respect, and dignity, women are merely the soil on which these attributes, along with manhood, grow. It is as soil that they are the “guardians” of Palestinian lives and survival.³⁶

The UNLU, which issued the Intifada communiqués, seems at times ambivalent, while at others, fully complicit in continuing the earlier tradition of conceiving the

30 Ibid., p. 11.

31 The Palestine Liberation Organization, “*T’lan al-Istiqlal*” (The Declaration of Independence) (emphasis added). The official Arabic version was published in *Shu’un Filastiniyya* 188 (November 1988), p. 5.

32 *Al-Intifada min Khilal Bayanat al-Qiyada al-Wataniyya al-Muwahhida* (Unified National Leadership of the Uprising) (Tunis: Majallat al-Hurriyya, 1989). I will limit myself mostly to examining the first 30 communiqués that were issued in the first year of the Intifada. Hereafter, all communiqués mentioned in the text, unless otherwise stated, come from this source.

33 Ibid. (emphasis added).

34 Ibid. *Manabit* actually means plant nurseries, like a greenhouse or a combination of several elements such as soil, climate, and environment—the proper conditions for plant growth.

35 Ibid., Communiqué No. 10 (emphasis added).

36 On the ideological role assigned to Israeli women in the reproduction of Israeli Sabras and its centrality in Zionist colonial discourse, see Nira Yuval-Davis, “National Reproduction and ‘the Demographic Race’ in Israel,” in Yuval-Davis et al., *Woman*, pp. 92–109.

masculine. In some communiqués,³⁷ women are listed with occupational groups such as merchants, peasants, students, and workers. This gives the impression that these occupational groups include men only, or that “women,” unlike “men,” constitute a separate occupational group, taking for granted women’s roles as housewives and denying this role the dignity of an occupation. In other communiqués,³⁸ women are mentioned together with vulnerable sectors of the population,³⁹ mainly children and old people. Women are listed with men only in the context of resistance and struggle, thus recognizing men’s agency as their *only* defining attribute, while women (who are not mothers) possess limited agency.⁴⁰

The specificity of Palestinian women’s bodies is significant in these texts only when reproduction is considered. This conception of the body defines the Palestinian that the UNLU has in mind when it declares that the Intifada consists of “the children and young men of the stones and Molotov cocktails, it is the thousands of women who miscarried as a result of poison gas and tear gas grenades, and those women whose sons and husbands were thrown in the Nazi prisons.”⁴¹ Palestinian women are mentioned in their reproductive capacities—when they miscarry—or in their social roles as mothers—when their *sons* are imprisoned.

Women’s reproductive roles appear everywhere in the communiqués of the first year of the Intifada. Women’s suffering at the hands of the occupier is exemplified in miscarriages—their failure to produce more nationalist agents.⁴² Yet, they are commended as mothers throughout. It is in recognition of their reproductive capacity that the UNLU sends women its love,⁴³ salutes them,⁴⁴ addresses them as the mothers of “the martyrs, the detainees and the wounded [all males],”⁴⁵ congratulates them on the martyrdom of their sons,⁴⁶ and sympathizes with them as “wailing widows and *thakala*” (mothers who lost their sons).⁴⁷

Women, in those communiqués, are also viewed outside the context of their reproductive roles. They are saluted as detainees of the occupation authorities,⁴⁸ and mourned when they, along with children and old people, are killed by Israelis.⁴⁹ When

37 Communiqués No. 2 and 3, among others.

38 Communiqués No. 12, 14, 21, and 24.

39 Interestingly, Communiqué No. 5 lists occupational sectors such as students, workers, etc., and vulnerable sectors such as children and older people, with women being clearly listed among the vulnerable rather than the occupational sector. “Oh our merchants, workers, peasants, students, children, women, older people, relatives, all relatives, Oh all sectors of our heroic people.” In the same communiqué, men, women, young and old people are called upon to resist the occupation. At the end of the same communiqué, women are listed with peasants, students, and workers.

40 Communiqués No. 12, 14, 21, and 24. In Communiqué No. 12, “men and children of the intifada” are the two categories of people listed as being detained by the Israeli occupation authorities.

41 Communiqué No. 12.

42 Communiqués No. 8 and 12.

43 Communiqué No. 8.

44 Communiqué No. 10.

45 Communiqué No. 12.

46 Communiqué No. 29.

47 Communiqué No. 30.

48 Communiqués No. 17 and 22.

49 Communiqué No. 21.

women, as daughters, are described as martyrs, they are listed with sons⁵⁰ They are also referred to, along with children and young and old people, as the “makers of the Intifada,”⁵¹ and are singled out to perform activities that the UNLU views as their responsibility⁵² These “responsibilities” include the commemoration of 8 March as International Women’s Day, with demonstrations against the occupation Women are praised for subordinating gender issues to national ones, and are asked implicitly to *transfer the legitimacy of their cause against sexual oppression to the national struggle*⁵³ The Women’s Committees (which are attached to the different branches of the national movement) have not articulated a clear gender agenda, although their 8 March communiqué addresses more directly the different facets of women’s activities during the Intifada Women’s activities in the Women’s Committees “remained an extension of [women’s] traditional roles in such fields as education and social services”⁵⁴

In 1989, in contrast to the tone of previous communiqués, the UNLU saluted the Palestinian woman and declared its “admiration for her heroism in the national struggle”⁵⁵ In 1990, the UNLU named its 8 March communiqué “The Woman’s Call,” in which a special section was devoted to women who were presented again in relational terms to men

Progressive nations celebrate International Women’s Day on 8 March as a day of struggle for the world’s women’s masses While celebrating this great day, in the name of all the sons of our people, we congratulate the world’s women’s masses and the masses of the Palestinian women’s movement and its vanguard organizations, hailing every working woman, woman struggler, and housewife, and especially our imprisoned strugglers We also pay tribute to the struggling role of the Palestinian uprising’s women’s movement, to every mother who has lost a son, daughter, husband, or brother, and to every woman who meets with a struggling daughter or a heroic son from behind the Bastille of the Zionist enemy⁵⁶

The communiqué proceeds to praise the Palestinian people for making history “through the blood of their sons”

The UNLU communiqués implicitly analogize the Intifada to a pregnancy While the Intifada is referred to as *entering* its eighth, ninth, or twelfth month,⁵⁷ the enemy’s attempt

50 Communiqué No 6

51 Communiqué No 12

52 Communiqués No 9, 12, and 23

53 On the dilemmas facing Palestinian women’s efforts to develop a feminist agenda in the context of national struggle, see Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, “Palestinian Women Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers,” in Zachary Lochman and Joel Beinin, eds., *Intifada The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation* (Boston: South End Press, 1989), pp 155–69

54 Islah Abdul-Jawwad, “The Evolution of the Political Role of the Palestinian Women’s Movement in the Uprising,” in Michael Hudson, ed., *The Palestinians New Directions* (Washington DC: Georgetown University, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), p 71

55 Communiqué No 35, cited in Joost Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada Labor and Women’s Movements in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p 201

56 Communiqué No 53, 6 March 1990, cited in *ibid*, p 201 All references to the communiqués issued in 1989 and 1990 are from Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, pp 200–201

57 See Communiqués No 21, 23, and 28 Like its English counterpart, the verb “to enter,” in Arabic, can be used to designate the beginning of periods, such as a storm “has entered its second day,” or a revolution “has entered its third year,” etc Its connection to pregnancy in this context, however, is made direct due to the

to repress it is constantly referred to as the enemy's attempt to *abort* it⁵⁸ Palestinian independence is clearly seen as the ultimate birth of the Intifada's pregnancy (see the Declaration) The Intifada is also viewed as "*the Palestinian wedding*," the apogee of heterosexual love⁵⁹ It seems that the outcome of the Intifada's pregnancy is both a birth and a wedding, in the sense that weddings inaugurate a new reproductive cycle—the reproduction of the next generation This places the heterosexual reproduction of the family at the center of the nationalist project The parties to the wedding seem to be none other than the Palestinians as nationalist agents, who are always already masculine, and Palestine, the mother/woman/land Once independence takes place, however, it is not clear whether Palestine the mother would be trusted again to conceive/reproduce the Palestinian people In the meantime, it is the Palestinian man who is the conceiver/reproducer of the nation In this vein, Yasir Arafat himself (who on some occasions is referred to as a "brother") is described as the "symbolic father" of the nation⁶⁰

MAPPING OUT PALESTINIAN MASCULINITY

Establishing a new model of anti-colonial masculinity was a much more complicated endeavor than its colonial counterpart In European nationalist discourses, as Chandra Mohanty argues, it was always European white masculinity that defined nationalist agency at home In the colonies, it was that same white colonial masculinity, made normative through European colonialism, which reigned supreme in dealing with the natives⁶¹ In adapting European nationalist thought to local conditions, anti-colonial nationalists were faced with the task of defining not only the roles of men and women in the nationalist project, but also what a non-European nationalist masculinity would look like, and what kind of performances would guarantee it In this vein, Palestinian nationalism, like other anti-colonial nationalisms, set itself similar tasks

Article 7 of the Palestinian National Charter refers to the Palestinian "individual," and is thus less gender-specific than the rest of the Charter Article 7 says that it is a Palestinian "national duty" to raise this "individual in an Arab and revolutionary way and all means of education and consciousness-raising [will be used] to acquaint the Palestinian with his homeland"⁶² The article also describes the national duty of the Palestinian individual who, after being raised according to the recommendations of Article 7, is rendered "qualified [to launch] armed struggle" as the "sacrific[ing] of his life and his

use of the verb "to abort" in reference to the Israeli occupiers' constant attempts to terminate the Intifada with military force

58 Communiqués No. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 28

59 Communiqué No. 29

60 Communiqué No. 28

61 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Introduction, Cartographies of Struggle: Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism," in Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, eds., *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 1–49

62 "Al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Filastini" (The Palestinian National Charter), in Hurani, *Al-Fikr* p. 236

money in the interest of retrieving his homeland until liberation”⁶³ This appeal to Palestinians includes not only the masculine ability to launch armed struggle, but also to have a bourgeois economic status. The appeal is made in the context of the Palestinian diaspora, where most of the Palestinian bourgeoisie now lives.

The trajectory of the metaphors of this discourse serves to produce a gendered mindset of agency with its own momentum. Speaking in 1974 at the United Nations about Palestinians in the diaspora, Arafat stated that Palestinian *sons*, educated in the diaspora, where they worked and contributed to the construction and development of neighboring countries, earned income which they used to help their younger and older relatives who could not leave the refugee camps. He emphasized that “the brother paid for the education of his brother and sister, and took care of his parents and raised his children, but continued to dream in his heart of returning to Palestine. He remained Palestinian, attached to his homeland with unrelenting loyalty, unweakened will, and untempered enthusiasm.”⁶⁴ Like all other political ideologies, nationalism is derived from its own social construction. In this vein, it is important to note the performative aspect of nationalist agency in Arafat’s text, whereby it is the brother’s *paying* for the education of his brother and sister, *taking care* of “his” parents, *raising* “his” children, and *dreaming* in “his” heart of *returning* to Palestine that characterize the agency of the Palestinian nationalist agent. Following Judith Butler, it is clear that the substantive effect of nationalist agency, like sexual and gender identities, is performatively produced and compelled by the regulatory practices of the coherence of the category of nationalist agency itself.⁶⁵ Given that nationalism, like all political positions, is perforce performative, *nationalist agency proves to be performatively constituted by the very expressions that are said to be its results*.

Clearly, when referring to Palestinians, a slippage occurs in the text of Arafat’s speech. “Palestinians” at times means both men and women, at others, “Palestinians” slips into men. What is important here is the context of this slippage. It is in defining the Palestinian nationalist agent and this agent’s commitment to Palestine that this agent slips from the ostensibly ungendered universal into the clearly masculine realm. This is not an uncharacteristic slip. Rather, as I show below, it is a reflection of how the masculine and the feminine are conceived within Palestinian nationalist thought.

While the Charter’s call on bourgeois Palestinians to sacrifice their money is made in the mid-1960s, Arafat’s portrait of the Palestinian nationalist agent is informed by the economic improvement in the lives of many Palestinians, inside the occupied territories and in the diaspora, over the next decade. Arafat’s Palestinian nationalist agent is working hard and obtaining money to support “his” family and educate “his” brothers and sisters. “He” is able to do this as a result of the economic opportunities that have opened up in the Gulf. These economic developments provide the context in which to portray the

63 Ibid. The rest of the Charter is written in the “universal” language of the individual. See Articles 17 and 30. On the always already gendered “universal” and its use in contract theory, see Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).

64 Arafat, “Al-Harb,” p. 16.

65 Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble, Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

Palestinian nationalist agent, not only as masculine, but also as bourgeois-in-the-making. In this regard, it is important to note that, while the future national status of the second brother is secured through his following in the footsteps of (performing like) the first older brother who educated him, the future national status of the sister, for whose education the Palestinian nationalist agent pays, is un contemplated by Arafat. In her autobiography, Layla Khalid, one of the better-known Palestinian guerrilla fighters of the 1960s and 1970s, agrees with Arafat on one count. Like him, she expects Palestinian men to follow a certain code of behavior. When the money that her revolutionary brother Muhammad promised to send for her tuition at the American University of Beirut was late in reaching her, she did not doubt her brother. He, "like all good Arab men, honoured his promises."⁶⁶ Like a "good" Arab woman herself, Khalid accepts her dependence on her brother.

In confronting the occupation in the context of the Intifada, the nationalist agent's body becomes the crucial instrument. One communiqué, for example, speaks to (male) students as follows: "You are the stronger body, you are the continuously pulsating artery among our people."⁶⁷ The comparative adjective "stronger" implicitly contrasts the Palestinian nationalist agent's body with the body of its male enemy. It is the nationalist agent's arm/hand, however, that is constantly invoked when describing the agent's body. Women, for example, are supposed to stand side by side with men, "in one line, and with one hand."⁶⁸ The UNLU states that "your [a masculine pronoun] strong arms which shake the foundations of the Zionist occupation are the same arms which will build the independent Palestinian state."⁶⁹ "Gaza's sons" in their thousands, the UNLU states, "went out of their den confronting with *their bodies* the occupier's machines [of destruction]."⁷⁰

The UNLU, however, conceives (of) the Palestinian people as one body, a man's body. It describes the Palestinian people's body as being a "giant [which] has *erected* itself and will not *bow*."⁷¹ Calls for the Palestinian people to rise up in a unified way are expressed in the UNLU's call to "rise as one man" in the face of siege,⁷² to defend the right of the people to struggle.⁷³ In this context, the battles against the enemy in which Palestinian children are killed are nothing but the "battles of *honor*, heroism, and sacrifice."⁷⁴ The Palestinian nationalist agent, in addition to being masculine and bourgeois-in-the-making, is young and able-bodied—free from the physical vulnerabilities of old age. "He" conceives (of) himself in terms of a group identity unifying him with the *shabiba* (male youth), with whom he struggles against the occupation. The self-masking of many Palestinian young men (and women), when confronting their occupiers

66 Leila Khaled, *My People Shall Live: The Autobiography of a Revolutionary*, ed. George Hajjar (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), p. 59.

67 Communiqué No. 4.

68 Communiqué No. 5.

69 Communiqué No. 17.

70 Communiqué No. 24 (emphasis added).

71 Communiqué No. 8 (emphasis added).

72 Communiqué No. 10.

73 Communiqué No. 22.

74 Communiqué No. 28 (emphasis added).

(for fear of being identified and punished by the Israelis), contributes to the erasure of their individual identities and the emergence of a strong collective one. The mask itself is usually the Palestinian *hatta* (the male head scarf or *kufiyya*), the symbol of Palestinian identity. Thus, struggling against the Israeli occupiers and colonizers is not only an affirmation of Palestinian nationalist agency, it is also a masculinizing act enabling the concrete pairing of nationalist agency and masculinity (the two being always already paired conceptually) and their logical inseparability within the discourse of nationalism. *Resisting occupation therefore can be used to stage masculine acts as it performs nationalist ones.* Through this national anti-colonial resistance, a new figuration of masculine bodies is mapped out on the terrain of the national struggle, one that becomes the model for Palestinian nationalist agency itself.⁷⁵

TOWARD A "POST-COLONIAL" FUTURE⁷⁶

Having examined the gender underpinnings of Palestinian nationalist thought, the following will look at how these impact the recent experience of Palestinian women in the Intifada, and women's prospects for liberation in a Palestinian independent state-to-be.

In the more recent past, Palestinian women's freedom of movement, dress, and behavior became highly restricted in Gaza as a result of the collaboration between the secular and religious strands of Palestinian nationalism. The secular nationalists assured women that this was a temporary arrangement, and that after liberation, women, too, would be free. This was not a tactical mistake that the secular leadership later declaredly regretted.⁷⁷ Rather, it was a political move that compromised very little nationalist ideology. It, in fact, followed directly from the way nationalist thought had always conceived the feminine and the masculine. It is within this context of nationalist thought, as always already gendered, that Ann McClintock underscores that "if nationalism is not

75 It is important to stress, however, that the discursive construction of Palestinian masculinity and its subordinate, femininity, permeates all types of Palestinian literary and cultural production the very same way European (and indeed global) nationalist construction of sexuality pervades not only European cultural production but also European policies toward Europe's own population and, by intersecting with the discourses on race and class, the peoples whom Europe colonized. For the experience of Palestinian women inside the Palestinian national movement, see the pioneering auto-critical study by Khadija Abu-'Ali, *Muqaddima Hawl Waqi' al-Mar'a wa Tajribatiha Fi al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya* (An Introduction about the Status and Experience of Women in the Palestinian Revolution) (Beirut: General Union of Palestinian Women, 1975). On the representation of Palestinian women in their traditional roles in poetry, see Ilham Abu-Ghazaleh, "The Portrayal of Women in Intifada Poetry" (Paper presented at the Alif Gallery, Washington DC, 1992). On the representation of women in Palestinian popular literature, see 'Abid 'Ubayd Al-Zuray'i, *Al-Mar'a fil-Adab al-Sha'bi al-Filastini* (The Woman in Popular Palestinian Literature), 2d ed. (Beirut: Manshurat al-Hadaf, 1986). On the portrayal of women in the Palestinian press, see Urayb Najar, "Al-Taghtiyya al-I'lamiyya lil-Nisa' fi Suhuf al-Difa al-Gharbiyya" (The Media Coverage of Women in the Press of the West Bank), in *Shu'un al-Mar'a* (Women's Issues) No. 3 (June 1992), pp. 142–58.

76 On the recent PLO-Israeli agreement, see Joseph Massad, "Repentant Terrorists or Settler-Colonialism Revisited: The PLO-Israeli Agreement in Perspective," *Found Object* 3 (1994), pp. 81–90. See, also, Joseph Massad, "Palestinians and the Limits of Racialized Discourse," *Social Text* 34 (1993), pp. 94–114.

77 Rema Hammami, "Women, the Hijab and the Intifada," *Middle East Report*, no. 164–165 (1990), pp. 24–28.

deeply informed by an analysis of gender power, the nation-state will remain a repository of male hopes, male aspirations, and male privilege”⁷⁸

Given the recent experience of Palestinian women in the Intifada, this view is shared by many a Palestinian woman activist and intellectual.⁷⁹ One activist with the Union of Palestinian Working Women’s Committees (UPWWC) stated that “men are still making the decisions [I]t will take a long time of struggle [to achieve equality], and we won’t automatically get our rights as women when we get our state”⁸⁰ Another activist emphasized that “[w]e realize that if we don’t raise issues now, we won’t be able to push them later on, and we’ll be abused by the national movement. We are struggling for independence, but we don’t want to compromise our role as women. The issue has come up now because we have realized through our work in the Intifada how important our role really is. This has given us confidence”⁸¹ The Intifada has created a new discursive space in which Palestinian women can challenge the dominant conception of Palestinian nationalist agency. Unfortunately, however, the strength and resilience of the masculinist axioms buttressing Palestinian nationalist thought are yet to be dented in any major way.⁸²

Despite the masculinist logic of Palestinian nationalist thought, Palestinian feminist Hanan ‘Ashrawi expresses, with some skepticism, a belief that Palestinian women will be able to free themselves within the framework of Palestinian nationalism.⁸³ She implies this by asserting that Palestinian feminists are “on the right track”⁸⁴ Hoping to avoid replicating the defeat of Algerian women after their revolution, ‘Ashrawi observes that Palestinian feminists “are trying to create a place for ourselves, to take part in the decision-making process,”⁸⁵ an eventuality, given the discursive axioms of Palestinian nationalism, that is far from assured. The Intifada has raised the consciousness of many women with regard to the gender agenda, as demonstrated in women’s publications during the Intifada. ‘Ashrawi’s claim, however, that “the grassroots work and organizational significance of the women’s committees in the social and economic transformation of society . . . has bestowed on the women’s movement credibility and legitimacy which

78 Ann McClintock, “No Longer in a Future Heaven: Women and Nationalism in South Africa,” *Transitions* 51 (1991), p. 122.

79 For more information on women and the Intifada, see Orayb Aref Najjar, *Portraits of Palestinian Women* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1992).

80 Interview with a UPWWC activist, Nablus, 17 December 1989, cited in Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, p. 200.

81 Interview with a UPWWC activist, Jerusalem, 21 October 1989, cited in *ibid.*, p. 203. In the context of the Intifada, Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson argue that Palestinian women “have enlarged or extended their traditional role rather than adopting a completely new role. Many of their forms of political participation are based on aspects of this role, particularly defense of family, nurturing and assisting family members, and mutual aid between kin. These aspects of women’s role have become a source of resistance because women have transformed their family responsibilities to encompass the entire community.” See Giacaman and Johnson, “Palestinian Women,” p. 161.

82 Palestinian women have been able, however, to force the UNLU to take up some of their issues. After months of struggle, the UNLU agreed to issue Communiqué No. 45, in which it opposed Hamas’s control over the daily lives of Gazan women. See Hammami, “Women, the Hijab and the Intifada.”

83 Rabab Hadi, “The Feminist Behind the Spokeswoman—A Candid Talk with Hanan Ashrawi” Interview in *Ms.*, 14–17 March/April 1992.

84 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

85 *Ibid.*

have made the articulation of feminist theory not only acceptable, but also desirable,”⁸⁶ is exaggerated. Whereas she is correct in claiming that women’s contributions to the Intifada have facilitated and led to the articulation of feminist issues by many Palestinian women, her claim that this contribution made the articulation of feminist theory “desirable,” ostensibly by the nationalist movement and/or Palestinian society, is not persuasive.⁸⁷

The Intifada has, indeed, increased women’s awareness of their position within nationalist thought and the nationalist movement. ‘Ashrawī, for example, responds to the male nationalist rhetoric that conceives of women as “hatcheries” by stating that the “male definition of self-value is based on their own progeny—ego about ‘the male line’ [K]eeping a woman pregnant and at home keeps her in a position of subservience, in a role which is biologically determined, according to men.”⁸⁸ Nevertheless, as ‘Ashrawī herself asserts, in the context of the Intifada, in which Palestinian men are interested in increasing the Palestinian population, and the Israeli occupiers are interested in limiting it, women’s bodies are the site of the battle with little control left to them over their own bodies. It is in this context of the Israeli tear- and poison-gas-induced miscarriages that Palestinian women are fighting to sustain a pregnancy, a right which the male leadership is supporting based on its own agenda.

In contrast to earlier conceptions of enemy-raped Palestinian women, the Intifada brought about some conceptual changes with regard to Palestinian women raped by Israeli Jews. ‘Ashrawī notes that

[W]omen who were in prison before [the Intifada] were not “marriageable commodities” because they’re “damaged goods.” With the Intifada there was a sudden change: released women prisoners became desirable because this was a source of honor—that you went to jail, that you had struggled—and the mythological questions of virginity or damaged goods were no longer questions. This was especially true because of support at the feminist level, from the women’s committees, and eventually from the general community.⁸⁹

It remains to be seen, however, whether this progressive change heralds more radical changes that could lead to the questioning of the masculine basis of Palestinian nationalist agency. In fact, ‘Ashrawī notes that this change was accompanied by a backlash: “families started trying to protect their daughters by bringing them back into the family unit through marriage, and sometimes early marriage.”⁹⁰

Although the Palestinian women’s movement, and women’s active participation in the Intifada, pressured the secular leadership into changing part of its conceptual

86 Hanan Mikhail Ashrawī, “The Politics of Cultural Revival,” in Hudson, *The Palestinians*, p. 81.

87 Despite the above-noted skepticism, the assumption that Palestinian women will legally obtain their rights along with national independence continues to prevail among many Palestinian women. As Islah Jad has argued, however, “a study of the Palestinian national movement does little to justify that assumption.” She adds that the “absence of social critique in the national movement, especially on the part of Fateh, which is its backbone, adds to the danger facing the women’s movement.” Islah Jad, “From Salons to the Popular Committees: Palestinian Women, 1919–1989,” in Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 138.

88 Hadi, “The Feminist,” p. 16.

89 Ibid., p. 15.

90 Ibid.

framework, the masculine still reigns supreme in Palestinian nationalist thought.⁹¹ The Palestinian anti-colonial struggle, since its beginnings, has transformed and continues to transform Palestinian women's lives and perceptions of their societal roles. These transformations, however, have not significantly changed the way Palestinian nationalist thought conceives (of) Palestinian women. They are still considered subordinate members of the nation. Palestinian nationalist thought has changed its conceptions over the decades regarding women's roles and duties to the nation, but these changes have always been made in response to changes in the Palestinian nationalist conception of men's roles in the national struggle, and to the exigencies of the national struggle itself. As such, the gap between men's and women's roles, and women's subordinate status, are maintained despite changes in the specificities of these roles in relation to the national struggle.⁹²

Palestinian women may have more say in Palestinian politics in the near future, but given their discursive construction in nationalist thought, they will be able to do so not as *Palestinian women* struggling for Palestinian women's rights, but as *Palestinian* women struggling for discursively constituted Palestinian rights, where Palestinian is always already conceived in the masculine. The recent performance of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) demonstrates the Palestinian leadership's commitment to the same masculine-supremacist path.⁹³ In the language of national liberation, one might add that no nation is free with half of its members being secondary and subservient. That this might be considered a specious argument is itself part of the symptom. If the Palestinian struggle does not develop this persistent auto-critique at its most embattled hour, the neglected lessons of history will make a possible victory pyrrhic.

91 On the lack of any major change in the way the nationalist movement views women, see Suhayr al-Taj's "Al-Mas'ala al-Ijtima'iyya, Intifada fi al-Intifada" (The Social Issue: The Uprising within the Uprising), *Sawt al-Watan* (The Nation's Voice) (Cyprus) (January 1990), pp. 15–18.

92 Here, it should be emphasized that post-1948 notions of Palestinian nationalist masculinity differ markedly from the pre-1948 period, insofar as Palestinian nationalist masculinity then did not include being bourgeois and educated as much as being a land-holder and/or a peasant who was unwilling to sell land to the Zionists, and who would fight to expel the colonists from Palestine. On Palestinian male guerrilla fighters' views of gender relations in relation to the national struggle, see Ghazi al-Khalili, *Al-Mar'a al-Filastiniyya wa al-Thawra* (The Palestinian Woman and the Revolution) (Beirut: Markaz al-Abhath, Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya, 1977).

93 See, for example, the critiques leveled by 'Ashrawi herself against the PNA's record on women in her recent autobiography, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 293–94. See, also, the papers presented at the Cairo Palestinian Population and Family Planning Conference, 3 April 1994, many (although not all) of which are pro-natalist and conceive of Palestinian women's bodies and their reproductive capacity as part and parcel of the national struggle. See especially Dhiyab 'Ayyush's paper, "Towards a National Population Policy in Palestine," which argues that the increase or decrease in the Palestinian population should be subject to the exigencies of the national struggle. 'Ayyush is the PNA's deputy minister of Social Welfare.

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
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Chronology

January 16, 1995-March 15, 1995

ABBREVIATIONS

FBIS, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*
Daily Report—Middle East & North Africa and
South Asia, Western Europe
FT, *The Financial Times*
JP, *The Jerusalem Post*
NYT, *The New York Times*
WP, *The Washington Post*
WSJ, *The Wall Street Journal*

Arab-Israeli Conflict

See also, Regional Affairs, Lebanon

1995

Jan 16 Israeli officials increased the number of housing units to be built in East Jerusalem and the West Bank by 1999 from 17,000 to 30,000 [1/17 WSJ]

In Cairo, the Egyptian parliament released a statement accusing Israel of overt hostility when Israel refused to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Egypt stated that its commitment to the treaty was contingent upon Israel's signature [1/19 WP]

Egyptian foreign ministry sources stated that Israel had granted Egypt most-favored-nation trading status, effective 1 January 1995 [1/17 FBIS]

Israeli transportation ministry representative Otm'el Schneller announced an agreement with Jordan to build rail lines from Haifa in Israel to Irbid in Jordan, from the Dead Sea to 'Aqaba and Elat, and from al-Safi, Jordan, to the southern Dead Sea [1/18 FBIS]

Jan 17: Demonstrations organized by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were staged at al-Birah and near Hebron and Nablus to protest continued con-

struction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Israeli soldiers wounded at least two Palestinians [1/17 FBIS, FT]

Jan. 18: In Jericho, Palestinian Salman Qurayshu died under interrogation by the Palestinian National Authority's (PNA) security forces. Qurayshu had been accused of collaborating with Israeli security forces [1/19 WP]

The PNA announced it had received only \$250 million of the \$787 million pledged by donor states, United Nations (UN) agencies, and the World Bank in 1994 [1/18 FBIS]

Algerian president Liamine Zeroual met with PLO chairman Yasir Arafat to discuss relations with Israel [1/18, 1/19 FBIS]

Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin stated to Meretz cabinet ministers that he had ordered a freeze on construction in the West Bank [1/19 FBIS]

At the Carthage Palace, Tunis, Tunisian president Zine al-'Abidine Ben 'Ali met with PLO chairman Arafat to discuss the status of Jerusalem [1/19 FBIS]

Jan. 19• Meeting in Erez with PLO chairman Arafat, Israeli prime minister Rabin stated that Israel would halt approval of new settlements and monitor existing construction. Further land confiscations from Arabs would be for the purpose of road construction to circumvent Arab towns and to hasten Israeli military evacuation [1/20 NYT, WP]

Palestinian security forces arrested four alleged Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) members at the Jabaliya refugee camp in Gaza [1/19 FBIS]

Jan 21 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), due to financial problems, reportedly disbanded 30 percent of its fighters who had served less than eight years and had stopped payments to families who had lost members in PFLP service [1/24 FBIS]

Jan 22. In Bet Lid, Israel, two car bombs exploded at a bus stop near an Israeli military base, killing 19 people and wounding 61. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility

and identified the bombers as Anwar Sukkar and Salah Shakir. Israel closed its borders with Gaza and the West Bank indefinitely and suspended Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [1/23 FT, NYT]

Jan. 24: In Cairo, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Palestinian negotiators met to draw up an agreement on return of Palestinian refugees of the June 1967 War [1/25 NYT]

US president Bill Clinton ordered a freeze on US assets of groups suspected of terrorist activities. Twelve organizations and 18 individuals were affected, including HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, Kach, Kahane Chai, and the PFLP [1/25 NYT]

In the West Bank, Israeli security forces arrested at least 60 Palestinians suspected of having ties to Islamic Jihad, ransacked a mosque, and closed down the Hebron offices of the Association of Religious Sages in Palestine [1/24 FBIS, 1/25 FT, WSJ]

Jan. 25: In Amman, PLO chairman Arafat met with Jordan's King Husayn to discuss bilateral relations [1/26 NYT]

The Israeli government approved the construction of 2,200 apartments in the West Bank near Jerusalem [1/26 NYT]

Jan. 26: Jordan and the PLO signed an accord turning over control of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem to the PLO. The accord also stipulated that the Jordanian dinar would become the official currency in the territories of Palestinian self-rule [1/27 FT]

Israeli settlers attempting to claim two hilltops in the West Bank near Jerusalem by occupying the hills with trailers and bulldozers were blocked by Israeli soldiers [1/27 WP]

Jan. 27: In Cairo, PLO chairman Arafat met with Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak to discuss bilateral relations, the peace process, and Arafat's 25 January talks with Jordan's King Husayn [1/27 FBIS]

Jan. 28: Near Kisan, in the West Bank, Palestinians and members of Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc) set fire to several structures erected by Israeli settlers several days earlier. Three Palestinians were arrested [1/30 FBIS]

An Israeli soldier wounded in the 22 January car bomb attack died, raising the death toll to 21 [1/29 NYT]

Jan. 29: In Herzliyya, north of Tel Aviv, 7,000 people attended a rally honoring the victims of the 22 January car bombing. Participants criticized Israeli prime minister Rabin's handling of the peace process [1/31 FBIS]

An Israeli military court in Hebron sentenced Palestinian Raziq Salah to life imprisonment for killing one Israeli soldier and wounding two others in Bethlehem in 1993 [1/31 FBIS]

The Israeli cabinet instructed Israeli police minister Moshe Shahal to develop a "separation plan" that would increase security along the border between Israel and the West Bank [1/31 FBIS]

Jan. 30: As part of the 26 October Israeli-Jordanian treaty, Israel turned over to Jordan 132 square miles of territory located along the Arava Valley [1/31 WSJ, NYT]

In Gaza City, The Local and Coordination Committees (LACC), the organization of international donors to

the PNA, allocated \$685 million to fund the PNA [2/1 FBIS]

In Jenin, in the West Bank, a military court sentenced Palestinian Muhammad Qumayl to life plus ten years in prison for aiding in the 6 April 1994 bombing in 'Afula, which killed eight people [1/31 FBIS]

Jan. 31: Israel demanded that the PNA turn over five Palestinians charged with killing four Israelis [2/1 WSJ]

The PNA claimed to have stopped three "operations" against Israel, resulting in an unspecified number of arrests [2/1 FBIS]

Feb. 1: Israel and the PNA agreed to build a seaport in Gaza City [2/6 FBIS]

Israeli security forces raided the offices of HAMAS's charity organization in the West Bank on suspicion that charity money was funding HAMAS military operations [2/1 FBIS]

Feb. 2: In Cairo, PLO chairman Arafat, Jordan's King Husayn, Egyptian president Mubarak, and Israeli prime minister Rabin attended a summit aimed at reviving the peace process. The leaders agreed to hold a series of meetings dealing with Palestinian elections, Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, and Israeli settlements. A joint statement condemned violence, reiterated commitment to the peace process, called for increased financial support of the PNA, and supported establishment of a regional development bank [2/2 FT, 2/3 NYT]

Feb. 4: In Amman, the Chambers of Commerce of Amman, Bethlehem, Jericho, and Ramallah signed an agreement to facilitate communication, investment, and trade between Jordan and the West Bank [2/8 FBIS]

Feb. 5: Egyptian president Mubarak met with US commerce secretary Ronald Brown to discuss removing regional trade barriers and supporting the local private sector [2/6 FBIS]

At a meeting in 'Aqaba, Jordan, Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres and Omani foreign minister Yusuf Bin-'Alawi agreed to open mutual interest sections [2/6 FBIS]

The Israeli government eased entry-ban restrictions, allowing doctors, nurses, teachers, and selected merchants to enter Israel from the West Bank and Gaza. The ban continued to affect an estimated 50,000 Palestinians employed in Israel [2/6 NYT]

Feb. 6: Israel and Jordan signed an accord on agriculture in which both sides agreed to cooperate on agricultural marketing, hygiene, research, and technology [2/7 FBIS]

Direct postal service began between Israel and Jordan in accordance with the 26 October 1994 treaty [2/6 FBIS]

In Gaza, near Nahal Oz, unidentified gunmen killed an Israeli security guard and wounded another. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) claimed responsibility [2/7 NYT, FBIS, 2/8 FBIS]

Palestinian police closed DFLP offices and arrested Palestinians suspected of having ties to the organization [2/8 WSJ, 2/10 FT]

Feb. 8: In Taba, Egypt, economic and trade ministers met to discuss trade issues related to the peace process. Representatives of Egypt, Israel, the PNA, and the

United States issued a statement supporting a regional trading bloc and pledged to increase co-operation, harmonize trade regulations, and decrease restrictions on foreign investments and flow of capital. Nabil Sha'ath, PLO representative to the negotiations, protested regional economic integration in light of Israeli "separation" plans [2/9 FT]

In Gaza, Palestinian security forces arrested 'Abd-al-Latif al-Hajj, a member of the DFLP's Central Committee, and 65-100 people believed to be associated with the DFLP [2/8 FBIS]

In Gaza, Palestinian police arrested 'Ala' al-Saftawi, the editor of the Islamic Jihad's newspaper *al-Istiqlal* [2/8 FBIS]

Palestinian police arrested Dr. Mahir al-Ghazali, a HAMAS leader and member of the board of directors of the Islamic University in Gaza [2/9 FBIS]

Israeli security forces arrested 21 alleged HAMAS and Islamic Jihad members in the West Bank [2/9 FBIS]

Israeli police minister Shahal revealed that the "separation" plan the Israeli cabinet had instructed him to develop, on 29 January, consisted of patrol roads along the border with the West Bank, observation posts, patrols, and electronic surveillance [2/9 FBIS]

Feb. 9. PLO chairman Arafat met with Israeli prime minister Rabin at the Erez checkpoint in the Gaza Strip. Rabin refused to open borders between Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank [2/10 NYT]

Supporters of PLO chairman Arafat clashed with Arafat opponents at the 'Ayn al-Hilwa camp in Sidon, Lebanon [2/10 FBIS]

Feb. 11. Jordan's Council of Ministers approved a bill that struck down laws boycotting Israel and prohibiting real estate sales to, and trade with, Israel [2/14 FBIS]

Feb. 12. In Washington, US president Clinton met with the foreign ministers of Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, and a senior PLO representative. Israel and Jordan pledged to continue negotiations on Israeli troop redeployment and elections in the West Bank and Gaza [2/13 FT]

Feb. 13. New York-based Human Rights Watch issued a report that accused the PNA of "political arrests, press censorship, and prisoner beating" [2/13 WP]

Palestinian police arrested four Fatah Hawks members suspected of attacks on Israeli targets [2/14 FBIS]

Feb. 14. In Cairo, Egypt and the Arab League formulated a draft treaty to establish the Middle East as a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The treaty would include Israel and Iran [2/15 FT]

In Hebron, Israeli security forces clashed with protesting Palestinians on the Islamic anniversary of the 25 February 1994 shooting by Baruch Goldstein of Muslims praying at the Tomb of the Patriarchs. At the al-Fawar refugee camp, one Palestinian was killed and six others were wounded in clashes [2/15 WP, WSJ]

Feb. 15. In Gaza, prominent human rights lawyer Raji al-Surani was detained for 16 hours by the PNA for criticizing PLO chairman Arafat's proposal to establish security courts [2/16 NYT]

Rabbi Moshe Levings, founder and leader of the settler movement, and his wife Miriam were arrested by

Israeli police on 10-month-old charges of assaulting police [2/16 WP]

Egypt banned the *Jerusalem Post* because of an unfavorable opinion article [2/16 FBIS]

Israel released two Palestinian-Americans arrested on 12 February on suspicion of funding a Palestinian militant group [2/16 NYT]

Feb. 16: At an Erez checkpoint meeting with PLO chairman Arafat, Israeli prime minister Rabin agreed to admit into Israel 10,000 Palestinian laborers from Gaza and 5,000 from the West Bank [2/17 NYT]

Secretary General of the Arab League 'Isamat 'Abd-al-Majid stated that Arab countries would only sign the NPT after Israel had signed the treaty [2/17 NYT]

Feb. 17: PLO chairman Arafat rejected an Israeli offer for the PNA to assume control of municipal and economic affairs of Jenin as long as Israel remained in charge of security [2/18 NYT]

Feb. 19. Israel approved the expansion of Jewish settlements by 1,800 homes in the vicinity of East Jerusalem [2/20 WP]

In Gaza, Palestinian security forces arrested Yasir Husayn, leader of HAMAS's Qassam brigade, and two aides [2/22 FBIS]

Feb. 21: In Tunis, PLO chairman Arafat met with Tunisian president Ben 'Ali to discuss Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [2/22 FBIS]

In Cairo, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators agreed that international observers should be present during Palestinian elections [2/22 FBIS]

Israeli prime minister Rabin announced that Germany was negotiating with Iran for the release of an Israeli pilot shot down in Lebanon in 1986 [2/22 NYT]

In the West Bank, Shaykh Jamil Hamami, an alleged political leader of HAMAS, was arrested by Israeli security forces [2/22 FBIS]

Feb. 22. In Cairo, following PLO executive committee meetings, PLO chairman Arafat met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss the committee's released statement [2/22 FBIS]

At the Safa Palace, PLO chairman Arafat met with Saudi Arabia's King Fahd to discuss the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations [2/21, 2/23 FBIS]

Feb. 23. In Cairo, Israeli foreign minister Peres met with Egyptian president Mubarak and foreign minister 'Amr Musa to discuss the NPT [2/23 FBIS, 2/24 WP]

Feb. 26: PLO chairman Arafat terminated police recruitment and announced plans to fire 2,000 police from its force of 9,000. An agreement with Israel limited the PNA to 6,000 officers [2/28 FBIS]

The PNA ordered the closing of the *al-Rasid* bulletin, published in Gaza, because of an article allegedly detrimental to PNA-Jordanian relations [2/27 FBIS]

The PNA allowed the reopening of the Al-Abrar press office—publisher of *al-Istiqlal*, a newspaper associated with the Islamic Jihad—which was closed on 8 February [2/27 FBIS]

Feb. 27. In Jericho, the Palestinian-Israeli Economic Committee agreed that Israeli moves toward security "separation" would not interfere with Palestinian-Israeli economic cooperation [2/28 FBIS]

Jordan refused to accept Israel's deportation of Muhammad Jamil al-'Isawi, an officer of the Palestinian Security Service and former bodyguard to PLO chairman Arafat, who had been arrested 16 January [2/27, 3/1 FBIS]

Fourteen Palestinians were wounded in a clash with Israeli security forces in Hebron [2/28 FBIS]

Mar 1 Major General Ilan Biran, commander of the Israeli Central Command, prohibited assembly, procession, or vigils in the West Bank without permission [3/2 FBIS]

In al-Karamah, Jordan, Israeli tour buses were struck by rocks, but no serious injuries were reported [3/10 FBIS]

Mar 2 Palestinian police released 'Ala' al-Saftawi, editor of *al-Istiqlal*, which had reopened on 26 February [3/3 FBIS]

An Israeli court fined and sentenced to four months imprisonment Arye Bar-Yoseph, Shmuel Ben-Yishai, and Amnon Tadmor for praising Baruch Goldstein, perpetrator of the 25 February 1994 massacre at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron [3/3 JP]

Mar 4 In Gaza, two Palestinians wanted by Israel for murder and two Islamic clerics with alleged ties to HAMAS were arrested by Palestinian police [3/6 FBIS]

Mar 5 Israel opened its borders to 3,000 more Palestinian laborers but limited the permits to married men over 30 who had worked in Israel before the closure. In addition, 500 Jerusalem tourism workers from the West Bank and 750 students from Gaza gained admittance [3/3 FBIS, WP]

Mar 7 Near Amman, Israeli foreign minister Peres met with Egyptian, Jordanian, and Palestinian representatives to discuss the status of Palestinian refugees from the June 1967 War [3/8 FT]

The Israeli military announced that Israeli soldiers were being trained to replace Palestinian laborers excluded from Israel since 22 January [3/8 FT]

Mar 8: US secretary of state Warren Christopher arrived in Cairo on the first stop of a week-long regional tour aimed at furthering negotiations between Israel and Syria and facilitating agreement on the NPT [3/8 FT, 3/9 NYT]

Mar. 9 At the Erez checkpoint, PLO chairman Arafat met with Israeli foreign minister Peres and set a 1 July 1995 target date for agreements on Israeli military redeployment in the West Bank and Palestinian elections. Arafat promised to crack down on Islamists, and Peres vowed to open safe transportation lines between Gaza and the West Bank and to allow 22,000 Palestinian laborers into Israel [3/10 FBIS, FT, NYT]

In Cairo, Egyptian president Mubarak met with US secretary of state Christopher to discuss the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and the NPT [3/9 FBIS]

In 'Aqaba, Jordan's King Husayn met with Israeli prime minister Rabin to discuss bilateral relations [3/10 FBIS]

US secretary of state Christopher met with Israeli prime minister Rabin to discuss regional issues [3/10 NYT]

Mar 10: US secretary of state Christopher met with PLO chairman Arafat to discuss regional violence and US aid to Palestinians [3/11 NYT]

Mar 11 In Cairo, PLO chairman Arafat met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss Palestinian-Israeli negotiations [3/13 FBIS]

The Cairo-based *al-Wafd* daily reported that Egypt had suspended official visits to Israel in response to Israeli intransigence over the NPT [3/16 FBIS]

Mar 12 In Jidda, US secretary of state Christopher met with Saudi Arabia's King Fahd to discuss a regional development bank and the NPT [3/13 NYT]

Palestinian police in Gaza reportedly defused two bombs along a route which PLO chairman Arafat was scheduled to travel [3/14 FBIS]

The Agence France Presse (AFP) reported that the PNA censored a critical article in the *Sahil al-Filastini* monthly [3/13 FBIS]

Mar 13 In Damascus, US secretary of state Christopher met with Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad to discuss the Israeli-Syrian deadlock over the Golan Heights [3/13 WP]

In Amman, US secretary of state Christopher met with Jordan's King Husayn to discuss a regional development bank and Israeli-Syrian negotiations [3/14 FBIS]

In Jenin, Israeli forces confiscated documents at the Awqaf (religious properties) Department [3/14 FBIS]

Mar 14 In Gaza, British prime minister John Major met with PLO chairman Arafat [3/15 FT]

In Damascus, US secretary of state Christopher met with Syrian president Asad. Asad agreed to resume direct talks with Israel. Christopher met earlier with Israeli prime minister Rabin in Jerusalem [3/15 NYT, WSJ]

After arriving from Israel, British prime minister Major met with Jordan's King Husayn and Crown Prince Hasan in Amman to discuss regional peace and bilateral economic relations [3/15 FBIS]

In Cairo, Israeli representative Joel Zinger and Palestinian representative Sa'ib 'Urayqat met to negotiate terms of Palestinian elections and Israeli troop redeployment in the West Bank [3/15 FBIS]

Mar 15 Egyptian authorities lifted the ban on the *Jerusalem Post*, which had been imposed 20 February [3/17 FBIS]

Mar 16 In Washington, Morocco's King Hassan II met with US president Clinton to discuss the peace process [3/16 NYT]

At the Carthage Palace in Tunis, PLO chairman Arafat met with Tunisian president Ben 'Ali to discuss the status of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [3/17 FBIS]

The PNA rejected Israel's proposal to establish a Palestinian state in Gaza and to postpone talks on the status of the West Bank for 20 years [3/17 FBIS]

Egyptian and Moroccan publishers attended the Jerusalem International Book Fair. They were the first Arabs to participate in the book fair [3/17 JP]

Mar 18 Israel participated in the Cairo International Trade Fair for the first time since 1987 [3/23 FBIS]

The newspaper *al-Istiqlal*, associated with the Islamic Jihad, resumed production following the 26 February re-opening of its press office, closed by the PNA on 8 February [3/20 FBIS]

Mar 19: In Hebron, Palestinians fired on an Israeli settlers' bus, killing two and wounding at least five. Settlers retaliated by ransacking several Palestinian shops until Israeli soldiers intervened [3/20 NYT]

Israel set a 25,000-person ceiling on the number of Palestinian laborers from the West Bank and Gaza allowed to cross the border [3/20 FBIS]

Mar 22: In Amman, US vice president Al Gore met with Jordan's King Husayn to discuss the peace process and bilateral relations [3/22 FBIS]

In southern Israel, Israeli forces arrested two alleged HAMAS members driving a truck registered in Gaza and equipped with explosives. Israel subsequently banned the entry of all vehicles into Israel from Gaza [3/22 WP]

Palestinian security forces arrested at least 70 alleged HAMAS members in Gaza City [3/22 FBIS]

Mar 23 In Cairo, PLO chairman Arafat met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss bilateral relations and the peace process [3/24 FBIS]

In Jerusalem, US vice president Gore met with Israeli prime minister Rabin and foreign minister Peres to discuss bilateral relations, the NPT, Iran, and the regional peace process [3/24 FBIS]

Mar 24: In Jericho, US vice president Gore met with PLO chairman Arafat and announced that \$65 million in US aid would be given to the PNA and that products and produce from PNA-administered areas could enter the United States duty-free [3/25 FBIS]

The PNA banned Israeli produce from entering Gaza in retaliation for an Israeli ban on Palestinian bananas and vegetables [3/28 FBIS]

Mar. 26 Israeli negotiator Zinger and Palestinian negotiator 'Urayqat met in Jericho to discuss Palestinian elections and Israeli troop redeployment in the West Bank [3/27 FBIS]

Mar 27 In Washington, Syrian ambassador to the United States, Wahid al-Mu'allim, and Israeli ambassador to the United States, Itamar Rabinovich, met to discuss Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights [3/29 FBIS]

Mar. 28 In Cairo, Palestinian-Israeli negotiations led by 'Urayqat and Zinger covered Palestinian elections and Israeli troop redeployment in the West Bank. The PNA rejected an Israeli plan for initial Israeli evacuation of Jenin and Nablus [3/29 FBIS]

Mar 29 In Gaza, Israeli soldiers shot to death a Palestinian truck driver who allegedly struck an Israeli police vehicle killing two police officers [3/30 WP]

Mar 30. Saudi Arabia announced that Israeli Arabs travelling to Mecca would be required to carry a Palestinian passport [3/30 FBIS]

Mar 31 Israeli officials reported that Syrian president Asad, during a discussion with US secretary of state Christopher on his 13-14 March visit, had agreed to establish low-level diplomatic relations with Israel prior to complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights [4/1 NYT]

Apr 1 Israel increased to 27,000 the number of entry permits issued to Palestinian laborers from Gaza and the West Bank [4/4 FBIS]

Apr 2: Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev met with Israeli prime minister Rabin to discuss the Syrian position on peace talks, the status of Palestinian elections, and the NPT [4/3 FBIS]

An explosion killed between three and eight people and wounded 30 in Gaza City. PNA officials stated that members of the HAMAS Qassam Brigade had been constructing bombs when the explosives accidentally detonated. Among the dead was Kamal Khayl, a senior leader of the Qassam Brigade [4/3 NYT, WP]

Apr 3: Israel's Labor Party Secretary General Nisim Zvili stated that the government was conducting unofficial talks with HAMAS political leaders aimed at including HAMAS in Palestinian elections [4/4 FBIS]

Demonstrators in Gaza City accused the PNA and Israel of killing HAMAS members in the explosion in Gaza City on 2 April [4/4 NYT]

Apr 4: In Jericho, Palestinian negotiator 'Urayqat met with Israeli negotiator Zinger to discuss Palestinian elections. The Palestinians received lists of eligible voters over 18 years old and maps to be used in drawing up constituencies [4/5 FBIS]

Israel and Jordan signed an agreement pledging cooperation in the field of tourism [4/5 FT]

Apr. 5 The PNA arrested five members of its intelligence service accused of killing Palestinian Muhammad al-Jundi, who had been arrested for collaborating with Israel [4/6 NYT]

Palestinian police arrested ten HAMAS members in connection with the 2 April explosion in Gaza City [4/5 FBIS]

In Gaza, lawyer Raji al-Surani was fired by the board of directors of the Gaza Center for Human Rights for publishing a statement criticizing PLO chairman Arafat's establishment of security courts [4/5 FBIS]

Apr 6 In Paris, Egyptian foreign minister Musa met with Israeli foreign minister Peres to discuss the NPT. No progress was reported [4/7 FBIS]

PLO chairman Arafat stated that Israeli explosives were found at the site of the 2 April Gaza City explosion that killed several HAMAS members [4/6 FT]

Apr 9: Near Kfar Darom, an Israeli settlement in Gaza, a car-bomb attack on an Israeli bus killed six Israeli soldiers and wounded 30 others. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack [4/10 NYT]

Near Netzarim, a car bomb attack on a convoy of Israeli vehicles killed one Israeli police officer and wounded two others. HAMAS claimed responsibility for the attack [4/10 FT, NYT]

Israel responded to the two attacks by closing two main roads in Gaza to Palestinian vehicles [4/10 FBIS]

Apr 10: In Cairo, Palestinian negotiator 'Urayqat and Israeli negotiator Zinger met to discuss Israeli troop redeployment and Palestinian elections [4/11 FBIS]

Marwan Mu'ashshur, Jordan's first ambassador to Israel, presented his credentials to the Israeli government, and Shimon Shamir, Israel's first ambassador to Jordan, presented his credentials to the Jordanian government [4/11 FBIS, NYT]

The death toll from the Kfar Darom car-bomb attack rose to eight when a US student and an Israeli soldier died [4/11 NYT]

Palestinian police arrested approximately 150 alleged HAMAS and Islamic Jihad members [4/10, 4/11 FT]

The PNA's special security court sentenced Samir 'Ali al-Jidi, an Islamic Jihad member, to 15 years imprisonment for training youths to carry out anti-Israeli suicide missions [4/11 FT, NYT]

Apr 11 In Cairo, PLO chairman Arafat met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss Palestinian-Israeli negotiations [4/12 FBIS]

Palestinian police arrested HAMAS leader Dr 'Umar Farawanah and journalist 'Imad al-Franji [4/12 FBIS]

The Right Movement for Championing the Palestinian People's Sons split from HAMAS and declared support for the PNA. The Palestinian National Democratic Grouping (PNDG) split from the PFLP and declared support for the PNA [4/12 FBIS]

Apr. 12. The PNA ordered the registration of all firearms by 11 May. Palestinian police also arrested an unspecified number of HAMAS and Islamic Jihad supporters [4/12 FBIS]

Apr 13. PNA official Rashid Abu-Shibak stated that 450 Gaza residents, including several HAMAS leaders, had been issued firearms licenses [4/14 FBIS]

Apr 14: Israel closed its borders to Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza from 14–23 April, during the Jewish Passover holiday [4/13 FT, 4/14 FBIS]

Palestinian police released 30 alleged HAMAS and Islamic Jihad members, arrested after the 9 April car-bomb attacks in Gaza [4/18 FBIS]

Apr 15. In Gaza, the PNA's special security court sentenced Islamic Jihad member 'Aziz al-Shami to 15 years imprisonment for "offenses against the state" [4/18 FBIS]

Central Asia and Transcaucasia

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Iran

1995

Jan. 21 Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed an agreement establishing "joint forces" with Russia. The agreement provided for combined Kazakh-Russian units, four bases in Kazakhstan under Russian control, and expatriate citizens' rights [1/25 WSJ]

Feb 5: Kyrgyzstan held its first post-Soviet election [2/6 FT]

Feb 8: Kazakhstan received assurances from China that it would "not use or threaten to use" nuclear weapons against Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan expressed concern over nuclear weapons tests in China's Xinjiang province [2/9 FT]

Feb 9: Kyrgyzstan signed an accord with the European Union (EU) covering commercial, economic, and polit-

ical relations. Each party granted the other most-favored-nation trading status [2/10 FT]

Feb 18 In presidential and parliamentary elections held in Kyrgyzstan, 61 percent of those registered voted, and 60 percent of the parliamentary seats were filled [2/21, 2/22 FT]

Feb 21: Turkmenistan's President Saparmurat Niyazov declared that government debt to banks was forgiven. Niyazov also ordered banks to give the government 75 percent of their 1994 income [2/21 FT]

Feb 26 Parliamentary elections were held in Tajikistan. Opposition leaders charged that President Imomali Rakhmonov manipulated the elections [2/27 FT]

Mar. 11: The Kazakhstan Parliament was dissolved by President Nazarbayev after the Constitutional Court ruled that the March 1994 elections did not comply with the Constitution. Nazarbayev declared he would rule by decree until elections could be held [3/12 NYT, 3/13 FT]

Mar. 13 In Baku, Azerbaijan, forces of the former Deputy Minister of the Interior Rovshan Dzhavadov attacked a police station. Two people were killed, and one was injured [3/16 FT]

Mar 16: In Kazakhstan, members of the parliament, dissolved on 11 March by President Nazarbayev, occupied the parliament building [3/16 FT]

Mar. 17 Azerbaijani army forces reportedly killed former Deputy Minister of the Interior Dzhavadov in an attack that crushed his rebel forces [3/18 NYT]

Mar 21. Russian soldiers shot to death 35 armed men attempting to cross into Tajikistan from Afghanistan [3/22 FT]

Mar 26 The term of Uzbek president Islam Karimov was extended from 1997 until 2000 during a special referendum [3/27 FT, 3/28 WP]

Apr. 6 In Almaty, US secretary of defense William Perry met with Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev and announced that the United States was supplying \$14.4 million to convert former Soviet nuclear and biological weapons facilities to commercial use [4/6 WP]

Apr 9. Ongoing clashes between Tajik opposition and Russian border troops along the Tajik-Afghan border resulted in at least 23 deaths [4/10 FT]

Apr 10. Kazakhstan and Germany signed trade and anti-crime agreements [4/11 FT]

Apr 11: Russian forces killed 47 Tajik opposition fighters on the Tajik-Afghan border in raids on two of their bases. Thirty-one Russian border guards and 160 Tajik opposition fighters were reportedly killed in six days of clashes [4/12 NYT, 4/13 WSJ]

Petroleum Affairs

See also, Iran, Kuwait

1995

Jan 19 In Moscow, Caspian Pipeline Consortium members Kazakhstan, Oman, and Russia announced initiation of the first stage of a pipeline that would

transport oil from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk [1/20 WSJ]

Jan 28. Iran and Pakistan agreed to establish a consortium to build a gas pipeline between the two countries [1/30 FBIS]

Feb 4 Algeria and Tunisia signed an agreement that would allow the transfer of Algerian natural gas over Tunisian territory for transport to Italy [2/8 FBIS]

Feb. 5 The US firm Enron, the Russian firm Gazprom, and the Uzbek state energy company, Uzbekneftegaz, signed an agreement to develop gas fields in Uzbekistan [2/6 FT]

Feb. 6 Turkey announced that it would purchase from Azerbaijan a 5-percent stake in a Caspian Sea offshore oil venture [2/7 FT]

Feb 9 The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) announced its agreement with Oman to develop the joint natural-gas field of Hangam-Khasib [2/10 FBIS]

Feb 13 The San Francisco-based Chevron corporation announced a 40-percent reduction in spending on the major oil field of Tengiz in Kazakhstan [2/13 WSJ]

The Russian gas firm Gazprom gained a 15-percent stake in the Karachaganak gas project in Kazakhstan in an agreement signed by Russia and Kazakhstan [2/13 WSJ]

Mar 2 The Russian oil group, Lukoil, agreed to join Socor, Azerbaijan's state oil company, to explore and develop Caspian Sea oil and gas fields [3/2 FT]

Yemen awarded the French oil group Total a \$3-billion petroleum production and export contract [3/2 FT]

The Italian firm Agip, British Gas, and the Russian firm Gazprom agreed to a \$5-billion deal to develop the natural-gas field of Karachaganak, Kazakhstan [3/3 FT]

Mar. 5. An unnamed Dutch company signed an agreement with the NIOC to develop and export oil from Iran's Sirri oil fields [3/6 FBIS]

Mar 15: The German IAB and the Dutch John Brown companies reached an agreement with the NIOC to reconstruct Iran's Pars and Abvzar oil fields [3/16 FBIS]

Pakistan and Turkmenistan agreed to cooperate on a gas pipeline project to connect a gas field in Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan [3/17 FBIS]

Mar 23. The French oil group Total signed a \$6-billion agreement with Yemen to establish a liquefied natural gas project [3/23 WSJ]

Mar 27. The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation agreed to supply SASOL Oil of South Africa with 25,000 barrels of crude oil per day [3/28 FBIS]

Jordan announced the establishment of a national oil company to attract foreign investment in petroleum exploration and development [3/28 FT]

Apr 11. Azerbaijan reportedly refused to include Iran in a \$7.4-billion plan to develop Caspian Sea oil US deputy energy secretary William H. White announced that Exxon Corporation was awarded a 5-percent stake in the project instead of the NIOC [4/11 FT, WP]

Regional Affairs

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict

1995

Jan. 17 In London, British police arrested two women and three men in connection with the 26 July 1994 bombing of the Israeli embassy and the 27 July 1994 bombing of the Balfour House. The suspects were reported to be Palestinians [1/18 WSJ, NYT]

Jan 20: In Tunis, interior ministers from Algeria, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Tunisia met to discuss the Algerian crisis, immigration from the Maghrib to Europe, and Islamist activity. Morocco decided not to participate [1/20 FT, 1/25 FBIS]

Jan 21 In 'Aqaba, Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak met with Jordan's King Husayn. This was the first visit to Jordan from Mubarak since diplomatic relations were suspended during Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait [1/22 NYT, WP, 1/23 FBIS]

Jan. 24. In Riyadh, Yemeni and Saudi Arabian officials met to negotiate a solution to their border dispute, which erupted into clashes throughout December 1994 [1/27 FT]

Jan 27. The Arab Writers' Union announced the expulsion of poet 'Ali Ahmad Sa'id, pseudonym "Adonis," for attending a meeting with Israeli intellectuals in 1993 [3/7 NYT]

Jan 30 Twelve defendants accused of planning attacks against the United States, on 4 July 1993, went on trial in New York City. Jury selection began on 9 January. The men, led by Egyptian Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, were accused of plotting to blow up New York facilities, including the Lincoln and Holland tunnels [1/31 WP]

Jan 31 Iran and Turkmenistan signed a cooperation agreement covering areas of banking, customs, trade, and transportation [2/1 FBIS]

Feb 8: Iraqi officials announced that they had signed an aviation transportation agreement with Qatar, giving each country the right to name official carriers between the two countries [2/9 FBIS]

Greece rejected a French-proposed EU plan to establish an EU-Turkey customs union in return for negotiations on Cypriot admission to the EU [2/6 FBIS, 2/10 FT]

Israeli officials reportedly evacuated 1,000 people of "Jewish extraction" from northern Iraq via Turkey [2/17 FBIS]

Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf, accused of being the mastermind of the 26 February 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was arraigned in New York and pleaded not guilty to all charges. Yusuf was arrested in Pakistan on 7 February and was extradited to the United States on 8 February [2/10 NYT]

Feb 11 The Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) claimed responsibility for killing five Tunisian guards at Tamerza, Tunisia [2/17 NYT]

Feb. 14. Turkish president Tansu Çiller ordered the border between Turkey and Armenia opened and lifted the embargo against Armenia [2/17 FBIS]

Feb. 16: Bahrain and Qatar agreed to seek Saudi Arabian mediation of their border dispute [2/17 FBIS]
Feb. 17 The United States agreed to pay \$400 million to the Italian Banca Nazionale del Lavoro to cover government-guaranteed loans on which Iraq had defaulted in August 1990 [2/18 NYT]

In the first extradition from Turkey to Iran since 1949, Turkey sent Iranian national 'Ah Asghar Shokrollah to Iran on swindling charges [2/21 FBIS]

Feb. 25. Cyprus and Israel agreed to measures designed to decrease the smuggling of antiques, arms, and drugs, and to combat fraud [2/27 FBIS]

Feb. 26 In Mecca, Saudi Arabia and Yemen signed a Memorandum of Understanding that recognized the 20 May 1934 Ta'if Accord as the basis for negotiating their border dispute [2/27 FBIS, FT]

Feb. 28. The Paris-based Agence France Presse (AFP) reported the massing of Turkish military forces, including tanks and heavy artillery, on the Iraqi border [3/1 FBIS]

Mar 6: The EU announced an agreement in which Greece would withdraw its veto of an EU-Turkish customs union in return for a timetable for Cyprus accession talks [3/5 FT, 3/7 NYT]

Mar. 9• China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan signed an agreement guaranteeing free transit for each other's goods [3/10 FBIS]

Mar. 11 Azerbaijan and Iran signed an agreement in which they would cooperate on commercial and tourist customs services and share information about smuggling of goods and drugs [3/13 FBIS]

Mar 14 In Islamabad, Iranian president 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani met with Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto to discuss transportation and petroleum issues. The two countries agreed to cooperate on several rail-transport and industrial projects [3/16 FBIS]

In Islamabad, Afghan president Borhanuddin Rabbani met with Iranian president Rafsanjani to discuss bilateral relations [3/16 FBIS]

Mar 15• Bahrain and Oman agreed to link their stock exchanges, the first such deal in the region [4/26 FT]

Mar 16 In Hormozgan Province, Iran, Kyrgyzstan president Askar Akayev, Afghan president Rabbani, and Iranian president Rafsanjani arrived to inaugurate the Bafq-Bandar 'Abbas rail-link [3/17 FBIS]

Mar. 20 Turkish forces, numbering approximately 35,000, invaded northern Iraq to crack down on Iraq-based Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) forces [3/21 FT, WSJ]

Mar 21. The Turkish government reported that eight Turkish soldiers and 200 PKK members were killed on the second day of the Turkish offensive against the PKK in northern Iraq [3/22 NYT]

Mar 22• Iraq condemned the Turkish offensive into northern Iraq as a violation of its sovereignty [3/23 NYT]

Mar 23 French foreign minister Alain Juppé and German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel condemned Turkey's announcement that it intended to establish a buffer zone in Iraq against PKK incursions [3/24 NYT]

In London, a Lebanese citizen, Samar 'Alami, was charged with the 26 July 1994 bombing in London of the Israeli embassy and other Jewish offices [3/24 NYT]

Mar 24 Turkish forces surrounded an estimated 2,400 PKK fighters in two areas, Metina and Hakurk, in northern Iraq [3/25 NYT, 3/27 FBIS]

The Turkish invasion of northern Iraq reportedly resulted in numerous instances of torture, beatings, looting, and destruction of villagers' property by Turkish soldiers. Turkish warplanes reportedly bombed villages suspected of harboring PKK forces [3/24 FT, WSJ]

Mar 25 Tunisia and the Palestine National Authority (PNA) signed an agreement on employment and worker training [3/27 FBIS]

Mar 26• The United Nations (UN) evacuated 1,000 Kurds from Zakho, Turkey, in the face of the Turkish offensive against the PKK in northern Iraq [3/27 FT]

Mar 27 Turkey prohibited journalists reporting on the Turkish offensive from entering northern Iraq [3/28 WSJ]

Mar 28: Turkish forces captured a Kurdish camp near Kirkuk, killing 62 Kurdish fighters [3/29 NYT, WP]

One hundred seventy-seven Kurdish refugees, fearing Turkish Army forces, forced entry into a UN aid base in northern Iraq. The UN agreed to transport the refugees to safety [3/29 WP, WSJ]

Mar 29• Turkish forces reportedly destroyed the Kurdish village of Beshile, causing an unspecified number of residents to flee [3/30 WP]

Apr 1. Libyan officials notified Egypt that Libyan aircraft carrying pilgrims to Mecca would cross Egyptian airspace [4/3 FBIS]

Apr 2 In San'a, a joint Saudi-Yemeni military committee met to discuss application of the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 26 February [4/4 FBIS]

Police in the Philippines announced they had arrested six men—two Jordanians, a Lebanese, an Omani, a Syrian, and a United Arab Emirates national—because of their association with Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman and Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf [4/3 NYT]

Apr 3 Sudan and Libya signed an agreement on information and cultural cooperation [4/6 FBIS]

Libyan President Mu'ammarr Qadhafi mediated a meeting between Sudanese and Ugandan officials aimed at settling Sudanese-Ugandan disputes over support for each other's opposition groups [4/5 FBIS]

Gulf Air, owned by Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar, canceled an approximately \$1.4-billion order for 12 Boeing 747s, citing overcapacity [4/4 FT, WSJ]

The Tel Aviv-based *Ha'aretz* reported that Israel had requested the disbanding of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which had been on the Jordanian-Israeli border since 1949 [4/5 FBIS]

Apr 4 Representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the United States met in 'Aqaba to discuss exploitation of coastal resources and joint regional projects [4/5 FBIS]

Representatives of Israel, Jordan, and the United States met in Amman to discuss plans to develop the Jordan Rift Valley [4/5 FBIS]

Apr. 5 The Turkish military claimed to have killed 321 PKK members since its offensive began on 20 March [4/6 FBIS]

Three Turkish Red Crescent workers and their four Kurdish guards were killed by a Kurdish group on its way to a funeral for people allegedly killed by Turkish troops [4/5 FBIS]

Apr. 6. Turkish deputy prime minister Hikmet Çetin stated that Turkish diplomats were in northern Iraq attempting to facilitate a rapprochement between Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) leader Mas'ud Barzani and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani, to restore non-PKK Kurdish authority along the Turkish border. Barzani pledged to cooperate with Turkey in establishing border security [4/7 FBIS, FT]

Apr. 9 Kuwait and Tunisia signed agreements covering judicial and legal matters [4/11 FBIS]

In northern Iraq, Turkish and PKK forces clashed, killing 34 PKK members and four Turkish soldiers [4/10 FT, WSJ]

Apr. 10 Algeria and Egypt signed an agreement concerning maritime transportation, tourism, and traditional handicrafts [4/11 FBIS]

Apr. 12 Sixty-six Kurdish delegates from Iran, Iraq, and Turkey established a Kurdish parliament in The Hague [4/13 FBIS]

Apr. 13. In New York, Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf, charged with planning the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was indicted on the additional counts of attempting to bomb two airliners in southeast Asia and successfully bombing a Philippine Airlines flight on 11 December 1994, which killed a Japanese citizen and wounded ten others [4/14 NYT]

Apr. 14 Algeria and Libya signed an agreement covering the areas of education, scientific research, and sports [4/14 FBIS]

Afghanistan

See also, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, Regional Affairs

1995

Jan. 16 Forces of Prime Minister Gulboddin Hekmatyar and local forces clashed in Balkh Province. Five people were killed and twelve were wounded [1/18 FBIS]

Jan. 17 Forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar looted a United Nations (UN) aid convoy headed for Kabul [1/19 FBIS]

Jan. 18 In Ghazni Province, south of Kabul, forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar clashed with local militias and Taliban (Islamically inspired university students) forces [1/19 FBIS]

Jan. 19• The Governor of Ghazni Province, Qara Baba, turned control of the province over to Taliban forces [1/23 FBIS]

Jan. 20 In Kabul, rockets fired by Prime Minister Hekmatyar's militia killed 22 people [1/23 FBIS]

Jan. 23 Russian warplanes reportedly bombed the Dazwas District of Badakhshan Province. Four people were killed and nine others wounded [1/28 FBIS]

Jan. 24 In Ghazni Province, local forces clashed with Prime Minister Hekmatyar's forces, resulting in an unspecified number of casualties [1/25 FBIS]

Jan. 29 Forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar fired rockets into Kabul, killing 12 people and wounding 64 others [1/30 FBIS]

Feb. 2 In Taymani, 'Ali Akbar Mesbah, associated with the Islamic Unity Party, and eight of his bodyguards were allegedly killed by Shura-ye Nezar forces [2/3 FBIS]

Feb. 5 Forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar clashed with Taliban forces, who advanced into Vardak Province, west of Kabul [2/6 FBIS]

Feb. 9 Rockets fired by Prime Minister Hekmatyar's forces killed 15 people in Kabul [2/13 FBIS]

Feb. 11: Taliban forces took control of Logar Province, south of Kabul, forcing Prime Minister Hekmatyar's forces from the region [2/13 FBIS]

Charles Santos, a special UN mediator, announced that several factions, including that of President Borhanuddin Rabbani, had agreed to establish a multi-party council that would lead to a new government within six months. The Taliban group was not included in the agreement. Under the accord the council would take charge of the government on 20 February [2/12 NYT, 2/13 FBIS]

Feb. 14 Advancing Taliban forces caused Prime Minister Hekmatyar's forces to abandon their main base at Charasayb, 15 miles south of Kabul [2/14 FBIS]

Feb. 15 Taliban forces moved to within a mile of the outskirts of Kabul and ordered the forces of President Rabbani to withdraw from Kabul [2/16 FT]

Feb. 16• The Kabul airport reopened after having been closed since January 1993 [2/17 FBIS]

Feb. 17 Forces of Prime Minister Hekmatyar and President Rabbani clashed in Kabul [2/18 WP]

Feb. 19: Taliban forces peacefully captured Paktika Province, southeast of Kabul [2/21 FBIS]

Feb. 20 Scheduled transfer of power from President Rabbani to the interim government council was disrupted by demands from Rabbani and from the Taliban forces for assurances that the new government be Islamic [2/20 FT]

Feb. 22 UN special envoy Mahmoud Mistrin appointed four close associates of former King Zahir Shah to renegotiate an interim government agreement taking into account Taliban and President Rabbani's demands [2/23 NYT]

Feb. 24• Russian warplanes bombed Maye, in the Darwaz District, Badakhshan Province, killing ten, wounding 24, and destroying houses and a high school. Russian border forces killed four people in Chaspak [2/27 FBIS]

Feb. 25• President Rabbani's forces launched rockets at Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami (Islamic Unity Party) forces in southwest Kabul [2/27 FBIS, NYT]

Feb. 28• In Kabul, negotiations between President Rabbani and Taliban failed when Rabbani refused to disarm the Shura-ye Nezar forces [2/28 FBIS]

Mar 1• Hezb-e Wahdat-e Eslami forces reportedly fired rockets into Kabul, killing four civilians and wounding four others [3/2 FBIS]

Mar 3 A special UN mediation team failed to induce the Taliban to join the interim government. The Taliban demanded control of Kabul [3/3 FBIS]

Mar. 6 President Rabbani's forces violated a UN cease-fire, attacking Hezb-e Wahdat-e Eslami forces in Kabul [3/6 FBIS, 3/7 NYT]

Mar. 7 Facing attacks by President Rabbani's forces, Hezb-e Wahdat-e Eslami forces fired rockets into Kabul, killing 30 and wounding 90 [3/8 WSJ]

Mar 8 Taliban forces attacked Hezb-e Wahdat-e Eslami forces, compelling them to evacuate areas of southwest Kabul, but were prevented from further advances by clashes with President Rabbani's forces [3/9 FBIS]

Mar 11 Forces of President Rabbani used artillery, helicopters, and warplanes to attack Taliban forces southwest of Kabul [3/12 NYT]

Mar 12 President Rabbani's forces attacked Taliban forces in southwestern Kabul, compelling them to evacuate toward Charasayb. The fighting reportedly resulted in 1,000 casualties [3/13 NYT]

Mar 14 Hezb-e Eslami leader 'Abdul 'Ali Mazari was killed while in Taliban custody. One report stated that Mazari died in a helicopter crash while another said he died fighting his captors [3/14 FT, WP]

Mar. 15. President Rabbani's forces pushed back Taliban forces southwest of Kabul in fighting that killed at least six Taliban members [3/16 FBIS]

Mar 18 A spokesperson for President Rabbani announced that Rabbani would not step down on the UN-appointed date of 21 March because the "mechanism" for the transfer of power had not been established [3/19 WP]

Mar 19: President Rabbani's government forces defeated Taliban forces at their base at Charasayb [3/20 FT]

Mar 21 Taliban forces counter-attacked advancing government forces outside of Kabul [3/22 WP]

Mar. 27 Government and Taliban forces clashed in Peshawar and in Paghman Provinces, resulting in an unspecified number of casualties [3/27 FBIS]

Mar. 28• Government forces of President Rabbani and Taliban forces clashed south of Kabul. As many as 50 combatants died [3/29 FBIS]

Mar 31• Government and Taliban forces clashed in Farah Province, in the western part of the country, resulting in an unspecified number of casualties [3/31 FBIS]

Apr 4 Government forces reportedly suffered 800 casualties and 300 captured in a clash with Taliban forces in Farah Province [4/6 FBIS]

Apr 6 Government and Taliban forces clashed near Herat's Shindand airport [4/7 FBIS]

Apr 7 Taliban and government forces clashed in Badakhshan Province. In Baghlan Province, north of Kabul, Taliban attacks on government forces were supported by Hezb-e Eslami forces [4/10 FBIS]

Apr 10. Russian warplanes bombed areas of Takhar Province, along the northern border, damaging build-

ings. Russian warplanes also bombed areas of Badakhshan Province, killing six [4/11, 4/12 FBIS]

Apr 13 In Takhar Province, Russian warplanes bombed Taloqam, killing as many as 100 people and wounding 200 [4/13 FBIS]

Algeria

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs

1995

Jan 16 France's Foreign Ministry released a statement calling on the Algerian government to follow up on the proposal from the 9 January Sant' Egidio conference in Rome by eight Algerian opposition parties. At the conference, the opposition parties called for a cease-fire to be preceded by the release of 10,000 political prisoners and for the formation of a transitional government to prepare for national elections [1/17 NYT]

Jan. 18: Foreign Ministry spokesman Ahmad 'Attaf rejected the opposition's peace plan, announced in Rome on 13 January [1/19 WP]

Jan. 19 Security forces reported that two people were killed and one wounded in an explosion in Bougara, 20 miles south of Algiers. In a separate incident in Bougara, two people were killed and 20 wounded when a car bomb exploded [1/20 FBIS]

Security forces reported that Miloud Badriar, national secretary of the National Federation of Algerian Youth and a university professor, was assassinated by unidentified gunmen [1/20 FBIS]

Jan. 21• Security forces reported that in Algiers, Algerian Soccer Association chairman Rachid Haraigue was shot to death, allegedly by Islamists [1/23 FBIS]

Jan. 22 In Algiers, a French businessman, Joseph Jose Charles Belaiche, was shot to death and another was wounded by unidentified gunmen [1/23 FBIS, NYT]

Security forces reported that they killed 46 alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 15–22 January [1/18, 1/19, 1/22, 1/24 FBIS]

Jan 23• Two religious schools were bombed by unidentified groups in Tlemcen Province northwest of Algiers. No casualties were reported [1/25 FBIS]

Jan. 26 The government announced plans to hold presidential elections before the end of 1995. [1/27 FBIS]

Jan 28• Musa Mughni, a member of the Transitional National Council, was killed by unidentified attackers at an undisclosed location [1/30 FBIS]

Jan 29: In Algiers, 10,000 demonstrators supporting President Liamine Zeroual protested the violence endemic to the conflict between the government and the Islamists [1/30 WSJ, 1/31 NYT]

Jan 30• In Algiers, a car bomb exploded near a police station, killing 42 people and wounding 286. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) claimed responsibility [1/31 NYT, 2/1 FT, WP, 2/9 FBIS]

Jan 31 Security forces reported that they killed 28 alleged Islamist terrorists throughout the period 30–31 January [2/1 FBIS]

Feb 1 In Sidi Mussa, 30 miles south of Algiers, television correspondent Nasir Wali was killed by "armed terrorists" [2/3 FBIS]

Feb 2 Rabah Kabir, a senior member of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) living in exile in Germany, issued a statement condemning the 30 January car bombing in Algiers [2/6 FT]

Feb 3 French president François Mitterand proposed a European Union (EU)-sponsored conference to focus on the conflict in Algeria [2/6 FBIS]

Feb 4 'Abassi Madani, president of the FIS, and 'Ali Belhaj, Madani's deputy, were reportedly returned to Blida prison from house arrest, which began 13 September 1994 [2/8 NYT]

The government recalled its ambassador to France, Hocine Djoudi, for consultations on French president Mitterand's proposed EU summit on Algeria. Foreign Ministry Secretary General 'Abd al-Qadir Tafir stated that the government "rejects any foreign interference in Algeria's internal affairs" [2/6 FBIS]

Feb 5 The Islamic Arab Rally party declared Ahmad Bensharif as a candidate in the presidential elections [2/6 FBIS]

Security forces reported that unidentified assailants decapitated National Liberation Front (FLN) leader Ahmad Qasbi after his 31 January abduction [2/6 FBIS]

French prime minister Edouard Balladur rejected French president Mitterand's proposed EU summit on Algeria [2/7 WP]

Feb 9 The London-based *al-Sharq al-Awsat* reported that FIS president Madani was moved to a hospital and his deputy, Belhaj, had been moved, but not to Blida prison, as reported 4 February. The Foreign Ministry confirmed that Madani was in the hospital [2/9, 2/10 FBIS]

Feb 11: At the port of Algiers, dock workers called a strike, affecting 4,200 workers, due to the failure of the port authority to sign branch agreements with union representatives designating the ports as oil- or commercial-related [2/14 FBIS]

Feb 12. In Algiers, unidentified gunmen shot to death Fatma Zohra Ourais, a French-language teacher [2/14 FBIS]

Security forces reported that they killed 73 alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 5–12 February [2/8, 2/14 FBIS, 2/13 WSJ]

Feb 13 In Algiers, 'Izz al-Din Majdubi, director of the Algerian national theater, was killed by GIA members [2/14, 2/21 FBIS]

Student 'Abd al-Hafiz al-Sa'id, chairman of the National Council of the Independent General Union of Students, was killed by GIA members in Algiers [2/14, 2/21 FBIS]

Feb 15 Well-known Rai musician Rachid was shot to death by unknown gunmen [2/17 FBIS]

In Tizi Ouzou, east of Algiers, the GIA claimed responsibility for the killing of Nabila Jahnin, the leader of The Cry of Women group [2/21 FBIS, 2/16 NYT]

Feb 17 In Gdyl, east of Oran, journalist Djamel Ziater was shot to death by unknown gunmen [2/21 FBIS]

Feb 18 In Algiers, the strike by dock workers that started 11 February ended when both the Union and management agreed to arbitration [2/21 FBIS]

Feb 19 Colonel Mrawi Jilali, a senior intelligence officer, and two bodyguards were shot to death by unidentified gunmen in the suburbs of Algiers [2/22 NYT]

Security forces reported that they killed 71 alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 13–19 February [2/15, 2/19, 2/21 FBIS]

Feb 22 In Algiers, security forces killed 95 Islamist inmates of the Serkadji prison during the suppression of a prison riot in which four prison guards were killed [2/22 WSJ, 2/23 NYT]

Feb. 24 Security forces reported that they killed 27 alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 21–24 February [2/22, 2/27 FBIS]

Mar 1: The government suspended the weekly *al-Wajh al-Akhar* for six months. No reason for the suspension was given [3/2 FBIS]

Mar. 3 Security forces reported that they killed 44 alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 26 February to 3 March [3/1, 3/6 FBIS]

In Brussels, ten Algerians were arrested by Belgian police after an investigation of GIA activity [3/3 FT]

Mar. 4. Security forces reported that in Algiers, Sa'adan Salah, a leader of the General Union of Algerian Workers was shot to death by unidentified gunmen [3/6 FBIS]

Security officials announced that 6,388 people were killed by Islamists in 1994 [3/6 FBIS]

Mar 5: The government banned the French-language newspaper *La Tribune* for failure to publish in Arabic, in violation of a law requiring dual publication in Arabic and French [3/6 FT]

Mar. 10• In Algiers, a car bomb exploded outside a building housing police and their families, wounding 33–63 people. The GIA claimed responsibility and stated that the attack was in retaliation for imprisonment of Muslim women [3/11 NYT, 3/12 FT]

Mar 11 Security forces reported killing 40 alleged Islamists throughout the country [3/15 FBIS]

Mar 13• The United States was reported to have had established contacts with Islamist opposition groups and was making plans to evacuate diplomatic staff in the event of an Islamist takeover [3/13 WSJ]

Mar. 15 Security forces reported killing 20 alleged Islamists throughout the country, including GIA leader Ahmad Zenuni and the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) leader Embarek Laboudi [3/17 FBIS]

Two teenage girls were abducted and subsequently killed in 'Ayn Farhat, 150 miles east of Algiers, by unidentified assailants, described by government security forces as a terrorist group [3/17 FBIS]

Mar 20 In Algiers, television correspondent Rashida Hammadi and her sister Horiya were attacked by gunmen. Horiya was killed and Rashida was wounded [3/20 FBIS]

Mar 21 Gunmen shot to death 'Ali Boukerbacke, manager of the Media-TV company [3/21 FBIS]

Mar 22 A clash west of Algiers between GIA and FIS forces left 15 dead [3/22 FBIS]

In Bouira Province, southeast of Algiers, unidentified gunmen shot to death 'Abd al-Wahab Ben Boulaid, son of Mustafa Ben Boulaid, a hero of the war against French [3/24 WP]

Mar 24 In 'Ayn Dafia, security forces ambushed a force of 900 GIA members, killing hundreds [3/26 FT, 3/27 NYT]

Security forces reported killing 42 alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 21–24 March [3/22, 3/27, 3/28 FBIS]

Mar 26 The government signed an agreement with Italy, rescheduling \$850 million of debt to Italy [3/27 FBIS]

Mar 27 Security officials alleged that Islamists killed *al-Mujahid* director Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahmani near Algiers [3/28 NYT, WP]

Drinking-water supplies were suspended in parts of Oum el Bouaghi Province due to approximately 300 cases of poisoning attributed to fuel contamination [3/30 FBIS]

Mar 28 Continued fighting following the government's ambush of 900 GIA members on 24 March resulted in the killing of 200 more GIA members, raising the reported death toll to 800 [3/28 WSJ]

Security forces reported killing 41 alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 25–28 March [3/28, 3/29 FBIS]

German police arrested two Algerians in Frankfurt and Aachen for smuggling weapons to the FIS [3/31 NYT]

Mar 30 Madani Merzak, leader of the FIS military wing, issued an open letter to President Zeroual calling for a negotiated end to violence and condemning government and Islamist abuses [3/31 NYT]

Television journalist Rashida Hammadi died of wounds sustained in a 20 March attack that also killed her sister, Horiya [4/3 FBIS]

Apr 1 In Blida, two officials of the Ministry of Religious Affairs were killed by unnamed attackers [4/3 FBIS]

Apr 4 Security forces reported killing 67 alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 29 March to 4 April [4/4, 4/6 FBIS]

Unknown assailants killed television sports correspondent Mekhlout Boukhzar in Constantine [4/5 FBIS]

Apr 9 President Zeroual met with 'Abdallah Jaballah, leader of the Islamic al-Nahdah Movement, to discuss ending the violence between the government and Islamist opponents [4/10 FBIS]

Apr 11 Security forces reported killing 45 alleged Islamists throughout the country during the period 8–11 April [4/10, 4/12 FBIS]

Bahrain

See also, Regional Affairs

1995

Jan 17 Shaykh 'Ali Salman, whose arrest on 5 December sparked rioting, arrived in London reportedly

to gain political asylum after being deported to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) [1/17 FBIS]

Jan 18 Security forces arrested Shaykh Muhammad Khujistah and Shaykh Muhammad Rashid al-Durazi and raided Shi'i mosques in Jidd Hafs and Mani, west of Manama. Shaykh Rashid al-Durazi was expelled to Dubai [1/19 FBIS]

Jan 20 In Manama, several people were wounded when anti-riot police clashed with anti-government demonstrators protesting the deportation of Shi'i Muslim clerics [1/23 FBIS]

Jan 24 The government released 25–30 people arrested in riots [1/26 FBIS]

Jan 26 The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) stated that 2,700 people had been arrested since demonstrations began on 5 December 1994, and an unspecified number had been tortured to death in prison [1/27 FBIS]

Jan 27 Anti-government protests in Banī Jamrah, northwest of Manama, and Sitrah, off the northeast coast, erupted during the funerals of two people killed during earlier anti-government demonstrations [1/30 FBIS]

Feb 11 In Manama, police arrested at least 24 women who were demonstrating outside a court in which prisoners arrested during the December 1994 and January 1995 demonstrations were on trial [2/13 FBIS]

Mar 2 Security forces killed two and wounded at least 12 during a confrontation with Shi'i protestors in Sitra [3/3 FBIS]

Mar 3 Security forces clashed with Shi'i Muslim demonstrators in Sitra and Karzakkan, east of Manama [3/6 FBIS]

Mar 9 Interior Ministry officials reported that six anti-government saboteurs set fire to a gas station, two power transformers, and Bahrain International Exhibition offices [3/10 FT]

Mar 18 The arrest of opposition leader 'Abd-al-Wahab Husayn on 17 March sparked protests throughout the country that, in turn, resulted in the arrests of Hasan al-Mushshayn and Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali al-'Akari [3/20 FBIS]

Mar 26 Police shot to death a student while dispersing a meeting at a college in al-Dīraz [3/27 FBIS]

Mar 28 In Jidd Hafs, demonstrators, including students of a girls' school, protesting the detention of people arrested in previous demonstrations, burned down a branch of the Bahrain Islamic Bank [3/29 FT]

Mar 30 In Sitra, one police officer died and two were wounded when a gas bomb struck their patrol car [3/31 FBIS]

Apr 15 Shaykh 'Abd al-Amīr al-Jamri was imprisoned in al-Qal'a prison [4/17 FBIS]

Cyprus

See also, Regional Affairs, Turkey

1995

Jan 16 United Nations (UN) special representative to Cyprus, Gustav Feissel, met with Greek Cypriot president Glavkos Khrīdhis [1/17 FBIS]

Jan 18 Turkish Cypriot cabinet changes
Mustafa Adaoglu, *Interior*
Salih Cosar, *Economy and Finance*
Suha Turkoz, *Public Works and Transportation*
Mustafa Gokman, *Environmental Affairs, Sports, Youth* [1/19 FBIS]
Jan 20 Turkish Cypriot president Rauf Denktas submitted to UN special envoy to Cyprus Feissel, a 14-point proposal to create a federal government [1/23 FBIS]
Jan 21 Greek Cypriot president Kleridhis rejected Turkish Cypriot president Denktas's 20 January proposal [1/23 FBIS]
Feb 18 Turkish Cypriot deputy prime minister Ozker Ozgur announced his candidacy in the April 1995 presidential election [2/23 FBIS]
Feb 25 Turkish Cypriot prime minister Hakkı Atun submitted his government's resignation to President Denktas [2/27 FBIS]
Feb 27 Greek Cypriot president Kleridhis protested to the UN the Turkish Cypriot decision to issue land title deeds [2/28 FBIS]
Apr 15 Turkish Cypriot elections resulted in a stalemate between Turkish Cypriot president Denktas and National Unity Party leader Dervis Eroglu. Runoff elections were scheduled for 22 April [4/17 FBIS]

Egypt

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1995

Jan 18 In France, Egyptian president Husni Mubarak met with French president François Mitterrand to discuss regional issues [1/19 FBIS]
Jan 19 In Manshiyat, al-Minya Governorate, 'Ujaybi Yusuf Milad, a Copt, was killed by Islamic Group gunmen [1/20 FBIS]
Security forces reportedly killed four alleged Islamists and arrested 44 others throughout the country [1/23 FBIS]
Jan. 22 In Banı Suwayf, in Upper Egypt, security forces shot to death alleged Islamists Rabi' Muhammad Mustafa and Ibrahim 'Ali 'Abd-al-Qadar. Two police officers were wounded in the confrontation [1/23 FBIS]
Islamist gunmen opened fire at a police station in Samant, Upper Egypt, killing one police officer and wounding another. Police arrested an Islamist suspected in the shooting [1/23 FBIS]
In the Suhaj, in Upper Egypt, security forces shot to death two alleged Islamists [1/24 FBIS]
Jan 23 Security forces arrested 27 members of the Muslim Brotherhood on suspicion of conspiring to organize anti-government cells [1/24 FBIS]
Security forces killed four alleged Islamists in two raids in Upper Egypt [1/23 WSJ]
Jan 25 The Interior Ministry announced that it was holding 8,193 political detainees, 325 criminal detainees, and 31,595 judicial prisoners [2/3 FBIS]
Jan. 27 In Cairo, 2,000 members of the Doctor's Union protested the arrest of seven colleagues during the 23

January arrest of Muslim Brotherhood members [1/30 FBIS]

In al-Minya, in Upper Egypt, four alleged Islamists were killed in a clash with security forces. [1/27 FBIS]

In Abu Qurqas, in al-Minya Governorate, six police officers were killed in a clash with Islamists [1/27 FBIS]

Jan 29 In Banı Khalid, Upper Egypt, security forces attacked an Islamist hideout, killing 12 Islamists [1/30 FBIS]

In Qena Province, in Upper Egypt, alleged Islamists shot two police recruits to death. Three civilians were also killed [1/29 WP]

Feb 7 Officials reported that 51 Islamists, including four in prison for the assassination of former Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat, would stand trial for plotting to assassinate President Mubarak [2/8 FBIS]

Feb 9 The government denounced as "lies" a US State Department report critical of Egypt's human rights abuses [2/12 WP]

The state-owned Textile Industries Holding Company sold off its Kabo clothing manufacturing company, resulting in an estimated 50 percent oversubscription [2/10 FT]

Feb. 11 In Maghagha, in Upper Egypt, security forces killed four alleged Islamists [2/13 FBIS]

Feb. 17 Two police officers were shot to death by unknown gunmen in al-Minya [2/21 FBIS]

Feb. 19 In al-Minya, five Islamists and one police officer were killed when police attacked an Islamist hideout [2/21 FBIS]

Feb. 25 Near Samalut, in Upper Egypt, one Copt was shot to death and one wounded in an attack by Islamists [2/27 FBIS]

Mar 4 Security forces reportedly arrested 53 alleged Islamists during a sweep of villages in Asyut Province, in Upper Egypt [3/6 FBIS]

Mar 8 According to police reports, in Mallawi, Upper Egypt, an alleged Islamist shot to death an imam of a mosque [3/9 FBIS]

Mar 17 In Samalut, security forces reportedly killed three alleged Islamists [3/20 FBIS]

Mar 19 Police officials announced the arrest of approximately 1,250 Islamists during a five-day sweep through villages south of Cairo [3/20 FBIS]

Mar. 20 In Cairo, US vice president Al Gore met with President Mubarak. They signed an accord pledging economic, educational, and technological cooperation [3/20 FBIS, WP]

President Mubarak met with Eritrean president Issalas Afewerke to discuss bilateral relations and security in the Horn of Africa [3/23 FBIS]

Mar. 22 Unidentified gunmen killed five people when they fired on a train in al-Minya [3/23 FT]

Mar 24 In al-Minya, unidentified gunmen shot to death one police officer and wounded two others [3/27 FBIS]

Mar 26 In al-Minya, unidentified gunmen shot to death two security sentries and wounded two others [3/27 FBIS]

Thirty-seven people arrested for demonstrating against Israeli participation in the Cairo International

Trade Fair on 22 and 24 March were reported to have been tortured [3/27 FBIS]

Mar. 29: In Cairo, Najī Mustafa and Muhammad al-Mahallawī were executed for the attempted murder of writer Najīb Mahfuz on 14 October 1994 [3/30 FBIS]

Mar. 30: Security forces reportedly killed 14 alleged Islamists during the period 25–30 March [3/27, 3/28, 3/31 FBIS]

Security forces announced they had arrested Mustafa Muhammad Darwish, Jum'ā Imam 'Abd-al-Mutī', Husayn Muhammad al-Sharqawī, and Anwar Anwar Sa'dallah Ahmad al-Turki, alleged leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood [3/31 FBIS]

Apr. 1: Twenty-one alleged Islamists accused of fire-bombing Cairo video stores and a restaurant were arrested by security forces [4/4 FBIS]

Apr. 3: In Washington, US secretary of state Warren Christopher met with President Mubarak to discuss bilateral relations, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and regional relations. Egypt sought a \$2.1-billion aid package from the United States [4/4 FBIS, WSJ]

In Cairo, police arrested 19 members of the Islamic Group, suspected of planning attacks against police and "video clubs" [4/4 FBIS]

Apr. 5: In Washington, US president Bill Clinton met with President Mubarak to discuss the NPT, regional relations, and US aid to Egypt [4/6 FBIS]

Security forces attacked an Islamist hideout in Markaz Salim, Upper Egypt, killing two Islamists and arresting 11 [4/7 FBIS]

Apr. 6: Security forces reportedly killed four alleged Islamists in Jrays, al-Minya [4/7 FBIS]

The government announced it would remove and re-route a nearly completed eight-lane highway because it would endanger the nearby Giza Pyramid and the Sphinx [4/6 WSJ]

Apr. 13: The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights was reportedly suing Shaykh 'Alī Jad al-Haq, rector of al-Azhar University, over a *fatwa* he published in October 1994 advocating female circumcision [4/13 WP]

Apr. 14: In Nawa, al-Minya, unidentified gunmen shot to death police officer Sabīr Mahmūd 'Abd al-Hakīm 'Abd al-Hakīm's family then entered the homes of two men they suspected of killing 'Abd al-Hakīm and killed five of their family members [4/15 WP]

Iran

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Iraq

1995

Jan. 16: Norway recalled its ambassador to Iran following a diplomatic dispute regarding the death sentence of author Salman Rushdie and the 1993 wounding of Rushdie's publisher, William Nygaard [1/17 FT]

Jan. 20: Former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan died in Bern, Switzerland, of a heart attack [1/23 FBIS, 1/24 NYT]

Jan. 22: Security forces seized 600 kilograms of narcotics and arrested 1,506 people during anti-narcotics raids in and around Tehran [1/23 FBIS]

In Tehran, clashes between fans of rival soccer teams developed into an anti-government demonstration when police arrived. Demonstrators allegedly clashed with police and set fire to the stadium [1/25 FBIS]

Jan. 24: In Sardasht, near the Iraqi border, a bomb exploded in the Islamic Publicity Organization building. No one claimed responsibility and no casualties were reported [2/1 FBIS]

Norway released into Russian custody, in Moscow, three Iranian citizens accused of hijacking a Russian aircraft to Norway in September 1993 [1/26 FBIS]

Jan. 29: The government announced new measures to attract foreign investment. Effective March 1995, non-Iranian companies would be allowed more than 50 percent ownership of joint-venture companies and would be able to benefit from tax incentives [1/30 FT]

Feb. 1: Norway downgraded its diplomatic relations with Iran by withdrawing its ambassador indefinitely. Norway also prohibited official visits and promotions of trade between the two countries [2/1 FT]

Feb. 11: Nation-wide rallies marked the 16th anniversary of the 1979 revolution. In Tehran, President 'Alī Akbar Hashemī Rafsanjani addressed an estimated 150,000 people [2/12 NYT, 2/13 FBIS]

Feb. 12: The *Jahan e-Eslam* newspaper, which is owned by Hojatolislam Hadī Khamenei, the brother of Ayatollah 'Alī Khamenei, was banned by the government for violating laws prohibiting anti-Islamic publishing [2/13 NYT]

Feb. 20: Russian officials announced the construction of four nuclear reactors in Iran for \$1 billion [2/21 NYT]

Feb. 22: The German government lifted all restrictions on German trade with Iran [2/23 FBIS]

Feb. 28: US military officials stated that Iran had increased the number of troops on islands in the Strait of Hormuz from 700 to 4,000 since October 1994, and had stationed anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles on the islands [3/1 NYT]

Mar. 1: Despite US protest, Hermes, the German state credit insurance company, re-established credit insurance on German exports to Iran, suspended since December 1993 [3/1 FT]

Mar. 6: The US oil company, Conoco, announced an agreement with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to develop and export Iranian gas and oil, the first such agreement since US-Iranian relations were severed in 1980 [3/7 NYT]

Mar. 14: Conoco canceled its oil development deal with the NIOC after the United States announced it would ban US oil-development agreements with Iran [3/15 FT, NYT]

Mar. 15: Iran was reported to be using an elaborate arms smuggling network in Central Asia and Europe to import equipment for its nuclear weapons program [3/15 NYT]

Mar 16 Greece signed an accord with Iran in which the parties pledged to cooperate in areas of law enforcement, narcotics interdiction, and security [3/17 FBIS]
Mar 17 Ahmed Khomeini, son of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and member of the Supreme National Security Council, died of cardiac arrest suffered on 12 March [3/18 NYT]
Mar 23 Yevgeny Primakov, head of Russia's External Intelligence Service, disputed the US view that Iran was engaged in a nuclear weapons program. He stated that the light-water reactor Russia proposed to sell to Iran could not be used to build weapons [3/24 WP]
Apr 2 US officials announced they had shared with Russia US intelligence concerning Iran's nuclear weapons program in an effort to persuade Russia to cancel its deal to build a nuclear reactor in Bushehr, in southern Iran [4/3 NYT]
Apr 4 Security forces reportedly killed as many as 100 demonstrators protesting high utility prices in Islan-shahr, southwest of Tehran. The Paris-based opposition group Organization for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms for Iran claimed that the protestors were killed when helicopters attacked 100,000 protestors [4/5 NYT]
Apr 7 Russia and Iran signed an agreement covering rail transport and border issues [4/7 FBIS]
Apr 9 The government signed agreements with Ukraine pledging economic and technological cooperation [4/11 FBIS]

Iraq

See also, Regional Affairs, Turkey, UAE

1995

Jan 17: In Baghdad, the Iranian-backed Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) headquarters in al-Andalus Square was attacked by unidentified "oppositionists." There was no report of casualties [1/19 FBIS]
Jan 19 The *Wall Street Journal* reported that Iraqi president Saddam Husayn and his son had survived an assassination attempt in early January for which 20 air force and army officers were executed [1/19 WSJ]
Jan 21 Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) forces clashed near Sanabari, in the al-Sulaymaniya area. The PUK claimed to have killed 20 KDP members [1/24 FBIS]
Jan 29 KDP and PUK forces clashed around the city of Irbil, in northeastern Iraq, killing at least ten people [1/30 FBIS]
Feb 5 Howard Teicher, who served on the US National Security Council from 1982-87, stated in an affidavit that the CIA had aided Iraq in acquiring sophisticated weapons in the mid-1980s [2/5 NYT]
Feb 6 An Iraqi opposition group, the Unified Iraqi National Congress (UINC), reported that 158 inmates at the Abu Gharib prison, in southern Iraq, were executed on 28 and 29 January [2/7 FBIS]

Feb 8 Representatives of 22 Kurdish parties meeting in Irbil issued a statement calling for the end of fighting between Kurdish groups [2/10 FBIS]
Feb. 12 Army units clashed with local Shi'i Muslim militia in the Qurnah region, in southern Iraq [2/13 FBIS]
Feb 15 Iraq was reported to have been selling up to 200,000 barrels of oil per day through outlets in Turkey and Iran despite the United Nations (UN) ban on Iraqi petroleum sales [2/16 NYT]
Feb 21 Wafiq al-Samra'i, an Iraqi general who defected in 1994, wrote an open letter to UN special envoy Rolf Ekeus in which he stated that Iraq retained long-range missiles and chemical and biological weapons [2/22 FT]
Feb 25 The government reportedly executed approximately 200 prisoners of the Abu Gharib and Karbala' prisons, in southern Iraq [2/27 FBIS]
 PUK and KDP forces clashed on the outskirts of Irbil. Sixty-seven combatants died in the fighting [2/27 FBIS]
Feb 27 In the Kurd-controlled city of Zakho, in northern Iraq, a car bomb exploded, killing at least 54 people and wounding 80 others [2/28 NYT]
 At the United Nations, UN spokesman Rolf Ekeus announced that Iraq failed to account for 20-30 tons of a material used in biological weapons production [2/28 NYT]
 UN human rights envoy to Iraq, Max van der Stoep, criticized Iraq's human rights record to a UN Commission and described Iraq as among "the worst offenders of human rights since the Second World War" [2/28 NYT]
Mar 1 UINC sources claimed that Iraqi tanks had attacked the Kurd-held town of Kifri in the UN exclusion zone in northern Iraq [3/2 FBIS]
Mar 3. Opposition sources stated that President Husayn's son, 'Udayy Saddam, was allegedly wounded in a coup attempt. More than 20 military officers were arrested in connection with the failed coup. [3/8 FBIS]
Mar 4: Government forces shelled Irbil and clashed with Kurdish forces near Kifri. In Qurna, in southern Iraq, Shi'i Muslim opposition forces clashed with government forces [3/5, 3/6 FT]
Mar 6 Government forces clashed with opposition forces in Kurd-controlled areas around Irbil and in the south near al-Kut [3/8 FBIS]
Mar 11. PUK forces reportedly clashed with Iraqi government forces in eastern Kirkuk, resulting in 92 casualties [3/13 FBIS]
Mar 12 The PUK claimed to have killed approximately 100 government troops during fighting near Irbil [3/13 FBIS]
Mar 13 The UN Security Council extended economic sanctions against Iraq, despite French, Iraqi, and Russian pressure against such measures [3/14 WP, WSJ]
 Two US nationals working in Kuwait, William Barloon and David Daliberti, were arrested by Iraqi police when they crossed the border [3/18, 3/19, 3/26 NYT]
Mar 15. Kurdish opposition forces and Iraqi government forces reportedly clashed in the al-'Amara Governorate in southern Iraq. The Kurdish groups claimed to have killed 100 Iraqi soldiers [3/16, 3/17 FBIS]

Mar. 16: Kurdish opposition forces attacked government forces near Jibara, in northern Iraq, resulting in an unspecified number of casualties [3/21 FBIS]

Mar. 22: Kurdish opposition forces clashed with government troops. At least 50 people were killed [3/23 FBIS]

Mar. 25: An Iraqi court sentenced US citizens Barloon and Daliberti, arrested 13 March for illegally entering the country, to eight years imprisonment [3/26 NYT]

Mar. 26: The government rejected a US and British plan to allow Iraq to sell \$2 billion worth of oil to finance humanitarian projects. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz stated that the plan would prolong sanctions, produce too little revenue, and interfere with Iraqi sovereignty [3/27 FT]

Mar. 27: PUK forces clashed with KDP forces near Banjwin, resulting in as many as 80 casualties [3/28 FBIS]

UN special envoy Ekeus stated that Iraq had failed to prove that its biological weapons program was completely dismantled [3/27 FBIS]

Mar. 28: PUK and KDP forces clashed near Irbil, resulting in at least 80 people killed and 150 wounded [3/29 NYT]

Mar. 30: Government forces, numbering up to 3,000, clashed with Kurdish opposition forces in Kanı Qarzala, near Irbil [3/31 FBIS]

Mar. 31: Government forces continued their offensive against Kurdish opposition forces near Irbil. No casualties were reported. Unspecified Kurdish factions in Irbil clashed, killing 140 people [3/31 FBIS]

Apr. 5: US secretary of state Warren Christopher stated that US intelligence reports indicated that Iraq was attempting to build biological weapons [4/5 WSJ]

Apr. 7: The PUK and KDP agreed to a two-week cease-fire [4/10 FBIS]

PUK and PKK forces allegedly attacked two vehicles near Zakho, in northeast Iraq, killing Faddah 'Irfan Harkuni, a former leader of the KDP, and five others, including four children [4/10 FBIS]

UN commander of the Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission Lieutenant General Krishna N S Thapa stated that UN border guards accidentally allowed US citizens Barloon and Daliberti to cross the border into Iraq on 13 March because their vehicle resembled a UN vehicle [4/7 NYT]

Apr. 10: The Independent Kurdish Labor Party (IKLP) attacked government forces near Irbil and claimed to have killed seven soldiers [4/12 FBIS]

A report to the UN by UN envoy Ekeus stated that "Iraq has not provided a full and comprehensive disclosure of its past military biological program." Specifically, Iraq failed to account for 17 of 22 tons of biological weapons material [4/11 WP]

Apr. 14: The UN Security Council approved a plan to allow the government to sell \$2 billion of oil every 180 days, subject to review every 90 days. The revenue from the sales would subsidize humanitarian aid with 30 percent supporting Kuwaiti victims of the 1990 invasion [4/15 NYT]

Israel

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Egypt, Lebanon

1995

Jan. 30: The Knesset rejected by a vote of 57-43 a no-confidence motion introduced by the United Torah Jewry party, the National Religious Party (NRP), and the Moledet party. The Tzomet party abstained from the vote [1/31 FBIS]

The Finance Ministry canceled a capital gains tax on stock market profits that had been in effect since 1 January [1/31 FT]

Feb. 8: Israel's central bank rejected a proposed devaluation of the shekel on the grounds that it would destabilize the economy. The manufacturing industry supported the devaluation to combat the effect of 14 percent inflation on export prices [2/8 FT]

Feb. 9: Tzomet leader Refa'el Eytan announced his candidacy for prime minister in the 1996 elections [2/9 FBIS]

Feb. 15: The government approved the sale of the state's controlling interest in Israel Chemicals as part of a privatization program [2/16 FT]

Feb. 20: The Likud party filed a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's government [2/21 FBIS]

Feb. 21: 'Uzi Bar'am was appointed Minister of the Interior and Shim'on Shetrit was appointed Minister for Religious Affairs [2/21 FBIS]

Feb. 22: The NRP and Tzomet filed a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Rabin [2/23 FBIS]

Feb. 23: In Jaffa, security forces arrested 73 demonstrators protesting construction on the site of an ancient Jewish cemetery [2/24 NYT]

Feb. 27: The Knesset rejected a no-confidence motion filed by the Likud, the NRP, and Tzomet by a vote of 59-48 [2/28, 3/7 FBIS]

Feb. 28: The NRP and Tzomet submitted a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Rabin [2/28 FBIS]

The government announced it would offer discounts on shares of state-owned companies to all adult citizens [3/1 FT]

Mar. 1: Israel signed agreements with Hungary and Slovakia pledging cooperation in sharing medical technologies [3/3 JP]

Mar. 6: The Knesset rejected, by a vote of 49-40, a no-confidence motion filed by the Likud, the NRP, and Tzomet on 28 February [3/7 FBIS]

Mar. 7: The *Jerusalem Post* reported a police investigation into misuse of funds by Histadrut, the trade union affiliated with the Labor party, in the 1992 Knesset elections [3/7 WSJ, 3/9 FBIS]

Mar. 14: British prime minister John Major met with Prime Minister Rabin to discuss bilateral economic relations [3/15 FBIS]

Mar. 19 The Bank of Israel lowered interest rates by 1.5 percent. The government announced a plan to cut the state budget by 1.2 billion shekels. [3/20 FBIS]

Mar. 23 Prime Minister Rabin announced he would run for re-election in 1996. [3/24 FBIS]

Mar. 24 The United States and Israel signed an agreement pledging cooperation on environmental issues. [3/24 FBIS]

Mar. 27 The Knesset rejected a vote of no confidence presented by the NRP and Tzomet by a vote of 59–43. [3/28 FBIS]

The Knesset Finance Committee rejected the sale of the state-owned Israel Shipyards to a private consortium. [3/28 FT]

Mar. 29 The Likud, Moledet, NRP, and Tzomet submitted a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Rabin. [3/30 FBIS]

Mar. 31 Water Commissioner Gid'on Tur announced plans to establish a water desalinization project along the Jordan River by the year 2000. [4/4 FBIS]

Apr. 3 The Knesset rejected a no-confidence motion brought by Likud, Moledet, NRP, and Tzomet on 29 March by a vote of 58–46. [4/4 FBIS]

Apr. 5 The Commander of the Central Command, Major General Ilan Biran, placed Kakh Movement leader Barukh Marzel under six-month house arrest. [4/7 FBIS]

The government launched the Ofek-3 satellite, describing its intended use for "scientific and technical purposes." The *New York Times* reported that it was a spy satellite. [4/6 NYT]

Apr. 6 The government approved a \$9 million shekel package to bail out debt-encumbered kibbutzim. The plan combined government payments, bank loan forgiveness, and the selling of 7,500 acres of kibbutz land. [4/6 FT]

Jordan

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs,

1995

Feb. 7 The Amman-based *al-Bilad* newspaper reported that security forces arrested several alleged Islamists in the Hittin Camp, al-Rusayfah, and al-Zarga. 'Izz-al-Din 'Abd-al-Latif, leader of the Islamic Action Front, was among those arrested. [2/7 FBIS]

Feb. 9 The Swiss ambassador, Gian Federico Pedotti, returned to his post in Amman after leaving in mid-January due to threats against his life from the Fatah Revolutionary Council, following the freezing of Fatah leader Abu Nidal's Swiss bank account by the Swiss government. [2/9 FBIS]

Feb. 20 The government sold 54 percent of its Jordan Hotels and Tourism Company in its largest privatization deal to date. [2/21 FT]

Feb. 24 In al-Mawjib, south of Amman, a French diplomat and his wife were wounded by gunmen for publicly eating during Ramadan. [2/27 FBIS]

Feb. 26 The government suspended *Hawadith al-Sa'ah* and *al-Bilad* newspapers due to licensing technicalities. [3/3 FBIS]

Feb. 27 The United States agreed to a \$15 million loan to Jordan in order to purchase US wheat and corn. [2/28 FBIS]

Mar. 22 Japan agreed to grant Jordan \$11 million, aimed at encouraging economic reform. [3/24 FBIS]

Mar. 27 In Washington, King Husayn met with US president Bill Clinton to discuss the Middle East peace process and the Jordanian debt to the United States. [3/28 FBIS]

Mar. 28 In Washington, Jordan's King Husayn met with Senators Bob Dole and Tom Daschle to discuss the abolition of the Jordanian debt to the United States. [3/28 NYT]

The United States and Jordan signed an extradition treaty. [3/29 FBIS]

Mar. 30 An appeals court overturned a security court's death sentences for 11 Islamists convicted of bombings and planning murders. [3/31 FBIS]

Apr. 4 Police were reported to have arrested 37 Islamists suspected of planning to attack tourist targets in Jordan. [4/5 FBIS]

Apr. 5 In New York, King Husayn met with United Nations (UN) secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali to discuss Jordan's role in regional peace. [4/6 FBIS]

Apr. 7 In Ottawa, Canadian prime minister Jean Chrétien met with King Husayn to discuss bilateral relations. [4/10 FBIS]

Kuwait

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Iraq

1995

Mar. 8 The government offered for sale more than half the shares of the state-owned United Realty Company. Only citizens of countries belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were eligible to purchase shares. [3/8 FT]

Mar. 14 Finance Minister Nasir 'Abdallah al-Rawdhan announced that welfare benefits would be reduced and utility fees increased in order to decrease the budget deficit. [3/15 FT]

Mar. 18 Approximately 500 oil workers for the state-owned Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) went on strike over the company's promotions policy. [3/22 FT]

Mar. 21 A court upheld death sentences for two Iraqis convicted of attempting to assassinate former US president George Bush in 1993. Four other Iraqis charged in the case had their sentences commuted from death to life imprisonment. [3/21 WP]

Mar. 24 Workers at the KOC suspended their strike, which began 18 March, following the government's pledge to consider changes in promotions and pay policy. [3/27 FBIS, WSJ]

Mar. 28 The government purchased from France eight fast patrol boats and an air-defense system for \$555 million. [3/28 WSJ]

Mar 29: The KOC and its workers' union reached an agreement on restructuring promotions and pay policy [3/30 FBIS]

Apr. 8: South African president Nelson Mandela met with Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabbah to discuss bilateral economic relations [4/10 FBIS]

The government contracted the US firm TCOM for \$119 million to maintain and train personnel for military and civil surveillance and radar installations [4/11 FBIS]

Apr. 8 A twelve-day joint naval exercise with France began in Kuwaiti waters [4/12 FBIS]

Lebanon

See also, Regional Affairs, Turkey

1995

Jan 17. In the Israeli self-declared "security zone," the Lebanese Army shelled Israeli forces and South Lebanese Army (SLA) positions, reportedly in retaliation for Israeli air strikes on al-Na'ima and al-Damur, in southern Lebanon, on 15 January [1/17 FBIS]

Jan. 19• In the "security zone," Israeli forces clashed with Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) forces. Six PFLP members were killed and two Israeli soldiers were injured [1/20 FBIS]

Jan. 20 Near al-Tayyiba in southern Lebanon, between two and five Hizballah and PFLP members were killed in clashes with Israeli forces. Five Israeli soldiers were wounded [1/20 FBIS, WSJ]

Jan. 25 Near Bayt Lif, in the "security zone," a clash between Israeli and Hizballah forces reportedly left six Hizballah members dead and two Israeli soldiers wounded [1/25 FBIS]

Jan 27 In the "security zone," Israeli and SLA forces exchanged artillery and rocket fire with "resistance groups." The Amal Movement detonated a bomb under an SLA patrol, causing unspecified casualties [1/31 FBIS]

Jan 30 In the "security zone," Hizballah forces attacked SLA positions, killing and wounding an unspecified number of SLA members [1/31 FBIS]

Jan 31. Clashes between Israeli and unidentified Lebanese forces in the "security zone" resulted in the death of one Israeli soldier and three Lebanese soldiers [1/31 FBIS]

Feb 1. The government allocated \$1 million to finance the reopening of the Beirut Stock Exchange, which closed in 1983 [2/2 FT]

Feb 2. Hizballah and SLA forces clashed near al-'Ayshiyas-al-Rayhan, in south Lebanon, resulting in an unspecified number of casualties [2/7 FBIS]

Feb 7 In Damascus, Japanese representatives announced that Japan would reopen its embassy in Lebanon, following a ten-year closure [2/8 FBIS]

Feb 8 Israeli naval forces blockaded the port of Tyre [2/27 FBIS]

Lebanon failed during talks in Washington to lift the US ban on travel to Lebanon, in place since 1985 [2/9 FT]

Feb 11• In Sidon, Mahmud Khalid 'Ayntur, a leader of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, was arrested by security forces on charges of being the chief assassin for the Fatah Revolutionary Council [2/11 NYT, 2/13 FBIS]

Feb. 18: Israeli and unidentified Lebanese forces exchanged rocket and artillery fire in the "security zone," killing at least one Israeli soldier [2/21 FBIS]

Feb. 19• Israeli warplanes and artillery attacked positions of unidentified Lebanese forces in the "security zone," and Hizballah forces attacked SLA forces. Two civilians, two Hizballah members, and one SLA member died in the clashes [2/21 FBIS]

Feb 23 Israeli naval forces extended the blockade of the Lebanese coast to Sidon from Tyre. Approximately 1,800 Lebanese fishermen were without work as a result of the blockade [2/27 FBIS, NYT]

Feb 26 Israeli forces shelled and moved soldiers into the Iqlim al-Tuffah area in southern Lebanon. One Israeli soldier was reported wounded [2/27 FBIS]

Feb. 28 Israeli forces shelled Iqlim al-Tuffah, and Hizballah forces attacked an SLA patrol near Jabal al-Rafi, in southern Lebanon, resulting in the death of three Hizballah members [3/1 FBIS]

Mar. 2• Lebanon protested Israel's blockade of Lebanon's southern coast in an open letter to United Nations (UN) secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali [3/3 NYT]

Mar 7. Islamic Resistance forces fired anti-aircraft weapons at Israeli warplanes flying over Beirut [3/7 WSJ]

Israeli forces shelled areas of the "security zone" during 5-7 March [3/6, 3/8 FBIS]

Mar 8 Israeli and SLA forces clashed with unidentified Lebanese and Hizballah forces in the "security zone," resulting in the deaths of at least 11 combatants. SLA and Hizballah forces clashed in the Jazzin area in southern Lebanon [3/8, 3/9 FBIS]

Mar. 9 Israel ended its blockade of the Lebanese coast, which began 8 February [3/11 NYT]

Mar 13 Hizballah spokesperson Shaykh Nabil Qawuq stated that Hizballah was willing to exchange two Israeli soldiers and 20 SLA soldiers for all Lebanese "POWs" held by Israel [3/14 FBIS]

Mar 14: A nationwide strike halted official and business activity in protest to the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon [3/15 NYT]

Mar 16: Israeli gunboats fired at Lebanese fishermen near Tyre, forcing them off the water. Unidentified Lebanese forces retaliated by attacking Israeli posts in the "security zone" [3/17 FBIS]

Mar 23 The Islamic Resistance detonated a bomb near an SLA patrol, killing an unspecified number of people [3/24 FBIS]

In Mashgharah, in southern Lebanon, an Israeli artillery attack killed a Syrian laborer and wounded three others [3/24 FBIS]

The government lodged a protest with the International Maritime Organization against Israel's blockade of Lebanon's southern coast [3/23 FT]

Mar 25. Hizballah detonated a bomb under two cars of SLA officials, killing four and wounding three. Israeli forces shelled areas of the "security zone" and Israeli

and SLA positions were shelled by unidentified forces [3/27 FBIS]

Mar 27 Israeli naval forces fired at Lebanese fishing boats, compelling them to return to shore [3/27 FBIS]

Mar 29 Israeli positions and unidentified Lebanese forces exchanged artillery fire in Sujud in southern Lebanon. A bomb exploded near an SLA patrol, wounding one SLA member [3/30 FBIS]

Mar 31 Israeli air forces attacked alleged Hizballah bases in the "security zone." An Israeli helicopter attack near Tyre killed Hizballah leader Rida Yasir. Hizballah retaliated by firing rockets into northern Israel, killing one civilian. In response, Israel fired artillery rounds into the "security zone" [3/31 FBIS, 4/1 WP, 4/3 FBIS]

Apr 3 Israeli and Islamic Resistance forces exchanged artillery fire in areas of the "security zone." Israeli warships prevented Lebanese fishing boats in Tyre from sailing [4/4 FBIS]

Apr 4 The Amal Movement attacked Israeli positions in Rashaf in south Lebanon with rockets, causing unspecified damage. Israeli naval forces prevented movement from the Tyre and Saratand ports. Two SLA members were wounded in an artillery attack in Sujud [4/4 FBIS]

Apr 5 Israeli artillery shelled areas of the "security zone," and Israeli warplanes staged mock raids on Tyre and Beirut [4/5 FBIS]

Apr. 6 SLA and Amal Movement forces clashed in 'Alman and al-Shrmaniya, in the "security zone," resulting in the death of at least one SLA member. Israeli artillery fired on areas of the "security zone" [4/6 FBIS]

Apr 7 Hizballah and Israeli forces exchanged fire in the "security zone," resulting in the death of one civilian and one SLA member [4/9 WP]

In the 'Ayn al-Hilwa refugee camp, bombs exploded in four video rental stores and a coffee shop [4/10 FBIS]

Apr 15 Twenty Katyusha rockets fell in Marjayun, wounding a nurse and damaging a hospital. Israeli and SLA forces shelled suspected Hizballah positions, wounding one Hizballah member [4/16 NYT, WP]

Libya

See also, Regional Affairs

1995

Jan 18 Colonel 'Umar al-Hariri, a leader of the 1969 Revolution, was released from prison after being held for an unspecified time [1/19 FBIS]

Feb 23 In Valletta, Malta, Libya and Malta signed a trade agreement in which the two countries pledged to cooperate on financial, industrial, and trade matters [2/24 FBIS]

Mar. 1: The government announced the release of 305 inmates and the destruction of the last prison in the country [3/2 FBIS]

Mar 23 The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced a \$4-million reward for the arrest of Libyans, 'Ali Megrahi and Lamin Khalifa Fhima, wanted for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988 [3/24 WP]

Mar. 29 Libyan president Mu'ammr Qadhafi stated that he would use the state airline to transport pilgrims to Mecca in defiance of a United Nations (UN) ban on Libyan flights. Qadhafi also stated that Libya would leave the UN if flights of pilgrims were obstructed [3/29 WSJ]

Mar. 31: The UN Security Council extended sanctions against Libya, imposed because of its refusal to surrender for trial two Libyans accused of bombing Pan Am flight 103 in 1988 [3/31 NYT]

Apr. 6 US assistant secretary of state Robert Pelletreau Jr. stated that the United States was involved in an effort to stop Libya from taking a seat on the UN Security Council in January 1996 [4/7 WP]

Morocco

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict

1995

Jan 31 King Hassan II dissolved the government and appointed 'Abdellatif Filali prime minister and minister of foreign affairs [2/1 FBIS]

Feb 23: The government and Canada signed a trade agreement covering Canadian exports to Morocco and technology sharing [2/27 FBIS]

Feb 27: Prime Minister Filali announced his new cabinet

Moulay Ahmad 'Alawi, *Minister of State*

Driss Basri, *Minister of State for the Interior*

'Abderrahmane Amalou, *Justice*

Muhammad Kabbaj, *Finance and Foreign Investments*

Hassan Abu Ayub, *Agriculture and Agricultural Investments*

Mustafa Sahl, *Fisheries and the Merchant Navy*

Abd al 'Aziz Meziane Belkhi, *Public Works*

Driss 'Alawi M'Daghri, *Communications and Official Government Spokesman*

Driss Jettou, *Trade, Industry, and Handicrafts*

'Abd al-Kabir M'Daghri Alawi, *Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs*

'Abd al-Latif Guerraoui, *Energy and Mines*

'Abd al-Sadiq Rabi', *Secretary General of the Government*

Sa'id Ameskane, *Transport*

Hamza Kittani, *Posts and Telecommunications*

Ahmad Meziane, *Youth and Sport*

Amin Damnati, *Employment and Social Affairs*

Sa'id Fassi, *Housing*

Muhammad Alawi Muhammad, *Tourism*

Nur al-Din Bin 'Umar 'Alami, *Environment*

'Abd al-Salam Baroual, *Vocational Training*

Muhammad 'Alami, *External Trade*

'Abd al-Rahman Sbai, *[Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister]*

Messaoud Mansuri, *[Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister] Administrative Affairs*

Muhammad Hamma, *[Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister] Promoting the Economy*

Muhammad Ziane, [*Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister*] *Human Rights*

Lamine Bin 'Umar, [*Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister*] *Population*

Tayib Fassi Fehri, *Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation*

Lahsene Gabon, [*Deputy Secretary of State to the Minister of Foreign Affairs*] *Moroccan Community Abroad Affairs*

'Abd al-'Aziz Msioui, [*Deputy Secretary of State to the Minister of Foreign Affairs*] *Relations with the Arab Maghrib Union* [2/28 FBIS]

Feb. 28: An Egyptian man forced entry into the Russian consulate in Rabat and detonated a grenade, injuring himself [3/1 FBIS]

Mar 15: In Washington, King Hassan II met with US president Bill Clinton to discuss Morocco's role in regional peace, economic issues, and bilateral relations [3/16 FBIS]

Mar 27: China and Morocco signed agreements aimed at increasing investment between the two countries [3/29 FBIS]

Mar. 28: Japan and Morocco signed an agreement in which Japan pledged to finance a drinking-water project [3/29 FBIS]

Oman

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs

1995

Mar 22: In Muscat, US vice president Al Gore met with Sultan Qabus Bin-Sa'id to discuss bilateral relations and regional issues [3/23 FBIS]

Pakistan

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs

1995

Jan. 27: Police arrested 19 people in a raid on a narcotics ring in 'Alam Gugar, southeast of Peshawar, confiscating 165 tons of hashish and 480 kilograms of heroin [1/30 FBIS]

Jan 31: The government arrested former chief of privatization Sa'id Qadir, on charges of fraud [2/1 FT]

Feb 4: In Karachi, 12 members of Harkut-ul-Ansar, a Shi'i Kashmiri group, were killed in a drive-by shooting by unknown gunmen [2/6 FT]

Feb 5: In Karachi, gunmen attacked Sunni Muslim areas, killing at least 21 people and wounding between 26 and 41 others, in apparent retaliation for the 4 February attack on Harkut-ul-Ansar members [2/6 WP, WSJ]

Feb 9: In Rawalpindi, a special anti-terrorist court sentenced Shaykh Rashid Ahmad, a National Assembly member, to seven years in prison [2/10 FBIS]

Feb. 10: Two Christians, Rehmat and Salamat Masih, were sentenced to death for blasphemy against the

Muslim Prophet Muhammad Both of the defendants denied the charge [2/10 FT]

Feb. 20: In Lahore, during a court appeal by two Christians condemned to death for blasphemy against Islam, 300 demonstrators demanded their execution [2/21 WP]

Feb. 23: In Lahore, police confronted demonstrators when a court dismissed charges against two Christians accused of blasphemy against Islam [2/24 FBIS]

Feb 25: In Karachi, 20 Shi'i Muslims were shot to death when unidentified gunmen fired into a mosque on two separate occasions [2/26 NYT]

Feb. 26: In Karachi, security forces clashed with mobs angered by the killing of 20 Shi'i Muslims on 25 February Two people were killed in the mob violence [2/27 FBIS]

In Karachi, police arrested 36 people, mostly Sunni Muslims with affiliations to radical groups, in response to violence between Shi'i and Sunni Muslims [2/27 FT]

Rehmat and Salamat Masih, two Christians cleared of charges of blasphemy against Islam, fled to Germany due to threats against their lives [3/1 WP]

Mar 2: In Karachi, seven Sunni Muslims were shot to death and six were wounded when unidentified gunmen entered a home near two Shi'i mosques where 20 worshippers were killed on 25 February [3/3 FT]

Mar 6: In Karachi, unidentified gunmen killed a police officer, a paramilitary ranger, and 11 others [3/6 FT]

Mar 7: In Lahore, gunmen shot to death Muhammad 'Ali Naqui, leader of the Shi'i party, Tehrik Jafria Pakistan (TJP) [3/7 FBIS]

Mar 8: Officials of the US consulate in Karachi, Jackie van Lanelingham and Gary C Durell, were killed and one other was wounded when three unidentified gunmen fired into their vehicle No one claimed responsibility The United States sent Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents to aid in the investigation [3/9, 3/10 NYT]

Mar. 10: In Karachi, a bomb exploded outside of a Shi'i mosque, which unidentified gunmen subsequently attacked, killing 14 and wounding 22 others [3/11 NYT, 3/12 FT, NYT]

Mar. 11: In Peshawar, police arrested an Iranian, two Pakistanis, and three Sudanese suspected of ties with World Trade Center bombing suspect Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf [3/17 NYT, 3/19 WP]

Mar 19: Police clashed with female demonstrators and Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) members in Shah Faisal Colony, in Karachi, wounding three people [3/20 FBIS]

Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto stated that the 11 March arrest of six men associated with Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf resulted in the revelation that Yusuf had attempted to assassinate Bhutto in September or October 1993 [3/19 WP]

Mar. 25: Businesses in Karachi and Lahore conducted a strike to protest government inability to curb lawlessness in Karachi [3/27 FT]

Mar 26: In Islamabad, US first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton met with Prime Minister Bhutto to discuss education, health, and social issues [3/27 NYT]

In Hayatabad, police arrested seven unnamed suspected accomplices of Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf belonging to the Hizbul Mujahideen organization [3/27 FBIS]
Mar 29. In Multan, police arrested Akhtar Hussayn Gilani, relative of National Assembly speaker Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, due to suspected ties with Ramzi Ahmed Yusuf [3/29 FBIS]

Apr 4. Government officials announced that two "drug lords," Iqbal Baig and Anwar Khattak, had been extradited to the United States to stand trial on heroin and hashish smuggling charges [4/4 WP]

Apr 6. In Washington, Prime Minister Bhutto met with US congressional leaders, including Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Bhutto also met with Senator Robert Dole to discuss the lifting of US sanctions aimed at Pakistan's nuclear weapons program [4/7 WP, 4/8 NYT]

Apr 10. In Washington, Prime Minister Bhutto stated that the United States should either deliver the 28 F-16 warplanes that Pakistan had purchased in 1990 for over \$600 million, or return the money. The Pressler Amendment, stopping arms sales to countries developing nuclear weapons, blocked the delivery of the warplanes [4/10 NYT]

Apr 11. In Washington, US president Bill Clinton met with Prime Minister Bhutto to discuss bilateral relations and the status of a \$600-million order for 28 US F-16 warplanes that was blocked in 1990 by the Pressler Amendment. Clinton stated that he would seek to reimburse Pakistan if the F-16s could not be delivered [4/12 NYT]

Qatar

See also, Regional Affairs

1995

Apr 10: In Doha, South African president Nelson Mandela met with Shaykh Khalifa Bin-Hamad al-Thani to discuss Afro-Arab cooperation and bilateral relations [4/11 FBIS]

Saudi Arabia

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1995

Jan 21: Three Filipinos were beheaded after their conviction of killing a son, housemaid, and driver of a prominent Saudi businessman on 23 October [1/21 WP]

Feb 8. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessment of the Saudi budget crisis reportedly recommended that the royal family end subsidized prices and sell off state- and quasi-state-owned companies [2/8 FT]

Feb. 20. The Korean Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company announced it was awarded \$100 million in a case against the Public Works and Housing Ministry [2/21 FT]

Mar 5. The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) reported that police arrested professors

of theology at Mecca and Riyadh Universities [3/7 FBIS, 3/8 WP]

Mar. 22: In Riyadh, US vice president Al Gore met with King Fahd to discuss bilateral relations [3/23 FBIS]

Sudan

See also, Regional Affairs

1995

Jan. 24. Fighting between government forces and elements of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) caused relief agencies to evacuate Nimule in southern Sudan [1/26 FBIS]

Feb 2. Government forces reportedly broke a siege of the city of Kapoeta, in southern Sudan, imposed by the SPLA, allowing supplies to be flown in [2/3 FBIS]

Feb 3. A General Elections Commission official announced that general elections would take place on an unspecified date after Ramadan [2/7 FBIS]

Feb. 8: One hundred fifty-three enlisted men and three officers were reportedly arrested after they mutinied over overdue wages [2/14 FBIS]

Feb 9: The president of the Republic, Lieutenant General 'Umar al-Bashir, appointed a new cabinet

'Ali 'Uthman Muhammad Taha, *Foreign Affairs*

Muhammad 'Uthman al-Khalifa, *Social Planning*

'Uthman 'Abd-al-Qadir 'Abd-al-Latif, *Roads and*

Communications

Ibrahim Ahmad 'Umar, *Higher Education and Scientific Research*

Kabashor Kuku, *Education*

Taj-al-Sirr Mustafa 'Abd-al-Salam, *Trade*

Muhammad Tahir, *Tourism and the Environment*

Al-Fatih Muhammad 'Ali, *Transport*

Badr-al-Din Muhammad Ahmad Sulayman, *Industry*

Ghazi Salah-al-Din 'Atabani, *Foreign Affairs*

'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad, *Agriculture*

Musa Muhammad Musa, *Industry*

'Abd-al-Rahman Nur-al-Din Mustafa, *Offices of the*

Federal Administration

Mahdi Ibrahim Muhammad, *Office of the President*

Ihsan 'Abdallah al-Ghabshaw, *Internal Affairs and*

Refugees [2/10 FBIS]

Feb. 11. Unaligned militiamen released five aid workers who were kidnapped on 8 February [2/13 FBIS]

Feb 21. The South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) reportedly overran the government-held town of Malakal in the South [2/27 FBIS]

Mar 18: Five hijackers surrendered to Sudanese authorities after seizing an Ethiopian airliner on a domestic flight with 92 people on board and diverting it to the Sudan [3/20 FBIS]

Mar. 19. Armed forces spokesman Staff Brigadier Muhammad Bashir Sulayman announced that the government had regained control of the southern Kordofan, Upper Nile, Bahr al-Ghazal, and western Equatorial areas [3/24 FBIS]

Mar. 25 Government forces captured the town of al-Nasir in southern Sudan from SSIM forces led by Riak Machar [3/27 FBIS]

Mar. 26: Former US president Jimmy Carter stated that he was seeking to negotiate a truce between government and opposition forces in order to begin a campaign against the parasitic guinea worm [3/27 NYT]

Mar. 28: The government and SPLA forces agreed to a two-month cease-fire negotiated by former US president Carter [3/29 WSJ, WP, 3/31 FT]

The SSIM claimed that government warplanes bombed the towns of Waat and Malual Garhouth, in southern Sudan, despite the cease-fire [3/29 FBIS]

Apr. 11. The government expelled a Ugandan diplomat in response to Uganda's expulsion of a Sudanese diplomat [4/11 FBIS]

Syria

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1995

Mar. 28 The government reportedly released 529 Muslim Brotherhood members held for unspecified reasons [3/30 FBIS]

Mar. 30 Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev signed an agreement with Syria in Damascus in which both countries pledged cultural and scientific cooperation [3/31 FBIS]

Tunisia

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs,

1995

Jan. 24• President Zine al-'Abidine Ben 'Ali announced the appointment of the following cabinet officials

'Abdallah Kallel, *Minister of State, Special Advisor to the President of the Republic*

Muhammad Jegham, *Interior*

Mustafa Nabli, *Economic Development*

Slaheddine Bouguerra, *Industry*

Shaheddine Ben M'Barek, *Trade*

Sadok Rabah, *Social Affairs*

Habib 'Ammar, *Communications*

Slaheddine Maa'wi, *Tourism and Handicrafts*

Salah Bakkari, *Culture*

Muhammad 'Ali Ghanzawi, *Security* [1/26 FBIS]

Jan. 26: Sahnoun al-Jawhari, a leader of the Tunisian Islamic movement imprisoned since 1992, died in the hospital of a "hemorrhage" [1/31 FBIS]

Mar. 18• China and Tunisia signed a trade cooperation agreement aimed at rectifying the trade imbalance favoring China [3/20 FBIS]

Mar. 20• Paris-based Radio France International reported that the government refused to allow opposition leader Moncef Marzouki to leave the country [3/22 FBIS]

Mar. 25. Prime Minister Hamed Karwi named Naziha Zarrouk Minister of Women's and Family Affairs [3/27 FBIS]

Apr. 13 The European Union (EU) and Tunisia signed an agreement that provided for Tunisian products to enter the EU free-trade zone gradually over 12 years [4/18 FBIS]

Turkey

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Cyprus, Iraq

1995

Jan. 18 Turkey reportedly began implementing a strategy to overcome obstacles to a customs union with the European Union (EU) that had been blocked because of Greece's objections as well as EU concerns about human rights violations. The strategy included an amendment to the constitution, intensified contacts with EU officials, and a compromise with Greece over territorial issues and the Cyprus dispute [1/18 FT]

Jan. 18 A previously unknown group, the Lebanon Freedom Fighters, claimed to be holding hostage US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Michael Couillard and his son, Matthew, who were reported missing from Kartalkaya, a ski resort between Ankara and Istanbul, on 15 January [1/19 NYT]

Jan. 19• Legislation was introduced in parliament to amend the 1983 constitution in order to stem human rights violations [1/20 FT]

Jan. 20. Police reported the arrest of a man claiming to have kidnapped Lieutenant Colonel Couillard and his son [1/24 FBIS]

Jan. 21: The government announced the purchase of six reconnaissance aircraft from France [1/25 FBIS]

Jan. 24 Near Bolu, northwest Turkey, a villager found Lieutenant Colonel Couillard and his son Matthew, who had been lost in the mountains since 15 January [1/25 NYT]

Jan. 25 The government announced that 'Abdallah Oçalan, leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), was stripped of his Turkish citizenship because he had not performed compulsory military service [1/31 FBIS]

Feb. 8. The human rights group Amnesty International reported 50 cases of "disappearances," kidnapping, and murder of Kurdish political opponents by security forces [2/8 FT]

Feb. 9. Greek air force fighters encountered a Turkish warplane that allegedly had violated Greek airspace. The warplane crashed into the Aegean Sea as a result of a malfunction. The uninjured Turkish pilot was rescued by the Greek navy [2/9 FT, WP]

Feb. 16. The European parliament voted for a resolution that tied an EU-Turkey customs union to an improved Turkish human rights record [2/17 FT]

Feb. 18 The People's Socialist Party (SHP) voted to merge into the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) [2/20 FT]

Murat Karayalcin resigned as leader of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) [2/21 FBIS]

Feb. 19 Security forces clashed with PKK forces in southeastern Turkey. The government claimed to have killed 51 PKK members [2/20 FT]

Mar. 12 In Istanbul, three Shi'ite 'Alawi Muslims were shot to death by Sunni Muslim gunmen, causing 'Alawi riots in protest [3/14 FT]

Mar. 13: In Istanbul, nine to 16 died and 100 to 150 were wounded in 'Alawi-Sunni Muslim violence and clashes between police and 'Alawis [3/14 FT, WSJ]

Mar. 15 In Istanbul, four 'Alawi protestors were killed and 25 injured during a clash with police. Four others died in 'Alawi-Sunni Muslim violence [3/16 NYT]

Mar. 16 In Istanbul and Ankara, clashes between police and 'Alawis protesting police handling of an attack on 'Alawis resulted in an estimated 30 deaths [3/17 FT]

Mar. 18: PKK forces ambushed and killed at least 15 Turkish soldiers near the Iraqi border [3/22 NYT]

Mar. 26 Six Germans were arrested for suspected collaboration with the PKK. The six claimed to be academics observing events related to the 20 March offensive in northern Iraq [3/27 FT]

Prime Minister Tansu Çiller named Erdal İnönü to the post of foreign minister [3/27 FT]

Mar. 27: President Süleyman Demirel approved the following new ministers

Hikmet Çetin, *Deputy Prime Minister*
Onur Kumbarcıbaşı, *State Minister*
Ziya Halis, *State Minister*
Algan Hacaloglu, *State Minister*
Sysel Baykal, *State Minister*
Erman Sahin, *Public Works and Housing*
Aydın Güven Gurkan, *Labor*
Hasan Akyol, *Industry and Trade*
Ercan Karakas, *Culture*
İrfan Gürkınar, *Tourism* [3/27 FBIS]

Mar. 29 German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel announced that his government was withholding \$106 million in subsidies to German firms building two ships for Turkey, and suspending arms deliveries to Turkey. Displeasure with the Turkish offensive against the PKK in northern Iraq was cited as the motive for the move [3/30 FT]

Mar. 30 İsmail Beşikçi was sentenced to two years in prison, and Husnu Onder was sentenced to six months, for publishing a report in 1993 alleging that Turkish troops raped a Kurdish woman in Diyarbakır. The two were sentenced under an anti-terrorism law [3/31 WP]

Apr. 5. Security forces arrested two Finnish Broadcasting Company journalists and seized film of Kurdish civilian casualties from Turkey's offensive into northern Iraq [4/6 FBIS]

Apr. 11: PKK leader Öcalan stated he was prepared to negotiate a political solution to the conflict between Turkey and the PKK [4/13 FBIS]

Transportation Minister Mehmet Kostepen resigned due to a disagreement with Prime Minister Çiller over state telephone privatization plans [4/12 FT]

Apr. 12 Clashes in Tunceli Province between Turkish troops and PKK forces left 21 PKK members and at least two Turkish soldiers dead [4/13 WP]

UAE

See also, Regional Affairs

1995

Jan. 16 In Abu Dhabi, Iraqi Islamic opposition leader Shaykh 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-'Alī was arrested by security forces for an unspecified reason [1/23 FBIS]

Jan. 18 France signed a defense agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) [1/19 FT]

Jan. 31 A Luxembourg court approved a plan, in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) case, in which creditors would recover 15 cents on the dollar. The government of Abu Dhabi agreed to pay \$1.8 billion in the settlement to creditors on 17 November 1993 [2/1 WSJ]

Feb. 22 Prime Minister Maktoum bin Rashid al-Maktoum established a financial oversight body to monitor government departments and state-controlled companies in Dubai [2/23 FT]

Yemen

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs

1995

Jan. 22: In San'a, two grenades were thrown at the Russian embassy, reportedly by Islamists angry at Russian military action in Chechnya [1/31 FBIS]

Jan. 25 In Aden, security forces dispersed demonstrators calling for press freedom [1/26 FBIS]

Jan. 31 In al-Dali Directorate, clashes occurred at the 'Abbud military camp reportedly due to pay arrears. Four soldiers were killed and four were wounded [2/3 FBIS]

Feb. 1. In San'a, 13 opposition parties announced the formation of a coalition group called the Democratic Coalition of Opposition [2/6 FBIS]

Feb. 15. Police arrested three people for the 10 February murder of Yemen Socialist Party leader Shaykh 'Alī Jamil [2/15 FBIS]

Mar. 29: The government announced measures to restructure the economy in order to correct its budget deficit. The resulting 50–100-percent hike in the cost of fuel led to demonstrations in Aden, where three people were reportedly killed in clashes with police [3/30, 3/31 FBIS]

Mar. 30: In Aden, police used tear gas to disperse demonstrators protesting price increases. Several people were wounded in clashes with the police. [3/31 FBIS]

The government devalued the official exchange rate of the rial, which applied to banks and customs departments, from 12 to the dollar to 50 [3/30 FT]

Apr. 1 Police released 52 people arrested in Aden during demonstrations against price increases of 29 March [4/4 FBIS]

Forthcoming in

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Book Reviews

ARMENIA

A History of the Armenian People, vol. II: 1500 A.D. to the Present, by George A. Bournoutian. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1994. xviii + 201 pages. Plates to p. 210. Bibl. to p. 219. Index to p. 237. \$14.95 paper.

Reviewed by Rouben P. Adalian

There are at least two challenges to writing an introductory textbook in history. The first involves selecting the topics that are considered essential to convey a comprehensive explanation about the historical evolution of a people. The second involves organizing the selected topics into a narrative that does not sacrifice continuity and depth in the process of covering the 16th to the 20th centuries. Bournoutian more than meets both challenges. He also offers an original approach to Armenian history.

Bournoutian skillfully balances the geographic divisions separating the Armenians into a number of communities. He attributes an important role to the Armenian diaspora in the forming of a modern sense of nationality. He demonstrates the connections between the people of the diaspora and the population in the Armenian homeland. For most of the period covered in this book, the division of

the Armenian homeland between the Ottoman and Russian empires remained a defining concern.

The author relates the history of the Armenian communities of Iran and India from the 17th century through the many emigré and exile settlements of the 20th century. The story of the Armenian diaspora, however, is never allowed to overshadow the central developments in Armenia proper. There, Bournoutian traces the experience of the Armenians under Russian and Ottoman rule, and focuses on the process of modernization under differing and uneven sets of circumstances. Under Russian rule, modernization leads to the formation of an Armenian state, and under Ottoman rule, it leads to the push to exterminate the Armenian population.

Bournoutian brings his story right up to 1994. This helps tremendously to see recent events in their proper light and to appreciate the importance of the past in shaping the present.

The work is not confined to political history, but pays attention to society and culture as well. The formation of new social classes and groups who sponsored a cultural revival is addressed, but compressing these topics into a few pages creates some problems. Students, the main readers of this book, are likely to find difficulty with the sections on society and culture, especially when only a string of names is given as evidence of the cultural revival registered in the 19th century.

On the other hand, students will find extremely useful the 25 maps and six timetables of major events. These place developments in Armenia in the context of global history. This will allow students to see Armenian history against the background of changes in Europe, Asia, and America. The maps are clearly drawn and show only places or boundaries relevant to the chapters they illustrate. Sixteen plates, a good bibliography, and an index make this just the right book for the classroom.

While at times Bournoutian waxes eloquent, at others signs of haste are detectable. This book, therefore, would benefit from more editing before it goes to a second printing. Keeping the audience in mind, the section on the Eastern Question—which is too long for a book of this size—and the discussion on the Armenian political parties should be simplified.

Students in introductory history courses and general audiences will enjoy this very readable book. Specialists will be impressed by the successful weave of the many strands of Armenian history into a narrative whole.

Rouben P. Adalian is an adjunct professor at Georgetown and George Washington Universities.

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics, ed. by Mohiaddin Mesbahi. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994. x + 319 pages. Contributes to p. 323. Index to p. 353. \$49.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Reviewed by David Nalle

The fifteen contributors to this book come from Central Asia, England, Russia, and the United States. With two exceptions, the articles were originally presented as papers at a conference in Tehran in March of 1992. The conference was organized by the editor, an associate professor at Florida International University, and hosted by the Institute for Political and International Stud-

ies, a think tank affiliated with the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The venue and the host add particular interest to what is intrinsically an informative and valuable book.

In the preface, the editor states that the contributions, focusing on the first two years after the break-up of the Soviet Union, were written so as not to be acutely time sensitive, and that they were updated before publication. *Central Asia and the Caucasus* opens with three essays contemplating ethnicity and Islam in the region. These are followed by seven articles on individual "new Muslim states." The final section of the book deals with "Russia and the Former Soviet South: The New Geopolitics."

This last section closes with a long and carefully worked out essay by the editor titled "Russia and the Geopolitics of the Muslim South." Mesbahi describes the fluctuating nature of Russian foreign policy and identifies two competing policy "perspectives"—the Euro-Atlanticist and the Neo-Eurasianist—suggesting a shift towards the latter. He gives a perceptive analysis of these two "schools of thought," identifying their contrasting attitudes towards Russia's place in a newly ambiguous world environment, the projection of Russian power and presence, the possibility of ethnic-driven conflicts involving members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the internal and external "threat" of Islam.

Mesbahi emphasizes that "structural dependency" continues to tie the newly independent states to Russia. This interdependence manifests itself in economic, political, psychological, and military fields. Given the implications of this interdependence, Mesbahi asks, "Are there any mitigating factors that might signal that Russia will not be able to repeat the remarkable imperial comeback similar to the post-1917 period?" (p. 306). He provides an interesting answer.

The key mitigating factor against Russia's reassertion [of dominance in the Muslim south] in the long term will be of a subjective nature, namely, the absence of a dynamic, forward-looking neoimperial vision and zeal. Russia's "great power ideology" lacks the religiously based "third Rome" of the tsars and the equally fanatical Marxian-Utopian conviction of the Bolsheviks (p. 307).

In a prophetic aside, Mesbahi firmly discounts the "outdated, nostalgic, and inherently exclusivist currency of Russian nationalism." As a substitute vision, he claims "it will engulf Russia in a bloodbath of civil war varieties at 'home' and wars of national liberation in its 'nearby foreign parts'" (p. 307).

Mesbahi's big-picture analysis is supported by the more specific articles preceding it. A persistent theme is the multiple trauma suffered by the people of Central Asia and their culture as a result, particularly, of the last 75 years of Russian/communist domination. This devastating impact is well delineated in Nazif Shahrani's essay on "Soviet Development Legacies and Future Challenges." He foresees a difficult struggle "for the long-oppressed peoples of this region" to meet the challenge of finding "a culturally appropriate alternative model for the future development of Turkestan that would ensure economic growth, political freedom and social justice" (p. 69).

In his theoretical and highly-structured analysis, "The Ethnohistorical Dynamics of Muslim Societies," Sergei Panarin, of Moscow's Institute of Oriental Studies, cites the "gloomy" results of "Muslim societies' experience as 'subjects' in history. [They] paid a high price to keep the balance between continuity and change to the benefit of the former." Detailing Muslim experience in Central Asia, Panarin stresses that "these historical losses could not pass without leaving a trace, altogether they preclude a smooth transition between the past existential structures and the present ones" (pp. 32-3). Eden Naby's article blends personal observation with scholarly analysis in her essay, "The Emerging Central Asia Ethnic and Religious Factions."

The core of the book, parts 2 and 3, includes articles on individual Muslim states and republics by Marie Bennigsen Broxup, Yuri Zinin, Alexei Maleshenko, Martha Brill Olcott, Zahid Munavarov, Alexander Filonyk, Aziz Niyazi, and Andrei Nedvetsky. These are useful reviews of the recent history and early independence of each of the Muslim states (Broxup covers the special category of Tatarstan and Chechnia). Filonyk, for example, provides insights on the role of tribal affiliations in Kyrgyz politics and the relative weakness of Islam in that country. Niyazi recounts Tajikistan's descent into civil war and the resurgence of the communist ruling elite. Munav-

arov applauds the "return of Islam to its proper place in [Uzbek] society" (p. 142), but downplays, as do most of his fellow authors, any serious threat from "fundamentalist Islam" in the region. The volume is rounded out with contributions by Milan Hauner, "The Disintegration of the Soviet Eurasian Empire," Arthur Sagadeev, "Great Power Ideology and the Muslim Nations of the CIS," and Anthony Hyman, "Central Asia and the Middle East."

The mix of authors from quite different academic traditions makes for a sense of unevenness in the book. In several cases, there is insufficient rigor in the daunting task of editing Russian translations into readable English. The anarchic approach to transliteration of Central Asian names and terms (an offense definitely not unique to this book) is also a minor irritant.

David Nalle is a former director for North Africa, the Near East, and South Asia at the United States Information Agency. He is now retired and specializing in Central Asian affairs.

EGYPT

Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society, by Kirk J. Beattie. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. viii + 235 pages. Appendices to p. 243. Bibliography to p. 249. Index to p. 269. \$60.

Reviewed by Robert L. Tignor

The cloak of secrecy with which Egypt's military leaders surrounded themselves following the 1952 coup d'état is steadily being pulled aside, offering observers and analysts new data and perspectives on the first and most fully studied of the military regimes on the African continent. For a long time, the military satraps made official proclamations and granted interviews to sympathetic journalists. Later, some members of the inner circle ('Abd al-Latif Baghdadi, Zakhariya Muhiy al-Din, and Muhammad Najib, for example) offered self-serving memoirs that did, however, place the reader around the table of the Revolutionary Command Council. In this fascinating and informative book, Kirk Beattie documents the Jamal

'Abd al-Nasir years through the more than 100 interviews he conducted with regime leaders, political opponents, and privileged observers. Although the prevailing custom has been for scholars to limit their interviews to no more than 50, the author, through the dint of being there and being an ardent researcher, far exceeded this allotment. The result is the most extensive and comprehensive body of oral testimony ever assembled on some of the most tumultuous years in Egypt's modern history.

Autobiographies, memoirs, and oral testimony must, of course, be used with great caution since, by definition, they are extremely self-interested. Yet, until scholars are allowed access to the records of the Revolutionary Command Council and the Egyptian Council of Ministers (unlikely to occur in the near future), the analyst can penetrate authoritative documentation in no other way. Beattie's reconstruction of the events of this cataclysmic era in Egyptian, Middle Eastern, and international politics has the feel of correctness. Certainly, his account of the tensions within the military regime itself is authoritative. It reveals how bitter disputes arose over how long the military should remain in office, how to align the country in the Cold War dispute, how, or whether, to establish democracy, and how to promote economic growth.

Beattie offers, by far, the best account of the military groupings that existed prior to the 1952 seizure of power and the effect that these alignments had on domestic and foreign policy after Nasir and his co-conspirators came to office. Yet, despite Beattie's prodigious research effort, he remains unable to answer many of the intensely debated questions about this era, not least of which is the actual numbers involved in the Free Officers movement before the coup. Beattie clearly demonstrates, however, that the original inner cadre, in seeking to increase their numbers, consciously lowered the ideological barriers to membership in their group. In so doing, they permitted a wide range of disparate opinions to enter their movement. This led to open conflict after the coup that was only partially muted by the fact that the officers in the inner circle were united in their authoritarianism and their suspicion of democratic institutions.

Beattie also contends that although Egypt possessed attractive economic prospects in 1952, it

failed to achieve meaningful economic progress. The deep ideological divides within the ruling officer corps compelled the rulers to settle for one-man autocracy rather than expose themselves to the risks of open political and economic discussions. This entirely plausible thesis is far from incontrovertible, however, given the massive social problems and international pressures that Egypt's rulers faced. Indeed, how promising were Egypt's economic prospects, given the already swollen population size, the country's limited land and raw material resources, and the educational deficiencies of the people? And how open and consultative could these military men afford to be, given the aggressive Middle Eastern policies of the superpowers and the hostile intentions of the new Israeli state? What, in fact, was the likelihood for open political and economic discourse, let alone representative institutions, in a polity compelled to operate under such strained internal and external pressures?

Robert L. Tignor, Princeton University

Nasser and Sadat: Decision Making and Foreign Policy (1970–1972), by Shaheen Ayubi. Lanham, MD and London: University Press of America, 1994. xiv + 212 pages. Appendixes to p. 218. Bibliography to p. 262. Index to p. 262. \$49.50 cloth, \$32.50 paper.

Reviewed by R. Hrair Dekmejian

The primary objective of this dissertation-cum-book is the reconstruction of the Egyptian foreign policy-making process in the late Nasir and early Sadat eras. The author wisely avoids narrow theoretical frameworks that have been used in studying foreign policy making in developed societies. Thus, instead of focusing on institutions, bureaucracies, and legislatures, *Nasser and Sadat* acknowledges the epicentric role of leadership in the formulation of foreign policy in developing countries. It emphasizes authoritarian leadership, charisma, ideology, nationalism, and personalized policy making.

Indeed, the tradition of centralized power in Egypt—"the pharaonic imperative"—necessitates the adoption of a research framework focusing on the leader's personality, belief system, and per-

ceptions of the environment. In recognition of these analytical concerns, Shaheen Ayubi's research strategy is to utilize an eclectic theoretical framework combining Erik H. Erikson's psychohistorical method with the operational code construct of Nathan Leites as reformulated by Alexander George.¹ Thus, Ayubi identifies the external, internal, and residual variables of the leader's operational environment, as these interact with his psychological environment in determining specific foreign policy decisions.

In reconstructing the Egyptian policy-making process, the book is concerned with two crucial decisions regarding the Soviet Union: Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's January 1970 invitation to the Soviet military to defend Egypt against Israeli air attacks, and Anwar al-Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet forces in July 1972. A detailed historical account of these events is presented, followed by brief personal portraits of Nasir and Sadat based on Erikson's psychohistorical theories. In two chapters, the research framework is used to analyze the operational and psychological determinants of Nasir's and Sadat's decisions.

In a concluding section, the author presents a counter-factual analysis to help determine the predictive power of the two decision-making models. He persuasively argues that if Nasir had been president in July 1972 instead of Sadat, the decisional outcome would probably have been different, i.e., Nasir would not have expelled the Soviets. On the other hand, the author argues that if Sadat had been president in January 1970, he would not have allowed Egypt to become dependent on Soviet support.

This book demonstrates the utility of applying sophisticated psychological theories to the study of leaders and policy making in the Middle East. Additionally, it suggests the feasibility of using such approaches to study policy making in other developing countries. Despite some shortcomings

1 Erik H. Erikson's psychohistorical framework uses Freudian theory in the context of social, cultural, and historical factors to analyze identity formation and adolescent development. Nathan Leites' operational code comprises the political belief system that shapes the strategies, tactics, and views of decision makers. Alexander George reformulated the operational code construct to analyze the impact of the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of political leaders on their foreign policy decisions.

in editing, this book provides significant insights into the contrasting personalities and behavioral patterns of Nasir and Sadat and their differing perceptions of reality. The author breaks new ground in applying the Eriksonian and operational code constructs to Egyptian decision making. Equally laudable is his extensive research based on a plethora of published sources on Egypt and interviews with the late President Sadat, Hasanayn Haykal, Butrus-Butrus Ghali, and several key diplomats and scholars. *Nasser and Sadat* includes a good overview of the foreign policy-making literature and a detailed bibliography that should prove valuable to students of Egyptian politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

R. Hrair Dekmejian is Professor of Political Science, University of Southern California, and author of Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, 2nd ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995).

The Prophet's Pulpit: Islamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt, by Patrick D. Gaffney. Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1994. viii + 268 pages. Appendixes to p. 316. Notes to p. 341. Bibliography to p. 357. Index to p. 367. \$50 cloth, \$20 paper.

Reviewed by Nathan Brown

Patrick D. Gaffney's study of Muslim preachers is based on extensive field research carried out in al-Minya (the capital of a province by the same name located in Egypt's *al-Sa'id*, south of Cairo), beginning in the late 1970s. The choice of location was fortuitous. Gaffney had no way of knowing that the beginning of a radical Islamist challenge to the Egyptian political and social order was germinating in the city at the time. Given subsequent highly publicized political violence in the area between al-Minya and Asyut, *The Prophet's Pulpit* will doubtless be of interest to those who focus on politics in Egypt specifically, and the Muslim world more generally. Although he is very much aware of the political significance of his subject, Gaffney focuses more of his attention on the role of preachers and the content of their sermons.

Gaffney begins with a general consideration of the nature of the mosque and of the Friday sermon. The analysis is based partly on a comparative religious perspective, and Gaffney demonstrates both an unashamed reliance on older social science literature and an informed integration of more recent critical writings. The author examines different approaches to Islam and to preaching extant in al-Minya. He offers a typology of a traditional Azhari teacher, a Sufi holy man, and a "holy warrior." This discussion introduces a more complex, but also more subtle, framework than a simple division between official and unofficial Islam or between the Islam of the 'ulama' (religious scholars) and popular Islam. Gaffney also discusses extensively the political context of the sermons and the preachers under study. He analyzes the events surrounding the rise of a radical Islamist movement centered in the newly established university in al-Minya. This is followed by an examination of the themes and vocabulary of sermons. Gaffney selects for extended analysis the words "security" (*amn*) and "belief" (*iman*). He examines their meaning, their relationship, and the role that they play in sermons. The final section of the book consists of a detailed rhetorical analysis of three sermons (and their social and political context), the transcriptions of which are included as appendices.

While *The Prophet's Pulpit* does not break new ground in its analysis of the social and political nature of Islam in modern Egypt, it does offer extremely rich local detail. There is little that would be startling to someone well-read on Islamic political movements in Egypt (although Gaffney does have some interesting and original observations about government attempts to exert greater direct control over private mosques and preachers). Yet it is rare indeed to read such a detailed account of a local setting, especially one outside the capital city. The description of the emerging radical Islamist movement is decidedly unfavorable—it is portrayed as intolerant in outlook and bullying in tactics. The government and security forces are depicted as inactive until they respond to a series of provocations. Such a picture would likely be sharply contested by many of the participants. The image is also dated, given the current decisive, even aggressive, policies of the government. Nevertheless, Gaffney is to be lauded for his ability to present clearly the details of the

local origins of the current violent confrontation between government and opposition.

Given the salience of that confrontation, it may be the political aspects of Gaffney's work that attract the most attention. Yet that is clearly not what motivated the research, nor is it the strongest feature of the book. The detailed analysis of Friday sermons forms the core of Gaffney's work, and it is there that he shows his expertise and originality. While he does, on occasion, feel compelled to point out misleading or ill-informed statements of some preachers, he is at his best when he focuses on the very different, but equally compelling, techniques of the three preachers.

The book is marred by two technical shortcomings, one of which is probably unavoidable. First, the transliteration is truly haphazard, marked not by occasional oversights but by total inconsistency. While this will bother specialized readers, it does not detract seriously from the content of the book. Second, the translations of the sermons are often infelicitous. As Gaffney points out, he is forced to translate twice: once from a spoken sermon to a written text, and once from Arabic to English. The result is that some passages in the sermons are somewhat obscure, but Gaffney makes every effort to clarify the resulting ambiguities.

Based on careful field work and expertise in both the religious and political context of the Friday sermon, *The Prophet's Pulpit* deserves to be widely read.

Nathan Brown, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, The George Washington University

IRAQ

Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968–89, by Amatzia Baram. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. xviii + 143 pages. Notes to p. 182. Bibliography to p. 189. Index to p. 196. \$35.

Reviewed by Robert Olson

In this study of Ba'thist Iraq (1968–89), the author describes the attempts of the Ba'thist party

to utilize the "paradise of the Mesopotamian national myth" to create a new national discourse, inclusive of Iraq's various ethnic and religious groups, especially the Kurds and Shi'is. The Ba'th focused attention particularly on the pre-Islamic Mesopotamian Akkadian, Sumerian, and Babylonian civilizations. It did not focus on the Achæmenian civilization because of its Persian connection. According to Amatzia Baram, the Ba'th influenced national discourse in order to achieve five aims: (1) "to provide the Iraqi people with a secular basis for a sense of mutual identity, thus furthering secularism in Iraq in general, (2) to provide Saddam Husayn with historical legitimacy by portraying him as the culmination to a continuous succession of great Iraqi rulers, (3) to create an historical common denominator that would unite Sunnis and Shi'is, Arabs and Kurds, (4) through the encouragement given to a uniquely Iraqi culture and the revival of Iraq's particular history, to reinforce the Iraqis' sense of uniqueness, hence a degree of separateness from the rest of the Arabs", and (5) "to provide the Iraqi people with a history that would give them great pride as the builders of the first civilization in the history of mankind" (pp. 136-7).

The bulk of this study, chapters 3-8, deals with the way the Ba'th used Mesopotamian archeology, art, folklore, and symbols in their attempt to create a new Iraqi national ideology that would be expressed by means of the theater and poetry. Chapter seven, "Art with Local and Mesopotamian Components," is of particular interest because the author's commentary is accompanied by pertinent plates.

How successful was the Ba'thist cultural campaign? According to Baram, not very. The war with Iran and a need for Islamic legitimacy undermined the first aim of furthering secularism in Iraq. It was undermined also when the regime announced that Michel 'Aflaq, a secular Christian, had converted to Islam before his death in 1989. The realization of the second aim, to portray Husayn as a leader in the grand historical tradition, was unpromising, chiefly because Mesopotamian culture is "little appreciated" by the vast majority of Iraqis.

Baram argues that aim number three, the creation of a national discourse that unites the various groups, has not been achieved with regard to the Kurds. Indeed, the attempts by the Ba'th to

'Arabize' the Akkadians in the 1970s did not leave any ideological space for the Aryan, Indo-European Kurds to embrace with any enthusiasm the Mesopotamian aspect of the newly emerging Iraqi national ideology. The Shi'is, being Arab and Arabic speaking, were more apt to engage the new inclusive ideology, but the Shi'i uprisings against the regime since 1991 suggest that they do not want to participate in the new discourse propounded by the regime in Baghdad.

Baram is more sanguine that the fourth and fifth aims have been partly achieved, i.e., the regime will continue with some success to emphasize Iraqi uniqueness, but it will not opt for isolation from the rest of the Arab world. Baram argues that Iraqis will continue to identify themselves strongly as Arabs. It seems likely that events of the last decade (such as the Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Persian Gulf War) could well accelerate this identification. One might add that Iraq will attempt to continue to participate in Arab politics in spite of efforts by external forces, especially the United States and Israel, to isolate it.

Baram's study suggests that as long as the Ba'th remains in power, components of the Iraqi nationalism that the party has constructed will remain salient in the national discourse. But if the Ba'th loses power, the new national discourse could also vanish. What Baram seems to argue, at least implicitly, is that the authoritarian and coercive policies of the Ba'th in Iraq have contributed to what this reviewer characterizes as the "normalization" of Iraqi history, that is, the inclusion of pre-Islamic and non-Arab history into contemporary historical and political discourse. It seems likely that aspects of this normalization will be part of the future Iraqi nationalist discourse whatever direction Iraqi history and politics take in the future.

This succinct study is a solid contribution to the cultural and intellectual history of post-World War II Iraq. It shows the artistic, cultural, historical, and intellectual dimensions of many artists, musicians, playwrights, and poets that contributed to the new discourse. Baram's book serves as an antidote to Samir Khalil's books, in that it makes rational the attempted Ba'thist cultural, political, and religious synthesis.¹ This was not just the

1 Samir Khalil, *The Monument: Art, Vulgarly and Responsibility in Iraq* (Berkeley: University of

creation of power-mad politicians and perverted ideologues

The major weakness of *Culture, History and Ideology* is that the author makes no mention of the external factors that influenced the evolution of Ba'athist/Iraqi nationalist discourse from 1968 onwards. These include the influence and policies of the United States, Israel, and Zionism, and the effects of superpower rivalry in the Middle East. Had these factors been included in the study, readers would have gained a better understanding of the evolution of Iraq's nationalist discourse from 1968–89.

There are several errors in the book. Achaemenian is spelled with a "k" on p. 44 and a "c" on pp. 109 and 138. There should be no "the" (third line from the bottom) on p. 131. The Treaty of Lausanne was not signed by Turkey and the Allies in July 1925 (p. 1), but rather on 24 July 1923.

Robert Olson, University of Kentucky

ISRAEL AND ZIONISM

Original Sins: Reflections on the History of Zionism and Israel, by Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi. New York: Olive Branch Press, 1993. v + 220 pages. Bibl. to p. 225. Index to p. 227. \$29.95 cloth, \$14.95 paper.

Reviewed by Yehuda Lukacs

The Zionist problematic, according to Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, has been the attempt to alleviate Jewish suffering in Europe by establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, which, in turn, has caused a Palestinian disaster. *Original Sins*, the book's title, reflects the author's thesis. The first sin occurred when the Europeans perpetrated injustices against the Jews, and the second has been Israel's displacement and victimization of the Palestinians.

Beit-Hallahmi, a psychologist teaching at Haifa University and the author of several books on Israel, offers a bold and courageous analysis of Zionism. Those who expect to read a comprehen-

sive history based on a systematic study must look elsewhere. Rather, this book offers several insights into Zionism's development and its impact on Israeli society and culture, and on world Jewry. As such, the book should be read by those seeking a deeper and more critical understanding of the role of Zionism, presented by an Israeli Jew who is both a participant (a citizen) and an observer (a scholar).

Reflecting on the Zionist enterprise from Theodore Herzl to the *Intifada*, Beit-Hallahmi examines the origins of Zionism, its relationship to the diaspora, its role vis-a-vis religion, and its effect on the Palestinians. He is at his best when analyzing Zionism and Israeli identity. Zionism's most triumphant achievement is its successful creation of an indigenous culture, emphasizing the unique Israeli experience through art, cinema, language, literature, and new social norms. Affirmation of the emergent Israeli culture, however, was predicated upon the rejection of diaspora values and experience. Early Zionists argued that the diaspora represented "passivity, cowardice and subservience" (p. 120). Hence, the traditional image of the Jew, living amidst a gentile world, was totally repudiated and replaced by a new Hebrew culture emphasizing activism, heroism, and sovereignty.

Since Jewish existence in the diaspora, replete with pogroms, hatred, and discrimination, epitomized Jewish powerlessness, the Zionists turned to the Bible in search of heroes, symbols, and a new national mythology. As the author correctly notes, "Zionism claimed a direct continuity with the ancient vestiges of Jewish sovereignty and with the tragic rebellions against the Romans which had all failed, but left behind images of heroic fight to the death. These heroes were physical and brave, tied to the land" (p. 122). Hence, the Jewish mass suicide in Massada in 73 CE has become a powerful national symbol, denoting Israel's resolve to commit suicide rather than fall hostage to its enemies.

As part of the socialization process, the curricula of secular Israeli schools includes Bible education, viewed as an integral component of the study of Jewish history. Beit-Hallahmi refers to this as the "historization of the Bible" (p. 124), whereby biblical heroes such as Abraham or King David are presented as forerunners of today's Zionists. In this regard, archeology becomes a

California, 1991), *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq* (Berkeley: University of California, 1989).

tool for rediscovering and preserving the past, in order to substantiate a historic connection between Israel's contemporary experience and the ancient Jewish presence in Palestine

Beit-Hallahmi discusses the rejection of Yiddish as the language of the diaspora and the revival of Hebrew as part of Zionism's legacy and attempt to delegitimize the Jewish experience in Europe. For example, traditional Jewish family names such as Freedman, Rosenberg, and Schwartz, viewed as representing the culture of the diaspora, were replaced with Hebrew names reflecting the new Zionist enterprise, such as Shamir (rock), Oz (might), and Peled (steel) (p. 128). High ranking military officers and air force pilots (the vanguard of Israel's military) are *required* to have Hebrew last names.

In what Beit-Hallahmi calls the "cult of toughness," Israelis have cultivated a machismo image, in contradistinction to the "anemic" image of diaspora Jewry. For instance, during the 1950s and 1960s, when Israelis alluded to a weak and timid person, the slang word *sabon* (soap) was widely used. This refers to a widely held belief among Israelis, but disputed by scholars, that the Nazis used soap made of Jewish corpses during World War II. The implications of this are quite obvious. Most Israelis regard the extermination of six million Jews during the Holocaust as a horror not to be repeated. The slogan "never again" symbolizes Israel's determination to break with the past when Jews were killed while offering little resistance.

Zionism's success in fostering an authentic new Israeli culture, however, also means that Jews throughout the world can identify with Israelis only up to a certain point. After all, Israel's unique experience is exogenous to that of diaspora Jews. With the passage of time, Israel is becoming more Middle Eastern and Mediterranean, and, for many diaspora Jews, it is becoming *terra incognita*.

When evaluating its historical record, Beit-Hallahmi believes Zionism has been only partially successful. Today, Jewish self-identification reflects the same options that existed in the 19th century: Zionism, with only a minority of Jews residing in Israel, Orthodoxy, constituting a small component of world Jewry, and assimilation and integration, which are practiced by the majority of Jews world-wide (p. 208). The author is certainly

correct to argue that, despite its early claims, Zionism has failed to present a clear and viable alternative to assimilation.

Finally, Beit-Hallahmi maintains that Israel is "cursed" because of its original sin against the Palestinians. He implicitly disregards the viability of diplomatic solutions to the conflict. Because of Zionism's past record and the Palestinians' determination to resist, Beit-Hallahmi is skeptical of the prospects for historic reconciliation. (The book was written before the signing of the 1993 Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles.) According to the author, true peace and coexistence between the two peoples is possible only when the majority of Israelis reject Zionism, thus atoning for their original sin vis-a-vis the Palestinians.

Despite Beit-Hallahmi's many gross generalizations and apparent political naiveté, this is a highly stimulating book. It is recommended for use as a supplementary text in courses dealing with Jewish studies, modern ideologies, Israel, and Arab-Israeli relations.

Yehuda Lukacs is Director of International Exchange and Study Abroad Programs, George Mason University. His latest book, chronicling Israeli-Jordanian relations since 1967, will be published by Syracuse University Press.

LEBANON

Come With Me From Lebanon: An American Family Odyssey, by Ann Zwicker Kerr. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994. xx1 + 301 pages. Bibl. to p. 306. Index to p. 322. \$28.95.

Reviewed by Erika G. Alin

Come With Me From Lebanon is a journey through one woman's abiding dedication to a country, to an institution of higher education, and to a man similarly devoted to that country and institution. It is a journey at once personal and public, historical and contemporary. Through her many visits to Lebanon, beginning as a student at the American University in Beirut (AUB) in 1954 and ending when she left the region in 1989—five years following her husband's assassination—

Kerr paints a gripping picture of the monumental transformations in Lebanon's political life, and of the impact of those transformations on AUB and the Kerr family. For students, scholars, and all others concerned with the Middle East, this is a picture well worth viewing.

Ann Zwicker first met Malcolm Kerr in 1954, during her junior year abroad at AUB—an uncommon destination for young American women in the 1950s. He was pursuing a Master's degree in Middle Eastern Studies and had spent much of his childhood in Lebanon. Kerr recounts the rich international and religious backgrounds of AUB students and her own status as somewhat of “an object of curiosity” as a female American student on campus. Over the subsequent year, with the devoted direction of Malcolm Kerr, the “magical attraction” that had impelled her to the region intensified to form “permanent visual images” that would remain with her, over the years, as reminders “of a world that no longer exists” (p. 51). Following her marriage to Malcolm Kerr and a three-year interval in the United States, the two returned to Beirut in the fall of 1958, remaining there during the “halcyon days” of the early 1960s. Kerr recollects her impressions on returning. The transformation of formerly sleepy streets into bustling shopping districts, the emergence of new office and apartment complexes, and the growing urbanization and population admixture of the city.

Between 1961 and 1981, the Kerrs were based in California, where Malcolm Kerr had accepted a teaching position. They visited Lebanon, as well as Egypt and other parts of the region, intermittently. During this period, Ann Kerr, among numerous other pursuits, initiated cultural orientation programs for American workers in the Middle East and completed her Master's degree in linguistics. While not living in Beirut during the political turmoil preceding the 1975–76 start of the Lebanese civil war, she succinctly surveys both the sources of the country's escalating tensions during this period and the challenges those tensions presented for AUB, which, in accordance with long-standing tradition, maintained its position of non-partisanship in Lebanon's politics.

Malcolm Kerr was appointed president of AUB in 1981. He arrived in Beirut in the fall of 1982 during an interlude of restored optimism, following the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO)

evacuation from the city and the partial Israeli troop redeployment to the South. During the subsequent two and a half years, as the country's political situation deteriorated, he worked to uphold AUB's commitment to open intellectual exchange amidst heightened student political activism and shelling around the campus. He also strove to navigate the institution's tense relations with the government of Amin Jumayyil, which sought to restrict the renewal of residence and work permits for American and Palestinian-born AUB employees. In August 1983, Ann Kerr joined her husband to resettle in Beirut. During the final six months of Malcolm Kerr's life, the two shared their life-long dedication to the principles and ideals for which AUB stood. These centered on open intellectual exchange, educational opportunities for all students in the region, non-partisanship, and enhancing US-Lebanese relations. They also shared the political complexities and hardships, as well as the faith and hope, that fluctuated in the lives of Lebanese during this time. On 18 January 1984, Malcolm Kerr was assassinated while at work in his office.

Ann Kerr skillfully balances her personal experiences and impressions with informative accounts of Lebanese historical and political developments. Throughout her discussion of both Lebanon's political history and the tragic death of her husband, she never departs from the conviction—most aptly expressed in the captioning of part one of the book “An End and a Beginning”—that “new forms of life could spring out of what had come before” (p. 174). Her thoughtful perspective—as an outsider who has come to know the Middle East intimately and passionately—provides a rare personal insight into both the impact of politics on the fabric of a society and the challenges and delights of an American family living through the historic political transformations of a country.

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PALESTINE AND THE PALESTINIANS

**Eyes Without Country: Searching for a
Palestinian Strategy of Liberation, by**

Souad R. Dajani Philadelphia Temple University Press, 1994 xvii + 158 pages Abbrevs to p 161 Notes to p 228 Index to p 238 \$44.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper

Reviewed by Fouad Moughrabi

This book examines the Palestinian Intifada and tries to develop theoretical insights about non-violent civilian resistance as a response to the continuing Israeli occupation of the West Bank. It also seeks to produce a long term "strategy of civilian-based defense (CBD) for the period beyond interim self-rule" (p. xii). Souad Dajani conducts her analysis on three levels: the Palestinian community, the Israeli body politic, and international public opinion (primarily in the United States).

The first three chapters outline the historical context of the Intifada, the emergence of Palestinian resistance to the occupation, and the course of the uprising itself. The analysis here is lucid, objective, and straightforward. There are a few problem areas, however. The author claims that, while the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) may have been "caught by surprise" by the timing of the Intifada, it did, nevertheless, approve of this kind of struggle and had been actively involved in laying the groundwork for it (p. 58). This may well be a gross exaggeration. There is no doubt that the late PLO leader, Abu Jihad, did, in fact, funnel considerable funds to the West Bank, thereby creating and strengthening various local institutions. But, Abu Jihad had set up so many channels for the PLO funds that, after he was assassinated, most of the money simply disappeared. No accounting procedures existed, only he knew who had received what. Thus, to attribute to the PLO leadership such farsightedness and skillful planning is far from justified. Most of the military operations the PLO conducted over the years were also poorly planned and poorly executed. Furthermore, there was rarely any link between military operations and political objectives.

On the eve of the Intifada, the general perception among most Palestinians was that the PLO was riddled with corruption. Furthermore, there was a strong conviction that the PLO and the Arab governments had failed to come to their assistance. The Palestinians under occupation, there-

fore, felt that they had to take matters into their own hands.

Rosemary Sayegh's research on the Palestinians in the refugee camps in Lebanon shows clearly that the institutions, which barely functioned while under PLO control, in fact came to life after the PLO exited Lebanon.¹ Indeed, the institutions played a crucial role in the defense of the Palestinian refugees during the 1985-88 siege by Amal militias. In a similar fashion, the Intifada began to decline and to have serious problems once the PLO bureaucracy in Tunis assumed more control over the decision-making process.

The theoretical section of this book is useful in that it draws attention to the urgent need to develop indigenous loci of power, and to preserve unity among the Palestinians. Dajani is less successful in her discussion of the impact of the Intifada on Israeli politics and society and on American public opinion. Here, the author underestimates the special nature of Israeli politics, history, and society, as well as Israel's unique links to the United States. The author's attempt to draw parallels with Vietnam and Northern Ireland is problematic because she fails to acknowledge the special nature of US-Israeli relations.

The Intifada brought about a significant transformation in international public opinion. Public opinion polls that the reviewer conducted with Gallup,² in addition to numerous other polls, show an impressive increase in sympathy for the Palestinians and a sharp decrease in sympathy for Israel as a result of the latter's abuses of the Palestinian population's human rights. In addition, the surveys show that the majority of Americans support the right of the Palestinians to have their own independent state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Americans also do not think that such a state would pose a threat to Israeli security. The question remains: Why did the PLO, with its international outreach and vast resources, fail to translate these into some concrete advantage for the Palestinian people?

1 *Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon* (London: Zed Books, 1994).

2 Fouad Moughrabi, "The Intifada in American Public Opinion," in Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990).

No matter how important such criticism is, it should not shift attention away from Dajani's otherwise valuable and strategically significant contribution to the empowerment of the Palestinians. This work is all the more timely as the Palestinians begin to shift gears in order to confront yet an additional obstacle, namely, the arbitrary nature of the Palestinian authority being established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

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A History of Palestine, 634–1099, by Moshe Gil. Tr. by Ethel Broido. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. xxvi + 837 pages. Chron. to p. 861. Bibl. to p. 911. Index to p. 968. \$125.

Reviewed by Mahmood Ibrahim

The impressive array of sources and documents used in this exhaustive study allow the author to make a noteworthy contribution to the understanding of the history of Palestine. The book covers the period beginning with Palestine's conquest by the Muslim Arabs in 634 AD and ending with the establishment of the kingdom of Jerusalem by the Crusaders in 1099 AD. Although the bibliographical index demonstrates Moshe Gil's access to these wide sources, the Cairo Geniza documents are the principle source on which this study is based. He adds Arabic, Greek, Latin, and Syriac sources, as well as relevant modern scholarship in various languages. This book is the translation of the first volume of Gil's *Palestine during the First Muslim Period* (in Hebrew, 1983).¹ The added glossary and the detailed chronology are helpful. Ethel Broido deserves praise for translating this volume in such a smooth and accessible manner.

Concentrating largely on political events played out in Palestine from the first conquests through Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid, and Turkish rule, Gil adds a section on the economy and another on the local population of Palestine under Muslim rule. He then covers the Christian community, noting relevant matters such as leaders,

personalities, rituals, and sects. The remaining part of the book, where undoubtedly Gil's major scholarly contribution lies, is devoted to the mainstream Jewish community in Palestine (with an independent section on the Karaites and Samaritans). Gil discusses their lives and controversies and their relationship with the regional Jewish community and with the authorities in power, especially the Fatimids. He describes the extraordinary mobility of Jewish merchants and the unprecedented Jewish role in military and political events. He highlights the role of the Palestinian Yeshiva and its leaders in Jewish affairs, and shows the fullness of life experienced during a period of gradual economic, religious, and social transformation, and constant political change, that the population at large experienced in Palestine.

Thorough scholarship notwithstanding, this book has two flaws. The information is presented in 949 sections ranging from short paragraphs to several pages in length. Thus, Gil provides a discontinuous narrative, made up of a series of short, self-contained essays about particular events and issues in the history of Palestine. The reader is therefore left with glimpses, images, and impressions with many gaps in between. In effect, this incomplete history leads to judgements based on impressions, startling inconsistencies, and non sequiturs, such as when Gil states that, despite the slaughter, vandalism, economic hardship, uprooting of the population, terrible suffering, evictions, and wandering, the "communities evidently remained in their places, and only were finally uprooted during the Crusaders' conquest" (p. 420).

Furthermore, the ethnocentric approach of this study may have led the author to make claims which are polemical at best. The Muslim conquests, for example, are attributed to *jihād* (holy struggle) and to economic needs. There is no doubt that Islam played a major role in the conquests. Gil, however, defines this role by saying that Islam was "imbued with an ardor of an extreme and uncompromisingly fanatical nature" (p. 12). As for the economic cause that led to the conquests, it was the virtual starvation of the Muslims at the outset of their campaigns (p. 14). Gil characterizes the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula as nomadic bedouins who, "devoid of any religious inclination, were the mainstay and composition of the Muslim battalions. [T]hey

1 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, Ve-Misrad Habitaḥon).

merely looked for opportunities to plunder and pillage the subdued populations" (p. 14). This reinforces an erroneous image of the Muslims as starving fanatics bent on vandalism and destruction.

Thereafter, in Gil's narratives, the words Muslims, Arabs, nomads, and bedouins (or tribesmen) are used interchangeably, giving the impression that the existence of the Arabs in Palestine was transitory since nomads do not strike roots or develop attachments to a sedentary existence. The Arabs are depicted not only as transitory, but also as destructive. In describing the Arab/Islamic political presence in Palestine for over 400 years, Gil concludes that the events, as he sees them, "do not call for much interpretation, together they simply form a picture of almost unceasing insecurity, of endless rebellions and wars, of upheavals and instability" (pp. 420–21). It should be noted that he is referring to the very period during which the region witnessed the growth of Arab/Islamic civilization that integrated and synthesized the cultural heritage of the Near East. Given the geographic and cultural position of Palestine in the Arab/Islamic world, it was never so isolated as not to benefit, or alternatively suffer, from those larger developments.

Finally, in discussing Jerusalem, the author states that it "was not holy to the Muslims [O]nly the Jews were still wholeheartedly attached to its sanctity" (p. 91). According to Gil, when the second Caliph, 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab, conquered Jerusalem and participated in purifying the sacred area of the Temple by removing the *qumama* (garbage and menstrual rags), he prayed toward Mecca, placing the Rock behind him. This allowed Gil to declare that Muslims did not bestow any sanctity on Jerusalem. Its sanctity, accordingly, was acquired later, when the Umayyad Caliph, 'Abd al-Malik, built the Dome of the Rock to compete with Mecca during his fight against the Zubayrids. The symbolism of 'Umar's act does not necessarily deny the sanctity of the Rock. Gil, preferring to accept a suspect report by the anti-Umayyad chronicler, Ahmad Ibn Abu Ya'qub al-Ya'qubi, disregards evidence of Muslim reverence for Jerusalem even before it fell into their hands.

Gil also implies that Jerusalem was defiled by Christian women who placed their menstrual rags in the area of the Temple. This was a widespread

practice followed by women who, from as far away as Constantinople, sent rags to be placed there. In Judaism (and Islam), menstrual rags are considered ritually impure. Be that as it may, the practice of placing menstrual rags in the area of the Temple is symbolically linked to fertility cults and rituals. The area of the Temple, it could be argued, was sacred to the Canaanites before the Jews conquered it under the command of David.

It is true that Gil is not alone in repeating these images, impressions, and stereotypes. Nonetheless, it is surprising to see them recur in such sound scholarship. It should be a reminder to us all to be more rigorous in our judgements and conclusions when we speak of the "other."

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TURKEY

The Making of Modern Turkey, by Feroz Ahmad. London and New York: Routledge, 1993. xiv + 227 pages. Notes to p. 237. Bibliography to p. 242. Index to p. 252. \$18.95 paper.

Reviewed by Howard A. Reed

This informative survey, by a well-known specialist on Turkey and Professor of History at the University of Massachusetts (Boston), consists of ten chapters. These focus on events from 1900 to 1991. *The Making of Modern Turkey* begins with an introduction "Turkey, a Military Society?" and concludes with an epilogue "Turkey Today and Tomorrow." Chapters in between discuss chronologically "The Ottoman Legacy," "From Empire to Nation, 1908–1923," "The New Turkey: Politics, 1923–1945," "The New Turkey: Society and Economy, 1923–1945," "The Multi-Party Conundrum, 1945–1960," "Military Intervention, Institutional Restructuring, and Ideological Politics, 1960–1971," "Military Intervention, Social Democracy, and Political Terror, 1971–1980," and "Military Intervention and Political and Economic Restructuring, 1980–1991."

The discussion centers on military, political, economic, and, to a lesser degree, ideological issues. Ahmad underscores the continuity be-

tween the late Ottoman and new Republican periods of contemporary Turkish history documented in his earlier work and more recent studies by Zürcher and Hanioglu.¹ He notes that "this book was conceived in the early 1980s when Turkey was under military rule," adding, "I thought it necessary to explore the roles of the army as a dynamic institution. This I do in the introduction" (p. ix).

Ahmad's reviews of the three military interventions that interrupted the evolution of democracy in Turkey in 1960, 1971, and 1980 are among the book's strong points. The author's emphasis on the power and ubiquity of the military in Turkish society, however, appears exaggerated. Other significant contributions deal with organized labor and elections, but the important roles of the Unions of Commerce and Industry are not discussed.

The power of intangible leadership and psychological factors in the creation of a new Turkish polity and society between 1919 and 1950, in particular, are noted effectively by the author. This is exemplified by the following statements from the book. Populism was "consciously nurtured by the Unionists" (p. 46). "The nationalists understood the value of Islamic discourse as the means of providing maximum unity among a mixed population of Circassians, Lazs, Arabs, Kurds and Turks, communities they wanted to mobilise for their own cause" (p. 48). "[Mustafa] Kemal knew that they had to create a 'new type of Turk very different from the 'Ottoman,' ' [because the] Kemalists had inherited a society in which the notion of a Turkish identity was almost totally non-existent" (p. 77). "With its own script and its native intelligence, our nation will take its place by the side of the civilised world" (Kemal, p. 81). "The policy of secularism had never been explained to them and they had never understood how they had benefited from it" (p. 105). "On 12 July [1946], President [İsmet] İnönü openly threw his weight behind the moderates in his party and

dealt the death blow to the statist faction. As a result, the mono-party option was abandoned and the opposition was given 'freedom of action and equality with the Republican Party' " (p. 107).

Ahmad epitomizes recent changes in Turkey as "the entry of new classes on the political stage" (p. 222), notably, "the provincial bourgeoisie in power since 1983" after the generals had, for a time after 1980, abolished political parties and disenfranchised their leaders (p. 208). Ahmad finds most of this new class "narrow-minded [with] little concern for the welfare of the people as a whole." Their "main concern is to acquire wealth and to preserve the new order they have so recently created" (pp. 208–9). The record is mixed, as gains in constitutional safeguards, public housing, infrastructure, and telecommunications indicate.

The Making of Modern Turkey falls short in its discussion of some issues. For example, education gets short shrift despite its central importance in human resource development, upward mobility, and the evolution of pluralism since 1923. The roles of "resurgent Islam" since about 1950 are dealt with inadequately. "Secularism" is not defined. This could mislead US readers who understand it as a clear separation between the state and religious establishments. This work gives no inkling that "secularism" means almost the opposite in Turkey. There, Islamic affairs are legally controlled by the Directorates of Religious Affairs, and of Evkaf (Muslim philanthropic trusts), responsible to the Prime Ministry and funded by parliament. The growing influence of Sufi (mystic) orders and of highly educated professionals in various fields devoted to Islam, the spate of Islamic publications, the creation of several theological faculties, important differences between illegal Quranic schools and those certified by the state, and Turkey's active roles in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, all are not mentioned. Nor are two major books on Islam in Turkey published in 1989 and 1991.²

Furthermore, this useful survey of contemporary Turkey's economy, history, politics, and

1 Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1993); and M. Şukru Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

2 Şerif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); and Richard Tapper, ed., *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991).

social change says nothing about environmental issues or the dilemmas of rapid population growth. It is silent about the vast Southeast Anatolia Development Project, with its major implications for Turkey's agriculture, economy, energy, and human and water resources. Nor are we informed that, since 1989, Turkey has devoted over 20 percent of its national budget to education. This is more than it devoted to defense, funding for which recently also fell behind that for social welfare. Ahmad does not discuss what such changes might portend for Turkey's evolving democracy.

More careful editing might have corrected most of the 12 errors in fact and 19 errors in English detected by this reviewer. While the text is annotated in part, there are 57 pages and many more paragraphs for which no sources are indicated. On 43 other pages direct quotations are used without reference to their sources. Does this presage a new style being adopted by authors and editors? Hopefully, a new edition will remedy such lacunae.

Howard A. Reed, Professor of History, Emeritus, The University of Connecticut, was recently invited by the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly to speak at a symposium at the Turkish Parliament marking the 75th anniversary of its establishment in Ankara.

Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role, by Andrew Mango. London and Westport, CO: Praeger, 1994. xvi + 133 pages. Notes to p. 135. Bibliography to p. 138. Index to p. 144. \$12.95 paper.

Reviewed by Michael M. Gunter

Too often the modern republic of Turkey has been perceived in the West largely, and thus erroneously, through the eyes of its Armenian, Greek, Kurdish, and human rights critics. Although Turkey is certainly not blameless, criticism of the only secular Muslim state that has achieved a functioning parliamentary democracy for what will be 70 million people by the year 2000 has been overdrawn.

For this reason, Andrew Mango's pithy and very readable review of Turkey's economy, foreign policy, political history, religion, social order, and Kurdish problem is most welcome.

Although sympathetic to his subject, Mango offers a hard, accurate analysis, ably demonstrating that the Turkish position often is much more reasonable than many in the West believe.

Turkey's two main problems today are clearly its economy and the Kurdish dilemma. The former "is a political problem, because governments have found it convenient to allow the country to live beyond its means. Public deficits are financed by printing money, increasing the domestic debt, and borrowing abroad" (p. 57). The latter presents a "direct threat to [Turkey's] territorial integrity" (p. viii). The increasing challenge of extremist right-wing religious and nationalist parties must also be reckoned with, as well as social problems concerning education, the environment, housing, human rights, population growth, poverty, and women.

The late President Turgut Ozal (1989–93) was intimately involved with most of these issues. On economic and Kurdish matters, he was part of both the problems and the solution. "When he died, his role in opening up Turkey [economically] to the world and in putting Turkey on the world map was widely acknowledged" (p. 29). It may well be that after Atatürk, Ozal was the most influential leader of modern Turkey. Yet corruption, inflation, and debt were also part of his legacy. Furthermore, although it was Ozal who took the first imaginative steps towards recognizing what his predecessor and successor Süleyman Demirel termed "the Kurdish reality," it was during Ozal's tenure as prime minister (1983–89) that the *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* (PKK, Kurdish Workers' Party) insurgency exploded in 1984.

In discussing solutions to the Kurdish problem, Mango points out "that in the last century reforms urged by the European powers contributed to the weakening and eventual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Many Turks are conscious of this and tend to treat all foreign advocacy of reforms as ill intentioned" (p. 51). Similarly, he argues that "those members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg (and, in particular, members from Greece) who are loudest in condemning Turkey's human rights record are precisely those who are opposed to Turkey for reasons unrelated to human rights" (p. 75).

After dismissing autonomy and federalism for the Kurds as unsafe options, Mango then suggests that "Turkey should consider reforms in three

areas that would grant full cultural rights to the Kurds, strengthen local government, including the rights of local government bodies to combine territorially, [and] eliminate all legal obstacles to the formation of nonviolent political parties, including regional and ethnic parties" (p. 50)

The March 1995 murder of several Alevis ('Alawis) in Istanbul's Gaziosmanpasa district and subsequent unsympathetic police response suggest that Mango could extend to the rest of the country his observation that "in central and eastern Anatolia tension between Sunnis and Alevis is endemic" (p. 82). Indeed, following the Sivas hotel arson case that caused thirty-seven deaths in July 1993, the prosecution of some of the Alevi victims by the chief Ankara State Security Court prosecutor, Nusret Demiral, demonstrates the inherent bias against the Alevis, who constitute an estimated 20 percent of the entire Turkish population. Even if the Kurdish problem is solved, that of the Alevis bodes to become increasingly serious.

While not downplaying any of these problems, Mango points out the reasons for optimism in solving them. He documents his text throughout and concludes it with a selected bibliography and short index. For anyone wishing to read a short, accurate update on Turkey, Mango's timely review will be welcomed.

Michael M. Gunter is the author of The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma (Boulder, CO: Westport Press, 1990), and The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992). He teaches political science at the Tennessee Technological University.

MODERN POLITICS

Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity, by Mohamed Rabie. Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1994. viii + 219 pages. Bibl. to p. 223. Index to p. 229. \$55.

Reviewed by Simona Sharoni

What role does ethnicity play in conflict situations and how can a better understanding of its dynamics contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the post-Cold War era? Mohamed Rabie,

a former professor of economics who lived and taught in both the United States and Kuwait, explores these questions in *Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity*. Rabie does not treat conflict as a negative phenomenon, but rather as "an integral part of individual life and of intergroup and interstate relationships [Accordingly] conflict can never be eliminated, it can only be managed to minimize its negative impact, reduce its intensity, and facilitate its positive role in human development" (p. 50).

The book examines four strategies of dealing with conflict—crisis prevention or avoidance, crisis management, control and containment, and conflict resolution—concluding that conflict resolution is the most desirable approach. Rabie insists that "conflict resolution moves to create peace processes and facilitate the establishment and maintenance of peace [while] crisis avoidance, crisis management, and conflict containment move usually to prevent or stop war, while sustaining conflict and manipulating its real causes" (p. 60). Conflict resolution, in Rabie's view, articulates a vision to change the status quo and eliminate the major sources of tension by "building integrative relationships that separate interests from values, emphasizing interests and recognizing values" (p. 58).

To examine the applicability of conflict resolution theories to the transformation of ethnic conflict, Rabie compares and contrasts three models: the consociational model, the control model, and the shared homeland model. According to Rabie, the consociational model "is a power sharing model that views different cultural groups as partners interested in overcoming their differences to make the system work and therefore are willing to negotiate and make compromises" (p. 61). The control model, on the other hand, is often designed "to achieve political stability by allowing the majority to have a near-total control over the minority [and] to enhance the interests of the controlling majority at the expense of the controlled minority, reducing it to a position of subordination and submission" (pp. 61–2).

Rabie presents the shared homeland model as an alternative to these models. He originally developed it to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The underlying assumption of this model is that "ethnic and national conflicts arise from the fact that two or more peoples who feel different from

each other live together in one country and are tied to each other in formal relationships that are perceived by one or more parties as unsatisfactory or discriminatory" (p. 174). According to Rabie's shared homeland model, the preferred solution to ethnic conflict is, on one hand, to separate communities in conflict along ethnic and national lines, and, on the other, to develop shared visions for economic and social cooperation.

To demonstrate the applicability of his model to various ethno-national and religious conflicts, Rabie draws examples from conflicts in China, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and Yugoslavia, as well as the situation of the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. It is somewhat ironic, however, that the author insists on the almost universal applicability of the shared homeland model given his own critique, throughout the book, of the tendency to impose conflict resolution concepts and practices uncritically across cultures.

Indeed, one of the most intriguing aspects of *Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity* is its insistence on "the irrelevance of certain Western conflict-resolution concepts" to other cultural contexts (p. 38). Rabie criticizes American-based organizations for imposing Western conflict resolution methods on Arab participants in their projects. In line with other contemporary critiques of conflict resolution frameworks that claim universal applicability,¹ Rabie concludes that "theories, models, and rules that assume that people place the same value on the same things or behave according to the same rules of rationality are misleading" (p. 39).

Rabie's arguments, however, become quite problematic when he employs ahistorical generalizations such as "Arabs generally do not acknowledge family problems, even when they are severe," or "community disputes in the Arab world are more the type regarding issues of honor between clans and tribes" (p. 39). These sweeping generalizations, which resemble many of the examples criticized in Edward Said's *Orientalism*, overlook the diverse experiences and multiplicity

of voices that characterize different Arab societies and cultures.² The task of challenging Western concepts of conflict resolution without falling into the trap of reductionism, essentialism, and simplification requires a less ambitious, but more self-reflexive, approach than the one undertaken by Rabie in *Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity*.

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Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel, by Michael N. Barnett. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. xiii + 261 pages. Appends. to p. 269. Notes to p. 343. Bibl. to p. 368. Index to p. 378. \$16.95 paper.

Reviewed by Ruth Margolies Beitlei

According to Michael Barnett, conventional wisdom dictates that war will contribute to a state's aggrandizement by increasing its control over society. Although he cites other authors, including Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly, who have countered this "ratchet effect" argument, Barnett contends that most studies concentrating on the influence of war on state power "have failed to recognize how the transformative possibilities reside in the government's manner of mobilizing security-related resources" (p. 6). Thus the key to understanding the change in state power stems not from the results of the crisis itself, but from a clear understanding of "the activities associated with preparing for war" (p. 7). By establishing a theoretical framework to examine direct, causal linkages between war preparation and state power, Barnett expects to account for the enigmatic findings that war-related processes can either increase or decrease state power.

Barnett cogently argues that a state must perform a masterful balancing act when implementing war preparation strategies by considering three important state interests: national security,

1 See, for example, Kevin Avruch, Peter Black, and Joseph Scimecca, eds. *Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991) and Paul Salem, "A Critique of Western Conflict Resolution from a Non-Western Perspective," *Negotiation Journal* (October 1993): 289-97.

2 (New York: Penguin, 1978).

political stability, and economic development. His typology of a government's determinants for selecting a war preparation strategy is useful to illustrate the direct connection between the domestic and international realms. For war preparation, although a state must generate revenue, mobilize manpower, and get supplies, societal actors can constrain the state's ability to extract these resources.

Thus, with these elements in mind, a government can choose from three broad mobilization strategies. The accommodational strategy maintains or modifies slightly existing policies, while the international strategy diffuses the costs of war onto foreign actors. Since these strategies circumvent societal constraints, state power is not transformed. State-society relations alter only when the state increases war preparation demands on the societal actors using the restructuring strategy. Taking Israel, from 1948–77, and Egypt, from 1952–77, as case studies, Barnett assesses the determinants of state war preparation strategies and their effects on state power.

The issue itself, although interesting, is not extraordinary. Barnett's book is a confirmation that war, along with war preparation, does transform state power. A major flaw of the book stems from the lack of a clear definition and delineation of the concept of war preparation. The particular nature of both Israel's and Egypt's histories during the periods under investigation makes it difficult to separate what constitutes war preparation from what reflects the effects of the actual outbreak of hostilities. For example, Barnett assesses that the period of 1952–67 did not reflect a transformation of state power as a result of war preparation strategies, but "the expansion was owing primarily to the galvanizing impact of the Suez War and the steady increase of the state's role in the economy in general and importance of domestic investment in particular" (p. 217). By not defining the parameters of war preparation, the distinct aspect of his argument that war preparation, and not war itself, transforms state power, is undermined. The boundary between war preparation and war, for both case studies, is blurred.

On another level, although Barnett defines state power as "the resources available to state managers in their governance of society in relation to societal actors" (p. 41), his assessment of both

Israel's and Egypt's power lacks an important component. He contends that in the quest to increase the state's military power, "a Dorian Gray image surfaces, for the expansion of each state's external strength came at the expense of its own internal health" (p. 211). This analysis is simplistic, for the creation of more state-society linkages may actually strengthen the legitimacy of a regime, thereby increasing its extractive capabilities for the future. The increase in state-society interconnectedness in financial, production, and conscription strategies does not necessarily connote a "weaker" state.

Although at times the argument is confusing to the reader, the book is well researched and documented and adds to the literature bridging national security policy with international and domestic political economy. For students of the Middle East, Barnett advances an interesting analysis of the determinants of war preparation strategies for both Israel and Egypt.

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The Failure of Political Islam, by Olivier Roy. Tr. by Carol Volk. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994. xi + 203 pages. Notes to p. 224. Bibl. to p. 229. Index to p. 238. \$22.95.

Reviewed by John O. Voll

Olivier Roy's examination of "political Islam" has already had an important impact on the study of Islamism. His analysis is carefully defined and clearly presented. There is a danger, however, that people will simply use the book's title to "prove" that the Islamic resurgence of the late 20th century has ended. Roy's conclusions are much more sophisticated and nuanced than this. He argues that a particular type of Islamist program has failed and been replaced, not by a non-Islamic mode of thought, but by a different Islamic approach.

The failure of "political Islam," as discussed by Roy, is the failure of radical revolutionary Islamist movements to achieve a significant transformation of the political world of Islam. Islamism, "the contemporary movement that conceives of Islam as a political ideology," has "not signifi-

cantly altered the political landscape of the Middle East" (p. ix). This failure, however, has led to a change in the nature of the Islamic revival, not its end. Roy argues that revolutionary Islamism has been replaced by a more conservative "neofundamentalism." Although "the specter of Islamic revolution is fading, Islamic symbols are penetrating the society and the political discourse of the Muslim world more than ever. The retreat of political Islamism has been accompanied by the advancement of Islam as a social phenomenon" (p. 78).

Roy's book presents a broad picture of this carefully defined Islamism. After a general introduction, the first three chapters discuss the basic concepts, social contexts, and intellectual "impasses" of Islamism. The next four chapters examine the critical issues of the emergence of "neofundamentalism," the social and ideological positions of the Islamist new intellectuals, and their international and economic perspectives. The experiences of Islamists in Afghanistan and Iran and the international dimensions of Shi'i Islamism are important case studies presented in the final three chapters, and a broadly interpretive conclusion closes the book.

The analyses of Afghanistan and Iran are the strongest parts of this book. In his other discussions, Roy tends to make broad generalizations that may not fit the full spectrum of the Islamist experiences which he is describing. For example, his discussion of the Islamist new intellectuals (chapter 6) speaks of the gap in the Islamist intellectual's understanding "between a body of knowledge he hasn't mastered and the categories in which he conceives of it" (pp. 89–90). This passage is reminiscent of the paradox described by Orientalists that the people in the Muslim world who understood the Islamic tradition did not understand modernity, while those who had a "modern" education did not know much about Islam. Fifty years ago this was a valid critique. It is not, however, as appropriate today to describe the Islamism which Roy himself aptly describes as "the *sharia* [Islamic law] plus electricity" (p. 52). Nor does the critique apply to Islamic banking, which is seen as "a 'technocratic' extension of traditionalist fundamentalism" (p. 141).

Although Roy cites Hasan al-Turabi, the leader of the Islamist movement in Sudan, 13 times in footnotes, all the references are to one article

This limitation allows a number of critical arguments raised by Roy to be disputed. While he believes that, in terms of the development of Islamism, "the age of thinkers has ended" (p. 90), Roy does not discuss important books by thinkers like Turabi that define the transformations of Islamism that Roy is describing. For example, Roy identifies the Sudanese Islamist movement with the tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, in which he notes that "it is explicitly stated that the party is reserved for an elite" (p. 68). This clearly ignores Turabi's analysis of the Islamic movement, which emphasizes the importance of creating a mass, rather than an elite, Islamic movement. Books like Turabi's *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi al-Sudan* (The Islamic Movement in the Sudan)¹ are providing the intellectual foundations for the emerging neofundamentalism, involving the creation of more mass movements and the "popularization and legalization of re-Islamization" (p. 129).

It is obvious that the age of the pioneers of Islamist thought—like Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi in Pakistan and Hasan al-Banna in Egypt—is past, as is the age of the radical ideologues of political Islam like Sayyid Qutb in Egypt and 'Ali Shari'ati in Iran. While Roy convincingly argues that we may be at the end of the particular phase of Islamist political thought exemplified by Qutb, it may be premature to declare the "end of the age of thinkers." Rather, the emerging agenda of Islamist thought may be defined by thinkers of another style, like Turabi or 'Abd al-Karim Surush in Iran, among others.

This book is essential reading for all interested in the late 20th century evolution of movements of religious activism and revival. Although one may strongly disagree with some of Roy's conclusions, the issues that he raises—regarding the nature of Islamist movements and their relationships with modern institutions and concepts—must be dealt with by all serious scholars in the field.

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1 (Cairo: Al-Qan' al-'Arabi, 1991).

India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute,
by Robert G Wirsing New York St Martin's
Press, 1994 xii + 263 pages Appends to p 278
Notes to p 330 Index to p 337 \$45

Reviewed by Eliza Van Hollen

Anyone who has wrestled with the Kashmir problem—a seemingly endless and insoluble source of hostility between India and Pakistan—will appreciate the masterful dissection of its multiple complexities in this highly analytical study. Focusing mainly, but not exclusively, on recent history and the current deadlock, Professor Wirsing provides sensible suggestions to lessen the ongoing violence.

Wirsing highlights the multidimensional nature of the Kashmir dispute by analyzing three separate clusters of issues. In Part I, "The Boundary Problem," he reviews India and Pakistan's conflicting claims to Kashmir and their disagreement over its boundaries. He also considers the strategic context of the dispute, particularly emphasizing China's active participation. Part II, "The Separatist Problem," is a detailed portrayal of the Kashmiri Muslims' uprising against India, which the author dates from 1988. Wirsing shows how both Pakistan and India fuel the fighting and continue to commit human rights abuses—Pakistan, by supplying cross-border assistance to the militants, and India, by daily increasing Kashmiri alienation through a repressive counter-insurgency campaign. He also describes the obstacles, including India's internal politics, that have hampered India's Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's efforts to find a political solution. Part III, "The Problem of Settlement," explores the potential for differing formats and formulas to resolve the dispute. All attempted formats, such as multilateral (United Nations) initiatives, third party involvement (the Soviet Union at Tashkent in 1966), and bilateral talks between India and Pakistan, have ultimately failed. Wirsing believes that the common basis of numerous proposed formulas—converting the current Line of Control (LOC) between India and Pakistan into an international boundary—is an unacceptable starting point for both Pakistan and the Kashmiris. (The LOC is the internal boundary that divides Indian- and Pakistani-held sectors of Kashmir, delimited

in 1949 as the Cease Fire Line and renamed in 1972 as the LOC.)

The book's final section is devoted to the author's own recommendations. He suggests focusing, for the indefinite future, on demilitarizing the LOC border, thus bypassing the emotional and essentially unanswerable questions regarding who has the greater claim to Kashmir. He also advocates renewing Indo-Pakistani bilateral negotiations to disengage from a costly confrontation on the Siachen Glacier in north-eastern Kashmir. The 1986–92 Siachen talks demonstrated that, at the time, both sides considered the issue to be negotiable.

India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute is a valuable addition to the literature on Kashmir. The comprehensive coverage of the on-going Kashmiri uprising and the Siachen Glacier dispute is based overwhelmingly on interviews with a wide range of Indian, Kashmiri, and Pakistani participants and on personal observation. The analysis of existing literature on the entitlement issue, focusing on whether a controversial partition boundary award (determined in August 1947 by the Punjab Boundary Commission, chaired by Sir Cyril Radcliffe) was deliberately intended to facilitate Kashmir's accession to India, is incisive and interesting. Wirsing's policy recommendations appear eminently practical. As he points out, however, even his relatively limited goal of pacifying the LOC boundary will be unattainable until India and Pakistan themselves summon the requisite political will.

Despite the breadth of this book, some additions would be beneficial. A detailed map of the Siachen Glacier area would help illuminate the text, including Wirsing's intriguing disclosure that erroneous official US maps may have exacerbated the tension that eventually led to India's military move onto the glacier in 1984. The author's greater emphasis on the impact of domestic Indian politics on developments in Kashmir is logical. The relative influence of Pakistan's various political players on Islamabad's Kashmir policy, however, needs amplification. Also, while the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars are covered briefly in the very useful chronology in Appendix I, their discussion in the narrative text would help highlight their relevance to regional perceptions of the Kashmir problem. Finally, in reference to Pakistan and the US "terrorism list"

(p 243), a brief examination of the law itself and its definition of terrorism might help the reader understand the legislative constraints under which the US secretary of state operates with regard to the terrorism issue. Briefly, the Export Administration Act of 1979 requires the State Department to notify Congress about countries that have repeatedly provided state support for terrorism. These countries comprise the so-called "terrorism list." It should also be noted that the decision to put Pakistan on probation, beginning in January 1993, was made by the George Bush administration's Secretary of State, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, as required by law, and not by President-elect Bill Clinton, as implied by the author.

Wirsing should be particularly commended for his studious objectivity throughout this excellent book. Indian and Pakistani readers will, in turn, disagree with certain conclusions. But surely none can deny the author's scrupulous dedication to examining all sides of the thorny issue.

Eliza Van Hollen, former Chief of the South Asia Division, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, United States Department of State

WOMEN

Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East, by Valentine M. Moghadam. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993. xvi + 256 pages. Notes to p. 290. Bibliography to p. 297. Index to p. 309. \$40 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Reviewed by NESTA RAMAZANI

In this study of women of the Middle East, North Africa, and Afghanistan, Valentine Moghadam has two main objectives. As a Marxist, she rejects religion as the principal determinant of women's social position and emphasizes, instead, social and economic change. In this regard, she focuses on patriarchy, tribalism, economic development, class, the state, the regional context, and the larger world system. As a feminist, she focuses on women as vital actors, as shapers of social change and not merely as passive victims of warped development.

Examining the impact on women of economic development, state policy, and employment opportunities, the author concludes that the region's political economy largely shapes women's constrained employment patterns and perpetuates their low social position. Ultimately, Moghadam concludes, education has been more important than employment in changing women's positions and self-perceptions.

In the Middle East, concepts of the emancipation of women were forged in the context of national liberation, nation-building, and the struggle to achieve modernity. Moghadam looks at several historic revolutions to explain why such upheavals do not necessarily have favorable outcomes for the status of women, even when women actively support them. Instead, revolutions often give rise to "neopatriarchy," characterized by state legislation, such as that passed in Iran, controlling women's dress and behavior. The author contends, however, that such control has been mitigated by the education of women and by the passage of legal reforms that modify some of the more conservative legislation.

Moghadam examines the rise of Islamism in the context of the weakening of the patriarchal family following industrialization, urbanization, and proletarianization. Economic mismanagement, poverty, unemployment, debt servicing, and political repression have also played into the hands of Islamist movements. Yet, as Moghadam demonstrates, even religious ideology weakens in the face of economic imperatives and women's activism, as has happened in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Examining fertility, literacy and education, and employment in Iran, Moghadam finds modifications in the early restrictive policies of the Islamic Revolution. Women today enjoy improved literacy rates, more access to higher education, a better work environment, and greater mobility. Had she written the book one year later, the author might also have documented the amazing progress authorities in Iran have made in associating "birthrates" with "the status of women." Birth rates have been successfully lowered through family planning policies aimed at increasing the education and employment of women.

In Afghanistan, on the other hand, attempts at improving women's access to education, employment, mobility, and greater freedom have largely

failed Moghadam analyzes the forces that have made modernization in Afghanistan difficult and limited, with adverse implications for women

In this well-researched and valuable study, the author neither merely catalogues injustices against women, nor simply celebrates feminist triumphs. Instead, she emphasizes the centrality of gender in the upheavals tearing at the social fabric of the Middle East. Moghadam addresses a bewildering array of puzzling anomalies and, slicing skillfully through them, exposes their bare bones and substructure. This book expands the discourse on the subject of Middle Eastern women.

Nesta Ramazani is a free-lance writer who specializes in women of the Middle East. She is currently working on an autobiographical novel.

Politics, Gender, and the Islamic Past: The Legacy of 'A'isha Bint Abi Bakr, by D. A. Spellberg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. x + 195 pages. Notes to p. 222. Gloss to p. 225. Bibl. to p. 238. Index to p. 243. \$35.

Reviewed by Mary Ann Tétéault

'A'isha Bint Abi Bakr was the Prophet Muhammad's favorite wife. Married at nine, she was the antithesis of the ignorant—and presumably submissive—child-bride. 'A'isha was a lively companion of the Prophet while he lived, and aggressive in defense of her beliefs and her interests both before and after he died. These interests, like those of other contenders in what D. A. Spellberg calls "the politics of succession," were familial as well as personal and doctrinal. Although not explicitly suggested in the context of her book, Spellberg's interpretation of 'A'isha's legacy forms a parallel to Aeschylus's *Oresteia*. The author shows the difficulty of creating a flourishing civic regime in the absence of "the breaking of familial or blood bonds and the subordination of the patriarchal family within the patriarchal state."¹

Where the patriarchal family remains strongly entrenched ideologically and socially, it rivals the state in the intensity of the personal commitment it can command. It also shapes that rivalry, metaphorically and actually, as a conflict of private, family-related interests. In the story of 'A'isha, the conflict over the succession to the Prophet becomes a conflict between supporters of 'A'isha's father, Abu Bakr, and the Prophet's son-in-law, 'Alī Ibn Abī Talīb. Support for the former represents a pattern of politically determined succession, indicating the primacy of the patriarchal state, while support for the sons of Muhammad's daughter, Fatima, and his son-in-law, 'Alī Ibn Abī Talīb, represents a pattern of dynastic succession, indicating the primacy of the patriarchal family.

Much of this conflict is, and has been, fought over the interpretation of 'A'isha's life. Spellberg concentrates on interpretations written—and painted—during the medieval period, when the Sunni-Shi'i schism in Islam became institutionalized through a process that included competitive recreations of the meaning of the Muslim past. Part of this legacy was embodied in stories of exemplary women, such as 'A'isha and Khadija, the wives of the Prophet, and Fatima, his daughter. Their hagiographies were modeled after women like Maryam, the mother of Jesus, and Asiya, the Pharaoh's wife who rescued Moses, examples of good women extolled in the Quran.

'A'isha's legacy is complicated by her transgression of deeply embedded cultural norms of honor and shame. 'A'isha, the only wife to accompany Muhammad on a raid against the Mustaliq tribe, was inadvertently left behind on the return to Medina. She was found and brought back by a young Muslim man, Safwan Ibn al-Mu'attal al-Sulami, inviting rumors of an assignation. 'A'isha's shame threatened the honor of Muhammad as 'A'isha's husband, and Abu Bakr, as her father. When Muhammad conferred with his advisors about what to do, 'Alī Ibn Abī Talīb suggested that he repudiate her, taking the position that the "prime asset of any married female is her chastity" (p. 69). Spellberg notes that Shi'i writers explain 'A'isha's opposition to 'Alī at the Battle of the Camel as motivated by nothing more than a desire to retaliate against him for urging that Muhammad divorce her (p. 70). The sexualization of the politics of succession is clearly

1 Sarah Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity* (New York: Schocken Books, 1975), p. 97.

indicated in this and other examples Spellberg cites of medieval Shi'ī, and eventually also Sunni, writings about 'A'isha

The historical 'A'isha is as difficult to know as the historical Fatima or Khadija. This is so even though we know more about 'A'isha as an individual, given her prominence as a companion of the Prophet and a link in the chain of oral transmission of *hadith* (sayings and deeds of the Prophet). Spellberg tells us that her elusive qualities rest in part on the relative richness of 'A'isha's story, which, despite the lacunae, conveys a picture of a complex person. Because of her complexity, there are different ways to envision 'A'isha, any of which could lead us to admire or detest her. This ambiguity is intensified because, like Joan of Arc, 'A'isha is not an icon of traditional womanhood.² In sharp contrast to Khadija and Fatima, 'A'isha's childlessness, her vigorous defense of her own virtue and of her entitlement to be reckoned with, and her willingness to venture all the way to the battlefield for her beliefs make her difficult to venerate as a feminine ideal.

Although 'A'isha seems to speak to us through chains of oral transmission, her illiteracy prevents us from hearing her voice in her own terms—through writings that could be passed down directly. In the absence of such authorial control, the 'A'isha we know is forever mediated, redacted, and revised. Yet 'A'isha the living woman played a central role in the development and transmission of a world religion. Her very prominence in this arena explains why her legacy is an object of struggle. Every interpretation of her life is bound to reflect one's position towards contending individuals and ideologies in the history of religion. The image of 'A'isha that any of us holds, says Spellberg, cannot be a "true" reflection of the woman herself. Her central importance requires the image to be part of our understanding of the meaning of Islam.

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2 Marina Warner, *Joan of Arc: The Image of Female Heroism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982).

Taj al-Saltana—Crowning Anguish: Memoirs of a Persian Princess from the Harem to Modernity, 1884–1914, by, Taj al-Saltana

Ed. by Abbas Amanat. Tr. by Anna Vanzan and Amin Neshati. Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 1993. 311 pages. Biogs. to p. 332. Notes to p. 336. Gloss to p. 342. Index to p. 345. Sources and Credits to p. 349. \$29.95 cloth, \$14.95 paper.

Reviewed by NESTA RAMAZANI

In this startlingly frank account of life in a Qajar harem, Taj al-Saltana exposes herself and the royal Persian court to public scrutiny. Born in 1883, Taj al-Saltana was the daughter of Nasir al-Din Shah, the fourth king of the Qajar dynasty and ruler of Iran for half a century (1848–96). Taj al-Saltana grew up in the harem in Golestan Palace, the principal royal residence. She was isolated from the outside world, guarded by eunuchs, and constrained by cultural conventions that ordained the veiling and seclusion of women. Relatively well-educated for her time, Taj al-Saltana could read Western literature, play the piano and the *ta* (Persian lute), and paint. Yet, she was acutely aware of the limitations of her education and of the debilitating effects of life in the harem on personal growth and development, and on any strivings toward autonomy or independence.

Living at a time when the bonds of religion were relaxing under the pressure of Western secular influences, Taj al-Saltana flouted convention by unveiling her face and leading a relatively independent life. For this she was castigated, vilified, and roundly condemned by her relatives and members of her social class. Her mother accused her of being a *babi* (an apostate), her brother, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, was furious with her for her "wantonness," and she herself anticipated censure for the "illicit proposals she put forth to the women" (p. 292).

While writing an autobiography in the early 20th century would have been a bold and unprecedented act for any Iranian woman, for Taj it was doubly bold in that she was a Qajar princess and in a position to describe daily life in the royal harem. This she did candidly, not only revealing her innermost thoughts and feelings, but also expressing often uncomplimentary views on her

country and her countrymen. Her work was not published until 60 years after her death.

Taj's memoirs clearly reveal her inner conflicts. She was an early advocate for the education of women, for their unveiling, and for their participation in the country's work force. Nevertheless, Taj al-Saltana was torn between new and old values. Her self-portrait reveals profound psychological suffering born of a crisis of faith and fed by feelings of frustration, anger, and guilt. She tried to commit suicide three times. Gifted and beautiful, she was sheltered, pampered, and indulged by her nanny and her father, and by the harem system that provided her with endless material benefits, but little moral, intellectual, or spiritual guidance. Yet, she suffered immeasurably from having an unloving mother and an uncaring, immature husband. Her eventual divorce resulted in her separation from her children and serious financial problems. She endured the peculiarly unrelenting scorn and opprobrium reserved for women who dared to transgress the conventions of the times.

While Taj al-Saltana rails against the restrictions placed on women in her country, she unwittingly reveals the exceptional power that some women in the harem managed to wield. Her account reveals exceptional political awareness among the women in the harem, where rivalries blossomed, alliances were formed and broken, and political fortunes rose and fell. It also reveals a peculiar egalitarianism in the Qajar court, whereby peasant men and women were able to rise to positions of great power and wealth.

A thoughtful and informative introduction by 'Abbas Amanat places the events described in Taj's memoirs in their historical and cultural setting. A treasure-trove of photographs of a now bygone era embellish, enhance, and round out this portrait of a fascinating moment in Iran's long and troubled history.

Nesta Ramazani is a writer whose work focuses on the women of the Middle East. She is currently working on an autobiographical novel.

Women in Kuwait: The Politics of Gender, by Haya al-Mughni. London: Saqi Books,

1993. 148 pages. Notes to p. 159. Bibl. to p. 166. Index to p. 174.

Reviewed by Jill Crystal

This very interesting book is one that anyone (and lately that seems to be just about everyone) interested in civil society should take a look at. A carefully researched analysis of four different voluntary organizations, the study looks at the historical development of these institutions, their social origins, and their relationship to current political issues and actors. The organizations happen to be women's groups, and the case happens to be Kuwait, but the issues raised are of much broader interest.

The work, which began as al-Mughni's doctoral dissertation at Exeter, is based on historical documents as well as on extensive interviews and less formal but extensive interactions with members and former members of these organizations. It is embedded in a larger analysis of the women's movement in Kuwait and the history of the emergence of voluntary associations there. The section on the institutionalization of voluntary associations, in general, contains new and interesting historical material. Al-Mughni focuses on four groups: the Women's Cultural and Social Society (WCSS), "Bayadiri al-Salam" (Threshing Fields of Peace), the Islamic Care Society, and the Girls' Club, and looks tangentially at other voluntary associations as they emerged historically.

As al-Mughni examines the WCSS, she concludes that this group had essentially little organizational concern for women per se and was in some ways hostile, or at best indifferent, to women's issues. It was a *women's* group only because virtually all voluntary organizations in Kuwait are segregated by gender. In essence, the WCSS served the rather different function of preserving class (in this case, merchant class) cohesion. If this group was unwilling to take on women's issues, the Arab Women's Development Society (AWDS), which did engage these issues, was unable to do so effectively. Through the AWDS, al-Mughni traces the failures and limited successes of the women's movement in Kuwait, and the debilitating rivalry between the AWDS and WCSS. She concludes with a discussion of the Girls' Club, which emerged from the rivalry between the AWDS and WCSS.

Her discussion of Bayadīr al-Salam analyzes the relationship between the women's movement and the Islamic movement in Kuwait. Al-Mughni describes the way in which Bayadīr proved subtly threatening to a number of women's groups. The WCSS felt threatened because of Bayadīr's broader recruitment along class lines. More secularist feminists and mainstream Islamic organizations felt threatened because of the group's spiritual autonomy. These organizations responded to the creation of Bayadīr by establishing their own women's groups. Finally, the Islamic Care Society comes across as a top-down, somewhat autocratic, religiously themed housewives' society.

As noted above, this book happens to be about women and happens to be about Kuwait, thus scholars of these topics should be interested in the book. There is a good deal of history about voluntary associations in Kuwait, an extensive discussion of gender politics there, and a post-script on post-war Kuwait.

There are few criticisms of the book. The author might have connected herself more explicitly to the debates on gender in the field. And she might have told us a little more about herself. These minor points aside, the book merits the attention of a broad audience.

Jill Crystal, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Auburn University

Recent Publications

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

Algeria. A Country Study, ed. by Helen Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994. 5th ed. xxxvii + 342 pages. Appends. Bibl. Gloss. Index. Contribs. \$17. Examines modern Algerian geopolitics according to economic, historical, political, social, and national security factors. In addition to scholarly books, journals, and monographs, the material is drawn from official government reports and

Annotations have been prepared with the assistance of Reema Bahnasy, Sarah Koss, Vaseema P. Nooruddin, Jordan M. Rankin, Will O. Sands, and Nancy C. Wood.

foreign and domestic newspapers. Although some sections have been updated, the main body of the text reflects the information available as of December 1993 (WS).

The Diplomat's Dictionary, by Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994. vi + 603 pages. Bibl. Index. \$20 paper. Personal compilation of quotes, advice, observations, insights, and classic wisdoms Freeman collected during his many years of foreign service, including being the American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Entries are organized alphabetically by subject. The dictionary identifies the historical significance of persons indicated. This dictionary on the art of diplomacy is intended for "anyone who may be called upon to deal with complex and challenging situations in cross-cultural circumstances" (p. ix) (RB).

Human Rights Watch World Report 1995: Events of 1994, by Human Rights Watch. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995. xxvii + 362 pages. \$25 paper. This report catalogues human rights abuses in 70 countries. The section on the Middle East covers abuses in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Additionally, the section titled "Helsinki Overview" documents abuses in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (WS).

Persian Gulf States: Country Studies, ed. by Helen Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994. xxix + 472 pages. Append. Bibl. Gloss. Index. Contribs. \$25. Part of the area handbook series, this study looks at the geography, economy, social and political systems, and contemporary politics of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The introduction surveys the history of civilization of the Gulf states, including issues like Wahhabism, the effects of oil, and foreign influence (JR).

Persian Gulf War Almanac, by Harry G. Summers, Jr. New York: Facts on File, 1995. xii + 301 pages. Bibl. Index. \$35. This is a reference guide for the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Divided into four sections, the book explores the historical developments in the Gulf region that resulted in the formation of the US-led coalition against Iraq. It offers a chronology of events, lists over 350 entries on a variety of war-related topics, and contains a bibliography of relevant writings. Maps are included (VPN).

BIOGRAPHY

Circle of Fear, by Hussein Sumaida, with Carole Jerome. Washington, DC and London: Brassey's, 1994. xvi + 304 pages. Index. \$23.95. This story of the author's experiences reads like a spy thriller, but is actually a candid account of an Iraqi mole for Israel's foreign intelligence service. The son of one of the founders of Iraq's ruling Ba'ath Party, Sumaida rebels against Saddam Husayn and the Ba'athist system by

joining the Israeli Mossad. When he feels his act of treason has been discovered, Sumarda turns himself in to Iraqi authorities, only to be forced to work for the Mukhabarat, Iraq's feared intelligence service. The book provides a firsthand account of the Ba'thist philosophy, the lifestyle of Iraqis living in a police state, and the dilemma faced by an individual working first against, and then with, one of the most intriguing Arab intelligence services (VPN).

The Life and Times of Shaikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, Ruler of Bahrain, 1942-1961, by Andrew Wheatcroft. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 232 pages. Bibl. \$59.95. This flattering work credits Shaykh Salman Ibn Hamad al-Khalifa with pioneering the social welfare structure of modern Bahrain. The author analyzes the development process that took place in Bahrain between 1942-61. The introduction explains that this book, written on the centennial of the former ruler's birth, is a tribute to Shaykh Salman. Wheatcroft depicts Bahrain as having found the delicate balance between the preservation of old traditions and the technologies of modernization to create a standard for sustainable development (RB).

On Both Banks of the Jordan: A Political Biography of Wasfi al-Tall, by Asher Susser. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1994. x + 208 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. \$35. The author, head of the Moshe Dayan Center at the University of Tel Aviv, describes Wasfi al-Tall as one of King Husayn's closest confidantes. He was one of Jordan's senior statesmen from the early 1960s until November 1971, when he was assassinated by the Palestinians, who blamed him for their defeat in Jordan (p. ix). The book covers al-Tall's early years, his 1949-61 service in the government, including his ambassadorship to Iraq from 1960 to 1962 (during which time Iraq demanded sovereignty over newly-independent Kuwait, a claim which Jordan did not support). The author also examines al-Tall's three terms as prime minister, "all at decisive junctures in the unfolding competition and confrontation between Jordan and the Palestinian national movement" (p. ix). The book concludes with a discussion of his part in the 1971 expulsion from Jordan of the *fida'iyyin*. Much of the study was originally published in Hebrew in 1983 and 1986 (NCW).

Younger Than That Now: A Peace Corps Volunteer Remembers Morocco, by Michael Moran. San Antonio, TX: Full Court Press, 1994. 143 pages. \$12.95 paper. Michael Moran was a Peace Corps volunteer in Boujad, Morocco from 1981-83. He uses a combination of facts, letters, and poems to convey his remembrances of living and teaching English in this Moroccan town. The story relates his struggle to bridge the cultural gap with Moroccans through an introspective journey which reveals the inner workings of the Peace Corps as well as the experience of being a volunteer and an expatriate (RB).

BAHRAIN

First Light: Modern Bahrain and its Heritage, by Hamad Bin Isa al-Khalifa. New York: Columbia Uni-

versity Press, 1994. xiv + 152 pages. \$59.50. Written by the Crown Prince of the State of Bahrain, this book focuses primarily on the history and future prospects of Bahrain, from a military and strategic viewpoint. Military strength and deterrence are perceived as crucial elements affecting national security. The topics discussed include: The military history of Bahrain, the development of the Bahrain Defense Force since the nation achieved independence in 1971, and future strategic goals (VPN).

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands, ed. by Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. 284 pages. Contrb's Index. \$39.95 cloth, \$15.95 paper. Originally presented in workshops at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, this collection of essays examines recent developments in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Part I provides an overview of the region's history and its current geopolitics. Part II contains case studies of each republic's domestic politics in relation to the "southern tier" Muslim states—Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. Part III examines the ramifications of the region's new geopolitics for Russia and the United States (WS).

Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder, by Suzanne Goldenberg. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1994. xv + 233 pages. Index. \$55 cloth, \$22.50 paper. Includes a survey of civilization in the Caucasus as well as a state-by-state assessment of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The author also discusses the region's relations with Iran, Russia, and Turkey, regional religious and economic issues, and Russia's North Caucasus territory (JR).

GULF RELATIONS

Political Dynamics and Security in the Arabian Peninsula through the 1990s, by Joseph A. Kechichian. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993. xx + 125 pages. Bibl. \$17.95 cloth, \$9.95 paper. This study provides a brief overview of domestic and international politics in the Persian Gulf region. Sections on Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf shaykhdoms discuss internal regime situations as well as the shifts in security calculations prompted by neighboring nations' actions. Kechichian notes that the 1991 Persian Gulf War has altered both domestic and regional concerns. He forecasts challenges that regimes are likely to face in the near future. Finally, the work explores implications for a US policy aimed at ensuring security and stability in the Gulf (SK).

IRAN

Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, by Mansoor Moaddel. New York: Columbia Uni-

versity Press, 1995 x + 346 pages Notes Bibl Index \$17.50 paper The author examines the role of class, ideology, and religion in the Iranian Revolution. He argues that "nationalist-liberal" ideology was transformed into Shi'i religious ideology through class conflict between the peasant and the urban merchant classes and the state. He asserts that Shi'i religious discourse became the revolutionary mechanism with which the dominated classes resisted the state. (JR)

Village Spaces: Settlement and Society in Northeastern Iran, by Lee Horne. Washington, DC and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994. xvi + 246 pages. Append. Notes. Refs. Index. \$59. This work discusses the social and physical dynamics of the village district of Khar o Tauran in northeastern Iran using an anthropological and ethnoarchaeological methodology that emphasizes the concept of the "living village" as an archaeological site. It analyzes village settlement in terms of geographic conditions, natural resources, and social structures. (JR)

JORDAN

Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan, ed. by Eugene L. Rogan and Tariq Tell. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. xxvii + 226 pages. Index. \$59.50. The essays in this book examine the relations between state and society in Jordan under Ottoman rule, the British Mandate, and Hashemite rule. They focus on each regime's struggle with tribal authority, efforts to improve agriculture, communication, exchange and trade, and attempts to tax production. (WS)

PAKISTAN

Proceedings of the Ninth Annual General Meeting of the Pakistan Society of Development Economists, Islamabad, January 7-10, 1993, parts I and II, ed. by Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi and Shamin A. Sahibzada. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1993. Part 1. 349 pages. Part 2. 1383 pages. These two volumes include lectures on Pakistani development policies related to agriculture, economics, education, gender, health care, international trade, irrigation, Islamic economy, labor, manufacturing, migration, personal consumption, population, poverty, and transportation. (WS)

PALESTINE AND PALESTINIANS

The Palestinians: The Road to Nationhood, by David McDowall. Concord, Mass.: Minority Rights Publications, 1995. viii + 215 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. \$24.95. The author examines the status of the Palestinian people and the evolution of their status throughout history. McDowall states that despite the 1993 Oslo Accord, the Palestinian people are currently a weak minority living in deplorable conditions with little hope

for improvement. The role of the international community in addressing the Palestinian issue is discussed. He makes proposals for the improvement of the lives and security of the Palestinians. (VPN)

YEMEN

Yemen—Present and Past, ed. by Bengt Knutsson et al. Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 1994. 116 pages. SK134. This book is the outcome of a conference on Yemen, held at Lund University in April 1992, attended by academics primarily from Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden. Some of the topics discussed include democracy in a tribal society, Jewry in Yemen, social organization in the Suq and the Old City of San'a, qat and its effects, the architecture of San'a, scientific results of the Danish expedition to "Arabia Felix," 1761-67, the struggle of Ottomans and Zaidis in the 16th-17th centuries, the lexicon of Nashwan Ibn Sa'ad al-Hinyari, 12th century judge, lexicographer, and poet, and the life of the philosopher and scholar al-Hamdani. (NCW)

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Energy Watchers VI. Energy Industry Responses to the 1990s: Competition, Efficiency, and Investment, and Middle Eastern Oil and Gas to 2000 and Beyond: Supply and Demand Issues, ed. by Dorothea H. El Mallakh. Boulder, CO: The International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development, 1995. xviii + 211 pages. \$24. This study includes the majority of the papers presented at the April 1994 IRCEED conferences—"Energy Industry Responses to the 1990s" and "Middle Eastern Oil and Gas to 2000 and Beyond." It seeks to determine how demand and supply will be reconciled in the near future, examining OPEC, hydrocarbon fuels, environmental issues, the European and Japanese oil markets, energy forecasts to 2010, Egyptian natural gas, Middle Eastern energy geopolitics, and privatization of Middle Eastern oil. (WS)

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

The Man Who Lost His Shadow, by Fathy Ghanem. Trans. by Desmond Stewart. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 352 pages. \$40. This novel depicts the life of a Cairo journalist named Yusuf Abdul from different perspectives, including those of his stepmother, who harbors a covert desire for him, an actress he nearly marries but ultimately rejects, a newspaper editor who marries the actress, and Yusuf, a "stranger to himself." Ghanem is an Egyptian writer and journalist who currently writes for *Ruz al-Yusuf* magazine. (WS)

A Millennium of Classical Persian Poetry: A Guide to the Reading and Understanding of Persian Poetry from the Tenth to the Twentieth Century, by Wheeler

M Thackston Bethesda, MD Iranbooks, 1994 xxvi + 186 pages Append Gloss Sources \$20 paper This guide provides students with a window into the metaphorical language of classical Persian poetry The pervasive element of mysticism, used by classical Persian poets to "explain the ineffable," is addressed In order to better present the Persian metrical system and poetic forms, selections from various works by both major and lesser-known poets are highlighted These include poetry by Abu al-Hasan 'Alī Farrukhi, Yusuf Nizami, and Khwaja Shamsuddin Muhammad Hafiz A Persian-English glossary is included (VPN)

Winter Sleep, by Goli Taraghi Tr by Francine T Mahak Costa Mesa, CA Mazda Publishers, 1994 vii + 104 pages \$7.95 paper Originally written in Persian, this work of modern fiction explores the experiences of an Iranian faced with the westernization and modernization of his society Focus is placed on the personal disorientation and stagnation that results when the individual is uprooted from his traditional culture and heritage The writer employs Jungian symbolism to portray the psychological fragmentation of the individual when faced with the challenge of self-realization within the context of a confused modernity (RB)

MEDIA

The U.S. Media and the Middle East: Image and Perception, ed by Yahya R Kamalipour Westport, CT and London Greenwood Press, 1995 xxi + 242 pages Bibl Index Contribs \$59 This is a collection of brief essays examining the American media's portrayal of the Middle East through film, magazines, newspapers, and political cartoons The work seeks to explore not only how stereotypes of Islam and the Middle East are transmitted by the mass media, but also how such portrayals shape the civic perception of, US policy towards, and US actions in the region It highlights media coverage of Iran, the Palestinian Intifada, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and Turkey, as well as media creation of a general portrait of Arabs, Islam, and Middle Eastern women The authors' conclusions emphasize political and cultural implications (SK)

MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

America and the Holy Land, by Moshe Davis Westport, CT and London Praeger, 1995 vii + 193 pages Index \$55 Part IV of the *With Eyes Toward Zion* series Davis discusses Zion's (the Holy Land) strong appeal to American Christians and Jews and the influence of Zion on American social and spiritual history He notes that the names of American places and institutions reflect Zion's effect on American historical development (JR)

The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916-1920, by Bruce Westgate University Park Pennsylvania State University, 1992 xvi + 240 pages Notes Bibl Index \$28.50 Westgate attempts to refute the conventional notion that the British Arab Bureau

was responsible for the disastrous situation of the post-World War I Middle East He argues that the members of the Arab Bureau were in fact competent and dedicated strategists and intelligence officers, working to protect communications with India, to answer Arab demands for sovereignty, and to avoid the liability of post-war occupation of the region (JR)

Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts about the U.S.-Israeli Relationship, by Paul Findley Brooklyn, NY Lawrence Hill Books, 1993 xvii + 326 pages Append Notes Bibl Index \$24.95 cloth, \$14.95 paper Findley seeks to dispel some of the myths surrounding Israel, particularly in relation to the United States, and reveal its "expansionist nature and discriminatory social structure" (xi) Sections address the formation and evolution of the Israeli state, highlighting the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Suez crisis of 1956, the Six Day War of 1967, UN Resolution 242, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon The book also discusses US aid to Israel, Israel's nuclear weapons program, Israel's relations with South Africa and the Third World, and incentives and obstacles to the peace process Findley served for 22 years as a member of the US House of Representatives, spending 12 years on the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East (WS)

From the Gulf to Central Asia. Players in the New Great Game, ed by Anoushiravan Ehteshami Exeter, UK University of Exeter Press, 1994 xvii + 242 pages Contribs Index n p A product of a July 1993 conference at the University of Exeter's Center for Arab Gulf Studies, this book examines relations between the Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics and Iran, the Persian Gulf States, and Turkey Essays explore the new states' economic status, prospects for regional economic cooperation, the regional and global impact of the emergence of the new states, and their influence on the policies of the Arab Middle East, Russia, and the Western world (WS)

Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, by John Obert Voll Syracuse, NY Syracuse University Press, 1994 2nd ed xiii + 439 pages Notes Gloss Bibl Essay Index \$16.95 paper This introduction to Islam traces general trends and shifts in Islam from the 18th century through the present It discusses Islam from North Africa to the Indian Ocean, and addresses minority movements in China and the former Soviet Union It briefly explains the foundation, basic tenets, and sects of Islam The study focuses on the relationship between Islam and politics, noting transitions in Islam in the wake of colonization, state formation, rising nationalism, and modernization The author emphasizes the diversity of the evolution of Islam in various national and regional contexts Voll concludes with a discussion of the current Islamic resurgence, providing multiple interpretations and prospects for the future (SK)

Islam: Opposing Viewpoints, ed by Paul A Winters San Diego, CA Greenhaven Press, 1995 311 pages Gloss Bibl Index n p Excerpts from books and journal articles demonstrate the multiple facets of the discourse surrounding Islam, including Islam's relation to democracy, politics, terrorism, the West, and women An

abstract at the start of each contributor's viewpoint frames the argument and provides a general overview of the debate surrounding each issue (SK)

The Middle East in the New World Order, ed by Haifaa A Jawad New York St Martin's Press, 1994 viii + 154 pages Bibl Index \$59 95 This study addresses different issues involving the Middle East, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab state system, democratization, Islamism, security structures, Yemeni unification, and the regional economic impact of the 1991 Persian Gulf War (JR)

The Next Threat: Western Perceptions of Islam, ed by Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg Tr by Loula Friese London Pluto Press, 1995 168 pages Contrb Index £35 cloth, £10 95 paper Originally published in German under the title *Feindbild Islam* (1993) Seven essays argue that the Western view of a hostile Islam is the result of the vacuum left by the end of the communist threat in the post-Cold War era The Islamic menace to the West is viewed as a function of the identity crisis which the West has been undergoing since the fall of the communist East Topics addressed include the role of the international media in creating a stereotyped, fundamentalist image of Islam, the evolution of the European view of the Orient from the romanticized time of the French Revolution through the superpower politics of the first World War, Islam and modernity beyond the European model, the manifestations of a diverse Islam in the Islamic world and in European Muslim communities, and the foreign policy attitudes of the West towards Islam and fundamentalism (RB)

Playing the "Communal Card" Communal Violence and Human Rights, by Human Rights Watch New York Human Rights Watch, 1995 xviii + 153 pages \$18 paper This report explores governmental provocation of ethnic, racial, and religious violence It confronts the belief held by the media and international leaders that communal violence is a result of ancient animosities or deep-seated hatreds Instead, this study traces the origins of various cases of communal violence to government provocation and policies Governments play the "communal card" by directing agents of the state to commit acts of violence or by tolerating communal violence in order to advance their own political agendas The report concentrates on situations in Azerbaijan, India, the Israeli-Occupied Territories, Kenya, Lebanon, Romania, Rwanda, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and the former Yugoslavia Recommendations for the prevention of communal violence are included (VPN)

Regional Security Regimes Israel and Its Neighbors, ed by Efraim Inbar Albany State University of New York Press, 1995 xii + 313 pages Contrb Index \$19 95 This study is the product of a June 1992 international conference at Bar-Ilan University in Israel It discusses methods of increasing regional security by establishing a security regime conducive to peace among the states involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict Chapters discuss the concept of security regime, previous regional security regimes, US Middle East policy, UN regional policy, growing cooperation in the Arab world, Israeli-Jordanian relations, Israeli-Syrian relations, regional arms control, cultural characteristics of

the Arab-Israeli conflict, water issues, prospects for scientific and technological cooperation, and Israeli strategic doctrine (WS)

Russia and the Third World in the Post-Soviet Era, ed by Mohiaddin Mesbahi Gainesville University Press of Florida, 1994 x + 414 pages Contrb Index \$49 95 cloth, \$19 95 paper Three of the essays in this study concern the Middle East These include, "Russia and the Middle East Continuity and Change," "The Dynamics of Russian-Afghan Relations A View from Moscow," and "The Collapse of the USSR and the Northern Tier States" (JR)

State Power and Social Forces Domination and Transformation in the Third World, ed by Joel S Migdal et al Cambridge and New York Cambridge University Press, 1994 x + 333 pages Index \$59 95 cloth, \$19 95 paper Two chapters in this work are relevant to the Middle East, namely, "Business Conflict, Collaboration, and Privilege in Interwar Egypt," and "A Time and a Place for the Nonstate Social Change in the Ottoman Empire during the 'Long Nineteenth Century'" (JR)

Terrorism and the Media From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing, by Brigitte L Nacos New York Columbia University Press, 1994 xi + 214 pages Notes Append Bibl Index \$32 50 This study examines the impact of anti-American terrorism on the American media, politics, and public The author asserts that terrorists successfully manipulate the media's influence on public opinion and political decision making She concentrates on Middle Eastern cases of hostage-taking and bombing, and analyzes American responses to terrorism, citing Jimmy Carter's failed rescue mission in 1980 and Ronald Reagan's bombing of Libya in 1986 (WS)

Turmoil: The Druzes, Lebanon, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, by Najib Alamuddin London Quartet Books, 1993 292 pages Sources Index £14 95 cloth, £7 95 paper In an attempt to undo what he perceives as damage by theologians and historians regarding Druze history and religion, Alamuddin, a Lebanese Druze, exposes misconceptions and attempts to construct an accurate account of Druze history He probes into various facets of the issue, from the origin of Druzes to their "secret" religion, facets of which, the author admits, were hidden from him for much of his life The Druzes' role in the Arab-Israeli conflict is highlighted (VPN)

Turning Point The Gulf War and US Military Strategy, ed by L Benjamin Ederington and Michael J Mazarr Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1995 xiv + 290 pages Contrb Index \$32 95 Using the 1991 Gulf War as a point-of-departure, this collection examines the future of US military strategy and defense policy and their future impact on US foreign policy The diversity of contributors stimulates debate and discussion on the issues Sections also cover the international and post-Cold War setting and the lessons of the Gulf War (WS)

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Allāh Transcendent Studies in the Structure and Semiotics of Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Cosmology, by Ian Richard Netton. Richmond, England: Curzon Press, 1994. xiii + 383 pages. Bibl. Index. \$29.95 paper. This is a comprehensive study of medieval Islamic philosophy, examining various medieval notions of God and several seminal medieval theologians, like Ibn Sina and Ibn al-'Arabi. Angels, cosmology, and proof of the existence of God are also discussed. (JR)

A History of Islamic Law, by N.J. Coulson. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995. viii + 264 pages. Notes. Gloss. Bibl. Index. \$25 paper. The author traces Islamic legal history by first drawing a fundamental distinction between classical jurisprudence and modern Muslim legal philosophy, and second, by dispelling the notion of the shari'a as a "rigid and immutable [legal] system" (p. 4). The evolution of the shari'a is measured against two criteria: rigidity, or its unwillingness to conform to modification, and uniformity as a standard to be used against various other legal systems. (VPN)

Islamic Society in Practice, by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994. x + 191 pages. Appends. Refs. Index. \$16 paper. Fluehr-Lobban combines anthropological research with regional personal experience in her examination of modern Islam. Islamic fundamentals are briefly surveyed, followed by analysis of contemporary Islamic issues. Chapters include "Family, Community, and Gender Relations," "Communal Identity: Religious, Ethnic, National," and "Contemporary Islamic Communities: Tensions from Within and Without." (JR)

Twenty-Three Years. A Study of the Prophetic Career of Mohammed, by 'Ali Dashti. Tr. by F.R.C. Bagley. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1994. xviii + 228 pages. Notes. Indices. \$15.95 paper. The broad issues of Islam and the prophetic life of Muhammad are analyzed and evaluated in this book originally written in Persian. Dashti dispels the grandiose image of Muhammad as something other than human, yet praises his greatness. Myths and superstitions surrounding Muhammad are addressed. (VPN)

PRE-20TH CENTURY HISTORY

The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, ed. by Avigdor Levy. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1994. xvi + 783 pages. Chron. Bibl. Index. \$49.95. These 28 essays grew out of a 1987 international conference at Brandeis University. They cover the structure of the Jewish community in the Ottoman Empire, the scope of Jewish autonomy, Jewish relations with the Ottoman authorities

and the population, Jewish/Muslim acculturation, the modernization of Ottoman Jewry, and Jewish participation in political life, among other topics. An introductory essay offers an account of 14th-20th century Ottoman Jewry, thus placing the individual essays in context. A chronology lists the main events relating to the Jews and the Ottomans from ca. 1280 to 1923. There are also a number of illustrations, graphs, and maps. (NCW)

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

The Development of Arab-American Identity, ed. by Ernest McCarus. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994. vi + 221 pages. Contribs. Index. \$45. A product of the University of Michigan's 1990 conference on Arab-American Immigrant Experience, this work details Arab-Americans' historical backgrounds since 1880, as well as the struggle for identity in an alien culture. Chapters outline the Arab-American role in American politics, religious development in Christian and Islamic Arab immigrant communities, Palestinian women in America, and ethnic stereotyping and anti-Arab racism. (WS)

Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognoses, ed. by Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1994. xix + 369 pages. Contribs. Refs. Index. \$25 paper. Contains 11 papers presented at an October 1992 symposium at Harvard University. They assess the water situation in the Arab world, forecast future problems, and evaluate long-term water strategies. Special topics covered include conflict and water use, climatic change, de-salinization, water issues in the Arab Mashriq (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria), and trans-boundary water issues. (WS)

WOMEN

Reconstructing Gender in the Middle East: Tradition, Identity, and Power, ed. by Fatma Muge Göçek and Shiva Balaghi. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. vii + 233 pages. Bibl. Index. \$16.50 paper. This compilation of essays highlights the various women's movements in the Middle East today. Analyses center around the reconstruction of notions of identity, power, and tradition and are conducted within the fields of anthropology, history, literary criticism, and political science. The scholars attempt to create a forum for women's voices from the region and to redefine conceptions of women's roles and status in Middle Eastern society. The essays stress both the progressive nature of gender relations and the limitations and obstacles yet to be overcome. (SK)

Bibliography of Periodical Literature

Note The Bibliography is intended to present a selective listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the rise of Islam. The material included covers Muslim Spain and the Ottoman Balkans, Afghanistan, the Arab world, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, and the republics of Central Asia and

Transcaucasia. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded. The list of periodicals reviewed is published annually in the Autumn issue.

Send notices of such articles to Bibliography Editor, MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, 1761 N Street, N W, Washington, D C 20036

Abbreviations

A /a, Asia, Asian, Asiatic, Asie, asiatique, etc
Acad, Academy
Admin, Administration, Administrative
Aff, Affairs
Afr./afr, Africa, African, Afrique, african, etc
Amer, America, American, etc
Ann, Annals, Annales
Annu, Annuaire
Anthrop /anthrop, Anthropology, Anthropological, Anthropologie, anthropologique, etc
Assoc, Association
B, Bulletin
BSOAS, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
C, Central
Cah, Cahiers
Comp, Comparative
Contemp /contemp., Contemporary, contemporain, etc
Cult., Culture, Cultural
Cur, Current
D, Deutsch, etc
Dept, Department
Dev, Developing
Develop, Development
East., Eastern
Econ /écon, Economics

Economie, économique, etc
For., Foreign
Fr /fr, France, French, français, etc
Geog./géog., Geography, Geographic, Geographical, Géographie, géographique, etc
Hist./hist, History, Historical, Histoire, historique
IBLA, Institut des belles Lettres arabes
IJMES, International Journal of Middle East Studies
Inst, Institute, Institut, etc
internac, internacional
Internat./internat., International, international, Internationale, etc
internaz, internazionale
J, Journal
JPS, Journal of Palestine Studies
Lit, Literature, Literary
Lab, Labor, Labour
Mag, Magazine
Maj, Majallah, Majallat
Med /Méd, Mediterranean, Méditerranée, etc
MEJ, Middle East Journal
MERIP, Middle East Research and Information Project
MESA, Middle East Studies Association
Mid, Middle

Mod /mod, Modern, moderne, moderno
Nr, Near
O., Orient, Oriental, Orientalia, oriental, oriente, etc
Org, Organization
Pak, Pakistan
Polit /polit, Politics, Political, Politique, politique, Politica, etc
Probs, Problems
Quart, Quarterly
Rel, Relations
Rep, Report
Res, Research
Rev, Review, Revue, Revista
Riv, Rivista
S, School, Schools
Sci, Science, Sciences Scienze, etc
Soc./soc., Society, Social, Societe, social, etc
Sociol /sociol, Sociology, Sociological, Sociologica, Sociologie, sociologique, etc
Stud, Studies, Studia
Supp, Supplement
Univ, University, Université, etc
US, United States
Z, Zeitschrift

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
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
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Boutros Boutros-Ghali

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Brian Urquhart

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Five Scenarios

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
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Arab Cooperation Council
ADL	Armistice Demarcation Line
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measure
DCO	Israeli District Coordination and Cooperation Office
DOP	Declaration of Principles
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
GAA	General Armistice Agreement
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HAMAS	Islamic Resistance Movement
IDF	Israel Defense Force
JSC	Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MINURSO	Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC	US National Security Council
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODD	Observer Detachment Damascus
OGE	Observer Group Egypt
OGG	Observer Group Golan
OGL	Observer Group Lebanon
PKO	Peace-Keeping Operation
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNA	Palestine National Authority
POLISARIO	Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia al-Hamra and Rio de Oro
SADR	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
SFM	Sinai Field Mission
SLA	South Lebanese Army
TIPH	Temporary International Presence in Hebron
UN	United Nations
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF I	United Nations Emergency Force I
UNEF II	United Nations Emergency Force II
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCOP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
VOA	Voice of America

Editor's Note

THIS issue of the *Middle East Journal* celebrates the 50th anniversary of the United Nations (UN), an organization that has played a critical role in the Middle East since its earliest years. The secretary-general of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, agreed to answer three questions I sent him for this special issue, which appear in the form of a commentary at the start of the issue. Brian Urquhart, who was undersecretary-general for special political affairs at the United Nations, has written a 50-year retrospective on the role of the United Nations in the region, and Clovis Maksoud, director of the Center for the Global South at The American University in Washington, DC, has prepared an essay on the parallel evolution of the League of Arab States (that is also celebrating its 50th anniversary) and the United Nations. Pierre Salinger, who was senior foreign correspondent for ABC News from 1978–1993, has given us an observer's perspective on the way the United States and the United Nations reacted to the Iraqi threat to invade Kuwait in the months and days preceding the 1991 Gulf War. Finally, two articles discuss the present and future roles of the United Nations in the region: one, by Yahia Zoubir of the American Graduate School of International Management-Thunderbird and Anthony Pazzanita, a researcher and independent attorney, focuses on the current UN role in the Western Sahara, and the other, by Joshua Sinai, a senior analyst at the Library of Congress, examines peace-keeping after peace returns to the Middle East.

The authors assess the successes and failures of the UN's efforts to deal with the various conflicts that have flared up in the past five decades between one or another of the states in the region. They look at past, present, and future attempts to negotiate solutions to intractable conflicts, to set up peace-keeping operations to prevent the resumption of fighting, and to send truce observers to monitor violations of agreements. The authors also remind us that the role of the United Nations has not only been a political one, but has also addressed the economic and social problems of the region. Some of the UN's most

successful programs have been those that have assisted both settled and displaced populations that suffered or were rendered homeless as the result of wars and civil wars, including Palestinians, Lebanese, Sudanese, Sahrawis, Kurds, and others

The many attempts at settling conflicts, the passing of UN Security Council resolutions, and the setting up of peace-keeping forces and relief operations have been criticized over the years for favoring one or another of the parties to a conflict. Today, the United Nations is under attack on a much broader front. It is accused of many "sins," including inefficiency, overspending, internal dissension, and a bloated bureaucracy, among others. Nowhere are these criticisms more stridently expressed than in Washington, where a campaign is being waged to clip the wings of this organization by cutting its funds and reducing its role in world affairs. Some are even calling for its demise.

To those doubting Thomases who question the usefulness of the United Nations, Brian Urquhart asks "What would have happened if there had been no United Nations, no General Assembly to lay down guidelines or to blow off steam in, no Security Council to complain to, no secretary-general, no peace-keeping forces, no truce observers, or massive relief operations?" (p. 580). He reminds us, with the words of another UN secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld, that the United Nations "was not invented to bring the human race to heaven, but to save it from hell" (p. 580).

I would like to thank several people who have helped me on this issue: Paul Hare, vice president of the Middle East Institute (MEI), who initiated the correspondence with the secretary-general's office that resulted in Boutros-Ghali's commentary, Jean-Claude Aimé, the chief of staff of the secretary-general, who pursued the matter, and Richard Parker, currently a scholar-in-residence at MEI, who invited Brian Urquhart to write a 50-year retrospective. Without their assistance, this special issue on the role of the United Nations in the Middle East would not have been possible.

Mary-Jane Deeb



COMMENTARY

United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali

The editor, Mary-Jane Deeb, sent the secretary-general three questions, which he answered in writing 1) What lessons can we draw from the role the United Nations has played in the Middle East in the past 50 years?, 2) What do you see the future role of the United Nations to be in the region and will it differ significantly from past patterns?, 3) As secretary-general of the United Nations, do you have a special message to address to the parties involved in the peace negotiations taking place in the Middle East? The following is the text that he sent for this special issue of the Middle East Journal

THE role the United Nations (UN) played in the Middle East in the last 50 years was, to a large extent, determined by the various mandates of the Security Council and the General Assembly on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this context, the United Nations was instrumental in establishing cease-fires, in monitoring troop withdrawals, and in observing buffer zones. It also played, for many years, an important mediating role starting with Count Bernadotte, who was assassinated in 1948, followed by Ralph Bunche, who successfully negotiated the armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, and, later, by Gunnar Jarring, who served as the secretary-general's

■
Boutros Boutros-Ghali formerly served as Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs and then as deputy prime minister before being elected secretary-general of the United Nations in 1992

special representative in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 after the June 1967 War. In addition, the United Nations helped to deal with the human suffering brought about by the conflict, in particular, through the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The United Nations, furthermore, is involved in coordinating the assistance for the reconstruction of Lebanon, and providing aid to the Palestinians.

The amount of UN resources—soldiers, civilian staff, and budget—employed in the Middle East, as well as the number of UN soldiers killed and wounded while serving in the region, and the duration of the UN's involvement—from 1948 until today, with no end in sight for the short-term future—make the case of the Middle East unique in the annals of the United Nations.

The lessons that can be drawn from the UN's experience in the Middle East are the same as those drawn from the history of the United Nations itself. The UN's efforts can be successful only if the parties to a conflict have the political will for a settlement and if the UN's member states, especially those on the Security Council, stand firmly behind those efforts. Even then, the United Nations can only support the parties, provide a framework for a settlement, and a breathing space in which to attain it. It cannot reach a settlement on their behalf. Similarly, the United Nations can alleviate human suffering resulting from armed conflicts, but it cannot solve the humanitarian questions as long as the parties are not willing to eradicate the root causes of their conflict.

The United Nations has provided a framework for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

* * *

As outlined above, the UN's role in the Middle East historically has been connected to the Arab-Israeli conflict. At present, a peace process is underway between Israel and its neighbors. The United Nations is supporting this process, not only diplomatically, in the General Assembly, but more importantly, with practical assistance on the ground. One main concern is to build a solid foundation for peace through economic and social development. To assist in this field will be one of the major future tasks of the United Nations. I have therefore initiated, already in 1993, a thorough review of the UN assistance programs in the area and the possibilities of expanding them rapidly.

In June 1994 I appointed a UN special coordinator in the Occupied Territories, Ambassador Terje Rod Larsen of Norway, who has put in place an effective coordination mechanism for the aid that is flowing into the Occupied Territories. Of the \$200 million that actually reached the territories in the past year, over half was channeled through UN bodies. The United Nations has been active in facilitating public works projects to create immediate employment opportunities and to bring visible changes to the Gaza Strip, in establishing a coordination mechanism on the ground to ensure effective disbursement of donor funds, and in coordinating training and other assistance for the Palestinian police. The committed efforts of the international community are gradually beginning to bear

fruit, and a number of improvements in the situation have taken place, in particular, with regard to institution-building and the development of infrastructure

While peace-keeping remains a major part of the UN's role in the region, together with humanitarian assistance for refugees, it is equally true that, to the extent that the Arab-Israeli conflict is on its way to a settlement, the UN's role is already changing and will continue to do so even more in the future. How and to what extent must be determined by the countries of the region, based on their needs and requests.

Some general trends can perhaps be identified already. The role of peace-keeping and the monitoring of buffer zones between adversaries will diminish. In its place, and perhaps for a transitional period, there might be limited monitoring of the security aspects of agreements reached between the parties. Similarly, once a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem is found, the UN's role in providing humanitarian assistance might come to an end and be replaced by assistance for long-term projects.

* * *

The countries of the region have embarked on a peace process starting in Madrid in 1991, based on UN resolutions, but without direct UN involvement. They have achieved remarkable successes, foremost of which is the 1995 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan and the 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP), agreed to by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The United Nations supports this process in the General Assembly through assistance on the ground and through its participation in the multilateral track of the peace process.

As secretary-general of the United Nations, and as a diplomat from the Middle East, I wholeheartedly welcome the efforts of the countries in the region to resolve their remaining differences peacefully. I can only encourage them to continue to do so, and not to become distracted by narrow parochial considerations. Negotiations will come to a successful conclusion when they are based upon respect for the needs and rights of all parties involved, and when they achieve economic development and improve the daily lives of the people in the region.

I also hope that the countries of the region will continue to contribute to the UN's efforts in the various fields of multilateral aid and diplomacy. After all, there are right now Egyptian and Jordanian peace-keepers serving under the UN flag, and Israel is providing economic and technical assistance to developing countries. The United Nations is only as strong as the member states make it, and as successful as they allow it to be.



THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A 50-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE

Brian Urquhart

The United Nations' actual role in critical situations was, to a considerable extent, pioneered in Palestine, where the organization has, for nearly 50 years, been involved in an effort to contain and limit conflict, to help the victims of conflict, and to create conditions for a settlement. Although the organization's place in the present affairs of the Middle East appears to be peripheral, the vital work of many of its agencies continues unabated.

THE founding philosophy of the United Nations (UN) was based on the experience of the 1930s and the failure to organize collective resistance against the aggression of Mussolini, Hitler, and militarist Japan. At its founding, the primary function of the United Nations was to be the peaceful settlement of disputes, and, failing that, collective action to deal with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression. The first of these functions assumed that the parties to a dispute would be willing to make compromises and concessions and would value peace more highly than gaining the whole of their claims by force. The second function, collective action against aggression, assumed that the Security Council would be able to identify the aggressor and agree on the action to be taken, and that the members of the United Nations would be willing to provide the necessary forces to take effective action.

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From 1946 until the present time these assumptions have proved to be irrelevant in a wide range of situations—from Kashmir to Sarajevo, from Cyprus to Somalia. Because no really effective substitute has been found for these basic tenets, there has been a steady erosion of public confidence in the United Nations. The UN's presence, both for peace-keeping and humanitarian relief, as now in ex-Yugoslavia, provides a show of international concern that allows governments to avoid risky and expensive unilateral interventions, but it does not necessarily address the real problem. Rather, the United Nations provides a screen, a safety net, a figleaf even, as well as the scapegoat that both the media and governments find so useful in critical situations. The UN's actual role in critical situations was, to a considerable extent, pioneered in Palestine, where the organization has, for nearly 50 years, been involved in an effort to contain and limit conflict, to help the victims of conflict, and to create conditions for a settlement.

In 1945 Palestine was ostensibly a League of Nations mandate which, like other League mandates, would become part of the UN Trusteeship system as a transitional step toward an ultimate settlement. It was clear from the outset, however, that Palestine was no ordinary mandate.

In 1947 the mandatory power in Palestine, Britain, drained by World War II, racked by the strains of a dissolving empire, and assailed from all sides for its policies in Palestine, brought the Palestine problem to the General Assembly. In those pre-Cold War days it was still considered desirable to put together an intergovernmental group to tackle a difficult problem. The UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), appointed by the General Assembly, was extraordinarily uneven in quality and expertise (Ralph Bunche called it “just about the worst group I have ever had to work with. If they do a good job it will be a real miracle.”)¹ In retrospect it is astonishing that such a mediocre body should have been entrusted with a problem of such importance. Its majority report (for partition) and its minority report (for federation) were both written by Bunche. The majority report—the partition plan—just achieved the requisite majority in the General Assembly in November 1947. This was the beginning of a grueling and profoundly frustrating involvement for the United Nations.

Ralph Bunche aptly described the basic problem when he was writing the Special Committee's report in July 1947. “One thing seems sure,” he wrote, “this problem can't be solved on the basis of abstract justice, historical or otherwise. Reality is that both Arabs and Jews are here and intend to stay. Therefore in any ‘solution’ some group, or at least its claim, is bound to get hurt.”² “No really satisfactory solution is possible—the best that can be done is a reasonable and workable compromise.”³

Two years later, when he had negotiated the armistice agreements that gave Israel and her Arab neighbors a seven-year respite from war, Bunche commented, “We had to make the best out of a bad situation. That sort of approach rarely leads to a *good* result, but only something *less bad*. But the hapless refugees are still on the hook. They are

1 Brian Urquhart, *Ralph Bunche: An American Life* (New York: Norton, 1993), p. 140.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 146.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 150.

the *real* victims of the affair”⁴ Forty-six years later these comments are still remarkably apposite

In the late 1940s none of the permanent members of the Security Council—nor any other government for that matter—wanted to be directly involved in the solution of the Palestine problem—a situation which did not fall easily into the scheme for peace and security outlined in the UN Charter. The United States suffered from considerable internal dissension on the Palestine question, especially with regard to the statehood of Israel. The Soviet Union, as part of its anti-colonialist stance, was strongly pro-Israel. France, with its own special interests in the Middle East, did not wish to be actively involved. Britain, the subject of almost universal condemnation as mandatory power, only wished to wash its hands of the problem, which it finally did by withdrawing the British mandatory authority in Palestine on 14 May 1948. The State of Israel was immediately proclaimed, and five Arab states invaded the new state on the following day. Thus, in 24 hours, the carefully planned progress to partition—a UN commission supervising the two-year transition to an Arab and a Jewish state within an economic union—was rendered null and void.

The effort to secure both a truce and a peaceful settlement fell squarely on the fledgling United Nations. The mediator appointed by the Security Council, Count Folke Bernadotte, assumed both tasks. Later, when Bernadotte had been assassinated in Jerusalem by the Stern Gang and his efforts to achieve a permanent settlement had failed, Bernadotte’s successor, Ralph Bunche, negotiated the armistice regime, which contained the situation until the Suez crisis of 1956.

From the very outset, both sides, in Palestine felt let down by, and vociferously complained about, successive UN efforts. The majority report of UNSCOP, on the whole, pleased the Jewish side (except for the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* and the Stern Gang), but it was totally rejected by the Arabs. The efforts of the first mediator, Count Bernadotte, were resented by both sides, and Jewish resentment led to Bernadotte’s assassination. In the aftermath of his assassination in September 1948, the Bernadotte plan for a settlement of the Palestine problem had, for a short time at least, the support of the United States and Britain. Any chance of its acceptance by the General Assembly, however, was blocked by Arab insistence that its consideration be deferred. Not for the first or last time, Israel was thus saved the trouble of actively opposing an unwelcome move, which, among other things, would have given the Negev to the Arabs.

* * *

What would have happened if the Arabs *had* accepted the partition plan and the Bernadotte plan? Would partition, with economic union, have taken root and become the cooperative arrangement which is still desperately being sought forty-seven years later? Could the subsequent wars and frictions have been avoided? Could the Palestine refugee question have been resolved before it became the vast and intractable human tragedy it is today?

4 Ibid., p. 230

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In any case, after 1948 the search for a permanent settlement in Palestine gave way to a series of supposedly temporary expedients to avoid or contain actual conflict and violence. Of these, the armistice agreements were the most effective and had the most solid legal basis, but they soon became eroded by Israeli differences with Syria and Egypt. A major strain on the armistice agreements arose from the incursions into Israel of the so-called *fida'iyin* (guerrillas) across the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) in Gaza and in Sinai. The *fida'iyin* theoretically had no governmental support, and no Arab government would take public responsibility for their actions. It was, therefore, impossible for the Security Council to take formal action against them. Israeli reprisals, on the other hand, were very much governmental actions and were condemned strongly by the Security Council. This created strong resentment in Israel—a resentment which grew in succeeding years into a conviction of partisanship by the United Nations, as decolonization provided a Third-World majority in the General Assembly that became increasingly critical of Israel and increasingly supportive of Palestinian claims.

The armistice agreements suffered major damage in the 1956 Suez Crisis and ceased to operate at all on the Egypt-Israel front. This unique crisis, involving not only Israel and her Arab neighbors, but also two permanent members of the Security Council, Britain and France, called for exceptional measures. The creation of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was a milestone in the development of the United Nations and signaled the birth of UN peace-keeping, a technique which has been widely used—and sometimes misused—ever since. One of the main motivations for this, and subsequent, UN actions in the Middle East (and elsewhere) was the urgent need to head off Soviet intervention and to prevent a regional conflict from triggering a confrontation between East and West. Thus, UN peace-keeping operations during the Cold-War period had an imperative motivation that has been lacking in recent years.

The UNEF provided not only a buffer between the British and French invading forces and the Egyptian army, but also the pretext for the British and French withdrawal. Later, and after complex negotiations, the UNEF was the catalyst for the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, and provided the buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces on the Gaza ADL and in Sinai, as well as the presence at Sharm al-Shaykh which allowed Egypt's President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir not to reoccupy the gun positions dominating the Strait of Tiran and the access to the Israeli port of Eilat. This regime lasted until 1967.

The ultimately successful handling of the Suez Crisis was due not only to the ideas of Lester Pearson,⁵ who first proposed to the General Assembly a peace-keeping *force*, but also to three people without whom the UNEF could not have succeeded. Both Egypt and Israel were initially intensely suspicious of this novel international arrangement. Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN secretary-general, had come to know Israel's Prime Minister

5 Lester Pearson, who was foreign minister of Canada at the time, was one of the senior advisors on the UN Charter at the San Francisco conference in April-June 1945. He was president of the UN General Assembly in 1952-53, and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957.

David Ben-Gurion in early 1956 when Hammarskjöld had made a prolonged effort to reinforce the armistice agreements. In spite of many pungently expressed differences on the events of the day, Ben-Gurion and Hammarskjöld became friends who shared a passionate interest in history and philosophy. Years after Hammarskjöld died, Ben-Gurion told me that Hammarskjöld was one of the best friends he had ever had. This personal bond allowed the UNEF arrangement to mature and become a reality, in spite of Israel's publicly stated belief that it was a Trojan horse for Nasir. The other personal relationship that facilitated this very difficult process was Hammarskjöld's friendship with Mahmud Fawzi, the foreign minister of Egypt, which gained Egypt's full acceptance of the UNEF by overcoming Egypt's conviction that the UNEF was a neo-colonial conspiracy to keep Egypt out of Sinai and Gaza.

Hammarskjöld was fascinated by the Middle East, and his personal diplomacy and relationships with its leaders made him an invaluable intermediary in its problems. The crisis in Lebanon in 1958, precipitated by President Camille Sham'un's determination to run for an unconstitutional second term, could well have brought to the Middle East the US-Soviet confrontation that was so widely dreaded, not to mention the horrors of a protracted Lebanese civil war. When, in a misapprehension of the nature of General 'Abd al-Karim al-Qasim's coup in Iraq in July 1958, the United States actually landed the marines on the beaches south of Beirut, the situation looked exceedingly ominous. As he had done for the British and French with the UNEF at Suez two years earlier, Hammarskjöld, who had worked very hard to keep Nasir from intervening in Lebanon, provided an honorable pretext for US withdrawal by greatly increasing the numbers of the UN Observer Group in Lebanon. The marines departed, a new Lebanese president was installed, and the crisis evaporated.

By 1965 the external context of the Arab-Israeli confrontation was radically changing. The Cold War had become an obsessive condition of international life. The security of Israel and the preservation of the Middle East from further Soviet penetration had become complementary priorities of US policy. In the United Nations, decolonization had done away with the original automatic Western majority in the General Assembly, while in the Security Council the Soviet Union had become the main supporter of radical Arab policies. Palestinians were beginning to challenge the apparent permanence of their refugee status by the organization of activist liberation groups, of which the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) became the central body. These trends began the process through which, during the next ten years, the United Nations became sidelined as a player in Middle East affairs, except when its peace-keeping capacity was required to terminate or contain a particular conflict situation.

The event which brought all these trends to a head was the June 1967 "Six-Day" War, to which the overture was the demand by Nasir for the withdrawal of the UNEF from Sinai. Because Israel, on the grounds of sovereignty, had refused to permit the UNEF to deploy on the Israeli side, the UNEF was stationed only on one side of the line, a fatal weakness for any peace-keeping force. Nasir was as well within his *legal* rights in demanding the UNEF's withdrawal from Egyptian territory as Israel had been ten years earlier in refusing to allow the UNEF to be stationed on Israeli territory. Nasir ignored all

efforts, especially those by UN secretary-general U Thant, to persuade him that his demand would inevitably have disastrous consequences and that he should withdraw it. Thus, in six days in June, the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian forces were routed, and Israel took possession of Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. A great new wave of Palestinian refugees came under the care of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which has played, and still plays, a vital, if largely unrecognized, role in the Middle East.

The Security Council, hopelessly divided on East-West lines, was on the sidelines during this radical and violent change in the Middle East situation, and neither Washington nor Moscow played any useful role in restraining either side from precipitate action. Only U Thant went to Cairo to try to dissuade Nasir, and only he made a series of suggestions for de-escalating the situation. Ironically, U Thant became, in the West at least, the main scapegoat for the catastrophe. The 1967 war made two things about the United Nations clear. The first was that the presence of a small, lightly armed peace-keeping force of some 1,200 effectives on a 300-mile front was far more important to peace in the Middle East than anyone had realized. The second was that a peace-keeping force, based on the consent of the host countries and with no military mandate or capacity, can easily be brushed aside by a determined government.

In the aftermath of the 1967 war, the Arabs seemed more intransigent about a settlement than ever. The Security Council, having done nothing to stop the 1967 disaster, managed, late in 1967, to adopt UN Resolution 242 as a basis for the pursuit of the settlement that had so far proved elusive. Like most Security Council resolutions, 242 was ambiguous on important points and vague enough to command general approval. Based on it, the pursuit of a settlement was resumed, first by US secretary of state William Rogers and then by the UN emissary, Gunnar Jarring. Although their efforts served as a sort of reconnaissance for later negotiations, nothing came of them.

Strangely enough, almost no one foresaw that the frustration of the search for a peaceful settlement based on Resolution 242 might lead Egypt to take forceful action to regain the territory lost in 1967. In spite of ominous remarks by various Egyptian representatives and an enormous military build-up in the open desert on the western side of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian crossing of the canal in October 1973 came as a surprise to almost everyone. Frantic resupply from the United States allowed the Israeli forces to recover, and a UN peace-keeping force, UNEF II, eventually stabilized the cease-fire in a critical period marked by Soviet threats and US counter-threats.

Paradoxically, the resulting shock, combined with the negotiating skill of US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, resulted in the first steps toward a peace settlement. In December 1973, in the Geneva peace conference under UN auspices, the parties, except for Syria, met face-to-face publicly for the first time since the Rhodes armistice negotiations in 1949. The conference provided the basis for Kissinger's negotiation of the disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt, and, later on, between Israel and Syria, but lack of agreement on the representation of the Palestinians made the resumption of the peace conference on broader issues impossible.

Kissinger, in negotiating the disengagement agreements, skillfully used the UN's peace-keeping capacity to implement them. The rapid establishment of UNEF II on the Suez Canal in October 1973 was a vital step in pinning down the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel at a point when there seemed to be a serious possibility of some sort of Soviet intervention. UNEF II then became the instrument for the implementation of the subsequent phases of the disengagement process in Sinai which led, five years later, to the Camp David agreements. In April 1974, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was set up to implement the Israeli disengagement with Syria on the Golan Heights, an arrangement which still exists today.

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What would have happened if, as some of us argued at the time, the United States and Israel had been prepared, in 1974, to sit at the table with the PLO and continue the peace process which had started in December 1973 in Geneva? In 1973 there were relatively few Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) did not exist. PLO chairman Yasir Arafat was at the height of his influence. Could there have been a breakthrough in the peace process 20 years earlier under far more favorable conditions? Or were the parties simply not psychologically prepared, in the context of the Cold War, to pursue a genuine peace process at that time?

In any case, years of frustration followed, until Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat flew to Jerusalem and US president Jimmy Carter put his presidential reputation on the line to secure an agreement—the Camp David Accords—between Egypt and Israel.

* * *

By the mid-1970s the United Nations had become a secondary player in Middle East affairs. Its peace-keeping capacity was still valuable, but its intergovernmental organs, the Security Council and, especially, the General Assembly, were no longer regarded as impartial forums by Israel, or even by the United States. In the Assembly a series of Third-World, Soviet-manipulated resolutions, especially the Zionism-Racism resolution of 1975, virtually dealt the UN's intergovernmental organs out of any serious role in the Middle East. They also destroyed the bipartisan support in Washington which had been a major pillar of the United Nations since its earliest years.

That is not to say that the UN's role of last resort and safety net had ceased to be of value. In 1978 a Palestinian raid north of Tel Aviv, in which 37 Israelis in a hijacked bus died during a shoot-out with Israeli forces, provided the gruesome pretext for a massive Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon. This action coincided with a critical phase of the Israeli-Egyptian talks, and the United States, which was sponsoring the talks, needed to show action against the Israeli invasion of another Arab state if Sadat was to be able to continue the talks. The only place where such an action could be taken was in, and through, the United Nations.

As the person in charge of UN peace-keeping operations at that time, I was strongly opposed to putting a peace-keeping force into the anarchic conditions of southern Lebanon, an area where we had military observers and which we had studied for many years. None of the conditions for a successful peace-keeping operation existed in southern Lebanon, and the Security Council would certainly be unable to agree on a force of a size, and with the mandate, to do the job. Southern Lebanon would be a peacekeeper's nightmare. I believed, rightly as it turned out, that once the Security Council had agreed, under US pressure, to send an inadequate force to south Lebanon, the United States and others would rapidly lose interest. The problems that our soldiers would inevitably face would be ignored, leaving the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries at loggerheads with all the various factions in southern Lebanon, and without the necessary political support or resources to do the job.

None of these arguments made any impression on the United States or its allies in the Security Council, and the approval of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was rushed through. UNIFIL has, quite predictably, had a troubled history, but it is still in southern Lebanon and, in now very different circumstances, remains as a buffer and shock absorber on what is currently the most disturbed frontier in the Middle East. I wonder if it will ever be withdrawn. I mention the UNIFIL episode at some length as typical of the temptation to use UN peace-keeping forces in inappropriate conditions as short-term, face-saving expedients—a problem the United Nations faces today in acute form in Bosnia.

The Camp David accords of 1978–1979, with which the United Nations was totally unassociated, provided for an international force and observers in Sinai and stated a preference that the United Nations should provide them. Since both the Soviet Union and the Arab states were totally opposed to the accords, there was no chance of the Security Council agreeing to this provision, and the United States ended up organizing the force UNEF II, which had played such an important role in 1973, was disbanded.

During the 1980s, although the General Assembly continued to adopt many resolutions and the Security Council held many meetings, the United Nations was sidelined in the Middle East, although its various practical commitments—UNRWA, UNDOF, UNIFIL, and UNTSO (UN Truce Supervisory Organization)—continued to function usefully on the ground, in spite of much carping criticism. The criticism, however, stopped well short of urging their withdrawal.

The end of the Cold War had radical consequences for the Middle East, as for other regions. The disappearance of the Soviet Union weakened both Syria and the PLO, a process speeded up in the PLO's case by Arafat's embrace of President Saddam Husayn after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. After months of secret contacts, in September 1993, Arafat suddenly appeared on the White House lawn with Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and US president Bill Clinton to sign the Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP), signifying the beginning, at last, of a peace process conducted largely by the main parties themselves—a process that might have started more effectively 20 years earlier. The question remains, especially for the Palestinians, whether the present process is too little and too late.

The United Nations, in its first half century, has had a mixed record in the Middle East. Its early efforts at objective mediation (Bernadotte, Bunche, and Jarring) pleased virtually no one. Its exercises in peace-keeping, however, have been a key element in whatever peace the people of the region have enjoyed. When the UN's intergovernmental debates became vociferously partisan, the organization lost much of its credibility, although it unquestionably provided a useful safety valve for dangerous passions and resentments, and kept vital issues—Palestinian rights, the status of Jerusalem—alive.

In the larger picture of international relations, the United Nations played an important role as last resort and safety net when the Arab-Israeli conflict threatened to spark wider confrontations. In 1956, 1958, 1973, and 1978, the work of the secretary-general, the Security Council, and peace-keeping operations on the ground contained the conflict and provided at least some degree of calm in which negotiators could pursue the beginnings of the peace process.

At a time when the credibility and performance of the United Nations is being questioned in many other places, the organization's place in the present affairs of the Middle East appears to be a peripheral one. The vital work of UNRWA is taken for granted, as are the peace-keeping operations on the Golan Heights (UNDOF) and in southern Lebanon (UNIFIL). It is instructive to speculate on what would happen if any of these three operations were withdrawn.

* * *

What would have happened if there had been no United Nations, no General Assembly to lay down guidelines or to blow off steam in, no Security Council to complain to, no secretary-general, no peace-keeping forces, no truce observers, or massive relief operations? Would Israel and her neighbors have come to a settlement sooner? Would the victims of the conflict have suffered more or the dead been more numerous? Would the battles have been more extensive and more devastating? Would a more just compromise have been easier to achieve?

* * *

The United Nations, as Dag Hammarskjöld once remarked, was not invented to bring the human race to heaven, but to save it from hell. In that perspective, the UN's performance over 50 years in the Middle East, mixed though it has been, has not been insignificant. Starting, in 1947, with the misplaced conviction that it could bring about a settlement that neither side was ready for, the United Nations shifted its attention to containing the conflict, mainly through the secretary-general and the organizations in the field, by helping the victims and trying to create a situation in which the parties themselves could finally begin to come to terms with their common future. That now appears to be happening at last. It has been an agonizing, slow, and sometimes bloody, process, and a satisfactory ending is still very far off.

In the Middle East, the United Nations had to face many of the basic dilemmas it is now facing elsewhere. Failing a peaceful settlement, an impartial stance is often regarded as partial by *both* sides. When violence erupts and the Security Council does not declare one side or the other the aggressor, the United Nations has to resort to non-forceful peace-keeping, which cannot deal with military force or armed conflict, or even low-level violence. When a large majority of its membership becomes partisan of one side in a conflict, the United Nations loses much of its credibility as mediator with the other side. Governments, not wishing to involve their own armed forces in a conflict, can safely pass the blame to a UN peace-keeping force, which cannot function in a situation where there is no peace to keep.

On the other hand, the basic decisions of the United Nations on the Palestine question, including Resolution 242, still stand as the main accepted guidelines to the solution of an incredibly difficult problem. UNRWA still works with nearly three million Palestinian refugees and has given Palestinians the possibility to develop their personal skills in the time of their diaspora and greatest tragedy. Truces, armistice arrangements, and peace-keeping forces have provided long periods of quiet on hostile frontiers at a time when the parties either could not, or would not, talk to each other.

Now, at last, the different parties in the Middle East seem to be prepared to discuss peace directly and to take responsibility themselves for working out a reasonable and workable compromise over what Ralph Bunche rightly called "the sort of problem for which no really satisfactory solution is possible."⁶ It remains to be seen how much help from outside, from the United Nations or elsewhere, they will be needing.



⁶ Urquhart, *Ralph Bunche*, p. 150

DIMINISHED SOVEREIGNTY, ENHANCED SOVEREIGNTY: UNITED NATIONS-ARAB LEAGUE RELATIONS AT 50

Clovis Maksoud

The United Nations and the League of Arab States have had a parallel evolution over the past 50 years dealing with similar issues and facing many of the same problems. Both have had to grapple with the concept of sovereignty of their member states, mechanisms for the implementation of their resolutions, the proliferation of intrastate disputes and conflicts, and criticisms that have undermined their effectiveness and their relevance on political and regional security matters.

THE United Nations (UN) and the League of Arab States celebrate this year their 50th anniversaries. While the term “celebrate” seems inappropriate, given that recently their specialized agencies’ relative achievements have been overshadowed by political failures and managerial flaws, the anniversaries have generated an impressive body of literature, including evaluations, criticisms, and reformist recommendations. In short, after 50 years, performance levels have fallen well below original expectations. The criticism, and even condemnation, of the global as well as the regional organization has been, in most instances, unfair and unjustified. This scrutiny, however, has brought to the surface some of the fundamental shortcomings of both organizations. It is appropriate, this year, to focus on the shared experiences of the United Nations and the Arab League, on their problems,

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on their potential for reassessing their respective visions, and on the prospects for enhanced cooperation in achieving the goals of their charters

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The relationship between the Arab League and the United Nations began as skeptical and distrusting. With the UN General Assembly resolution partitioning Palestine on 29 November 1947, and the success of behind-the-scenes US pressure, a wave of antagonism toward the United Nations swept the Arab world, the United Nations was considered an adversary. No sooner was Israel established and declared a state, on 14 May 1948—bringing about war and the concomitant massive exodus of Palestinian refugees—than the Arab League became heavily involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and its overwhelming consequences. The armistice agreements between Arab states and Israel, UN involvement through the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and the continued state of belligerency between member states and Israel (with its political, legal, and economic consequences) forced the Arab League gradually to abandon its complaints against the “political” United Nations and deal with it institutionally (as well as politically). So, on 1 November 1950, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 477(V) by a vote of 49 to 1, with a number of abstentions, in which the UN secretary-general invited the secretary-general of the Arab League to attend sessions of the General Assembly as an observer.¹

The Arab League’s presence at the United Nations focused initially on mobilizing support for the Arab liberation struggles and ensuring that newly-independent Arab states were immediately incorporated into the growing activities of the League. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine question remained constant items on the General Assembly’s agenda. Recurring crises in the League’s region were referred to the United Nations, and the League’s resort to and respect for the United Nations grew and matured. With the Arab military defeat of June 1967 and the adoption of Security Council Resolution 242 in November 1967, Arab League efforts and responsibilities increased within the United Nations. In October 1973, the stalemate in the search for Middle East peace was jolted when Syria and Egypt exercised the military option.

The fact that Arab armies resurrected their credibility in 1973 led to the paramountcy of the Arab state in managing the strategic confrontation with Israel, after having ceded the agenda to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) after the June 1967 War. The Rabat summit in 1974 recognized unequivocally the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. This same year, the PLO obtained observer status at the United Nations, and Yasir Arafat, the PLO chairman, addressed the General Assembly. It was the Arab League that sponsored the move to enhance the institutional and political status of the PLO in the United Nations. Ironically, the 1973 limited war with Israel

1 “United Nations General Assembly Resolution Inviting Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to Attend Session of the General Assembly,” in Mohammed Khalil, *The Arab State and the Arab League Documentary Record*, vol. 1 (Beirut: Khayyat, 1962), p. 80.

curtailed the PLO's revolutionary mobility in the Arab world, while enhancing its political and diplomatic mobility on the international scene. The Arab League was entrusted with the management of this new equation, it dealt with the PLO as a full-member state, while at the same time campaigning internationally for its rights and aspirations as a national liberation movement. This duality was reflected in UN-Arab League dealings, the League's principal involvement at the United Nations was geared toward securing the treatment of the PLO as a state and mobilizing the international community to achieve for the Palestinians their inalienable right to self-determination, including their right to an independent state.

The Arab League, while conditioned to consider the Palestine question as its political priority, also saw this issue bring about major challenges to the League, the most critical being Egypt's suspension from the League in 1979, following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. This led, among other things, to the transfer of the League's headquarters from Cairo to Tunis, which, along with the transfer of PLO headquarters to Tunis, resulted in an inevitable closeness that, at times, meant the League gave priority to the Palestine question above all other considerations.

In the meantime, the decade of the 1980s witnessed increased League dealings with the United Nations in various political and diplomatic endeavors. The fact that the League interpreted Egypt's suspension as limited to its government enabled it to consult with Egypt informally. Several regional crises, such as the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War, intensified Arab League-UN involvement and coordination. Resolutions passed in the General Assembly conferred UN legitimacy on Arab demands. While UN support was ensured on issues concerning Palestinian and Arab rights in the General Assembly, and in several agencies and units of the UN Secretariat, this was not the case when the League had to confront the United States in the UN Security Council on issues relating to regional conflicts. While during the Iran-Iraq War a degree of cooperation had existed between the United States and the Arab League, on other matters at the United Nations there were varied degrees of confrontation, most notably in 1986 regarding the bombing of Libya, and in 1988 on the issue of granting a visa to Yasir Arafat to attend the General Assembly session.

THE UNITED NATIONS, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, AND THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY

Both the United Nations and the Arab League must grapple with the new challenges that the end of the Cold War and the bi-polar system introduced at the end of the last decade. The primary issue is how to reconcile member states' sovereignty with the rapid globalization of issues, such as the environment, human rights, migration, AIDS, the rights of women, terrorism, and so on.

Sovereignty is the predicate of membership in both the United Nations and the Arab League. For numerous countries of the developing world, sovereignty is the cherished achievement of national liberation struggles. It is the culmination, at times, of long periods of suffering, sacrifice, and outside domination. Sovereignty is not only the expression of

independence, but also the recognition of legal equality among states and the manifestation of a nation's dignity. On the other hand, sovereignty can be used as a pretext to shield violations of human rights, to restrict and thwart humanitarian intervention, and to avoid accountability. State membership in such organizations as the United Nations and the Arab League presumes limitations on some sovereign prerogatives, and the UN Charter provides the Security Council with the authority to enforce its resolutions under Chapter 7.² With the absence of an equivalent mechanism in the Arab League, many of its resolutions remain, as the Arab saying goes, "ink on paper." Frequent use of the veto by the five permanent members of the Security Council led to a paralysis of the UN's will that was overcome and reversed only in the aftermath of the Cold War. As for the Arab League, the absence of an enforcement mechanism marginalized that organization on frequent occasions and, when most needed, led to its irrelevance.

Besides being an intergovernmental regional organization, the Arab League was also envisaged as a *national* institution.³ To the Arab nationalists of the 1950s and early 1960s, the Arab League was a necessary prelude to Arab unity after liberation from foreign domination. The existence of sovereign Arab states was considered merely a *transitional* stage, for the nationalists, sovereignty was grudgingly accepted as legal, but not politically legitimate. The union of Egypt and Syria in 1958 was a validation of their perception of Arab unity and the beginning of the realization of a long-standing and pervasive dream. The short life of the United Arab Republic, however, restored the primacy of the Arab state system and reintroduced the Arab League into a new nationalist discourse. After September 1961, when Syria reclaimed its sovereignty and separate identity, all other attempts at formal Arab unity were divested of any credibility and consequence. Subsequently, the fervor of nationalism was harnessed into strengthening the coordinating functions of the Arab League. When the Arabs were defeated in the June 1967 War, any lingering aspirations for unity were abandoned, and both the legal and legitimate features of sovereignty were restored. After the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi regime on 2 August 1990 and the ensuing war, the reinforced attributes of state sovereignty weakened unmistakably even the coordinating functions of the Arab League.

The proliferation of intrastate disputes and conflicts rendered UN intervention inevitable. Peace-making and peace-keeping activities proliferated, and, while some UN interventions failed, such as those in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, impressive successes were achieved in Kampuchea, Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique. Despite this checkered record, the UN's *right* to intervene, always acknowledged, is now increasingly being exercised. Furthermore, the UN's growing humanitarian and developmental functions—especially in the case of refugees and in the area of human rights—render the United Nations a repository of emerging elements of global governance. Hence, while state sovereignty is being strengthened within the Arab League, within the UN system it is becoming more vulnerable.

2 United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice* (New York: United Nations, 1945), p. 22.

3 Ali Salafy, *The League of Arab States: Role and Objective* (Washington, DC: Arab Information Center, 1989), p. 1.

This situation poses a potential dilemma for the two organizations insofar as their respective concepts and attitudes toward state sovereignty are concerned. Both secretary-generals, Boutros Boutros-Ghali of the United Nations and 'Isma' al-Majid of the Arab League, reiterate, as their predecessors did, that their respect for sovereignty remains unshaken and that both secretariats consider "the member states" their masters. But since the 1991 Gulf War, the Arab League secretary-general, in the context of a still-acute division among the Arab states, has been reticent to comment on the subject of sovereignty, while the UN secretary-general is increasingly eager to articulate his views on what constitutes a consensus among members, and to spell out what ought to be done by the states about collective international security and peace.

Encouraged by the mandate from the first summit meeting of the UN Security Council on 30 January 1992, Boutros-Ghali submitted to the General Assembly in 1994 an *Agenda for Peace*⁴ that was considered a landmark in terms of its presentation of guidelines for the future role of the United Nations in securing international peace and security. Further elaboration on the *Agenda for Peace* was submitted on 12 October 1994, when Boutros-Ghali drew attention to the discrepancies and difficulties confronting the United Nations in its endeavors to pursue the agenda's direction, despite earlier approval and declarations of support. He was particularly eager to clarify the role of sanctions, which are authorized under Article 41 of the UN Charter. Boutros-Ghali considers sanctions "as a blunt instrument. They raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behavior is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects."⁵ At the time of his statement, it was obvious that the secretary-general had in mind the consequences of sanctions on the peoples of Iraq and Libya, among others. It is interesting that while affirming the validity of sanctions as a necessary penalty for government violations, the secretary-general was also defining the UN's moral power and his role as the spokesperson of human conscience. Whether this role can be achieved successfully remains to be seen, but that it is being attempted and spelled out underlines a deliberate plan for an activist role by the UN Secretariat.

The same, unfortunately, cannot be said of the Arab League. In the past two years, efforts by Secretary-General 'Abd al-Majid to bring about a modicum of agreement, let alone reconciliation, among Arab states were deemed "untimely" and were dismissed by the states.⁶ When Egyptian president Husni Mubarak, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria met in Alexandria on 28 December 1994, at the request of the Egyptian president, the three heads-of-state decided to reaffirm their support for the Arab League. To that end, they requested that the secretary-general undertake measures that would lead to "activating" or "energizing" the League and its specialized agencies. This "mini-summit" generated a favorable response throughout the Arab world, especially

4 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 1992).

5 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, January 1995).

6 *Al-Hayat*, 2 October 1995.

since the three participants were considered to be among the pivotal—some would say *are* the pivotal—states in the Arab League. Immediately after the Alexandria summit, ‘Abd al-Majid visited the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Three weeks later, in January 1995, another summit took place in Cairo, attended this time by the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO, and by Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin; this was the first Arab summit also attended by an Israeli leader. Unfortunately, the Arab public and official reactions to Rabin’s presence negated the positive unifying effects that had resulted from the Alexandria meeting.⁷ Clearly, the equivocal role of President Mubarak—caught between a desire to play a leading Arab role and to remain credible to the other partners of the 1978 Camp David agreements—slowed, and ultimately reversed, the momentum started in Alexandria. The Cairo summit only deepened the division within the Arab League between those Arab states that have relations with Israel and those that do not.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

In Alexandria, in December 1994, there had been a confirmation of the primacy of UN resolutions as the basis for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the Cairo summit, a month later, Arab states decided that the UN resolutions were to be superseded by the Camp David accords and their offspring, the Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israel and the PLO (signed in September 1993) and the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty (signed in October 1994). This, in turn, led to the removal of the Palestine question and the Middle East conflict, for all practical purposes, from UN jurisdiction, and became the prelude to attempts to replace the Arab state system with a Middle East regional construct. This development seemed to further weaken the political clout of the Arab League within its own constituency and within the United Nations itself. The long-term outcome of such a development would be that the Arab League would become a mere regional organization at the United Nations, treated institutionally in the same way as all other intergovernmental organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the European Union (EU). This is a far cry from the political status and accompanying clout the League had held within the United Nations during the 1970s and 1980s as the result of having been an Arab national organization in addition to a regional one.

The issues that the Palestinians considered to be Israeli transgressions, and which had usually been referred to the United Nations, are now being dealt with by the Camp David partners. Recently, each time the PLO has felt that Israel was renegeing on the DOP agreement, it has complained, in most instances, to Egypt, in order to have it arbitrate and press Israel for more flexibility. At the United Nations, in March-April 1995, when Egypt felt that the regional balance in the Middle East was, as a result of Arab division, being

7 Clovis Maksoud, “Madha Hadath bayn Qummatay al-Iskandriyya wa al-Qahira” (What happened between the Alexandria and Cairo summits), *Al-Quds al-Arabi*, 2 July 1995.

tipped in Israel's favor, it raised the issue of Israel's non-compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). What followed revealed the limitations of Egypt's ability to resume its pivotal Arab role. No sooner had Egypt made Israel's compliance with the NPT a condition for its own support of the treaty, than the United States threw its weight to derail Egypt's effort to mobilize the Arab and the Non-Aligned group of states. The League went through the motions of supporting Egypt's position on the NPT.⁸ For a moment it appeared that Arab solidarity on this issue would prevail, but in the UN General Assembly, Arab member-states were released from their commitment, for all intents and purposes, when a consensus vote approved a US-supported resolution requiring permanent adherence by treaty signatories, which Israel was not. The Arab League resolution proved meaningless.

The League had another opportunity to assert the existence of an Arab collective will at the United Nations when, in May 1995, the Security Council convened, at the PLO's and Arab League's request, to take measures against Israel's intended confiscation of additional Palestinian lands in East Jerusalem. When the United States vetoed those measures dealing with a very sensitive issue to the Arab and Muslim worlds, it indicated clearly to the Arab states and the League that, although Washington sponsored the "peace process," it would not tolerate any Arab recourse to the United Nations against Israel, irrespective of the merits of the Arab or Palestinian positions. Thus, while Arab complaints against Israel are being sidestepped or ultimately thwarted in the United Nations today, the United States and the Western powers insist on securing absolute compliance by Iraq and Libya with every UN resolution, however justified. This has deepened a popular Arab conception of a US-dominated UN Security Council. Ironically, it mirrors the US complaint about the United Nations prior to the end of the Cold War—that it was dominated by an Arab-Soviet bloc.

Confrontational rhetoric notwithstanding, there is evidence to justify earlier US skepticism, especially during the 1980s, about the UN General Assembly resolutions concerning the Middle East. For many years, the United States, alone with Israel, voted against impressive majorities and significant abstentions on resolutions invariably sponsored or initiated by the Arab League and its member states. But, the General Assembly resolutions were (and are) recommendatory, while the Security Council's resolutions are mandatory. This distinction remains crucial, as it explains the depth of Arab frustration with a post-Cold War global equation that continues to marginalize the General Assembly while enhancing the role of the Security Council.

8 League of Arab States, "Tansiq al-Mawaqif al-'Arabiyya Iza' Mad Sarayan Mu'ahadat 'Adam Intishar al-Asliha al-Nawawiyya wa Kadhahika Iza' Mashru' Mu'ahadat Ja'l Mantaqat al-Sharq al-Awsat Khaliya min Kafat Aslihat al-Damar al-Shamil" (Arab cooperation facing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the treaty proposal for ridding the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction), Resolution no. 5455, 29 March 1995.

UNITED NATIONS-ARAB LEAGUE RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The Arab League, as a national organization, is no longer perceived or dealt with as such by its member states. This is reflected in the loss of its effectiveness and relevance on political and regional security issues. The end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War led to the rise of a strategic dependency on the United States by states in the Gulf region that, at least temporarily, takes precedence over traditional horizontal Arab relations. This dependency, in addition to the political culture of the peace agreements with Israel, has allowed persistent US pressure to weaken and remove remaining Arab League-administered boycott laws against Israel. The rapidly diminishing role of the Arab League, however, was most dramatically demonstrated when no Arab head-of-state deemed it necessary to participate in what the League hoped would be a golden anniversary commemoration. Only President Mubarak of Egypt attended, opening the League's council session as head of the host country. In contrast, a number of Arab heads-of-state attended the UN's 50th anniversary activities.

The history of the Arab League's presence in, and relationship with, the United Nations has not always been confined to the political realm. Nor have they been at the present ebb. Since the 1940s, cooperation among the various specialized agencies of both organizations steadily grew over the years. This was especially the case after multilateral proposals on interagency sectoral levels were adopted in Tunis in July 1983. Those related to the regular monitoring of cooperation between the two agencies on the administrative development of the Arab League Secretariat, the strengthening of the population research unit, the training of League staff, and the development of computer software and the provision of the necessary hardware and equipment for the League by the United Nations. In other sectors, cooperation and coordination were undertaken for joint projects on children, disaster preparedness and prevention, drugs, food programs, the environment, human settlements, nutrition, poverty-alleviation programs, and welfare. In the Middle East, these aspects of assistance, training, and interagency cooperation are responsibilities that have been assumed increasingly by the UN system, with some input from the Arab League. They have often enhanced relations with the United Nations despite the debilitating impact of political vagaries on these relations.

The training, assistance, and aid programs of the UN services are, however, limited in scope, and, while they bolster the recipient projects, they pale in the face of the overall needs and requirements of the region. Unless and until Arab League member states work within the Arab regional context, UN cooperation with the Arab League will continue to be restricted and peripheral. In view of the overall political conditions in the region, most Arab states prefer to sustain direct bilateral relations with the UN system rather than operate through arrangements with the League. While this is characteristic of member states in other regional organizations, those organizations have plans and projects to elicit UN assistance. Such regional projects include some that deal with human rights, the monitoring of elections, as well as others in the field of social development. The Arab League *could* broaden its scope of cooperation with the United Nations on a regional scale.

if its Arab members exhibited the necessary will to restore and restate their overall national purpose. On the Arab League's 50th anniversary, this has yet to come about.

The picture, although seemingly bleak for the Arab League, is definitely not hopeless. There are new opportunities for cooperation with the United Nations, a great deal of potential for creative interaction remains untapped. It is in this direction that plans for complementarity between the League and the United Nations hold some promise. These plans need to be spelled out after being thoroughly examined. While Chapter 8 of the UN Charter envisages an important role for regional organizations, Secretary-General Butrus-Ghali has elaborated in his *Agenda for Peace*, as well as in its supplement, the possible ways in which regional organizations could assist the UN's tasks of preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, and development. The General Assembly adopted his position on 20 September 1994.⁹ The secretary-general also noted that "under the Charter the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security but *regional* action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the United Nations could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs."¹⁰

Butrus-Ghali's offer to broaden and render more significant the nature of cooperation between the United Nations and various regional organizations and agencies undoubtedly provided an opening for the Arab League. On 29 March 1995, the Arab League's council adopted a proposed charter for Arab cooperation and security that includes an Arab court of justice to resolve inter-Arab disputes, and establishes instruments by means of which the League's secretary-general can address problems and find solutions in accordance with the mandates authorized by the League's council. Furthermore, the plan recommends that an "Arab Peace-keeping Force" be formed, to be used when necessary, in accordance with the Charter and the Joint Defense Treaty (ratified in 1945 but never seriously implemented).¹¹

This lukewarm Arab League response to the innovative challenge posed by the *Agenda for Peace*, while inadequate and flawed, could be a positive start toward increased cooperation between the two organizations. It would be necessary, however, for the League to actualize the potentially beneficial suggestions in the Agenda. Butrus-Ghali envisages that such cooperation "would encourage states outside [a] region to act supportively. And should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within the region, it could serve to lend the weight of the UN to the validity of the regional effort. Carried forward in the spirit of the Charter and as envisioned in Chapter Eight, this approach outlined here could strengthen a general sense that democratization is being encouraged."¹²

9 United Nations, "Agenda for Peace and Preventive Diplomacy and Related Matters," General Assembly Resolution, 47/120B (New York: United Nations, 18 December 1992).

10 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, 2d ed. (New York: United Nations, 1995), p. 64.

11 League of Arab States, "Mashru' Mithaq lil-Amn wal Ta'awun al-'Arabi" (Plan for pact on security and Arab cooperation) (Cairo, 29 March 1995).

12 Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, 2d ed.

The operative words in the area of regional cooperation with the United Nations are “complementarity” and “democratization.” In order to accomplish these objectives, parallel structures need to be established in the secretariats of both the United Nations and the Arab League. These units would gather, from member states and from their external offices, information that would be studied, examined, and analyzed, and would constitute the raw material for the discernment and detection of potential or emerging disputes. Such material for an early-warning system would enable the United Nations, as well as the regional secretariats (in this case the League’s), to set in motion preventive diplomatic initiatives that could, if necessary, diffuse or reduce tensions between states, stop a dispute from developing into a conflict, or contain a conflict in order to establish a propitious environment to prepare for its resolution. If, for instance, the dispute is among states within the Arab League and all diplomatic efforts have been exhausted, the United Nations would then be alerted, at which time it could take the necessary measures to negotiate a settlement of the issue and restore the security threatened by the dispute or conflict. This was not attempted when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The League had neither the necessary mechanisms suggested in Butrus-Ghali’s Agenda, nor did member states have the collective will to empower the League to deal with this unprecedented case of an invasion of one Arab state by another. Instead, the UN Security Council took charge of the crisis, while the League became totally dysfunctional.

In Somalia, a member state of the Arab League, the United Nations sought the cooperation of the League and the OAU. Again, the League made certain limited perfunctory gestures, but to no avail. When UN troops finally withdrew, neither the League nor the United Nations could provide, unilaterally or jointly, the necessary assistance in governance required to reconstitute a failed state. Even in Yemen, where civil war broke out on 2 May 1994, neither the Arab League nor the UN envoys could bring about a rapid settlement of the conflict. This has led some to suggest that, while preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution are the indispensable responsibilities of international and regional organizations, in the case of the Arab League, a rapid deployment force should also be available. This force could be abetted by a roster of League (or member-state) civil servants from which to draw, so that the structures of governance could be put into place pending the restoration of a legitimate government in a failed member state. This course of action should become required, in the Arab League and in other regional organizations, as the fragility of some states warrants such transitional functions. If the League can develop these instruments of governance and preventive diplomacy, then it can be entrusted by the United Nations, and by its member states, to shoulder operational responsibilities and satisfy the “complementarity” requirement of the UN secretary-general. The Arab League can then regain its central role in Arab affairs, redefine its national purpose, and position itself as an indispensable regional instrument for authentic peace-building and international security.

In Bosnia and the ex-Yugoslavia, the United Nations’ attempt to implement a policy of cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to carry out enforcement measures, however, has not resulted in fulfilling the expectations raised by the secretary-general. Part of the problem is that NATO is not a *regional* organization, as

envisioned in Chapter 8 of the UN Charter¹³ NATO was established as a multi-state defense organization, which is having its overall strategy revamped after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. It is now in the process of redefining its mission. Even if Butrus-Ghali considers “the provision by NATO of air power to support the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia”¹⁴ as the “most developed example” of a paradigm of operational support, this cannot be treated as the complementary relationship envisaged for future cooperation with regional organizations which are not, as is NATO, confined to military and geopolitical tasks.

It is important to explore new ways of institutionalizing regular UN-Arab League collaboration in the areas of preventive diplomacy and governance. If cooperation is truly the goal, it is somewhat disturbing that Butrus-Ghali has stated that “agreed mechanisms for consultation should be established but *need not be formal*”¹⁵ While his restraint in proposing a bold new organizational structure can be appreciated, it is at the same time crucial to prevent regional organizations from extricating themselves from their responsibilities. The innovative thinking that is taking place at the United Nations, generally, on these matters, should be an impetus for the Arab League to engage energetically in this new global discourse.

AGENDA FOR PEACE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

A complementary role for the Arab League, as spelled out in the UN *Agenda for Peace*, is an opportunity for the League to reassess its own institutions and revamp its organizational strategy. This would, among the Arab states, restore a modicum of national cohesion. Simultaneously, the Arab League secretary-general, like his counterpart at the United Nations, should assess the League’s experiences, achievements, and failures, seek frank advice, and emulate the United Nations by introducing a “Friends of the Secretary-General” group. The League must go beyond officialdom and widen its contacts with sectors that remain outside the framework of the ruling elites. This should be done in tandem with Arab governments, but, if resisted, the League must insist even more that this be done. It is only by promoting the institutions of civil society and a political culture of democratization that the Arab League will regain relevance and help provide Arabs with a sense of direction.

This recommendation seems, at first glance, far-fetched and unrealizable. The alternative, however, is that the Arab League remain an adjunct to existing governing elites. This circumscribed role, if permitted to continue, will preclude any significant advance in the democratization process in the region. It will undermine the League’s ability to assume complementary functions with the United Nations in the realms of preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, and governance. Advancing and vitalizing institutions of civil society is a risk worth taking inasmuch as the Arab League is the only

13 United Nations, *Charter*, p. 28

14 Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, p. 31

15 Ibid., p. 32 (emphasis added)

remaining all-Arab institution. This entails communicating an uplifting vision of the national purpose and rendering this vision as an essential component to salvaging the decaying Arab state system. While the League is the *servant* of the Arab states—working for their interests, their causes, their rights, and their common aspirations—it should be, in the present condition of Arab disarray, the catalyst of their common destiny, the institutional memory of their nation's heritage, and the vehicle through which to express and realize their presently-elusive common goals.

It can, of course, be argued that this is easier said than done. Perhaps, but there are always subtle means by which to achieve this sort of conceptual and behavioral breakthrough. It starts with the knowledge that the existing rupture between state and society is inimical to the vital interests of the Arab state system inasmuch as it is debilitating to the texture of Arab civil society. This knowledge becomes the tool of persuasion *vis-à-vis* both state and society. The Arab League can start by activating the charter proposed in March 1995, which advocates “organizing cooperation between the League and the Arab Non-Governmental Organizations” (NGOs), in addition to the provision that licenses “an Arab parliamentary body within the framework of the League.”¹⁶ There is, admittedly, a large degree of skepticism as to the actual representative character of most Arab parliaments, and even of the degree of independence enjoyed by many of the Arab NGOs. The fact that governments might tentatively acquiesce to forming these new bodies is tantamount to “legalizing” Arab League moves to give form and substance to NGO participation. This is a beginning. Though it might be an unimplementable resolution, as most others have been, the League must take it seriously. If it is blocked or impeded, the Secretariat should project its moral authority by showing the discrepancy between declared commitments and actual behaviors.

The United Nations can be an important ally in this endeavor. It can render the various international conferences it sponsors and the activities that follow so vital to the Arab region, that the Arab League is able to enhance, in a very visible and audible manner, its level of participation in them. The legal status of the Arab League as “observer” notwithstanding, access to the international forums on environment, human rights, population, social development, women's issues, habitat, as well as in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, should be optimized. The League should not only seek consensus, but act as the Arab conscience. Not having the means of enforcement or instruments of control and coercion considered the pillars of power, the League's moral influence and its intellectual vitality are, for the moment, the sources of its authority, influence, effectiveness, and credibility. From another perspective, the League should deal more effectively with the human problems of Arab societies and seek complementarity within the Arab state system in developmental plans and projects that would energize the body politic and assist the United Nations in its regional development.

The awareness that would ensue from the active presence of the Arab League in international gatherings, platforms, and conversations would strengthen cooperation with the United Nations and bring into the Arab discourse the global dimension that has eluded

16' League of Arab States, “Mashru' Mithaq”

it for too long. Also, a heightened level of cooperation might reinvigorate the Arab quest for humane development and authenticity, both temporarily obscured by the shadow of genuine grievances and the current distortions of the politics of protest.

CONCLUSION

Over the course of 50 years, many problems, crises, and issues concerning the Arab region were, in general, dealt with sympathetically at the United Nations, and Arab League resolutions were generally accepted as consistent with the objectives of the UN Charter. Both organizations, however, were entrusted with broad responsibilities, and both were consistently denied the necessary means to carry them out. When states' sovereignty was at a peak, the League and the United Nations were made scapegoats for the flaws and failures in regional or international relations. When member states sought to ensconce their real positions and policies on particular issues, they bestowed on these organizations, temporarily, an authority that they later withdrew. This has resulted in situations where the ability of these bodies to perform was intermittent, and their capacity to achieve their mandates often interrupted. At various points, the secretariats of both organizations were asked to reform themselves and improve their managerial operations, only to be undermined by intrusive requests for favoritism or by new budgetary restraints imposed by major member states.

The similarity of the respective secretariats' experiences and their accompanying frustrations have led to a tacit and mutual understanding between the two organizations. Aware of the limitations of their authority, the organizations are conscious of what they potentially can do. Both have been led by activist secretary-generals, at times, and also by professional diplomats and bureaucrats. This has strengthened the sense of community between the services—civil servants—in both organizations, leading to a desire to cooperate and bring about results, despite extraneous handicaps and political roadblocks. This community of professionals—especially in the fields of economic and social development and technical training—has provided, through sectorial cooperation, a degree of immunity from the vagaries of political conditions, both regionally and internationally. This is a legacy worth protecting and nurturing.

Although the United Nations has been a "comforting" arena for Arab League policies, projects, and plans of action during the last decade, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait dramatically altered the growing sense of congeniality that had characterized Arab League-UN relations, damaging the credibility and effectiveness of the League as a vibrant national entity. While technical cooperation continues to grow between the two organizations, it is hoped that this factor will, at a future date, bring back a functional complementarity that is missing on this 50th anniversary. Perhaps a more feasible target date for such a major breakthrough is the year 2000.

THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE GULF WAR

Pierre Salinger

This article looks at the events preceding the 1991 Gulf War. It argues that the United States made no effort to stop the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait before it took place, and did not negotiate directly with Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion. Furthermore, it contends that the United Nations was not informed of the Iraqi threat to Kuwait before August 1990, and was never asked to act as a mediator between the parties concerned.

The military event of the 20th century about which the media around the world failed to tell the public the real truth was the 1991 Gulf War. Of course, the actual war was extensively covered by world television. The role of the United States and its coalition allies was highly praised for liberating Kuwait. The press criticized US president George Bush for ending the war too soon and not sending his troops into Baghdad to overthrow Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. Despite that criticism, Bush emerged from the Gulf War with support from 80 percent of the American people for his actions.

But the public did not know the truth about what happened before the Gulf War. The United States had made no effort to stop the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It had not warned the United Nations (UN) that troops were on the Kuwaiti border before the war. False information on what was happening in Kuwait was spread through the US media to

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convince Congress to adopt the resolution backing President Bush's decision to invade Kuwait

It was in early 1990 that, as a journalist looking at the Middle East, I began to get information that something dangerous was happening between Iraq and Kuwait. The first significant piece of information I received came from Jordan, where Saddam Husayn had gone on 24 February to attend the first anniversary of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), which included Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen.

In his opening speech, Saddam attacked the United States: "The country that exerts the greatest influence on the region, on the Gulf and its oil, will consolidate its superiority as an unrivaled superpower. This proves that if the population of the Gulf—and of the entire Arab world—is not vigilant, this area will be ruled according to the wishes of the United States. For example, the price of oil will be fixed for the benefit of American interests, and everyone else's interests will be ignored."¹ This statement angered Egypt's President Husni Mubarak, the main ally of the United States in the region. His country receives more than \$2 billion in aid every year from Washington. Mubarak was going to leave the meeting, but King Husayn of Jordan convinced him to have a private meeting with Saddam instead. During their meeting, Saddam recalled the \$30 billion he had been loaned by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia during his difficult war with Iran. "If they don't cancel the debt and give me another \$30 billion, I shall take steps to retaliate."² Mubarak warned Saddam that his demands were going to cause a lot of trouble for the region.³ He then left for Cairo, canceling the second day of ACC debates.

The Saudi Arabian government, having learned what happened in Amman, alerted the local US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) office of the threat hanging over the region. The word got to Washington, but there was no response from the Bush administration.⁴

On the other hand, King Husayn, upset by what had happened at the meeting, decided to visit the Gulf states on 26 February 1990 to try to help negotiate an agreement between Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. He returned on 1 March without any positive reaction to his negotiations from any of the countries. He briefed Saddam on his visit, and told him that the amir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, refused to enter into any negotiations until Iraq officially recognized Kuwaiti sovereignty over all its borders.⁵ The Baghdad government had, in fact, recognized the independence of Kuwait in 1963, but had not reached agreement on the demarcation of all its borders. Three days after his meeting with King Husayn, the Iraqi president summoned all the members of the military high command to a secret meeting and told them to draw up immediate plans for the massing of troops on the border of Kuwait.⁶

1 Speech by Saddam Husayn on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), Amman, 24 February 1990.

2 Interview with source who attended the meeting but wished to remain anonymous, Amman, August 1990.

3 Ibid.

4 Information was given by source who wished to be remain anonymous.

5 Interview with Jordan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Marwan al-Qasim, Amman, 30 August 1990.

6 Interview with Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Sa'dun Hammadi, Baghdad, 1 September 1990.

On 2 April 1990 Saddam Husayn gave a speech in Iraq, broadcast in full on the radio. Referring to the new chemical weapons that had been perfected by Iraqi scientists, he shouted "By God, if the Israelis try anything against us, we'll see to it that half their country is destroyed by fire. Whoever threatens us with atomic bombs will be exterminated with chemical weapons."⁷ President Bush condemned these statements and asked Iraq to reject immediately the use of chemical weapons. He said that such words did not help the Middle East or Iraq's security.⁸ He then added, "I suggest that such statements about chemical and biological weapons be forgotten."⁹

On 15 April—13 days later—there was an Easter lunch in Jerusalem attended by the present Israeli foreign minister, Shimon Peres, and General Ehud Barak, chief of the Israeli military forces. There was also the US ambassador to Israel, William A. Brown, and another guest, a friend, who briefed me on the lunch. They started talking about Saddam's threat to use chemical weapons against Israel, when General Barak intervened. "Saddam Husayn's trying to fool the world. His plan isn't to attack Israel. You should look south of Iraq. That's where he is really looking."¹⁰ Obviously he was referring to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

In late May 1990, 21 Arab monarchs and heads of state went to Baghdad to attend a summit meeting of the League of Arab States. In Saddam Husayn's speech, he uttered another warning. Talking about the Gulf states, he said "They are extracting too much petrol and helping to keep prices at too low a level. Every time the price of a barrel drops by one dollar, Iraq loses \$1 billion a year. You're virtually waging an economic war against my country. Indeed, brother Arabs, it has to be clearly understood that we are today living through another conflict."¹¹

US GREEN-LIGHT MESSAGES

How was the US government reacting to these warnings? To begin with, it was not looking at the Middle East. It was concentrating at the time on the Soviet Union and the Eastern-bloc countries. As for Saddam Husayn, he kept getting messages that the United States wanted to be his friend.

In February 1990 US assistant secretary of state John Kelly made his first visit to Iraq. In a meeting with Saddam Husayn he said "You are a force of moderation in the region, and the United States wishes to broaden her relations with Iraq."¹² A few days later, however, the Voice of America (VOA), the radio representing the US government, put out a statement about dictators around the world. It concentrated on Saddam Husayn,

7 *London Times*, 3 April 1990.

8 White House statement made on 4 April 1990 in Washington, DC. Copy of statement in author's possession.

9 *Ibid*.

10 Interview with an anonymous source who attended the luncheon, on 12 January 1991, in Paris.

11 Interview with Jordan's Foreign Minister al-Qasim on 30 August 1990, in Amman. Statement confirmed by Hammadi, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, in an interview on 1 September 1990, in Baghdad.

12 Quoted in an ABC News special, "A Line in the Sand," on 11 September 1990.

who was condemned as one of the worst tyrants in the world¹³ This convinced Saddam that the United States was playing a double game

On 12 April a delegation of US senators led by Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, the minority leader of the Senate, arrived in Baghdad and then traveled to Mosul There the senators had a long meeting with Saddam and discussed a number of important issues At one point, Saddam turned to Senator Dole and said, "I'm aware that a massive campaign has been launched against us by the United States and Europe"¹⁴ Dole replied "Such a campaign certainly doesn't come from President Bush"¹⁵ Senator Alan Simpson from Wyoming added "There's no problem between you and the American government or the American people Your only problem is with our press"¹⁶

Then, Senator Dole turned to the issue of the VOA's attack against Saddam Husayn in February He apologized for the program and informed Saddam that the journalist responsible had been fired He also stated that in his last conversation with President Bush, he was told that the president and his government were hoping to improve relations with Iraq "I can even assure you that President Bush will oppose sanctions He could even veto such a decision, unless any provocative act should occur"¹⁷ The meeting closed with US ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie assuring Saddam that this was indeed the policy of the US government¹⁸

Several days after this meeting, on 25 April, as an indication of a new-found peace of mind, President Bush sent a message of friendship to Saddam Husayn to mark the end of Ramadan In it he expressed the hope that "the ties between the United States and Iraq would contribute to the peace and stability in the Middle East"¹⁹

In the next two months, after the Arab League meeting in Baghdad, as the possibility of war got closer, the US government did not address the danger and continued to give positive messages to Saddam In early June, the CIA warned the White House that a Gulf war was becoming increasingly possible The White House paid no attention It is interesting that on 16 June, with all the information I had gathered, I gave a speech in Brighton, England, to an important tobacco company that had brought in all their people who sold tobacco in the Middle East They asked me to give my assessment of that area of the world I closed my speech with a shocking statement "Ladies and Gentlemen, be on the alert There could be a brutal war in the Gulf area before the end of this year"²⁰ The audience was very surprised, but after the speech I shared the information I had with the company executives and staff

By July 1990 the possibility of a war was increasing On 16 July, Tariq 'Aziz, who was then the foreign minister of Iraq, arrived in Tunis to attend a meeting of the Arab

13 VOA statement quoted in *ibid*

14 Transcript of US senators' meeting with Saddam Husayn given to the author by Iraq's Ambassador to the United Nations Nizar Hamdun, on 1 September 1990, in Baghdad

15 *Ibid*

16 *Ibid*

17 *Ibid*

18 *Ibid*

19 Hamdun showed the author the message, on 1 September 1990, in Baghdad

20 Pierre Salinger's speech to Rothman's Tobacco Company executives, 16 June 1990, in Brighton, England

League and brought with him what he called “an important memorandum that has to be distributed to all the members of the Arab League”²¹ Before handing over the memo, he told his colleague, Marwan al-Qasim, then foreign minister of Jordan “We are convinced that certain states are engaged in a genuine conspiracy against us Let me tell you that our country won’t be brought to its knees”²² Al-Qasim warned him, “You’re in the process of walking into a trap You have to be careful”²³ Tariq ‘Aziz did not reply The memorandum, which was handed out to Arab foreign ministers, was tough

What has motivated the present note is that we find ourselves, alas, faced with a situation that, because of the policy of the Kuwaiti government, not only completely contradicts the nationalistic principles we have just mentioned, but threatens their very essence Although we have always insisted upon sincere fraternal relations and have always tried to pursue a dialogue with them at all times, the Kuwaiti leaders have undertaken, methodically and knowingly, to harm Iraq, attempting to weaken it at the very moment when it was emerging from a terrible eight-year war, during which, in the opinion of all sincere Arab leaders, intellectuals, and citizens, including the heads of the Gulf States, Iraq defended the sovereignty of the whole Arab nation, especially that of the countries in the Gulf, and, in particular, that of Kuwait²⁴

When the word got to the Gulf states, the nervousness about the possibility of war began to rise It rose even more the next day, after Saddam Husayn gave a speech in Baghdad in which he confirmed the eventuality of war “Thanks to our new weapons, the imperialists can no longer launch a military attack against us, so they have chosen to wage an economic guerrilla war with the help of those agents of imperialism, the leaders of the Gulf states Their policy of keeping oil prices at low levels is a poisoned dagger planted in Iraq’s back If words fail to protect us, we will have no choice other than to go into action to reestablish the correct state of affairs and restore our rights”²⁵ The same day, the first Iraqi troops started to move toward the Kuwaiti border

That was 17 July, 16 days before the invasion of Kuwait At no time, to my knowledge, in those 16 days was any warning sent out by the United States to Saddam Husayn Not one warning took place, but other messages were sent that must have convinced Saddam that the United States was not worried about an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait By contrast, when Saddam Husayn moved troops once again to the Kuwaiti border, in October of 1994, US president Bill Clinton reacted within hours, warning Saddam not to cross the border He immediately dispatched ships and troops to the region, thereby demonstrating US resolve to launch a brutal air attack on Iraq if its troops moved any further Saddam quickly pulled back, and the possibility of a second invasion of Kuwait was halted Personally, I did not think Saddam, at the time, was going to invade

21 Interview with Shawqi Marzuq, the assistant to Shadhli Klibi, chairman of the League of Arab States, 8 February 1991, Tunis

22 Ibid

23 Ibid

24 Note from Tariq ‘Aziz, then Iraq’s minister of foreign affairs, to Klibi, 15 July 1990 Full text quoted in Pierre Salinger et al, *Secret Dossier The Hidden Agenda Behind the Gulf War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), Appendix 1, pp 223–34

25 Saddam Husayn’s speech given on 17 July 1990, in Baghdad Information given to the author by Shadhli Klibi in an interview on 9 February 1991, in Tunis

Kuwait. He was trying to press the United Nations to drop the sanctions against his country.

On 24 July 1990 the CIA informed the White House that Saddam Husayn had deployed two divisions in the direction of the Kuwaiti border. The next day, Saddam met with April Glaspie. She expressed her admiration for his efforts to rebuild his country and her understanding of his need for funds to do so. "But," she added, "we have no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."²⁶ If Saddam Husayn's response had been understood, the Bush administration should have taken the same steps that the Clinton administration later took. Saddam answered that President Mubarak had told him that the Kuwaitis were scared because of the presence of Iraqi troops only 20 kilometers north of the Kuwaiti border. He had answered Mubarak that, regardless of how many troops there were, he would not do anything until he met with the Kuwaitis. He then added, "If, when we meet, we see there is hope, nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it be natural that Iraq will not accept death, even though wisdom is above everything else."²⁷ What he was saying, clearly, was that if the negotiations with Kuwait that were to take place in Saudi Arabia on 31 July did not work, Iraq was going to invade Kuwait. Once again, the United States did not respond to what Saddam had told Ambassador Glaspie.

By 26 July, there were 30,000 Iraqi troops on the border. On 27 July, the CIA sent the White House satellite photos showing an even greater concentration of men and equipment on the border. By 30 July, the CIA was in a position to assess the state of Iraqi forces massed near the borders of Kuwait: 100,000 men, including elite troops of the Republican Guard, 300 tanks, and 300 pieces of heavy artillery.²⁸ The Bush administration and Washington remained silent.

LAST TALKS BEFORE THE INVASION

For both sides, 31 July was a critical day. On the Iraqi side, their delegation had gone to Jidda for negotiations with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The Jidda conference was a confused and tragic event that resulted in war because nobody was able or willing to avoid it. It was also a conference that got no media coverage in the United States. Only three hours before the meeting, the amir of Kuwait announced that he, himself, would not attend the meeting. To Saddam Husayn, the news came as a "deadly insult." He, too, decided not to go to Jidda, but to send instead 'Izzat Ibrahim, the number-two man in the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. The Kuwaiti delegation included Prime Minister Crown Prince Sa'ad, the foreign minister, and the justice minister. The two other Iraqi negotiators were Deputy Prime Minister Sa'dun Hammadi and Saddam Husayn's cousin, 'Ali Hassan al-Majid, who a few weeks later would be appointed governor of Kuwait.

26 Transcript of US ambassador April Glaspie's meeting with Saddam Husayn on 25 July 1990, given to the author by Hamdun on 1 September 1990, in Baghdad. Quoted from ABC's "A Line in the Sand."

27 Ibid.

28 Information from US intelligence source who wished to remain anonymous.

The Kuwaitis and the Iraqis stayed in Jidda until the next day, 1 August, but the real negotiations lasted, at most, no more than an hour and a half, from six to seven-thirty, on the first evening. Crown Prince 'Abdallah, second in rank and importance in the Saudi kingdom, greeted the two delegations, but left the hall as soon as the meeting started. The Iraqis were the first to speak. 'Izzat Ibrahim read a prepared speech reiterating all the charges against Kuwait. He read the speech slowly and steadily, without departing from it by a single word.²⁹ The language was strange, peppered as it was with religious expressions. "It gave us a curious feeling. There was something puritanical about it, like a sermon in the mosque," confided one of the Kuwaitis present at the meeting.³⁰

At first, the Kuwaitis were disconcerted by this introduction. Then, Crown Prince Sa'ad undertook to refute calmly, one by one, page by page, the grievances that had been set out. The atmosphere was not, as yet, particularly tense, but on both sides it was already beginning to seem likely that the meeting would end in failure.

At a certain point in the meeting, the two main negotiators went into an adjoining room and spoke privately for about ten minutes. 'Izzat Ibrahim, the head of the Iraqi delegation, then asked Prince Sa'ad if he could invite the members of the Iraqi delegation to join the meeting.³¹ The Prince accepted. Discussions became strained when the subject moved to financial matters. Although both the Iraqis and the Kuwaitis later denied that this issue had been discussed, I got complete confirmation that the topic had been discussed and that it had given rise to a long and bitter debate. 'Izzat Ibrahim touched on a demand for \$10 billion and added that Iraq would be satisfied with a loan if an outright gift were not possible. After much discussion, Crown Prince al-Sabah agreed, in principle, to a loan of \$9 billion. His refusal to grant the extra \$1 billion struck the Iraqis as a deliberate attempt to humiliate them. Ibrahim replied, "I don't have the authorization from President Saddam Hussein to accept less than \$10 billion."³² The meeting was adjourned at 7:30 PM. The Iraqi delegation returned to the hotel, where they held a meeting while waiting for the dinner to be given by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia.

Among those present at the meeting was 'Abdallah Bishara, Kuwait's secretary of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). "We suggested to the Crown Prince that he put forward a proposal that would allow the two sides to agree on four points: first, ending all hostile propaganda—the media, especially in Iraq, should put a stop to all their attacks, second, demobilizing all the forces stationed on the border between the two countries, third—and this was the most important from a diplomatic point of view—designing measures to nurture mutual confidence through dialogue, visits, etc., and, finally, agreeing about the next meeting."³³

Before the dinner, King Fahd had been informed of the state of negotiations, in particular, the Kuwaiti refusal to improve on the offer of \$9 billion. Toward the end of the

29 Information given to the author by Sa'dun Hammadi in an interview on 1 September 1990, in Baghdad.

30 Notes from the 1 September 1990 meeting with Hammadi, who quoted a Kuwaiti delegate present at the 1 August 1990 meeting in Jidda.

31 Based on an interview with Hammadi, 1 September 1990, in Baghdad.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

meal King Fahd turned to his guests, who included King Husayn of Jordan, and announced that Saudi Arabia would give the disputed \$1 billion as a gift to Iraq, with no strings attached ³⁴

The Saudi king thought that, with this gesture, he had defused the tension between the two delegations, an optimistic assessment shared by King Husayn. After dinner, the Kuwaitis and the Iraqis were left alone together to continue the negotiations. It was then that Crown Prince Sa'ad said to 'Izzat Ibrahim that, before they settled the details of the \$9-billion loan, they had to discuss another question, namely, the exact demarcation of Kuwait's borders with Iraq. "We can do it now, at this meeting, and then the money is yours" ³⁵ Ibrahim, taken by surprise, accused the Kuwaitis of bad faith and asked Prince Sa'ad why the border dispute had not been brought up at the start of the meeting. The Prince replied that he had no orders from the amir to tackle this problem at the beginning of their discussions ³⁶

The conversation apparently became more heated when 'Izzat Ibrahim told Prince Sa'ad that Iraq knew how to get money from them as well as from the Saudis ³⁷ Sa'ad replied that Kuwait had very powerful friends (referring to the United States and Great Britain) and could force Iraq to pay back all the money it owed Kuwait ³⁸ Those threatening words were the last spoken. The two delegations parted unceremoniously and returned to their hotels.

On the same day as the Jidda meeting, John Kelly testified before the Middle East subcommittee of the US House of Representatives in Washington. Congressman Lee Hamilton, then the chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, asked Kelly a question. "Defense Secretary Richard Cheney has been quoted in the press as saying that the United States was committed to going to the defense of Kuwait if she were attacked. Is that exactly what was said? Could you clarify this?" ³⁹ Kelly answered. "I don't know the quotation to which you refer, but I have confidence in the administration's position on this matter. We don't have any defense treaty in the Gulf States. That's clear" ⁴⁰ Hamilton asked another question. "If such a thing would happen [an invasion], is it correct to say that we have no treaty, no commitment, which would oblige us to use American forces?" ⁴¹ Kelly responded. "That's exactly right" ⁴² Kelly's statements were broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and were heard in Baghdad. Kelly had, thus, sent

34 Ibid, information confirmed by King Husayn of Jordan in an interview with the author on 5 March 1991, in Amman.

35 Ibid, information based on the 1 September 1990 interview with Hammadi. See, also, Salinger, *Secret Dossier*, pp. 75–6.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 US House Foreign Relations Committee, transcript of John Kelly's testimony before the Middle East subcommittee, 31 July 1990, Washington, DC.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

a signal to Saddam Husayn that could be understood as a pledge that the United States would not intervene militarily in case Iraq invaded Kuwait ⁴³

Two days earlier, on 29 July, the VOA had prepared an editorial warning Saddam Husayn not to invade Kuwait. That editorial was written by Bill Stetson, the man who had written the editorial attacking Saddam for his dictatorship in February of 1990 and who, Senator Bob Dole had told Saddam, had been fired. But that warning editorial was never broadcast ⁴⁴. At the US Department of State, Kelly told the VOA not to broadcast that threat. Why had the US government, from the beginning of the appearance of Iraqi troops on the Kuwaiti border, constantly refused to threaten Saddam Husayn with US intervention if there was an invasion of Kuwait?

At ten o'clock on the morning of 1 August 1990, when both were in Jidda, Sa'dun Hammadi, received a telephone call from the deputy foreign minister of Kuwait, who suggested that a joint communiqué, approved by both sides, be issued. Hammadi listened carefully to the various points of the suggested text. The one that particularly surprised him stated that "progress had been made in the discussions" ⁴⁵. After talking the matter over with the leader of his delegation, 'Izzat Ibrahim, ⁴⁶ Hammadi telephoned the Kuwaiti minister and told him that each delegation would issue its own independent communiqué ⁴⁷.

The Iraqi delegation then left Jidda and returned to Baghdad that same afternoon. Ibrahim immediately went to meet Saddam Husayn, who, soon afterward, summoned the members of the Revolutionary Command Council. In less than an hour, the decision was made to invade Kuwait ⁴⁸.

On the day the Iraqi delegation returned to Baghdad, the US government seemed to emerge from its lethargy and take a keen interest in how the situation was developing. A day-long meeting, on 1 August 1990, bringing together officials of the main departments concerned, was held in the State Department ⁴⁹. Until 30 July, the Pentagon had not considered an Iraqi attack likely because certain essential conditions for supporting an offensive, such as a communications system, artillery, and munitions, were lacking. By 1 August, however, all these elements had been put in place by the Iraqis, and still nobody foresaw an invasion.

After the meeting, Richard Haas, senior director for Middle East Affairs in the National Security Council (NSC), met with his chief, General Brent Scowcroft, and briefed him on the various statements and viewpoints of those present at the State Department meeting. One thing was clear: there was no longer a consensus that Iraq was merely flexing its muscles to force Kuwait into negotiating concessions. Scowcroft and

43 See Salinger, *Secret Dossier*, p. 69.

44 Transcript of VOA program given to the author by William Stetson, editorial writer for VOA, on 24 September 1993. Quoted in Pierre Salinger, *P.S., A Memoir* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 270–71.

45 Interview with Hammadi, 1 September 1990, in Baghdad.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Interview with Richard Haas, senior director of Middle East Affairs on the National Security Council, at the White House on 23 October 1990.

Haas then left the offices of the NSC, in the basement of the White House, and went up to see President Bush in his apartment on the first floor of the main building. The three talked for 45 minutes about the results and implications of the State Department meeting.⁵⁰

While they were speaking, a call came from Robert Kimmitt, acting secretary of state in the absence of Secretary of State James Baker and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. Kimmitt told Scowcroft that he had just received information, as yet unconfirmed, that the first shots had been fired on Kuwait. In fact, the invasion of Kuwait had started.⁵¹

As to the role of the United Nations in the period before the invasion of Kuwait, it is important to note that former Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar told me he had never been alerted by either the United States or Russia that the Iraqi troops were on the border of Kuwait and that the chances of war were rising. Pérez de Cuéllar told me that had he been alerted, he would immediately have brought in the UN Security Council to put out a declaration warning the Iraqis not to invade Kuwait. Although the United Nations later played an important role in the crisis, Pérez de Cuéllar's comments confirm my belief that there was US manipulation of the United Nations before Iraq invaded Kuwait.⁵²

On 2 August 1990—the day of the invasion of Kuwait—the UN Security Council met and unanimously adopted Resolution 660 calling for Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Earlier that morning, before this resolution was adopted, President Bush signed papers freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States, banning US trade and transactions with Iraq, and banning air and sea travel to Iraqi ports.⁵³ As he signed these papers, he told his head of the NSC, Brent Scowcroft, to alert the State Department to get the word to all Arab states to issue statements condemning Iraq for the invasion. On 4 August, the European Community (EC) imposed a boycott on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil and prohibited the sale of arms to those countries. Japan followed suit the next day. On 6 August, the UN Security Council voted to impose mandatory arms and economic sanctions against Iraq, except for medical supplies and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs. This was Resolution 661, and, in the period between 2 August and 29 November, the Security Council passed 12 resolutions in connection with the situation between Iraq and Kuwait.⁵⁴

50 Ibid

51 Ibid

52 Telephone conversation with Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, UN secretary-general during the Gulf War, from Lima, Peru, 4 August 1995

53 Interview with Haas, 23 October 1990, Washington, DC

54 UN Department of Public Information, "Resolutions of the UN Security Council and Statements by its President Concerning the Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait," DPI/1104/rev 4 (New York: United Nations, April 1994)

FAILURE OF ARAB NEGOTIATIONS

In the early morning hours of 2 August, King Husayn of Jordan was informed by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia that Kuwait had been invaded and that the Iraqis were only a few miles from Kuwait City. King Fahd asked King Husayn to call Saddam Husayn and ask him to withdraw his troops from the disputed border area.⁵⁵ King Husayn promised to intervene at once. It took seven hours for the king to get Saddam on the phone. Finally, at 1 PM, Saddam called: "We had to go in. I am now in full control of Kuwait. We were driven to that. I am committed to a withdrawal from Kuwait. It will start within days and will last several weeks. Please do whatever you can with the Arabs to persuade them that condemnations and threats don't work with us."⁵⁶ They agreed that King Husayn would fly to Baghdad, either that night, 2 August, or early the next morning.

King Husayn immediately phoned President Mubarak and told him of his talk with the Iraqi leader and of his plan to call an Arab mini-summit, either in Cairo or in Riyadh, for the morning of 4 August. He received Mubarak's full support, and the two heads of state decided to meet as soon as possible in Alexandria, Egypt.⁵⁷

King Husayn quickly flew to Alexandria. He insisted in his discussion with Mubarak that there should be no verbal attack on Iraq from Arab nations before the 4 August summit had taken place. They both decided they should discuss this problem with President Bush, who had asked for an immediate condemnation of Iraq by Arab states. They reached Bush on his private jet, Air Force One, en route from Washington, DC, to Aspen, Colorado, where he was going to give a speech and meet with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. King Husayn outlined his phone conversation with Saddam Husayn and his plans to go to Baghdad. He said it was essential to find an Arab solution immediately. King Husayn urged President Bush not to pressure Arab states to issue communiqués criticizing Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait for at least another 48 hours, until he had the chance to resolve the problem within an Arab framework. Bush agreed and said he would leave it up to King Husayn.⁵⁸

King Husayn left for Baghdad the next day, 3 August, to see Saddam Husayn. He was immediately taken to the presidential palace, where the meeting lasted several hours and ended in an agreement. The king asked the Iraqi leader if he would attend the mini-summit planned for 4 August, and Saddam Husayn answered that he would. The king posed another question, asking whether Saddam would leave Kuwait, to which Saddam immediately replied that he would if he settled his differences with Kuwait. He also said that he would prefer to negotiate an agreement with King Fahd, because he had better relations with him than with the al-Sabah family.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Information is based on an interview with Jordan's Foreign Minister al-Qasim on 30 August 1990, in Amman, and confirmed in an interview with King Husayn on 6 March 1991, in Amman.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid. This was also confirmed by Haas in his interview with the author on 23 October 1990.

⁵⁹ Based on interviews with al-Qasim on 30 August 1990, and King Husayn on 6 March 1991.

On his return to Amman, the king was told that he had an urgent call from his foreign minister, Marwan al-Qasim. He was informed that the Egyptian Foreign Ministry had just put out a statement condemning the Iraqis for invading Kuwait. King Husayn was shocked. "This destroys everything. And it gives all the chances for broadening the conflict,"⁶⁰ he told al-Qasim. It has since been confirmed that the Egyptian government decided to put out the communiqué at the request of the United States. Egypt's \$7-billion debt was subsequently canceled when it participated in the coalition forces against Iraq. Even though President Bush had told King Husayn and President Mubarak in their telephone call on 2 August that he was not going to push the Arab states to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait during the next 48 hours, the Bush administration apparently did just that.

That evening, under pressure from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the Arab League prepared a resolution condemning Iraq and calling for its troops to withdraw to its border unconditionally. Seven of the 21 members abstained from voting. Those who abstained included Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Sudan, and Yemen. But in that resolution, there was a statement cautioning against "any foreign intervention or attempt to intervene in Arab affairs."⁶¹ Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria voted for that resolution and that clause. Within four days, however, the United States would turn around the Arab League's position on this issue, with US troops arriving on Saudi territory.

ATTEMPTS AT DIALOGUE

In the months following these events, it was clear that some nations wanted to intervene diplomatically to try to achieve a solution to this crisis. But the United States refused any dialogue with Iraq. In my first visit to Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait, I met with the then Deputy Foreign Minister Nizar Hamdun. At one point, Hamdun asked me if I could arrange for a TV debate between Saddam Husayn and George Bush.⁶² I immediately replied that there was absolutely no chance that President Bush would accept such an idea. Hamdun told me that, even before the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Husayn wanted to stay in touch with the United States. In fact, after this meeting, I learned that Saddam Husayn, through a rich Palestinian businessman who lives part of his life in the United States and has high government contacts, had sent a message to the White House saying that he was willing to negotiate with the United States to pull out of Kuwait. The message was delivered to John Sununu, then the chief of staff at the White House, but there was no reply from Bush.⁶³

In August and early September 1990, the United States deployed some 200,000 troops in Saudi Arabia. It was joined by other nations, including the United Kingdom and

60 Ibid.

61 Summit Meeting of the League of Arab States, Cairo, 3 August 1990. Information based on an interview with Shadhli Klibi, 9 February 1991, in Tunis.

62 Interview with Hamdun on 1 September 1990.

63 Ibid. Also based on an interview with a Palestinian businessman who wished to remain anonymous.

France, as well as by Arab nations like Egypt and Syria. For military observers, this particular deployment was seen as providing for the defense of Saudi Arabia in case Iraq went beyond just invading Kuwait. But in November, the White House deployed another 200,000 troops. This was no longer seen as a defensive measure but as a means to liberate Kuwait. On 29 November, the UN Security Council, under the influence and pressure of the United States, passed Resolution 678. The resolution demanded "that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) [calling for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait] and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so."⁶⁴ The Security Council resolution also authorized "Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq, on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, , the foregoing resolutions, *to use all necessary means* to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."⁶⁵ The use of the phrase "all necessary means" was enough to allow the waging of the Gulf War.

On the very day UN Resolution 678 was passed, President Bush put forward a peace plan to convince the world that war was not inevitable. He proposed to meet with Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz in Washington, and to send Secretary of State James Baker to Baghdad to see President Saddam Husayn. This proposal was welcomed by nations around the world as a clear sign that Bush was seeking a diplomatic solution to the crisis, and, for the first time, was willing to have a dialogue with the Iraqis. The PLO and its leader, Chairman Yasir Arafat, who had been working behind the scenes since the invasion of Kuwait to try to arrive at a solution, immediately reacted to the Bush proposal by sending a message to Saddam Husayn, conveyed to him through the Iraqi embassy in Tunis. The message urged the Iraqi president to accept the Bush proposal, warning him that it was probably the last chance to arrive at a peaceful solution to this crisis, and suggested that he free Western hostages, taken by Iraq in August 1990, before Tariq 'Aziz met with President Bush in order to facilitate a diplomatic solution.⁶⁶

Saddam Husayn announced a few days later that all the hostages in Iraq were free to leave. On the issue of the meetings, however, despite much activity, nothing seemed to be moving forward. The United States and Iraq could not seem to reach an agreement on when Tariq 'Aziz would go to Washington and James Baker to Baghdad. From the US perspective, this was Iraq's fault. The United States said it had proposed 15 dates but Saddam Husayn had accepted none of them. Saddam finally called for a meeting with Baker on 12 January, which the United States felt was too close to the 15 January deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. On the Iraqi side, the US refusal to meet on that date was another indication that Washington did not want to have any serious talks with Baghdad, since it was unwilling to negotiate, even on dates.

64 Quoted in UN Department of Public Information, "Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council," Resolution 678 (29 November 1990), Article 2.

65 Ibid., emphasis added.

66 Interview with Abu Iyad, the number-two man in the PLO in charge of intelligence and security, on 1 December 1990, in Tunis.

While this was going on, I was in touch with a top Iraqi source who has given me nothing but accurate information, but who has refused to be identified. He told me that what was needed to set up conversations involving 'Aziz, Bush, Baker, and Husayn was for Bush to pick up the phone and call Saddam and discuss the problem with him. From the beginning of the crisis, the Iraqi president had felt that the only way to arrive at a negotiated solution was to have direct talks with two people—King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and President Bush of the United States. In any case, Bush's overture failed. Only one direct US-Iraqi contact took place in a meeting between James Baker and Tariq 'Aziz, on 9 January, in Geneva.

There were other attempts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis that had the total backing of the United Nations and Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar. The Algerian President, Chadli Benjedid, went to Baghdad on 12 December for a meeting with Saddam Husayn to try to resolve the problem. For years Algeria had played an important role in dealing with regional crises. Perhaps the most important example was its work in late 1980s and early 1981 to help release the US hostages in Iran. But after Benjedid met with Saddam, he was refused access to King Fahd and President Bush to carry on the negotiations.

While the United States and Iraq had not yet come to an agreement on dates for meetings between Tariq 'Aziz and James Baker, 'Aziz sent word to the EC that he wished to meet with their foreign ministers. But on 15 December 1990, in Brussels, the EC foreign ministers rejected the proposal for a meeting with the Iraqi foreign minister, indicating that they did not want to give the impression that a split was developing in the anti-Iraq alliance.⁶⁷

During these attempts at finding a peaceful solution, President Bush was trying to get Congress to pass a bill supporting a possible invasion of Kuwait by the United States and other nations to free the country. At that time, however, both Congress and the US public were split on whether the United States should get involved in this kind of war.

The Kuwaiti government hired a US public relations firm to manipulate information. Before the voting in Congress took place on the bill that Bush was trying to have passed, an unknown woman testified, at a public hearing of the Human Rights Caucus of the US House of Representatives, that she had visited a Kuwaiti hospital and had seen "Iraqi soldiers come into the hospital with guns. They took the babies out of the incubators, took the incubators, and left the children to die on the cold floor."⁶⁸ More than this testimony, the public relations firm put out information that 250 babies had been killed in this way. This testimony and information influenced many members of Congress that the war was necessary and influenced many people in the United States as well. Later, it was revealed that the woman, Nayira al-Sabah, was the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States. After the war, an important investigating company, Kroll, checked the story of the 250 children killed and discovered that it was false. On the daughter of the Kuwaiti

⁶⁷ Interview with Tariq 'Aziz on 10 November 1992, in Baghdad.

⁶⁸ House Committee, transcript of testimony by Nayira al-Sabah, the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador in Washington, DC. She testified on 10 October 1990 at a Public Hearing of the Human Rights Caucus of the US House of Representatives.

ambassador, Kroll's report said "She witnessed this scene for no more than seconds"⁶⁹ The report continued "Kroll's most conservative estimate, based on corroborated eyewitness testimony, is that a minimum of seven babies died directly because of looting of incubators and ventilators from pediatric wards at al-Jahra and al-'Adan hospitals. Additional eyewitness testimony indicated that five more babies died, but Kroll was less satisfied with the level of corroboration."⁷⁰ So the information that 250 babies were killed turned out to be false. The public relations firm went further. It sent a message to the organization that had hired them—Citizens for a Free Kuwait—saying that there was a "lessening of the US public's enthusiasm for pursuing the military option."⁷¹ They called for more atrocity charges from eyewitnesses. The Kroll report, tracking down those "eyewitnesses" who emerged, discovered their information was false. For example, Dr Ibrahim Bahbahani, who was identified as a Kuwaiti surgeon at the UN Security Council hearings, said he knew of 120 incubator murders. Later, he told Kroll that he had no *direct* knowledge of such incidents. Kroll also discovered that Bahbahani had lied about his identity. He was not a surgeon, but a dentist.

Nevertheless, under the influence of this testimony, the Senate and the House passed the bill, on 11 January 1991, allowing for military intervention in Kuwait—but only by a majority of one vote in each case. If this manipulated information had not been circulated, Congress might have rejected the idea of supporting President Bush on the invasion of Kuwait.

I was in Geneva for the 9 January meeting between Baker and 'Aziz. When the meeting started, the media was allowed into the room to see and film the opening of the encounter between the US secretary of state and the Iraqi foreign minister. Although Baker and 'Aziz leaned across the table and shook hands, there were no smiles. As the meeting lasted much longer than predicted, it seemed that Baker and 'Aziz were really trying to arrive at a solution. After more than six hours of discussion, including breaks when Baker called President Bush, the meeting ended. Baker, in a press conference, said "Regrettably, ladies and gentlemen, I heard nothing today—in over six hours, I heard nothing that suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever on complying with the UN Security Council resolutions."⁷²

But in discussions with Algeria's Foreign Minister Sid Ahmad Ghozali and PLO Foreign Policy Chief Faruk Qaddumi, who had been in Tariq 'Aziz's room during the negotiations and had talked to him during the breaks when Baker was calling Bush, I learned why the peace talks had failed. According to these sources, 'Aziz had been sent to Geneva with a message from Saddam Husayn that Iraq was ready to talk about a peaceful solution, but only after 15 January. On one occasion, 'Aziz walked into the room and told Ghozali and Qaddumi "We're not going to make any progress on these talks

69 *Kroll Report* (New York: Kroll Associates Inc., 1992). The information is substantiated by earlier reports by Amnesty International in April 1991, and ABC World News interviews with Kuwaiti hospital staff in March 1991.

70 *Ibid*.

71 *Ibid*.

72 Author's personal notes on the Geneva meeting.

They will not discuss the 15th of January. They are not ready to lift the January 15th deadline. We can't negotiate with them unless they do."⁷³

THE ONLY UN DIRECT MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSAYN

It was only two days later that the final meeting took place that might have stopped the possibility of war. UN secretary-general Pérez de Cuéllar arrived in Baghdad on 11 January for meetings with Saddam Husayn. The meeting, however, did not start until the evening of 13 January—two days before the 15 January deadline. When I wrote the English version of my Gulf book, which was published in April of 1991, I got access to the Iraqi transcript of that meeting.⁷⁴ Since then, I have had discussions with Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, who told me that there was only a slight difference between the Iraqi and the UN versions of the transcript of this conversation. The secretary-general opened the meeting on 13 January by saying:

Mr. President, I should like to say that I have come to Iraq without being charged with any mandate, I am entrusted with no specific task, either by the Security Council or the United Nations. I have, however, been encouraged to make this trip not only by heads of state and governments, but also by the Pope and by humble citizens who have asked me to take advantage of our position, particularly its moral aspect, to work for the establishment of peace in this region. It may surprise you, Mr. President, that among those who have wished success for my mission is the President of the United States, with whom I have met and talked four times since last Saturday. But I wish to assure you that I do not carry any message and I am no one's messenger. I represent only myself.⁷⁵

The secretary-general reminded Saddam of his impartial approach when he attempted to assist Iraq to conclude the war with Iran.

The day before, Pérez de Cuéllar had had a meeting with Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz. The secretary-general told Saddam that he had come out of that meeting understanding, from 'Aziz's explanation, "in an extremely clear manner the position of the Iraqi government."⁷⁶ He told Saddam that he understood his position and he respected it. He also told the Iraqi president that, although he could not serve as a guarantor of the sincerity of President Bush, he had gained the clear impression from his meeting with him that Bush really wished to see a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Pérez de Cuéllar told Saddam what Bush had said: "I, who am responsible for peace and war in my country, would prefer a peaceful solution."⁷⁷

But the secretary-general made it clear to Saddam that the only way to resolve the crisis was to meet the conditions of the UN resolutions. He told the Iraqi president that he was "a man of courage," as had been demonstrated in his relations to Iran. But then, he

73 Interview with Algeria's Foreign Minister Sid Ahmad al-Ghozali, 27 September 1991, in Algiers.

74 Text of transcript also quoted in Salinger, *Secret Dossier*, pp. 212–18.

75 The information in the transcript of this meeting, in the author's possession, was confirmed in a telephone conversation with Pérez de Cuéllar on 4 August 1995.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

added, "In order to put an end to the present crisis, it would be necessary to implement resolutions 660 and 678"⁷⁸

The Iraqi president once more explained to Pérez de Cuéllar the reasons for the invasion of Iraq⁷⁹ He then went on to say, on 5 August, that he had declared "unequivocally" that Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait He assured Pérez de Cuéllar that this had not been a mere declaration of intent, but that Iraq had actually withdrawn a mechanized brigade He added that he had halted the withdrawal when the United States escalated its threats against Iraq⁸⁰ It was on the day the US forces arrived in Saudi Arabia that Iraq announced its annexation of Kuwait

The UN secretary-general and the Iraqi president went on speaking for some time, but as they got near the end of the meeting, Saddam Husayn said something that clearly indicated that he was not ready to pull out of Kuwait under the existing circumstances

Did you notice how President Bush was persistent in pushing his last bill [supporting US military action in Kuwait] through the House and the Senate He used his influence in the same manner as he pushed resolution 678 [calling for Iraq to pull out of Kuwait by 15 January] through the Security Council He obtained his bill by implying that it would not be for the purpose of using force, but in order to exert more pressure on Iraq so that it would withdraw Iraq, however, will not withdraw under threats⁸¹

Pérez de Cuéllar told Saddam that he would be returning to New York without having achieved anything, and asked him, on behalf of the international community, that he be given something to lessen the pressure and prevent a catastrophe for the region and the world⁸² He suggested informing the Security Council that the Iraqi president wished to continue negotiating through the secretary-general Saddam Husayn authorized him to do so, and said that this was the reason why he had given him such a long exposé on the situation⁸³

The secretary-general closed the meeting by saying he would clearly reflect the words of the president in his report to the Security Council as well as in his bilateral contacts with member states He said he would convey to Saddam Husayn, through his foreign minister, the reaction of those who were inclined to begin hostilities⁸⁴

Pérez de Cuéllar headed back to New York late on the morning of 14 January, stopping in Paris to see President François Mitterand He emerged from the meeting looking despondent "Unfortunately, at the end of my trip I see no cause for optimism I see no reason to have more hope than on the day I left I am a diplomat, but I am also honest and direct, and I cannot conceal that I made no progress in Baghdad"⁸⁵

78 Ibid

79 Ibid

80 Ibid

81 Ibid

82 Ibid

83 Ibid

84 Ibid

85 *Le Monde* (Paris), 14 January 1991

Anybody who heard those words had to understand that the war was about to start. In my ABC News bureau in London, I was alerted late in the afternoon of the following day by a military specialist that war would start that night. At 11:30 PM London time, bombs started to fall on Baghdad. As the United Nations wrote that day: "one day after the deadline, the States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, acting in accordance with the Council's authorization but not under the control of or direction by the United Nations, began offensive military operations."⁸⁶ The war was on.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE GULF WAR

The 1991 Gulf War was not a UN operation but a UN-backed operation. Most military experts examining that war believe it was one of the most effective in history. It came to an end at midnight, New York time, on 28 February 1991. It had lasted a total of 43 days. The loss of US and other coalition troops that invaded Kuwait on 24 February was the lowest in any war of that kind. It is now known that some US troops were accidentally killed by other US troops. Four years after the war, we still do not know the actual number of Iraqi casualties that resulted from the mass bombings that took place against Iraq. Some have estimated it at 100,000, and others at an even higher figure.

What are some of the consequences of the Gulf War for countries other than Iraq? It affected a number of airline industries around the world, such as Air France, which has never made a profit since the Gulf War. Tourist industries were also seriously hurt for a few years after the war. Stores across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East lost wealthy clients from Iraq. The war had a negative impact on the world economies late in 1991—including that of the United States.

The economic impact on the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, was even worse. Both were rich countries when they entered the Gulf War. But the cost of the war was so high that they now have serious economic problems and heavy debts. It took Kuwait more than a year after the war to start selling oil again, because its oil wells were left burning when the Iraqis pulled out of their country.

Islamic fundamentalism also increased in the region as a consequence of the war. While many Arab states decided to ally themselves with the United States to fight Iraq, their populations had a completely different view. Many in the region were against the war and against Western powers fighting an Arab nation. That antagonism led to an increase in fundamentalism, especially in Algeria and Egypt.

As for Iraq, since the end of the Gulf War, it has been suffering under international sanctions. UN investigators continue to say that Iraq has not complied fully with UN resolutions, particularly Resolution 687, which was passed by the Security Council on 3 April 1991, after the war was over. The resolution called for the destruction of all illegal weapons, such as bacteriological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Obviously, the continuing sanctions are having a deep effect on the Iraqi population. According to different sources, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi citizens, including children, have died of

⁸⁶ UN report "Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council," p. 1

hunger and/or medical problems. Some have argued that the time has come to drop the sanctions. Others looking at the UN resolution passed in 1994 that permitted Iraq to sell \$1.5 billion worth of its oil, but under UN control, say that the suffering of Iraqi citizens is the fault of Saddam Husayn, who did not agree to the plan. The no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq—which were created by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France without the support of the United Nations—are splitting the country and giving rise to serious concerns among experts that Iraq could fall apart—changing the balance of power in the Gulf region.

What is quite clear is that the war was not needed. The Bush administration could have prevented Saddam Husayn from invading Kuwait by taking the tough military action that President Clinton took four years later. Even that tough military action would not have been necessary if President Bush had called Saddam Husayn on 28 July and told him that, if his troops crossed the border, the United States would intervene and there would be a brutal war. Bush also should have made it clear that he was aware of the historical border problem with Kuwait and was going to send Secretary of State James Baker to Baghdad to discuss this subject with him. When I was in Baghdad after the war, every top Iraqi official, including Saddam himself, said that if Saddam Husayn had received that call, he would not have invaded Kuwait.⁸⁷

I would close this article by saying that the fact that UN secretary-general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar met with Saddam Husayn only two days before the war started, in January 1991, demonstrates that important negotiations that could have prevented the war did not take place. At no time did the Security Council ask the United Nations to intervene to try to solve the crisis, whereas the United Nations had been very effective in bringing the Iran-Iraq war to an end by intervening strongly with both nations. The world still looks at the Gulf War as the biggest victory of the United States since the end of World War II. My view is that it was the biggest mistake of the United States since the end of World War II.



⁸⁷ Interview with Hamid Yusuf Hammadi, Iraq's Minister of Information, 11 November 1992. Also based on an interview with Tariq 'Aziz, 10 November 1992.

THE UNITED NATIONS' FAILURE IN RESOLVING THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT

Yahia H. Zoubir and Anthony G. Pazzanita

Although a peace plan was accepted by Morocco and the POLISARIO in 1988, and despite a UN presence in the Western Sahara since 1991, the world body has failed to implement a referendum on self-determination in the former Spanish colony. The stalemate in the Western Sahara has put in question the competence and impartiality of the United Nations. Failure to end this 20-year-old conflict will inevitably result in a resumption of hostilities and will further destabilize the Maghrib region.

THE continuation of the little-known Western Sahara conflict¹ in the Maghrib region, although minor compared to the more tragic wars in Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Rwanda, is nevertheless an obvious example of the failure of the United Nations (UN) in

1 Some of the reasons for the absence of interest in the Western Sahara conflict are dealt with in Anthony G. Pazzanita, "Morocco versus POLISARIO: A Political Interpretation," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 32, no. 2 (1994), pp. 265-78. For further details on the origins and evolution of the conflict, see Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1983), an updated version was published in French as *Sahara Occidental: Origines et enjeux d'une guerre du désert* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987), John Dams, *Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), and I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), chapter 2.

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the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Western Sahara remains to this date the UN's last decolonization problem in Africa. This article reviews the main reasons that have prevented the denouement of this long-lasting conflict.

THE UN ROLE IN THE WESTERN SAHARA: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The planning and attempted execution of the UN referendum for the Western Sahara (also referred to as the Territory), stalled due to grave difficulties both political and in the disputed Territory itself, has its origins in a series of efforts undertaken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The OAU envisioned the withdrawal of the armed forces of both the Moroccan government and the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia al-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO) from the Western Sahara, the emplacement of a neutral, interim government, and a referendum of self-determination in which the choice presented to the voters would be between independence or integration with the Kingdom of Morocco.²

After some strenuous diplomacy, the OAU succeeded in getting Morocco's King Hasan II to subscribe to the concept of a plebiscite. Its efforts, however, were destined to advance no further due to a number of factors: the lack of experience of the OAU in successfully conducting similar referenda elsewhere in Africa, the refusal of Morocco to negotiate directly with the POLISARIO, and the pro-Sahrawi sympathies of an increasing number of OAU member-states. Those states recognized the POLISARIO's state-in-exile, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), proclaimed by the POLISARIO on 27 February 1976. The matter was further complicated between 1982–84 by the divisions in the OAU between those African countries favoring the POLISARIO and those taking Morocco's side and temporarily boycotting the OAU.

The complete collapse of the OAU was only headed off by the agreement of the POLISARIO-SADR delegation not to take its seat as a full OAU member, a position it had been awarded in February 1982 in a controversial move by the organization's secretary-general, Edem Kodjo, of Togo.³ After the OAU's summit meetings in 1982 and 1983 were delayed or canceled due to the boycott, the 1984 summit, held in November of that year, took a different turn. At that conference, the SADR finally took its place as an OAU member. Morocco, carrying out the threat it had long articulated, resigned from the OAU in protest. Thus, the organization's referendum plans were stymied by the absence of one of its most important members.⁴

Renewed activity occurred in the spring of 1986, after the UN General Assembly had passed Resolution 40/50 in December 1985, by a lopsided margin of 96 votes in favor and 7 against, with 39 abstentions. The resolution endorsed the broad outlines of the OAU

2 John Damis, "The O A U and Western Sahara," in Yassin el-Ayouty and I. William Zartman, eds., *The O A U After Twenty Years* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), pp. 286–95.

3 See Tony Hodges, "The Western Sahara File," *Third World Quarterly* 6, no. 1 (January 1984), p. 109.

4 See Anthony G. Pazzanita, "The Proposed Referendum in the Western Sahara: Background, Developments and Prospects," in Yahia H. Zoubir and Daniel Volman, eds., *International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993), esp. p. 197.

strategy for defusing tensions in the Territory and conducting a plebiscite "without any administrative or military constraints"⁵ The General Assembly also urged the UN secretary-general, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, to use his good offices to bring Morocco and the POLISARIO together and to start serious preparations for a referendum Pérez de Cuéllar began a series of "proximity talks" at UN headquarters in New York, whereby the two protagonists could exchange their views without the necessity of meeting face-to-face These talks accomplished little as the attitudes of the two parties were not reconciled to the degree necessary for further progress⁶ They ended in failure in May 1986

After a further resolution was passed by the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1986⁷ urging the secretary-general to persevere in his efforts to organize a referendum, the United Nations and the OAU eventually decided that a joint UN-OAU Technical Mission be sent to Morocco and the Western Sahara to gather information and to assess the problems inherent in a referendum on self-determination That included determining the identities and whereabouts of eligible Sahrawi voters from among a fairly large and historically nomadic population, with few written records of births, deaths, marriages, and movements in and near the former Spanish colony In November and December of 1987, the UN mission traveled to the Western Sahara, where both Moroccan authorities and the POLISARIO were very cooperative, and wrote a confidential report to Pérez de Cuéllar⁸

Despite these hopeful signs, the United Nations probably would have failed to come up with a referendum plan had it not been for an unexpected development in intra-Maghribi relations On 16 May 1988, Algeria—the POLISARIO's principal supporter since 1975—and Morocco agreed to restore diplomatic relations, which had been severed in March 1976 as a result of Algeria's recognition of the SADR⁹ The renewed diplomatic ties, the relaxation of intra-regional tensions, the felt necessity for a political solution to the conflict, and a few meetings between the POLISARIO and Moroccan officials enabled Pérez de Cuéllar to formulate a detailed referendum plan in the summer of 1988 He presented his blueprint to Morocco and the POLISARIO at separate meetings on 11 August, and two weeks later obtained a positive response from both¹⁰ Broadly similar to the OAU plan, Pérez de Cuéllar's plan called for the partial withdrawal and/or confinement to supervised bases of the Moroccan and POLISARIO armies, the deployment of about 2,000 UN peace-keeping troops, civil police, and administrators to maintain a comprehensive cease-fire, and a plebiscite The referendum would take place after the UN force had conducted a survey of the Sahrawi population for voter-eligibility purposes,

5 UN General Assembly, *Resolution 40/50*, 2 December 1985, reaffirmed in the UN Fourth (Decolonization) Committee Resolution, A/C.4/42/L.5 of 21 October 1987

6 Pazzanita, "The Proposed Referendum in the Western Sahara," pp. 198–99

7 UN General Assembly, *Resolution 41/16* of 31 October 1986, cited in *The Question of Western Sahara Report of the Secretary-General*, A/42/601, 1 October 1987, pp. 1–3

8 For details, see *West Africa*, 28 December 1987–4 January 1988, p. 2560, *West Africa*, 11 January 1988, p. 55, and the *New York Times*, 6 December 1987

9 Nicole Grimaud, *La Politique extérieure de l'Algérie* (The Foreign Policy of Algeria) (Paris: Karthala, 1984), p. 213

10 Yahia H. Zoubir, "The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and International Dimensions," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 28, no. 2 (1990), p. 228

using as its basis a (disputed) Spanish census carried out in 1974, which counted 73,497 indigenous persons in the Territory ¹¹

PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR'S 1990 PLAN FOR A REFERENDUM

Until well into 1990, the two parties remained as far apart as ever on referendum modalities. Although there was a first-ever direct meeting in Marrakech between King Hasan and a high-ranking POLISARIO delegation in January 1989, there were no other breakthroughs. The situation stagnated until 18 June 1990, when Pérez de Cuéllar put forth a more detailed plan for the UN presence in the Western Sahara. It called for a cessation of hostilities between Morocco and the POLISARIO, troop withdrawals, the setting up of a UN force—the United Nations' Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)—the establishment of an Identification Commission to assemble and publish a list of eligible Sahrawi voters, and a referendum to be held about 24 weeks after the beginning of the process. The choice for the Sahrawi people was to be between integration with Morocco and independence. Upon the announcement of the results of the plebiscite, either the Moroccan troops would have to withdraw from the Territory, or, if the voters favored integration with Morocco, the POLISARIO forces would then have to be disbanded ¹²

Although the UN Security Council, by a unanimous vote taken a few days later, endorsed the secretary-general's report and called for prompt action to put the plan into effect,¹³ progress came to an abrupt halt on 2 August 1990 when the UN's attention became heavily focused on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. After the 1991 Gulf War, the United Nations began to devote more attention to the Western Sahara. On 19 April 1991, the secretary-general issued another report on the status of MINURSO that contained the timetable for the referendum and the guidelines for the Identification Commission. The UN Security Council unanimously approved the report in Resolution 690 of 29 April ¹⁴ It was subsequently decided that the peace process would start on 6 September 1991, the date of the beginning of the cease-fire. According to the UN schedule, the fate of the Western Sahara would be decided by late January 1992.

In the weeks leading up to 6 September, Moroccan military forces went on the offensive, attacking Sahrawi settlements from the air and using ground forces to move into certain areas of the Western Sahara they had not formerly controlled ¹⁵ The Moroccan

11 Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara*, pp. 131–32.

12 United Nations, *The Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General*, S/21360, 18 June 1990.

13 United Nations, *Resolution Adopted by the Security Council*, Resolution 658, 2929th Meeting, S/RES/658, 29 June 1990.

14 United Nations, *The Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report by the Secretary-General*, S/22464, 19 April 1991, and *Resolution Adopted by the Security Council*, Resolution 690, 2984th Meeting, S/RES/690, 29 April 1991.

15 See *Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Near East and South Asia* (hereafter, *FBIS-NES*), 5 August 1991, p. 30, and 6 August 1991, pp. 29–30. See also *Middle East International*, 16 August 1991, pp. 15–16, and 30 August 1991, p. 10.

attacks destroyed or damaged many buildings and other facilities that had been earmarked by MINURSO for its own use

From 6 September to the end of 1991 the situation in the Western Sahara deteriorated. Pérez de Cuéllar went ahead with the insertion of 240 MINURSO military observers at ten strategic locations in the Territory to monitor the cease-fire.¹⁶ Their numbers, however, could not be increased beyond approximately 375 in the following year due to Morocco's insistence that population-related issues be resolved before the United Nations' interim administration could be fully functional. Thus, the UN forces from various countries, including France and the United States, had little to do but monitor the cease-fire, which was holding despite the Moroccan attacks of August and September 1991.

Regarding the work of the Identification Commission, UN Special Representative for the Western Sahara Johannes Manz, of Switzerland, was encountering enormous problems. Since 1990, when the Commission was established, it had been updating the information provided by the 1974 Spanish census, utilizing the recollections of "tribal elders" as well as more conventional means, to ascertain births, deaths, and familial relations. In the summer of 1991, the Commission arrived at a list of 70,204 prospective voters, a small number from the standpoint of both Morocco and the POLISARIO, but probably consisting of persons who could most easily be proven to have resided in the Western Sahara before or in 1974.¹⁷ But almost as soon as the UN presence in the Territory had been established, Morocco sought to alter the composition of the voter pool by moving thousands of people from Morocco to the Western Sahara and asking that their voting applications all be evaluated by the Identification Commission.

The political implications of this new turn of events seemed to be not whether the voters' list composed by the United Nations could be challenged, but whether Morocco was to be allowed to alter the status quo unilaterally. The secretary-general's report of 19 April 1991 outlined procedures for persons to follow if they wished to challenge their exclusion from the initial list of electors, but the lodging of the petitions and the submission of any supporting evidence would be expected to come from individual Sahrawis, not corporately by one of the parties to the conflict.¹⁸ The new arrivals in the Western Sahara may or may not have been Sahrawis, displaced and forced to live elsewhere by earlier armed conflicts (including a French-Spanish campaign in 1958), but the evaluation of their petitions promised to consume much additional time and resources on the part of the Identification Commission, inevitably delaying the referendum.

As attempts were made to overcome this new imbroglio in the fall of 1991, the Moroccans appeared unwilling to allow the United Nations to assert its transitional authority over the Western Sahara and barred its military observers from moving freely in the Territory, as was their mandate. The MINURSO headquarters in al-'Uyun, the capital of the Western Sahara, were virtually surrounded by Moroccan police, and the local

16 For details of initial MINURSO deployments, see *Letter Dated 3 September 1991 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/23008, 4 September 1991.

17 *Le Monde*, 3 August 1991, and *FBIS-NES*, 22 August 1991, pp. 11-12.

18 *West Africa*, 2-8 September 1991, p. 1452.

population throughout the Territory was seldom permitted any contact with the peace-keepers. In addition, UN troops on patrol were sometimes intimidated by the Moroccan authorities.¹⁹

There were other problems that plagued the United Nations in the Western Sahara. In November 1991, the POLISARIO charged that a certain UN official had improperly given demographic information to Morocco, data which the Sahrawi leadership had supplied to the world body in confidence for use only by the Identification Commission. The accusation was denied by the person concerned—although he was dismissed from his UN employment—but the suspicion was inescapable that somewhere within the United Nations there were forces determined to place the Sahrawis at a further disadvantage. In addition, stories of financial irregularities on the part of MINURSO surfaced as part of a report written by a staff member of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee.²⁰ Discouraged by these tales of malfeasance and the continuing stalemate, Special Representative Manz announced his resignation, effective 1 January 1992, to coincide with the departure of Pérez de Cuéllar and the arrival of the new secretary-general, Butrus Butrus-Ghali. One of Manz's prime complaints, laid out in a "Confidential Letter" addressed to Pérez de Cuéllar, dated 13 December 1991, was that Pérez de Cuéllar had had meetings with Moroccan officials and had introduced alterations to the peace plan without consulting with him.²¹ Manz also expressed disappointment with the way the United Nations was handling Morocco's cease-fire violations.

Before leaving office, Pérez de Cuéllar presented a detailed report on the Western Sahara/MINURSO effort that contained his proposed solution to the voter qualification dilemma. Following the advice of those who wanted eligibility to be broadened beyond the approximately 70,000 voters on the Identification Commission's list, he floated the idea of allowing those Sahrawis who could prove that they had resided in the Western Sahara for six consecutive years prior to December 1974—the time Spain had conducted the last census—or twelve years intermittently, again before 1974, to vote.²² These proposals infuriated the POLISARIO and puzzled some independent observers. Pérez de Cuéllar seemed to neglect the possibilities for confusion, delay, and fraud in this process, particularly since methods of establishing residence could be open to question if they originated with any of the two parties over the past two decades. Only Spanish records, some observers believed, were sufficiently untainted to be relied upon. The secretary-general's plan, however, would restrict the application of the residence criteria to one generation of Sahrawis only, thus setting some sort of upper limit on how much the voter rolls could be expanded.

19 *Libération* (Paris), 9 September 1991. See also Robert J. Bookmiller, "The Western Sahara: Future Prospects," *American-Arab Affairs*, no. 37 (Summer 1991), pp. 64–76, and the *Washington Post*, 14 March 1992.

20 *Middle East International*, 22 November 1991, p. 14, and *Africa Confidential*, 20 December 1991. See also George Pickart, *The Western Sahara: The Referendum Process in Danger* (Washington, DC: United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, January 1992).

21 Copy of Manz's letter to Pérez de Cuéllar in Yahia Zoubir's personal archives. References to this letter can also be found in *Le Monde diplomatique*, November 1992, p. 13.

22 United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara*, S/23299, 19 December 1991, pp. 5–11.

Clearly, the proposal did not go as far as Morocco probably would have wished. On the other hand, the POLISARIO feared that since the computer disks allegedly given to the Moroccans by the wayward UN official contained the names of Sahrawis who had died since the 1974 census, Morocco would induce some of the new arrivals to the Western Sahara to assume the identities of the deceased, thereby further tilting the voting balance in its favor.²³

Intense diplomatic activity in the UN Security Council marked the final days of 1991. France sought a resolution endorsing the secretary-general's new criteria. French policymakers resisted the idea of a Sahrawi state,²⁴ fearing that a Sahrawi victory would bring down the monarchy and destabilize the Moroccan state. But other Council members, especially the United States, represented by Ambassador Thomas Pickering, as well as some African countries such as Zimbabwe, pressured France to withhold support for Pérez de Cuéllar's plans and give the matter to the incoming secretary-general for possible reconsideration. On 31 December 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 725—the wording of which was purposely ambiguous to preserve unanimity—merely “welcomed” Pérez de Cuéllar's report, and urged further efforts to resolve the (unnamed) dispute.²⁵

BUTRUS BUTRUS-GHALI'S 1992 REPORT GENESIS OF THE STALEMATE

In Resolution 725, the Security Council directed the secretary-general to make a further report on the Western Sahara within two months. Before Butrus-Ghali did so, he engaged in a strenuous round of meetings to attempt to reach a compromise on voter eligibility, by the time he issued the report on 28 February 1992, however, all he was able to claim was the resolution of a few relatively minor matters. The report asserted that Morocco was responsible for the vast majority of cease-fire violations in the Territory since the UN's deployment in September 1991, with Rabat being charged with 75 breaches as against the POLISARIO's two, although none of them involved the exchange of live fire.²⁶

The upshot of the secretary-general's report was reassuring in that he urged that MINURSO be kept in place and fully funded. But Butrus-Ghali did say that if no further progress was made, “it may well be necessary to consider alternative courses of action and possibly adopt a new approach to the whole problem,”²⁷ an utterance that may be taken as a virtual admission of failure by the United Nations. Matters were further complicated by the appointment, on 23 March 1992, of Sahabzada Ya'qub Khan as the

23 See *Africa Research Bulletin, Political Series* 28, no. 11 (1–31 November 1991), p. 10355, and *Middle East International*, 22 November 1991, p. 14.

24 See Nicole Grimaud, “Algeria and Socialist France,” *Middle East Journal* 40, no. 2 (Spring 1986), p. 252–66.

25 United Nations, *Resolution Adopted by the Security Council, Resolution 725, 3025th Meeting, S/RES/725* (31 December 1991).

26 United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, S/23662*, 28 February 1992.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

new UN special representative for the Western Sahara. A longtime Pakistani diplomat—and foreign minister for most of the 1980s—Ya'qub Khan had formidable qualifications but one severe handicap: the POLISARIO's poorly concealed distrust of his motives, given his alleged pro-Moroccan views.²⁸

At about the same time, King Hasan injected yet another difficulty into the peace process when he announced on 3 March that a Moroccan constitutional referendum and municipal and parliamentary elections would be held not only in Morocco proper but in the "Saharan provinces" as well.²⁹ This was something that he had done twice before but never with a simultaneous UN presence in the Western Sahara. When Butrus-Ghali issued another in a series of periodic reports on the situation on 2 August 1992, he expressed concern on the elections issue that bordered on disapproval. Ya'qub Khan, on the other hand, displayed a more relaxed attitude on the matter, further alienating the POLISARIO.³⁰

In January 1993, the secretary-general released his next report.³¹ He reviewed the dispute between Morocco and the POLISARIO on the voter qualification issue and emphasized that, despite his and Khan's best efforts, the impasse was no closer to being overcome than it had been in late 1991. Butrus-Ghali's feelings were evident in the closing paragraphs of the report, which contained his suggested alternatives for the future of MINURSO. Those alternatives included, first, to continue and intensify the consultative efforts which had taken up the previous 18 months, although, as Butrus-Ghali stated, "it is my considered opinion . . . that the chances for success under this option are very slim."³² The second possibility was to hold the referendum based upon Pérez de Cuéllar's criteria set out in December 1991. Butrus-Ghali freely admitted that "this may mean that the implementation would have to proceed without the cooperation of one of the parties,"³³ i.e., the POLISARIO, which opposed the liberalized voting qualifications outlined in the 1991 document. In the third option, the UN secretary-general theorized that an entirely different avenue could be pursued: "an alternative approach not based on the settlement plan,"³⁴ an echo of his January 1992 pronouncement. The matter went to the UN Security Council a few weeks later.

Among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, France was most inclined to endorse the secretary-general's second option, which would have been the least inconvenient to Morocco. It could not, however, persuade the other members of the Council of the wisdom of this approach. The United States expressed a desire to adopt the

28 See John Damis, "The UN Settlement Plan for the Western Sahara: Problems and Prospects," *Middle East Policy* 1, no. 2 (1992), pp. 41–2. The other choice for the position of UN special representative was the American, Vernon Walters, whose long-lasting friendship with the Moroccans is common knowledge.

29 *Le Monde*, 5 March 1992; *FBIS-NES*, 92–043, 4 March 1992, pp. 16–17.

30 See United Nations, *The Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report by the Secretary-General*, S/24464, 20 August 1992, pp. 2–4, and *Africa Research Bulletin, Political Series* 29, no. 3 (1–31 March 1992), pp. 10490–91. See also *FBIS-NES*, 4 March 1992, pp. 16–18.

31 United Nations, *The Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report by the Secretary-General*, S/25170, 26 January 1993.

32 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

33 *Ibid.*

34 *Ibid.*

first alternative instead—in other words, to keep negotiating a while longer. So, on 2 March 1993 the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 809, thereby instructing Butrus-Ghali to “intensify efforts in order to resolve the issues identified in his January report, in particular those relating to the interpretation and application of the criteria for voter eligibility”³⁵

After Resolution 809 was passed, Butrus-Ghali went back to trying to narrow the differences between the Moroccan and the POLISARIO delegations. This task was not made easier by charges of pro-Moroccan bias leveled against him and Khan by the POLISARIO, its supporters, and even by some outside observers. On 21 May 1993, he issued yet another report on the Western Sahara situation, pessimistic in tone, except for the announcement that the Identification Commission would increase its level of activity that summer.³⁶

In late June 1993, the POLISARIO issued a statement that it would accept—with reservations—Pérez de Cuéllar's voter registration criteria contained in the former secretary-general's report of 19 December 1991.³⁷ This stunned some observers, since it modified one of the Sahrawi organization's most fervently-held positions. There were further encouraging signs of a breakthrough when Morocco and the POLISARIO met again, face-to-face, on 17–19 July 1993 in al-'Uyun.³⁸ These efforts, however, were not sufficient to move the peace process forward. An attempt by Butrus-Ghali to re-activate the Morocco-POLISARIO dialogue after the abortive al-'Uyun meetings, this time in New York, was unsuccessful.

The Identification Commission, now headed by the Malaysian Erik Jensen, began refining its detailed procedures for establishing the identity of the voters and their eligibility in light of the POLISARIO's acceptance of the secretary-general's controversial December 1991 criteria. Clearly, the Commission was heartened by this change in the POLISARIO's attitude, despite a diplomatic picture which was, overall, still very cloudy.³⁹ Soon afterward, Jensen published revised lists of prospective voters, based, for the most part, on the 1974 Spanish census, but with supplements primarily for younger Sahrawis. These rosters were posted at ten locations throughout al-'Uyun and in the POLISARIO's refugee camps in southwestern Algeria. By the middle of February 1994, Morocco had assented to the United Nations' placing the lists in Boujdour, Dakhla, and Smara, all of them significant Western Saharan population centers under the control of the Rabat government. The actual posting of the lists in these Moroccan-administered areas, however, never took place. This angered the POLISARIO and frustrated the UN personnel

35 United Nations, *Resolution Adopted by the Security Council, Resolution 809*, 3179th Meeting, S/RES/809, 2 March 1993.

36 See United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara*, S/25818, 21 May 1993.

37 United Nations, *Western Sahara Working Paper Prepared by the Secretariat*, A/AC, 109/1163, 8 July 1993, p. 11.

38 *The Boston Globe*, 18 July 1993.

39 United Nations, *Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Question of Western Sahara. Report of the Secretary-General*, UN General Assembly, 48th session, A/48/426, 27 September 1993, p. 5.

on the ground who had thought that real progress was finally being made on one of the prime issues of contention between King Hasan and his Sahrawi opponents ⁴⁰

Continued disputes over voter-registration criteria, along with a general lack of confidence in the peace process by the POLISARIO because of its conviction that UN efforts were skewed toward Morocco, prevented the holding of the referendum once again. In an annex to his report of 10 May 1994, Butrus-Ghali set new criteria for the acceptance of the testimony of the "tribal elders" (*Shuyukh*). He also suggested another test for the inclusion or exclusion of prospective voters based on tribal affiliation. In particular, he proposed that if any member of a Sahrawi tribal "subfraction" (family group) was present within the Territory at the time of the 1974 Spanish census, he should be allowed to proceed to the next stage of the eligibility process laid out by Pérez de Cuéllar in his report of 19 December 1991.

This new proposal did not mean that mere membership in a subfraction "existing within the Territory" (i.e., the Western Sahara) in 1974 would, by itself, entitle a person to vote. The December 1991 residency requirements would still be applied. On the other hand, if no member of a tribal subfraction was inside the Territory in 1974, the entire group automatically would be disqualified from voting. This was to ensure that individuals, possibly alien to the Territory, would not be included and would not affect the outcome of the referendum ⁴¹. Morocco objected to this scheme because it would have excluded from the eligible list those subfraction members who were part of a Sahrawi tribe but were absent from the Western Sahara in 1974 due to factors beyond their control ⁴².

For its part, the POLISARIO was intensely skeptical of Butrus-Ghali's set of proposals put forward on this issue in March 1994. The POLISARIO's representatives stated that the criteria relative to membership in tribal subfractions did not take into account the history of the Western Sahara. They proposed that those Sahrawis whose subfraction had a majority of members, counted by the Madrid authorities in 1974, be permitted to progress to the next stage of the eligibility-determination process. Morocco rejected this as too arbitrary, and Butrus-Ghali tended to agree, stating that the POLISARIO's recommendations would be "mathematically impossible" to carry into practice, although he did state that Morocco's own proposals were "too imprecise and too broad" to be workable ⁴³.

The secretary-general poured cold water on another POLISARIO proposal regarding the testimony of the Sahrawi tribal elders on the length of residency of their subfractions in the Western Sahara and their tribal membership. This proposal was to allow the elders to decide essentially by themselves the facts regarding the presence or absence of a tribal subfraction in the Territory in 1973-74, when the *Shuyukh* were last appointed by the Spanish colonial regime. Butrus-Ghali said that this would accomplish little, since the

40 United Nations, *The Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report by the Secretary-General*, S/1994/283, 10 March 1994, p. 5.

41 Ibid., pp. 10-14 (Annex 1).

42 Ibid., p. 11.

43 Ibid.

elders had already purportedly shown a tendency to reflect the wishes of whichever party to the conflict they lived under

Summing up this most important set of developments, Butrus-Ghali succinctly addressed the basic problem—the differences between Morocco and the POLISARIO reflected the “fundamentally divergent positions of the parties in the establishment of the electorate, one party (i.e., Morocco) wanting to make all persons who are Saharans eligible to participate in the referendum, and the other (i.e., the POLISARIO) wanting to limit the electorate as far as possible to those counted in the Territory in 1974.”⁴⁴ Having criticized the positions of both disputants, he held fast to his compromise proposal as the best way to ensure that the final enrollment of voters could proceed without further delay

But the most prominent sections of the secretary-general’s report of 10 March were not those dealing with voter qualification. They were those that addressed MINURSO’s overall future in light of the deadlock in attempting to arrange for negotiations between Morocco and the POLISARIO. Butrus-Ghali set out three options. The first was to hold the referendum regardless of whether Morocco or the POLISARIO was cooperative. Under this course of action, MINURSO would wind up its duties by 31 December 1994. The second option was to continue the UN effort to reconcile the parties’ respective positions. The third option was to abandon the UN endeavor in the Western Sahara entirely, for a fixed period of time, or to indefinitely suspend voter registration, while keeping some MINURSO troops in the Territory to enforce the cease-fire.⁴⁵

In his report and in his cost estimates for each option in an addendum to his main report,⁴⁶ Butrus-Ghali appeared to favor either a quick referendum or the abandonment of the whole MINURSO endeavor. Once again, it looked as though the UN venture in the Western Sahara was nearing collapse.

As it had done twice before, the UN Security Council, by a unanimous vote, passed Resolution 907 on 29 March 1994,⁴⁷ rejecting the drastic implications of the first and third options, and urging the Identification Commission to continue its work into the summer of 1994. It also called for conciliation efforts to continue, despite the disagreements, and for MINURSO to be reassessed at a future (unspecified) date. The UN Security Council welcomed the secretary-general’s compromise proposal on voter eligibility criteria set forth in his March 1994 report, but said little in favor of it, although it did not scotch the proposal outright.⁴⁸ All the permanent members of the Security Council—including France—showed themselves more willing to prolong the peace process than some observers might have believed.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., pp. 7–8.

46 See United Nations, *The Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General Addendum*, S/1994/283/Add. 1, 21 March 1994.

47 United Nations, *Resolution Adopted by the Security Council*, Resolution 907, 3355th Meeting, S/RES/907, 29 March 1994.

48 Ibid., p. 2.

By the time Butrus-Ghali's next progress report was issued, on 12 July 1994,⁴⁹ the whole MINURSO endeavor appeared shakier than ever, despite obvious Security Council backing and considerable progress on the voter registration issue. Australia, Canada, and Switzerland pulled out all or most of their peace-keeping contingents from the Territory, and substitute forces from other countries had to be found.⁵⁰ This, by itself, was a worrying development, since more, not fewer, troops and police would be urgently required if Butrus-Ghali's new 15 February 1995 deadline for the referendum was to be met.⁵¹ All the more so since it appeared that voter identification was beginning to gather momentum, with lists being posted and updated not only in the Western Sahara and in the Tindouf region, but also in northern Mauritania, formal voter registration, in fact, began on 28 August 1994.

Aside from the still-contentious voter question, the problem of observers from the OAU remained. King Hasan, for his part, refused at first to allow any OAU presence in his "Saharan provinces," noting that the African body had admitted the POLISARIO-proclaimed SADR to full membership in 1982. Morocco demanded that the OAU expel the SADR before sending observers to monitor the situation in the Western Sahara. When this request fell on deaf ears, a few OAU personnel slated to take part in the monitoring of the plebiscite were sent, and the POLISARIO scored a minor victory. King Hasan's troops were then required to begin a partial withdrawal from the Territory by early 1995, a measure that, under the latest secretary-general's report, was to start no later than mid-August 1995.⁵² Furthermore, both sides were supposed to begin exchanging prisoners of war (something Morocco had always refused to do) and releasing political detainees. To date, neither of those requirements has been met.

By March 1995, Butrus-Ghali hoped that, if the process continued uninterrupted, the transition period could begin in August 1995 and that the referendum might finally be held in January 1996.⁵³ But the POLISARIO's several complaints concerning Moroccan and UN conduct during the Identification Commission's work had to be addressed by the UN special representative. The POLISARIO charged that MINURSO's application forms for voting were unclear and incomplete. It claimed that the forms did not allow space for Sahrawis to mention alternative criteria for qualification that they might wish to use. The POLISARIO also claimed that some census documents from the Spanish colonial period had been lost, or allegedly stolen by Morocco, and delivered later to many new arrivals, namely, Moroccan settlers to the Western Sahara. The Sahrawi leaders reiterated that only Spanish documents—with the exception contained in paragraph 16 of UN Document

49 See *The Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report by the Secretary-General*, S/1994/819, 12 July 1994.

50 Ibid., pp. 2–3.

51 In his report to the Security Council in November 1994, UN secretary-general Butrus-Ghali stated that "many months will be required to make sufficient progress in the identification process to be close to determining a date for the referendum." UN Security Council, *The Situation Concerning the Western Sahara: Report by the Secretary-General*, S/1994/1257, 5 November 1994, p. 7.

52 UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning the Western Sahara*, S/1994/1420, 14 December 1994.

53 UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning the Western Sahara*, S/1995/240, 30 March 1995.

26185 of 28 July 1993—were sufficiently reliable to be used by MINURSO. Finally, they alleged that Western deputies, international jurists, and the foreign media, by the summer of 1995, had not been allowed sufficient free access and free movement inside the Territory to observe what was taking place.⁵⁴

In his testimony before the US Congress on 25 January 1995, US ambassador Frank Ruddy, former deputy chairman of the Identification Commission of the MINURSO Peace-keeping Operation, corroborated the POLISARIO's grievances. The conservative Republican ambassador denounced what he saw as Morocco's obstructionist tactics and stated unequivocally that MINURSO had lost credibility due to what he described as "thuggery" on the part of Moroccan officials who had perverted the UN mission and were practically controlling it.⁵⁵ He reported that Moroccans prohibited UN flags in UN buildings where identification was to take place.⁵⁶ Erik Jensen, the head of MINURSO and Butrus-Ghali's special representative for the Western Sahara since late June 1995 (replacing Ya'qub Khan), himself agreed that there were still "endless obstacles" to the process of identification.⁵⁷ The accusations, which were corroborated by other independent sources,⁵⁸ were credible enough to induce the UN Security Council, in April 1995, to set up a fact-finding commission to investigate the situation in the Territory in June. The commission confirmed that there were many obstacles facing the identification process and determined that the January 1996 date for the referendum might not be realistic.⁵⁹ Indeed, in view of the many obstacles concerning the identification process and the additional lists of thousands of voters submitted by the Moroccans, Butrus-Ghali agreed that the process needed more time and, thus, requested in his September 1995 report that MINURSO's mission be extended.⁶⁰ The UN Security Council, in a report that highlighted exasperation on the part of its members, decided to prolong MINURSO until January 1996. It requested Butrus-Ghali "to report by 15 January 1996 on progress achieved towards the implementation of the Settlement Plan, and to state in that report whether or

54 Letter of Bachir Mustapha Sayed, Sahrawi coordinator with MINURSO, to Erik Jensen, special deputy representative, president of the Identification Commission of MINURSO, 7 September 1994. Butrus-Ghali's report of December 1994 took note of this problem. The European parliament issued a similar complaint with respect to access of foreign observers to the Territory, see *Parlement Européen, Résolution, B4-0424/RC, PE 188 683/RC 1, Doc FR/RC/269/269759 hd*, 16 March 1995, p. 2.

55 Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, "Review of United Nations Operations and Peacekeeping," Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Washington, DC, 25 January 1995. Although he highlighted Morocco's delaying tactics in his testimony, Ambassador Frank Ruddy spared King Hasan II from any direct criticism, arguing that were he aware of "the thuggery" of his officials in the occupied territory, Hasan would remedy the situation.

56 Ibid. Although the United Nations questioned the credibility of Ambassador Ruddy, it did acknowledge some of his accusations. The UN report, however, was silent on the most important charges regarding the weaknesses of MINURSO. UN General Assembly, *Document A/49/884*, 5 April 1995.

57 Cited in the *Guardian*, 25 February 1995. It was reported that UN technicians in al-'Uyun uncovered a wiretapping system on 4 lines to UN Headquarters in New York, see the *New York Times*, 5 March 1995.

58 See Thomas Dreger's article in *Woz Wochenzeitung* (Zurich), 6 April 1995.

59 UN Security Council, *Report to the Security Council Mission to Western Sahara from 3 to 9 June 1995*, S/1995/498, 21 June 1995.

60 UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General*, S/1995/779, 8 September 1995.

not the transitional period will be able to begin by 31 May 1996”⁶¹ The Security Council made it clear that if there was no real progress in the meantime, the secretary-general should “present the Security Council with alternative options for consideration, including the possibility of the withdrawal of MINURSO”⁶²

CONCLUSION

The end of the conflict in the Western Sahara is still quite problematic. The obstacles to the implementation of the peace plan are so numerous that there is little ground for optimism. The refusal of Morocco to negotiate with the POLISARIO makes matters more complicated, especially when the POLISARIO accuses the United Nations, including the secretary-general, of favoring Morocco.⁶³ On the other hand, dismantling MINURSO and leaving the Western Sahara for good—one of the suggestions made by Butrus-Ghali in his March 1994 report—could have dangerous consequences for the Territory and for North Africa. Indeed, if MINURSO were to be withdrawn,⁶⁴ it would be extremely difficult to re-establish any UN presence there in the future, blocking any further intervention by the world body in Saharan affairs. The abandonment of MINURSO would also cripple at a stroke its only real accomplishment: the maintenance of a stable cease-fire between Morocco and the POLISARIO. If MINURSO were eliminated as a barrier between the two parties to the dispute, the way would be open to a speedy resumption of armed conflict between the two parties, with the possible involvement of other regional actors, such as Algeria.

MINURSO’s operations have been jeopardized by a US congressional decision in April 1995 to cancel the \$14.5 million in funds appropriated the previous year for the UN Mission in the Territory.⁶⁵ Fortunately, the European Union (EU), which too is anxious to see an end to the conflict, will provide some funding if solicited by the United Nations.⁶⁶ Even Great Britain, whose peace-keeping forces were withdrawn from MINURSO when the process seemed frozen, has expressed its willingness to send back these forces and make some financial contributions. It is especially interested in increasing the number of Identification Centers to help the United Nations fulfill its mission.⁶⁷

King Hasan once declared that “what is important for us—even if we should wait for 20 years—is an international endorsement. I would like that our deed of property of the

61 United Nations, UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1017 (1995), 22 September 1995 (New York: United Nations, 1995), p. 2.

62 Ibid.

63 Bachir Mustapha Sayed, the POLISARIO’s second in command, said it explicitly in an interview published in the Algerian newspaper *El Watan* on 10 August 1994.

64 In May 1995, Butrus-Ghali asked the UN Security Council to extend the mandate of MINURSO until September 1995, but the Security Council, in its resolution 995 of 26 May 1995, agreed to extend it only until the end of June, thus showing how precarious the existence of MINURSO had become. In June 1995, however, the Security Council decided to extend MINURSO’s mandate by another three months.

65 *Washington Post*, 15 April 1995.

66 Communication to Yahia Zoubir by high-ranking member of the European Commission, London, 24 May 1995.

67 Interview conducted by Yahia Zoubir with British Foreign Office professional, London, 24 May 1995.

Western Sahara be deposited at the Land Registry of the United Nations in order to forever prevent any contention⁶⁸ Moroccans are hopeful that the United Nations will help them accomplish this goal The Code of Conduct that Butrus-Ghali submitted to the two parties in December 1994, which was rejected by both parties in August 1995, contains an implicit recognition of Moroccan authority over the Territory, could not but expose the secretary-general to criticism Yet, aware of the implications of a less-than-fair and regular referendum, the United States and, more recently, France—claiming to have adopted a less pro-Moroccan stance⁶⁹—have been careful not to give Butrus-Ghali a free hand on this matter At the same time, they still have not shown the political will to terminate this conflict, which, if not resolved in an equitable fashion, might result in a much more serious regional war The presence of yet another optimistic referendum schedule cannot, in short, obscure the real possibility for disaster in a region shaken by multifarious crises, especially when the POLISARIO is considering the resumption of hostilities to break the stalemate⁷⁰ All sides understand the significance of the failure of the peace process, as was made clear by Butrus-Ghali himself in his reports of March, May, and September 1995⁷¹



68 "Un entretien avec le roi du Maroc" (An interview with the King of Morocco), *Le Monde*, 2 September 1992, cited in Philippe Moreau Defarges, "L'Organisation des Nations Unies et le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes" (The United Nations organization and the self-determination of peoples), *Politique Étrangère* (Foreign Policy) no. 3 (Autumn 1993), p. 666 (translated from the French by Yahia Zoubir)

69 Interview conducted by Yahia Zoubir with French Foreign Ministry official, 6 September 1994 The French now seem to favor a UN solution, but, one might argue that they now could do no more than what they have already accomplished on behalf of Morocco in the Security Council, especially since December 1991 Furthermore, France does not want to see the Islamists come to power in Algeria Therefore, weakening the Algerian position on this question will be counter-productive

70 See *FBIS-NES*, 95-165, 25 August 1995, pp. 25-26 POLISARIO officials argue that if the UN fails to implement the peace plan, Sahrawis would have no choice but to return to the battlefield

71 UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General*, S/1995/240, 30 March 1995, S/1995/404, 19 May 1995, S/1995/779, 8 September 1995

UNITED NATIONS' AND NON-UNITED NATIONS' PEACE-KEEPING IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI SECTOR: FIVE SCENARIOS

Joshua Sinai

Several types of United Nations' (UN) and non-UN peace-keeping operations (PKOs) are likely to play a significant role in the Arab-Israeli sector, with the probable resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the next few years. In order to ascertain the nature of these future PKOs, this paper assesses the prospects for five alternative scenarios. It concludes that these PKOs are not likely to be homogeneous in nature, with three types of PKOs apt to play such a role: UN-commanded PKOs, non-UN, US-led multinational PKOs, and joint Arab-Israeli security arrangements.

With the probable resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the next few years, several types of peace-keeping operations (PKOs) are likely to play a significant role in the interim phase as transitional confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) that could lead to greater inter-state security between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In particular, PKOs will supervise, monitor, and verify compliance with the security arrangements specified in the peace treaties signed by Israel and its bordering Arab states.

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(including the independent Palestinian state that is likely to emerge from the ongoing peace process in the late 1990s¹)

These PKOs, however, are unlikely to be homogeneous in nature, due to the different security-related requirements along the five borders with Israel—Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, a Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza, and Syria. In general, three types of PKOs will doubtless play a role in the Arab-Israeli sector:² 1) UN-commanded PKOs of the traditional or second-generation variety, 2) non-UN, US-led multinational PKOs, and 3) joint Arab-Israeli security arrangements. In the post-conflict phase, these PKOs, in their various configurations, would carry out various assignments: interpositioning between armies, including supervising and patrolling demilitarized and neutral buffers, supervising, monitoring, and verifying compliance to peace treaties, supervising and monitoring the disengagement and redeployment of forces, including the demobilization and disarmament of sub-state militias, preventing the presence of arms in an area, mediating small-scale border disputes, and, in certain cases, providing humanitarian assistance or assisting in various aspects of nation-building.

This discussion does not intend to suggest that the transition from conflict to peace will be nonviolent; in fact, it is liable to be accompanied by certain low-intensity forms of terrorism or guerrilla attacks by rejectionist elements on all sides. Furthermore, the military buildups currently underway throughout the region are likely to continue. Thus, the primary role in safeguarding the new boundaries will continue to be provided by national armies, as the peace-keeping forces, whatever form they assume, are not intended to counterbalance militarily the armies of the conflicting parties. In fact, the international legitimacy that is accorded PKOs is largely derived from their political and moral, rather than their military, status.³ This is the case unless they possess the deterrent capability provided by the backing of a superpower or a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

This subject is significant because, while the Arab-Israeli sector has long been regarded as an “active laboratory” for establishing a variety of different UN peace-keeping operations, usually following wars,⁴ in the mid-1990s, new, non-UN peace-keeping missions have either been established or are being contemplated in order to adapt to the new, post-conflict reality in the region. Thus, historically, five UN PKOs, one non-UN multinational PKO, and a temporary international PKO have been deployed in this sector from 1948 to 1995 as part of the international effort to provide a sense of normalcy to an otherwise highly-volatile region. There have also been some notable failures in some of

1 According to the September 1993 Israeli-PLO “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” (hereafter referred to as the DOP), the negotiations on the permanent status of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza will commence in 1996.

2 The term “Arab-Israeli sector” is used to connote what is generally referred to as the zone of the “Arab-Israeli conflict” or “Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”

3 Bertil Stjernfelt, *The Sinai Peace Front: UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East, 1973–1980* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 211.

4 Avi Beker, “The United Nations and Security Regimes: The Unfulfilled Vision,” in Efraim Inbar, ed., *Regional Security Regimes: Israel and Its Neighbors* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 89.

these PKOs, the lessons of which will determine the types of PKOs that are likely to be established in this new inter-state-oriented, post-conflict era

This new era, in the mid-1990s, represents the second major transformation in multinational peace-keeping in the region. The first transformation occurred in the Egyptian-Israeli sector in the aftermath of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) was terminated in July 1979, and the US-manned Sinai Field Mission (SFM), created in February 1976, assumed its responsibilities. The non-UN, US-led Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai became the primary PKO in the peninsula three years later, on 25 April 1982.

In order to ascertain the nature of the future PKOs that are likely to be deployed in the post-conflict era, this paper assesses the prospects for five alternative scenarios. This assumes, of course, that comprehensive peace treaties will characterize the relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors in the foreseeable future. In the event that such treaties are not concluded, these scenarios should nonetheless retain their validity.

It is not the purpose of this paper to define in exact terms what new security arrangements will probably be reached in the various peace agreements, that is the prerogative and responsibility of the various governments concerned. Rather, the purpose of this paper is to prepare the ground for consideration of some of the issues that the five scenarios would likely produce.

In the first scenario, the current UN PKOs—the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and the non-UN MFO in the Sinai—will remain in place.

The second scenario is that, in order to respond to new security requirements, the current traditional-type UN PKOs will be reconfigured and expanded into what are termed second-generation PKOs, with added responsibilities for peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and nation-building.

In the third scenario, all the UN PKOs will be replaced by the non-UN multinational PKOs of the MFO-Sinai type. They will be staffed by US and other multinational contingents, and be under US command and control.

The fourth scenario is that the future PKOs will consist of joint Arab-Israeli security arrangements to the exclusion of the United Nations, the United States, and other multinational contingents.

The fifth scenario is that the future PKOs will consist of a combination of UN, US-led multinational, and joint Arab-Israeli peace-keeping operations.

PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS DEFINED

Before proceeding to a discussion of the five scenarios, it is necessary to define “peace-keeping operations.” In its most basic context, it refers to “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the

prevention of conflict and the making of peace”⁵ A distinction is made between military observer missions and peace-keeping operations Military observer missions are generally composed of unarmed officers who observe and report on the maintenance of a cease-fire, or investigate violations and recommend action to improve the situation Peace-keeping operations, on the other hand, have expanded mandates, are lightly or heavily armed, and are larger in terms of personnel, equipment, and cost These forces assist in preventing the recurrence of fighting, restoring and maintaining peace, and promoting a return to normal conditions by running patrols, and interposing physically between the opposing parties

The term “peace-keeping operations” has also evolved over the years from traditional to second-generation-type missions to reflect the more ambitious and complex mandates authorized by the UN Security Council As a result, they have acquired new capabilities and roles, and are composed of unarmed, lightly armed, or even heavily armed military troops, police, administrative, political, economic, and humanitarian-relief civilian components⁶ This evolution, in turn, has spawned new terms to describe peace-keeping operations, such as “peace operations,” “operations other than war,” “wider peace-keeping,” “muscular peace-keeping,” “second-generation peace-keeping,” “the new peace-keeping partnership,” “preventive diplomacy,” “peace enforcement,” and even “peace-making”

The legal provisions for the UN’s involvement in international peace and security are the 111 articles of the UN Charter, although this document does not specifically mention the term “peace-keeping” Under the Charter’s Chapter VI, the Security Council, which has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,”⁷ is authorized to use peaceful measures such as “negotiation, conciliation, and mediation,”⁸ or to recommend terms of settlement to help settle international disputes⁹ When the provisions of Chapter VI are insufficient to resolve a conflict by peaceful means, Chapter VII grants the Security Council the authority to take enforcement measures, including the use of military force and economic sanctions, if necessary, to “maintain or restore international peace and security”¹⁰ In situations where the provisions in Chapter VI have been insufficient and the application of Chapter VII has been impossible, what is termed “Chapter VI-and-a-half” is used by the Security Council to authorize the formation of a multinational force, under the secretary-general’s direct authority, in order to de-escalate and contain conflict around the world

A distinction is made between UN-commanded PKOs and UN-authorized, but non-UN-commanded, multinational “peace enforcement actions,” in which a major power

5 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1992), p. 11

6 See, for example, Robert C. R. Siekmann, *Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-Keeping Forces* (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), p. vii

7 Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, p. 15

8 Shashi Tharoor, *Peace-Keeping: Principles, Problems, Prospects* (Research Report 9-93) (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Strategic Research Department, December 1993), p. 3

9 *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice* (New York: United Nations, September 1993), pp. 20-1

10 *Ibid.*, p. 22

or regional organization is designated or contracted by the Security Council to lead a military campaign against an aggressor state, such as the US-led military campaigns in Korea (1950–53) and the US-led multinational force in Haiti (1994–95)

In certain circumstances where the deployment of a UN PKO is not preferred or considered to be impractical, non-UN, multinational peace-keeping missions have been established without UN command or participation (although not necessarily without unofficial UN consent), such as the MFO in the Sinai and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)

SCENARIO I EXTENSION OF CURRENT PKO MANDATES

In the first scenario, the UNTSO, UNDOF, and UNIFIL missions, as well as the non-UN MFO in the Sinai, will continue to carry out their traditional military observation and peace-keeping duties in this sector

UNTSO was established by UN Security Council Resolution 50 of 29 May 1948. It is the UN's longest-running mission. It is a military observer mission. It has an indefinite mandate because of concern that a constant UN presence is required in this turbulent region. UNTSO's mandate is limited to "observing, reporting, and investigating" cease-fire violations and other border incidents in the course of supervising the implementation of the General Armistice Agreements (GAAs) along the Arab-Israeli borders initially signed in 1948. It serves as a deterrent to potential aggression by the contending sides by its presence as a neutral observer force, while using no force or enforcement powers to resolve these violations. Its military force is unarmed to ensure its status as a neutral observer, and it has little military equipment or staff.

UNTSO's activities have evolved over the years in response to developments in the Arab-Israeli arena, resulting in the force performing new roles following the 1956 Suez Crisis, the June 1967 War, and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. UNTSO, which is headquartered in Government House, in Jerusalem, serves as a "headquarters service" for all the UN's PKOs in the Middle East. In 1995, it consisted of 174 military observers (its smallest size to date). Because of its long-standing experience, UNTSO personnel have been made available at short notice to form the nucleus of new UN peace-keeping operations. Despite the evolution in its peace-keeping role, however, the force's size has decreased over time as a result of the formation of UNEF I and II, UNDOF, and UNIFIL.

In its current configuration, UNTSO is assigned to provide three sectors with military observers and other assistance. In the first sector, organized as Observer Group Egypt (OGE), and headquartered in Isma'iliyya, in the Suez Canal region, UNTSO operates six outposts in the Sinai region of Egypt and conducts patrols in much of the peninsula.¹¹ A few UNTSO personnel also maintain an office in the Gaza Strip. In the second and third sectors, UNTSO personnel assist the UNIFIL and UNDOF PKOs in the region. Thus, a

¹¹ Although UNTSO observers patrol much of the Sinai Peninsula, their role is independent of the peace-keeping functions performed by the MFO-Sinai mission. It is at the insistence of the Egyptian government—not Israel—that UNTSO is deployed in the Sinai.

small detachment of UNTSO observers are detailed as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) to assist UNIFIL in the areas where UNIFIL infantry units are not deployed. In the Israeli-Syrian sector, UNTSO personnel are detailed in the form of Observer Group Golan (OGG) to maintain observation posts located on the Israeli side of the Golan Heights where UNDOF observers are not deployed.¹² A separate UNTSO unit, the Observer Detachment Damascus (ODD), represents UNTSO in Syria and performs support functions for OGG. An UNTSO liaison office was maintained in Amman, Jordan, until April 1995, when it was shut down.

UNDOF became operational in June 1974, following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 350 of 31 May 1974 that called for a new PKO to be deployed on the Golan Heights following the separation-of-forces agreement between Syria and Israel.¹³

The mission's mandate is to supervise the disengagement of forces on the Golan, to supervise and monitor the area of separation, to carry out inspections of the areas of limited armaments and forces, to assist in maintaining the cease-fire, and to undertake some activities of a humanitarian nature, such as arranging the transfer of prisoners and war-dead between Syria and Israel. It operates a series of checkpoints and observation posts, and conducts ground patrols in the area of separation, which lies on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights.¹⁴

As of 30 November 1994, UNDOF comprised 1,036 troops, consisting of 759 infantry and 200 logistics and support personnel, 77 headquarters personnel, and 120 local and international civilian personnel.¹⁵ UNDOF consisted of national contingents from Austria (464), Canada (215), and Poland (357).¹⁶ The mission is assisted by a detachment of some 80 UNTSO military observers.¹⁷

UNIFIL was established by UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 of 19 March 1978, after Israel's invasion of south Lebanon¹⁸ five days earlier.¹⁹ The force's initial mandate was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, assist in restoring international peace and security in the region by acting as a buffer between the Israeli and Palestinian forces, and assist the Lebanese government to ensure the return of its effective

12 As a remnant of the Cold War, however, the Chinese, French, Russian, and US contingents in UNTSO are restricted from being deployed on the Golan Heights.

13 United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping* (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1990), p. 101.

14 *United Nations Peace-Keeping Information Notes, Update May 1994* (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, June 1994), pp. 13–14.

15 Report of the Secretary-General, *Financing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces in the Middle East: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force*, A/49/553/Add. 1 (New York: United Nations, General Assembly, 12 April 1995), pp. 15–16.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 16.

17 *United Nations Peace-Keeping Information Notes, Update May 1994*, p. 13.

18 The term "South Lebanon" refers to the area south of the Awali River, bound in the west by the ancient port cities of Tyre and Sidon, and in the east by Mount Hermon, which straddles the Syrian-Lebanese border.

19 Israel launched Operation Litani in retaliation for Palestinian guerilla attacks carried out near Tel Aviv on 11 March 1978. The objectives of Israel's invasion were to extend the territory under the control of Major Sa'ad Haddad to a 10-kilometer-wide security zone along Lebanon's southern border, and to eradicate the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in south Lebanon as a threat to Israel.

authority in south Lebanon UNIFIL has also extended humanitarian assistance to the population of the area, particularly following the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 UNIFIL's area of operation does not include the 850-kilometer security zone stretching along the Israeli-Lebanese border controlled by the pro-Israeli South Lebanese Army (SLA), which is commanded (by a Lebanese Maronite) and staffed by local Lebanese (Christians, Shi'is, and Druze)

In April 1994, UNIFIL had 5,313 troops, who were assisted by 59 UNTSO military observers and 540 international and local civilian staff²⁰

The MFO in the Sinai was established on 25 April 1982 as an independent, international observation and verification organization called for in the provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty²¹ It succeeded UNEF II,²² which was created following the October 1973 War to supervise the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement (known as the Sinai I Agreement of January 1974), and was terminated in July 1979, and the US-manned Sinai Field Mission (SFM), which was established in February 1976 as a result of the Sinai II Agreement of 4 September 1975 that called upon the United States to install and operate an early-warning system to monitor the flow of traffic at the entrances to the Jiddi and Mitla Passes, and at the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance stations located at opposite ends of the Jiddi Valley²³

The MFO-Sinai is a non-UN PKO due to two factors First, the Soviet Union, at the urging of rejectionist Arab governments, had threatened to exercise its veto in the Security Council to prevent the deployment of a UN PKO to implement the terms of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty Second, the UN secretary-general, Kurt Waldheim, was not particularly enthusiastic about deploying such a mission He argued that UN peace-keeping was appropriate to help maintain a cease-fire while the parties to a dispute worked out a political solution It was not appropriate, he maintained, in cases where a formal peace treaty had been concluded which effectively ended the dispute

The MFO's mission is to "observe and report" on limitations on military forces and equipment in four security zones—three zones in the Sinai, in Egypt, and one in Israel along the international border²⁴ It operates early-warning systems by means of check-points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts, and ensures freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran²⁵

The MFO is funded on an equal basis by Egypt, Israel, and the United States, with

20 *United Nations Peace-Keeping Information Notes, Update May 1994*, p. 15

21 For an assessment of the MFO, see Mona Ghali, "Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East," Occasional Paper No. 12 (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, May 1993), and John Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 160–98

22 UNEF II, in turn, succeeded UNEF I, which was terminated following its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in May 1967, during the escalation in tensions between Egypt and Israel, prior to the outbreak of the June 1967 War

23 Multinational Force and Observers, *The Multinational Force and Observers: Servants of Peace* (Rome: Multinational Force and Observers, June 1993), p. 7

24 Multinational Force and Observers, *Annual Report of the Director General* (Rome: Multinational Force and Observers, 25 April 1991), p. 5

25 *Ibid.*

Germany and Japan agreeing to fund any shortfall ²⁶ In fiscal year 1995, its budget was estimated at \$51 million ²⁷

The mission's military contingents are provided by the nations participating in its force. The MFO consists of a Civilian Observer Unit as well as infantry, aviation, coastal patrol, and military police units. In November 1994, it was composed of 1,988 military personnel from 11 countries ²⁸ The United States is the largest contributor, with 985 personnel in the form of a light infantry battalion, a headquarters staff, and a logistics support unit ²⁹

SCENARIO II COMBINING OLD AND NEW PKOs

In the second scenario, in the event of comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace treaties, the mandates of the three UN PKOs would be reconfigured and expanded, and a fourth UN PKO would be established along the new Israeli-Palestinian border. In contrast to the first-generation-type PKOs, these new operations would have more ambitious mandates, including provisions for CSBMs and peace enforcement. They would also have larger forces, strengthened military capability, expanded areas of operation, and would be much more expensive to maintain. Because it is difficult to forecast precisely how the UN's new PKOs would be reconfigured, the following discussion is general in nature.

As part of this scenario, a new, second-generation-type UN PKO would be established, probably in the late 1990s, to implement the transitional security arrangements accompanying the establishment of the new Palestinian state in portions of the West Bank and Gaza. Its duties would include monitoring and verifying the withdrawal and redeployment of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) from the new Palestinian territory, serving as a buffer between the Palestinian and Israeli forces, verifying an arms control regime, supervising and monitoring the demilitarization process, including the demobilization and disarmament of extremist Palestinian and Israeli armed groups in the area, supervising and verifying the evacuation of Jewish settlements, assisting in the establishment and training of new Palestinian police forces and border guards, accompanying Israeli-Palestinian joint patrols along the common border, until an exclusively Palestinian force assumes this task, supervising critical transit routes, such as protecting the corridor between the West Bank and Gaza, and bridges and roads linking the Palestinian state with Jordan and Egypt, assisting in nation-building (for example, supervising elections in the new Palestinian state, and helping to organize new Palestinian judicial institutions), and providing humanitarian assistance ³⁰

26 Multinational Force and Observers, *The Multinational Force and Observers* (Rome: Multinational Force and Observers, December 1987), p. 19.

27 Multinational Force and Observers, *Annual Report of the Director General, Multinational Force and Observers* (Rome: Multinational Force and Observers, January 1995), p. 7.

28 Ibid., p. 3.

29 Ibid.

30 These potential tasks are based on Naomi Weinberger, "An Israeli-Palestinian Security Regime: The Role of Peacekeeping Forces," in Efraim Karsh and Gregory Mahler, eds., *Israel at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Peace* (New York: British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 113-21, and Juergen Dedring, "The Role

In the event of an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty, if both parties to the agreement decided to retain the UN mission in their midst, UNDOF would be reconfigured into a larger military force and would operate in the demilitarized Golan Heights to be evacuated by Israel. The UN force would be complemented by US early-warning systems. The reconfigured UNDOF would replace the departing Israeli forces in the territory, and would monitor and verify their withdrawal, as well as the redeployment of Syrian troops, away from the area. The UN force would conduct peace-keeping operations in the demilitarized territory, and monitor and verify adherence to the terms of the peace agreement by both sides.³¹

In the event of an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty (which would inevitably follow an Israeli-Syrian accord), UNIFIL would be reconfigured, expanded, and upgraded militarily. UNIFIL's role would be enhanced, especially in terms of its military capability, in order "to offer Israel a credible alternative to the 'security zone'."³² UNIFIL would implement the security provisions of the peace treaty by supervising, monitoring, and verifying the withdrawal of the IDF and its allied army, the SLA, from south Lebanon, as well as the withdrawal of radical Lebanese groups, such as Hizballah and Amal, from the region. The force would likely be granted by the Security Council a peace enforcement mandate to ensure that the territory along the Israeli-Lebanese border would be completely demilitarized and free of any potential source of aggression toward Israel. Additional functions for the expanded UNIFIL would include assisting in the reintegration of the SLA into the national army, training a reinvigorated Lebanese national police force in modern policing methods, and providing mediation, reconciliation, and other confidence-building measures to assist the Lebanese in stabilizing the southern region.³³

SCENARIO III NON-UN MULTINATIONAL PKOs

In the third scenario, in the event of Arab-Israeli peace, all UN PKOs (except for the MFO-Sinai) would be replaced by new non-UN multinational PKOs. These would likely be staffed by the United States, and under US command and control, although with the participation of other multinational contingents acceptable to all sides.

In this scenario, a non-UN PKO would be established to implement the terms of the September 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of May 1994, and the Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995.³⁴ In fact, a number of steps have already taken

of the United Nations in the Middle East," in Elise Boulding, ed., *Building Peace in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 223-33.

31 See Andrew Bacevich, et al., *Supporting Peace: America's Role in an Israeli-Syrian Peace Agreement* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994), p. 34.

32 Fida Nasrallah, *Prospects for Lebanon: The Questions of South Lebanon* (Oxford, UK: Centre for Lebanese Studies, May 1992), p. 15.

33 Ibid., pp. 16-17.

34 A related issue is the future of the United Nations Relief and Works Organization for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). In fact, in UNRWA's annual report of 21 September 1994, its commissioner-general acknowledged that with the establishment of the Palestine National Authority (PNA) in Gaza and the extension of self-rule in the West Bank, "UNRWA [has] entered a new era in its relationship with

place between Israel and the PLO-led Palestine National Authority (PNA) to deploy a non-UN PKO in the West Bank, although with an extremely limited mandate. An example of such a PKO was the establishment of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) observer mission following the 25 February 1994 massacre of 29 Muslim worshippers in the Islamic mosque-part of the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. The TIPH's deployment resulted from the agreement by Israel and the PNA on 31 March 1994 to request Denmark, Norway, and Italy to provide personnel for an international force of observers to assist in promoting stability and restoring normal life in the city of Hebron. This was followed on 2 May by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding by the five parties, with Denmark, Norway, and Italy agreeing to provide 160 observers to the TIPH.³⁵ In accordance with its mandate, the force's observers monitored events in Hebron for an initial three-month period, from 8 May to 8 August 1994, and reported on security incidents to a joint Israeli-Palestinian monitoring committee.

A second potential deployment of a non-UN PKO would be a US-led MFO deployed along the newly-demarcated border separating Israel and the Palestinian state. Such an operation would be established because of Israeli apprehension about the utility of a UN PKO in this highly security-conscious sector. It would perform the functions envisioned for a second-generation-type UN PKO.

In the case of an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty, a US-led MFO would be deployed on the Golan Heights as a transitional instrument to implement the terms of the treaty.³⁶ In the formation of this MFO, a number of steps would be taken to allay Israeli—as well as Syrian—security concerns resulting from the withdrawal of the IDF from the Golan. First, the United States would exercise complete command and control responsibility over the operation. Second, the size of the US participation in the MFO would likely consist of a battalion of some 1,000 light infantry troops and a contingent of civilian observers. Other national contingents in the MFO might include Canadian and Austrian peace-keeping troops, because of their highly regarded, long-term, and extensive experience as participants in UNDOF. The MFO would also include headquarters, patrol, logistics, and signal units. Third, although the MFO would not be designed to engage an attacking force, it would serve as a tripwire. It would likely be equipped with some armored personnel carriers, and would monitor radar and early-warning stations³⁷ to verify compliance with the peace agreement by both sides, and, if necessary, enforce its terms. Finally, the MFO would establish liaison offices in Damascus and Tel Aviv to provide representation to the

the Palestinian people. Thenceforth, in addition to maintaining the services that it had provided for over 40 years, the Agency would soon begin a process of preparing for the eventual hand-over of its installations, services and programs to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 1 July 1993–30 June 1994* (United Nations General Assembly, 21 September 1994), p. 1.

35 Of the total 160 observers, Norway provided 90, and Denmark and Italy 35 each.

36 The deployment of the MFO would follow agreement by Israel and Syria on security arrangements concerning demilitarized zones, troop reductions, pullbacks and their new placements, weapons deployment limits, an early-warning system to alert both sides to possible attack, in addition to normalization of relations in terms of open borders, diplomacy, and trade between the two countries.

37 Bacevich, et al., *Supporting Peace*, p. 36.

governments of Syria and Israel, respectively, as well as the diplomatic missions of the force's national contingents

Following the Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty, a US-led MFO would be deployed along their common border, in a similar, although expanded, capacity as a reconfigured, second-generation-type UNIFIL

SCENARIO IV JOINT ARAB-ISRAELI PKOs

In this scenario, future PKOs would consist of joint Arab-Israeli operations to the exclusion of any third-party peace-keeping involvement by the United Nations, the United States, and any other multinational force

This scenario envisions a joint Israeli-Palestinian security arrangement that would provide for joint police patrols as well as the sharing of intelligence information, particularly concerning violent rejectionist groups such as the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), Islamic Jihad, and any potential right-wing Jewish terrorist groups

This scenario is already formalized in the September 1993 Israeli-PLO DOP agreement, with internal security responsibilities divided between Israel and the Palestinians. To coordinate cooperation in security matters, a joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee (referred to as the "JSC") has been established, which can recommend security policy guidelines and provide a channel for exchanging information between the two sides³⁸

On the local level, three joint District Coordination and Cooperation offices (referred to as the "DCOs") have also been created in their respective areas of Gaza, Jericho, and Khan Yunis, to monitor matters that, according to the JSC, require coordination. Israel retains responsibility for "Israelis and settlements," with the Israeli military retaining the overriding responsibility and powers for security in designated "Yellow Areas," which include border crossings, checkpoints, and settlements. Under this arrangement, the Palestinians are responsible for "public order and internal security of Palestinians" by means of the 9,000-member Palestinian police force in the Gaza-Jericho area.³⁹ There is some cooperation and joint patrols between the Palestinian police and the Israeli police and IDF, with the DCOs working in close cooperation with the Israeli and Palestinian joint patrols operating in their relevant districts.⁴⁰

In accordance with the Cairo Agreement of May 1994, the Israeli military withdrew its forces from Gaza and the central parts of Jericho, while remaining redeployed in other areas, with the Palestinians empowered to police their own territory.⁴¹ As part of the Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995, the IDF was scheduled to be redeployed away

38 See the Israeli-PLO "Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area," Cairo, 4 May 1994, Article VIII (Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

39 Israel Information Center, *The Middle East Peace Process: An Overview* (Washington, DC: Embassy of Israel, Office of Public Affairs, September 1994), p. 9.

40 Dore Gold, "The Syrian-Israeli Track—Taking the Final Step," *Middle East Insight* X, no. 6 (September-October 1994), p. 15.

41 See "The Protocol Concerning Withdrawal of Israeli Military Forces," in Annex 1 of the *Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area*, Cairo, May 1994.

from seven Palestinian cities and some 450 towns and villages in the West Bank, prior to holding Palestinian elections, as part of the extension of Palestinian self-rule throughout the West Bank

In the case of Israel and Jordan, this scenario is already a reality formalized by the peace treaty of 26 October 1994.⁴² In addition to providing for various confidence-building measures, the treaty's Article 4, on "Security," bans belligerent military alliances with third parties, calls for cooperation between the two countries against security threats of any kind, such as terrorism, subversion, or cross-boundary infiltrations, and proposes to establish a conference on security and cooperation in the Middle East to make the region free from weapons of mass destruction.⁴³

In the event of peace between Israel and Syria, formal arrangements would be made for both countries to establish a joint security commission that would oversee joint border patrols by their forces, and would monitor and verify compliance with the terms of a peace agreement along their common border.⁴⁴ The 27-kilometer-wide Golan Heights would be completely demilitarized. No foreign intermediaries would be present, with both sides working together in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation and trust.

Finally, the governments of Israel and Lebanon (with Syrian consent) would establish a Joint Liaison Committee to supervise the implementation of the security arrangements in the areas covered by a peace agreement between them.⁴⁵ In addition, the two countries would participate in joint military patrols and other measures to secure their common border. A new security zone would be created in south Lebanon that would be completely demilitarized and under Lebanese central government control (backed or guaranteed by the Syrian zone of influence in the region). The Lebanese army, rather than a UN PKO force, would establish control over south Lebanon and patrol along the border. The militias of radical Islamic groups, such as Hizballah, Amal, and rejectionist Palestinian groups, would be withdrawn from south Lebanon. The 2,500-man, Israeli-allied SLA would be demobilized and its personnel reintegrated into the Lebanese army.

SCENARIO V MULTIPLE TYPES OF PKOs

This scenario is based on what realistically can be expected for future PKOs in the Arab-Israeli sector. It foresees a mix of two US-led MFOs in Sinai and the Golan, three joint Arab-Israeli security arrangements along the borders between Israel and Jordan, Lebanon, and a Palestinian entity, and one UN mission (UNTSO) continuing to be deployed in the Sinai Peninsula.

This forecast is based on several assumptions. First, with the exception of UNTSO, the current traditional-type UN PKOs (UNDOF and UNIFIL) are likely to be withdrawn

42 "Jordan-Israel Peace: The Terms of the Peace Treaty," *Middle East Economic Digest* (4 November 1994), pp. 38-9.

43 *Ibid.*, p. 38.

44 This scenario is based on Bacevich, et al., *Supporting Peace*, p. 33.

45 This scenario is based on the security arrangements specified in the abortive Israeli-Lebanon peace agreement of 17 May 1983.

and replaced by non-UN MFOs or joint Arab-Israeli security arrangements (scenarios III and IV). This is due to the fact that Israel has had long-standing difficulties with the UN parliamentary structure, particularly the General Assembly. It regards this body as generally non-supportive of its interests,⁴⁶ and PKOs as deriving their mandate and functions from these parliamentary bodies. Therefore, as the primary territorial compromiser, Israel is likely to insist on non-UN security arrangements to fill the vacuum resulting from the withdrawal of its forces from the agreed-upon areas. Israel also is likely to prefer non-UN multinational-type PKOs because these arrangements would enable it to retain some control over their operation—as opposed to the UN forces where Israeli decision-making authority is limited to expelling them from its territory.

The fourth scenario is also preferred by Israel because of its belief that the most effective inter-state security is bilateral in nature, through the establishment of close relations and constant communication between government leaders, military officers, and, at the ground level, soldiers. Thus, Israel's strongest security relationship has been with Jordan, with whom it has coexisted in a *de facto* peace since 1948 (except for the June 1967 War). Furthermore, the bilateral relationship is preferred because when governments decide to do so, they can restrain the activities of irredentist groups on their territory. For example, since 1974 the Israeli-Syrian border has experienced practically no infiltrations into Israel by terrorist or guerrilla groups. The Israelis also believe that Damascus could control Hizballah in south Lebanon if it so desired.

Because of these assumptions, the following combination of PKOs is likely to be established in the near future. The current MFO-Sinai would probably remain as the Sinai Peninsula's primary peace-keeping force. It would be accompanied by Egypt's and Israel's Joint Monitoring Commission, which supervises the implementation of the 1979 peace accord. This would remain the prevailing situation despite recent reports that the Egyptian government is seeking to change the mission's scope, going so far as to call for the force's withdrawal from the Sinai.⁴⁷ Apparently, Egypt hopes to replace the MFO with a UN PKO because of budgetary and political reasons (Egypt would not have to contribute to financing a UN mission, and it prefers a UN presence on its territory that would not infringe on its "sovereignty"). Such change, however, is opposed by Israel, which seeks to maintain the demilitarization of the Sinai and its patrol by a militarily-capable, non-UN, US-led multinational force.

At the same time, although UNTSO-OGE is not intended to serve as a militarily-viable PKO, it is likely to remain deployed in a limited capacity in the peninsula because of Egypt's preference for a UN presence in the region.

The joint security arrangements envisioned in Scenario IV would constitute future peace-keeping in the highly-problematic Israeli-Palestinian sector.⁴⁸ This is due to the fact that a second TIPH-type mission is unlikely to be established because it was never

⁴⁶ Israel regards the UN Security Council as generally acting in a more responsible manner toward it, although it has experienced some problems with its decisions in the past.

⁴⁷ Sharone Parnes, "Egypt Seeks Sinai Force Withdrawal Or Cutback," *Defense News* (9–15 January 1995), p. 10.

⁴⁸ See Aryeh Shalev, *The West Bank: Line of Defense* (New York: Praeger, 1984).

expected to be militarily viable, except as a symbolic reassurance to the Palestinians of a multinational peace-observation presence in the Hebron area. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Israelis would permit, either during the transitional period or following the establishment of the Palestinian state, a UN- or US-led multinational PKO to monitor and patrol along this border. Israel would oppose such a force because it would restrict its ability to maintain the option of a preemptive attack in a crisis. In addition, a US-led MFO would be opposed by Palestinian elements as a form of collusion between the United States and Israel in carrying out peace-keeping responsibilities.⁴⁹ Therefore, the future security arrangements would probably be based on the provisions of the September 1993, May 1994, September 1995, and other future Israeli-PLO agreements.

The Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of 26 October 1994 almost certainly will continue to provide the basis for the security arrangements between the two countries as envisioned in Scenario IV.

In the case of Syria, although UNDOF is universally considered to be one of the UN's most effective peace-keeping operations,⁵⁰ the new security requirements facing Israel and Syria in the event of a peace treaty are likely to bring about its replacement by a US-led MFO (Scenario III).

In the event of an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty that required Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights, a US-led MFO would probably be established in the evacuated territory, resulting in UNDOF's termination. This would result from several factors.⁵¹ First, it would take several years before close bilateral relations based on mutual trust and friendship would be established between Israel and Syria. In return for withdrawing from a highly-strategic territory, therefore, a new PKO on the Golan would have to provide Israel (as well as Syria) with a sense of security and confidence far broader in scope than that currently offered by UNDOF, with an expanded mandate and size. That is why the Sinai model would be more appropriate for the Golan than the current UN operation.

A new and highly-capable PKO would also have to be established to replace the departing IDF in the newly demilitarized territory, because UNDOF was only deployed on the Syrian side of the Golan.

49 Naomi Weimberger, "Achieving Security in the West Bank and Gaza" (Unpublished paper given to author, 1994), p. 27.

50 UNDOF's successes have included the following: its physical presence on the Golan Heights and its role in separating Syrian and Israeli forces have prevented the two parties from initiating a war against each other despite the continuation of the dispute over the Israeli occupation of the Golan and the absence of a final peace settlement between Israel and Syria; only a small number of incidents has occurred in its sector, and its mandate has been renewed, with both parties' agreement every six months for the past 20 years. Thus, while escalation leading to armed conflict has been a distinct possibility on numerous occasions, the peace held.

51 For in-depth assessments of Israel's security requirements, see Ze'ev Schiff, *Peace With Security: Israel's Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with Syria* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993); Aryeh Shalev, *Israel and Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Bacevich, et al., *Supporting Peace*, and Michael Eisenstadt, "Peace Talks: US Troops on the Golan?," *Middle East Insight* (January-February 1995), pp. 46-53.

On the Golan, an expanded PKO of the MFO-Sinai variety is likely to be the preferred peace-keeping instrument for Israel, Syria, and the United States.⁵² In such an arrangement, there would be extraordinarily closely supervised agreements to demilitarize the Golan, with the Syrian army not returning to the Golan to replace the Israelis. For Israel, the presence of US peacekeepers, with an early-warning capability in a demilitarized Golan, would tend to provide the kind of security that was required for it to agree to exchange territory for peace. For the Syrians, other multinational contingents, sanctioned by the United Nations, that would include such long-standing contributors as Canada and Austria, might provide the legitimacy needed for Damascus to sign a peace treaty with Israel. And the United States would probably agree to a peace-keeping role involving a battalion or so of its own forces, accompanied by comparably sized and equipped contingents from Canada and Austria. Accompanying the deployment of the MFO would be joint Israeli-Syrian security arrangements.

Finally, the Lebanese border presents Israel with unique security problems.⁵³ UNIFIL is likely to be replaced by a joint Israeli-Lebanese security arrangement (Scenario IV) because a more militarily-effective PKO would be required to impose order in the volatile area of south Lebanon. This does not imply that UNIFIL has been completely ineffective. It has served as a buffer, however fragile, between Israel and its adversaries in Lebanon, including Syrian forces, and the areas in which it is deployed are more stable and prosperous than in the past. Nevertheless, its various weaknesses led to the continued occupation by Israel, and its ally, the SLA, of the security zone.⁵⁴

Thus, in the south Lebanon area, the Israelis would probably welcome the deployment of the Lebanese army along the border, provided that it was capable of asserting its control over the region. For this reason, joint Israeli-Lebanese military coordination in this sector would be the preferred alternative. This would be made possible by the ability of the Lebanese government to prevent Hizballah's military presence in the area, and guarantees from Syria that no hostile military actions would be launched from the area against Israel.

CONCLUSION

Several lessons can be drawn from the experience of peace-keeping in the Arab-Israeli sector. First, the continued deployment of UN peace-keeping operations depends on consent to its continued presence by the local parties to a conflict. Problems arise for the United Nations when one of the parties determines that its security interests are no longer served by a continued UN peace-keeping presence, as a result of alleged UN partiality or lack of military effectiveness in the area of operation. Thus, UN officials must

52 Although the Labor Party-led Israeli government favors an MFO-type deployment on the Golan, the opposition Likud Party and its right-wing allies in Israel are firmly opposed to the deployment of any such MFO because of their opposition to relinquishing territory and signing a peace accord between Israel and Syria.

53 For a discussion of the security situation along the Israeli-Lebanese border, see Andrew Rathmell, "The War in South Lebanon," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 6, no. 4, (April 1994), pp. 178–82.

54 Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, p. 63; Alan James, *Interminable Interim: The UN Force in Lebanon* (Conflict Studies no. 210) (London: The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1988), pp. 27–8.

continuously consult with all parties to a conflict to ensure that they are satisfied with the impartiality and effectiveness of the PKO

Second, while UN PKOs are capable of providing vital confidence- and security-building measures during the post-conflict transitional phase, joint security arrangements between states should be sought as the most effective means for sustaining long-term peace

Third, as impartial third parties to a conflict, multinational peacekeepers, whether of the UN or non-UN type, can contribute to confidence-building during a transitional period by assuming tasks that the two sides to the conflict are unable to entrust to the other ⁵⁵

Fourth, PKOs by themselves have little military capability. They have few military assets on the ground apart from the capacity to respond quickly to violations and to report them up the chain of command. Some, like the MFO in the Sinai, are structured to delay a violation with light force for a limited period of time. But this buys hours rather than weeks. Thus, these forces are not designed to fight wars, nor should they be.

Fifth, to supplement the deployment of PKOs, an arms-control regime would have to be established in the sector as an added confidence-building measure.

Sixth, in the Israeli-Palestinian sector, some security-related problems may never be completely eradicated, such as the inability of Palestinian authorities to prevent attacks against Israel by rejectionist groups. The final peace-keeping arrangements would, therefore, have to balance the potential for reassertion of Israeli military control over the Palestinian areas, with the Palestinian requirement to maintain internal security over its own sovereign territory. Similarly, some form of civil disobedience by rejectionist elements among the Jewish settlers in the West Bank is likely, particularly when the transition to Palestinian statehood becomes imminent. The Israeli security services would have to maintain close vigilance to contain any outbreak of such violence.

Finally, during the transitional period leading to full-fledged diplomatic relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the deployment of PKOs, whether UN- or non-UN MFO types, have certain operational advantages. But it is only through agreements by the local parties that conflicts are ultimately resolved, as demonstrated by the Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement of September 1993 and the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of October 1994. Thus, during the final phase, the best confidence-building instruments will be joint Arab-Israeli security arrangements, accompanied by formal peace treaties and the normalization of relations between these governments and peoples. It is to the credit of the United Nations that the involvement of its peace-keeping operations in this sector provided the necessary experience and expertise to usher in new types of non-UN peace-keeping arrangements.

⁵⁵ Weinberger, "Achieving Security in the West Bank and Gaza," p. 2

Chronology

April 16, 1995-July 15, 1995

ABBREVIATIONS

FBIS, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*
Daily Report—Middle East & North Africa and
South Asia, Western Europe
FT, *The Financial Times*
JP, *The Jerusalem Post*
NYT, *The New York Times*
WP, *The Washington Post*
WSJ, *The Wall Street Journal*

Arab-Israeli Conflict

See also, Israel, Lebanon

1995

Apr. 16 In Hebron, Israeli security forces ambushed and killed three Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) members suspected in the 19 March 1995 killing of two Israelis on a bus in Hebron [4/17 NYT]

In Gaza, HAMAS representatives Ahmad Tibi and Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish met with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat to discuss preventing HAMAS anti-Israeli violence, which had hampered Arafat's negotiations with the Israelis [4/18 FBIS, NYT]

The Palestinian National Authority's (PNA) special anti-terrorism court sentenced HAMAS members Muhammad Abu 'Shamala and Riyad Attar to two years imprisonment, for the 1994 murder of an Israeli officer [4/17 NYT, WP]

Apr. 17 In Ramalla, Israeli security forces clashed with a group of 100 Palestinians calling for the release of

Palestinians in Israeli prisons. Thirteen protestors were arrested [4/18 FT]

Approximately 10,000 Israelis, protesting territory relinquished to Palestinians, marched from the western edge of the West Bank to the coastal city of Netanya [4/19 NYT]

Apr. 18 The PNA released 50 HAMAS and seven Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) members arrested following the 9 April 1995 car bombings in Gaza [4/18 FBIS]

In Hebron, a fire bomb damaged a vehicle near Israeli military headquarters, and Israeli security forces discovered and defused two bombs in a Palestinian house [4/18 FBIS]

Apr. 19 In Gaza, the PNA released two HAMAS and five DFLP members [4/19 FBIS]

Apr. 20 Three fire bombs were thrown at an Israeli vehicle in Fir'awn, Israel, and Israeli security forces clashed with Palestinians throwing rocks in Abu-Dis, east of Jerusalem [4/20 FBIS]

Apr. 22 Following talks with PLO chairman Arafat, DFLP spokesman Ahmad Hamad stated that the group's anti-Israeli activities in Gaza would be suspended [4/25 FBIS]

Apr. 24 A PNA court sentenced two HAMAS members to three years' imprisonment for murdering a man suspected of collaborating with Israel [4/25 FBIS]

Israeli military sources announced that 14 members of a Palestinian group in Hebron, responsible for ten attacks and at least one Israeli death, had been arrested [4/25 FBIS]

Fourteen thousand Palestinians from Gaza and 12,000 from the West Bank returned to work in Israel after being banned from Israel since 14 April for the Passover holiday [4/25 FT]

Apr. 25 Palestinian 'Abd-al-Samid Kharizat, arrested on 22 April 1995 by Israeli security forces in Hebron for suspected membership in HAMAS, died at Hadassah-


The Chronology was prepared by the editorial assistant

'En Kerem, in Jerusalem, prompting an Israeli Justice Ministry investigation into alleged abuse [4/25 FBIS, 4/26 NYT]

Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin announced that three military training camps in the West Bank and Gaza would be transferred to Israel. The bases would be occupied by regular troops [4/26 FBIS]

Apr 26: Saudi Arabia rescinded its 30 March 1995 announcement that Israeli Arabs traveling to Mecca would be required to hold a Palestinian passport [4/28 FBIS]

Israeli security forces raided a Palestinian security office in Hebron, headed by Jibril al-Rujub, and arrested seven of its members for their unauthorized presence in Hebron [4/26 FBIS]

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) member 'Awni Muhammad Kafarina was sentenced in a PNA court to one year's imprisonment for unspecified offenses [4/27 FBIS]

Apr 27 Meeting in Paris, Israeli and Palestinian representatives agreed to establish terminals at the Erez checkpoint and at the Qarni crossing to allow transport of goods between Gaza and Israel [4/28 FBIS]

Israeli security forces shot to death a Palestinian at a road block near Har Hadar, near Jerusalem [4/28 FBIS]

Apr 28. The PNA and Israel agreed to a plan to accept \$60 million from international donors toward meeting the PNA's \$136-million budget gap [4/28 WSJ]

Apr 29 Two Israeli physicians and one Scottish physician examined the body of Palestinian 'Abd-al-Samid Kharizat, who died in Israeli custody on 25 April, and pronounced that torture was the cause of death [5/1 FBIS]

Apr 30 Construction of 2,500 units of Israeli housing in Har Hornoj, in Jerusalem, was approved by the Jerusalem Municipality's Planning and Construction Committee [5/1 FBIS]

May 1: A partial commercial strike, called by HAMAS to protest East Jerusalem land confiscation by Israel, was observed in al-Birah, East Jerusalem, and Ramalla [5/1 FBIS]

Israel announced it would prohibit Palestinian movement across Israeli borders between 2-5 May during Israel's independence celebrations [5/1 FT]

A military court in Gaza sentenced a Palestinian police officer to death for the killing of another Palestinian police officer [5/3 FBIS]

May 3. In Bayt Hanina, near Jerusalem, unidentified persons set fire to the offices of the opposition newspaper *al-Ummah* [5/4 FBIS]

May 4: PNA minister of planning and international cooperation Nabil Sha'th announced that a telecommunications consortium, consisting of the al-'Aqqad Development Group, the Arab Bank, and the Palestine Development and Investment Company, would establish the Palestine Telecommunications Company [5/5 FBIS]

Palestinian police had reportedly arrested ten HAMAS members from the al-Shati' and al-Nusayrat refugee camps in Gaza in connection with the 9 April 1995 car bombings in Gaza [5/7 FT]

May 5 Three Israeli security officers and a *waqf* (Muslim institutions) official were injured when 20 Hai Vekayam activists attempted to force their way onto the Temple of the Mount in Jerusalem. Police arrested 15 Hai Vekayam members [5/5 WP]

May 6 In Bay Ulla, in the West Bank, 1,000 Palestinian demonstrators protested Israeli expropriation of 2,500 acres along the West Bank-Israeli border [5/7 FT]

May 8: In Washington, Israeli prime minister Rabin met with congressional leaders to discuss US aid to Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, and the PLO. They also discussed Iran and Israeli talks with Syria [5/9 NYT]

In Cairo, Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres met with Egyptian president Husni Mubarak to discuss Israeli land confiscations in East Jerusalem [5/8 FBIS]

In Cairo, Israeli foreign minister Peres met with the PNA minister of planning and international cooperation, Nabil Sha'th. The PNA acquired jurisdiction over banking, energy, industry, labor, and securities in the West Bank. Israel agreed to increase work permits for Palestinians in Israel by 5,000 to a total of 31,000. The two sides also agreed to establish a committee to examine Israeli land expropriations in East Jerusalem [5/9 FBIS]

Israeli authorities reportedly timed the release of 250 jailed Palestinians to coincide with the *'Id al-Adha* Islamic holiday [5/9 NYT]

May 9. US senator Robert Dole introduced legislation in the US congress calling for the transfer of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem [5/11 NYT]

Based on Israeli military information, the Peace Watch organization announced that 38 Palestinians in the West Bank and eight in Gaza were killed by Israeli security forces during the period May 1994-April 1995 [5/10 FBIS]

May 11 The PNA received two Russian-made MI-8 helicopters from Egypt for transporting Palestinian officials. These were the first aircraft acquired by the PNA [5/15 FBIS]

May 12: In Jerusalem, approximately 100 Israelis and Palestinians protested the Israeli government's appropriation of 131 acres of land in the vicinity of East Jerusalem for Jewish housing [5/16 FBIS]

May 14: The Israeli government confirmed the confiscation of 131 acres in Bay Satafa and Bay Hanina, near East Jerusalem. Israeli prime minister Rabin stated that no more confiscations would occur without Palestinian permission [5/15 NYT]

A Palestinian court sentenced HAMAS leader and *al-Watan* editor Sayyid Abu Missana to two years' imprisonment for printing "seditious" articles [5/15 NYT, 5/16 FBIS]

May 15 In Washington, Syrian foreign minister Faruq al-Shar' met with US president Bill Clinton to discuss the Israeli-Syrian impasse over demilitarization of the Golan Heights [5/16 FBIS]

The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (HADASH) and the Arab Democratic Party submitted a no-confidence motion against the government of prime minister Rabin due to the government's confiscation of Palestinian land in the West Bank [5/15 FBIS]

Palestinian police arrested ten HAMAS members in Gaza City and Jabalya [5/16 FBIS]

May 16 Palestinian police arrested ten HAMAS members in Gaza City [5/17 FBIS]

May 17 The United States vetoed a United Nations (UN) resolution that condemned as illegal the Israeli confiscation of Palestinian land in the West Bank near East Jerusalem [5/18 NYT]

In Amman, 60 of the 80 members of the Jordanian parliament called for the suspension of the peace agreement with Israel in protest against Israel's confiscation of Palestinian land bordering East Jerusalem [5/18 FBIS]

Israel and the PNA agreed to allow 133 Palestinians living abroad to return to Gaza. These Palestinians were expected to invest in Gaza upon their return [5/18 FBIS]

Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in Cairo agreed to ask the European Union (EU) to organize international supervision of Palestinian elections [5/18 FBIS]

Palestinian police raided five mosques in Gaza searching for "inflammatory" material [5/17 FBIS]

May 22 Israel suspended plans to confiscate 131 acres of land on the outskirts of East Jerusalem. The move avoided a no-confidence vote brought by Arab and right-wing Jewish parties against the government of Israeli prime minister Rabin. Arab states responded by suspending a summit scheduled for 27 April 1995 in Morocco to discuss the land confiscations [5/23 NYT]

May 23: In Amman, PLO chairman Arafat met with Jordan's King Husayn to discuss the status of relations with Israel [5/24 FBIS, FT]

May 24 The Israeli Interior Ministry announced a plan to build 1,500 homes for Palestinians in East Jerusalem [5/24 FBIS]

May 25 In Helopolis, Egypt, PLO chairman Arafat met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss negotiations with Israel [5/25 FBIS]

US officials announced that Syria had retracted its demand that Israeli and Syrian areas of demilitarization around the Golan Heights be of equal size [5/25 FT, NYT]

May 27 In Rabat, Israeli foreign minister Peres met with PLO chairman Arafat to discuss expanding Palestinian self-rule. The two later met with Morocco's King Hassan II [5/28 WP]

May 28 While meeting in Rabat with Morocco's King Hassan II and PLO chairman Arafat, Israeli foreign minister Peres stated that Israel viewed the Golan Heights as Syrian land [5/29 FT]

In Algiers, PLO chairman Arafat met with Algerian president Liamine Zeroual to discuss Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [5/30 FBIS]

May 29: Jordanian authorities banned a conference to be held at the University of Jordan in Amman that had been organized to condemn the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty [5/30 FBIS]

May 30 At the request of Israel, Palestinian police arrested Usama Abu Taha and Yusuf Malihi, two HAMAS members accused of killing three Israelis [5/30 FBIS]

May 31 In Jidda, PLO chairman Arafat met with Saudi Arabia's King Fahd. Arafat announced that King Fahd

had promised broad financial support to the PLO [6/1 NYT]

In Cairo, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations covered the issues of redeployment and telecommunications [6/1 WSJ]

Israeli foreign minister Peres revealed on US television that Israel proposed a four-year timetable for withdrawal from the Golan Heights, while Syria insisted on 18 months [6/1 FT]

Jordan reportedly ejected two HAMAS officials, Musa Abu Marzuq and 'Imad al-'Alami, following a PLO request [6/1 FBIS]

Jun 1 Muhammad Hamid Qassam Hamud, a Lebanese, was convicted in an Israeli court in Nazareth of spying for Hizballah and sentenced to eight-and-a-half-years' imprisonment. The court also sentenced Syrian 'Assaf Tawfiq Haydar to six years' imprisonment for spying for Syria [6/2 FBIS]

In Damascus, Egyptian president Mubarak met with Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad to discuss Syrian-Israeli negotiations [6/2 FT]

Israeli prime minister Rabin stated that an Israeli peace treaty with Syria would be submitted to a referendum [6/2 FBIS]

The Israeli Knesset approved the transfer to the PNA of a 75-percent Value Added Tax (VAT) and income taxes paid by workers from the West Bank [6/2 FBIS]

Jun 2 In Hebron, Israeli security forces killed alleged HAMAS member Ahmad Yarmur in a shoot-out [6/2, 6/5 FBIS]

Jun 5 Meeting in Jordan with Israeli prime minister Rabin and Jordan's King Husayn, German chancellor Helmut Kohl promised financial support for regional water and economic projects [6/6 FT]

In Cairo, PLO chairman Arafat met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss the status of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [6/5 FBIS]

Israeli military sources reported the arrest near East Jerusalem of 45 members of HAMAS's Qassam Brigade suspected of planning several terrorist attacks, including a bus hijacking and a car bomb attack in Jerusalem [6/6 NYT]

Jun. 6 Israeli negotiators agreed to transfer all civilian powers to elected Palestinian authorities following Palestinian elections in Gaza and the West Bank [6/8 WP]

Jun. 7 An Israeli court in Hebron sentenced 'Arafat al-Natsha, an alleged HAMAS member, to life imprisonment for attacks in which three Jewish Israelis died [6/8 FBIS]

In Jericho, German chancellor Kohl met with PLO chairman Arafat to discuss German-Palestinian relations and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [6/8 FBIS]

Israeli authorities announced that interrogators who caused the death of Palestinian 'Abd-al-Samid Kharizat on 25 April would not face criminal prosecution, but would be subject to internal disciplinary action [6/8 NYT]

Jun 8 US secretary of state Warren Christopher arrived in Jerusalem on the first stop of a tour of the region to facilitate Israeli-Syrian negotiations [6/9 WP]

Jun 9 In Cairo, US secretary of state Christopher met with Israeli prime minister Rabin and Egyptian presi-

dent Mubarak in an attempt to mend differences between Egypt and Israel, and to move Israeli-Palestinian negotiations forward [6/10 NYT]

Jun 10. In Damascus, US secretary of state Christopher met with Syrian president Asad to discuss Israeli-Syrian negotiations [6/11 WP]

Jun 11. In Jericho, US secretary of state Christopher met with PLO chairman Arafat to discuss Israeli-PLO negotiations. Later, Christopher met with Jordan's King Husayn to discuss the regional peace process [6/12 NYT]

The PNA cabinet approved the reinstatement of a Jerusalem city council [6/13 FT]

In Jerusalem, PNA representative Nabil Sha'th met with Israeli police minister Moshe Shahal. Shahal agreed to improve conditions for Palestinian prisoners and increase family visits [6/12 FBIS]

Jun. 12. Chairman of the Palestine Red Crescent Society Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi' announced the establishment of the Palestinian Democratic Construction Movement (PDCM) [6/15 FBIS]

Israeli president Ezer Weizman stated that Israel would exchange the entire Golan Heights for peace with Syria [6/13 WP]

Jun. 13. In Paris, Israeli prime minister Rabin met with French president Jacques Chirac to discuss Israeli negotiations with Syria and EU-Israeli relations [6/14 FBIS]

The Israeli military limited entry of Palestinian workers into Israel from the West Bank and Gaza to married men over 30 years old [6/16 FBIS]

In East Jerusalem, 12 people were wounded during clashes between Israeli police and demonstrators protesting demolition of Palestinian houses. The razing was subsequently halted [6/14 WSJ]

Jun 14. Palestinian security sources reported that Israeli forces killed three Palestinians attempting to cross into Gaza from Egypt [6/14 WP]

In Borqan, in the West Bank, Jewish settlers occupied 13 abandoned buildings on a hill to protest Israeli government plans to relinquish control of the West Bank to the PNA [6/15 NYT]

Jun 16: In Gaza, the arrest of HAMAS member Bassam 'Isa by PNA police sparked a clash between protestors and police [6/16 FBIS]

Jun. 18. Palestinian prisoners in Israeli detention centers began a hunger strike to be released. One report said that 5,000 prisoners participated in the strike, while another said that only 200 took part [6/19 WSJ]

Jun 21. The PNA and Israel signed an agreement that included terms for the establishment of a television station in Ramalla and a radio station in Gaza [6/22 FBIS]

Jun 22. In Gaza, unidentified gunmen shot to death Mahmud al-Khawaja, a leader of Islamic Jihad [6/22 FBIS, 6/23 NYT]

In Ramalla, in the West Bank, 100 demonstrators protesting Israeli detention of Palestinian prisoners clashed with Israeli security forces. Four Palestinians were injured [6/23 FBIS]

Jun. 24. In Jerusalem, Israeli police clashed with Palestinians in front of PLO headquarters, injuring thirteen people [6/25 WP]

Jun 25. Near the Jewish settlement of Neve Dekalim, in Gaza, three Israeli soldiers were wounded when a Palestinian in a donkey cart blew himself up next to an Israeli convoy. HAMAS claimed responsibility for the attack [6/26 NYT, 6/27 WP]

In Gaza, Israeli foreign minister Peres met with PLO chairman Arafat to discuss Israeli troop redeployment and Palestinian elections. Peres agreed that Palestinians in Jerusalem should participate in the voting [6/26 FBIS]

In Nablus, Palestinians protesting Israeli incarceration of Palestinians clashed with Israeli security forces. Two Palestinians were shot to death and approximately 35 were wounded [6/26 NYT]

Jun 26. In Gaza, Palestinian police arrested approximately 30 HAMAS members, including Mahmud al-Zahhar and Shaykh Ahmad Bahr, in response to the 25 June suicide bombing near Neve Dekalim [6/27 FT, WSJ, 6/26 FBIS]

Jun. 27. Palestinian police released approximately 40 HAMAS members, arrested since the 25 June bombing near Neve Dekalim [6/28 FBIS]

Jun 28. Israeli sources stated that Israeli-Syrian talks in Washington resulted in an agreement in principle that a Golan Heights settlement would include a demilitarized zone, a limited-militarized zone, an early-warning system, and confidence-building measures between members of the Israeli and Syrian armies [6/30 NYT]

In the West Bank, Israeli security forces killed HAMAS leader Tahir Kafisa. An Israeli border guard was wounded in the clash [6/30 WSJ, FBIS]

At al-Shati' refugee camp in Gaza, Palestinian police arrested HAMAS member Sa'id al-'Arabid, who was wanted by Israeli police for attacks in Israel [6/29 FBIS]

Jun 30: Four hundred prisoners in the Junayd prison, in the West Bank, ended their hunger strike [7/3 FBIS]

July 1. PLO chairman Arafat and Israeli foreign minister Peres met but failed to reach an agreement on Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Palestinian elections by the 1 July deadline [7/2 NYT]

Israeli security forces killed a Palestinian teenager in Janin and clashed with Palestinian demonstrators in Hebron, Nablus, and Ramalla. Fifty people were arrested [7/2 NYT, 7/3 FBIS]

Palestinian prisoners in Hebron, Janin, and Nablus ended their hunger strike [7/5 FBIS]

July 2. Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails resumed their hunger strike [7/5 FBIS]

July 3. An Israeli official stated that Syria had proposed that the ratio of Israeli to Syrian demilitarized territory be set at six to ten. Negotiations on this basis would then be held in Washington [7/4 FT]

July 4. PLO chairman Arafat and Israeli foreign minister Peres met and established 25 July as the signing date for an agreement on Israeli troop redeployment in the West Bank and on Palestinian elections [7/5 NYT]

Palestinian police released HAMAS leader Majid 'Ali, arrested after the 25 June attack at Neve Dekalim [7/5 FBIS]

Italy and the PNA signed an agreement in which Italy donated \$30 million to the PNA [7/6 FBIS]

July 5 In Geneva, PLO chairman Arafat met with French president Chirac to discuss French and European involvement in the peace process [7/7 FBIS]

Prisoners at the Junayd prison ended their hunger strike which had resumed on 2 July [7/6 FBIS]

In Ramalla, Palestinian marches protesting Israel's imprisonment of Palestinians resulted in clashes between protesters and Israeli security forces [7/6 WP]

Morocco and the PNA signed an accord in which Morocco agreed to supervise construction of an airport in Gaza and to train Palestinians to be airport personnel [7/10 FBIS]

July 8 In Janin, in the West Bank, five Palestinians were wounded in a clash between rock-throwing demonstrators and Israeli security forces [7/10 FBIS]

July 9 The World Bank extended a \$20 million grant to the PNA to improve health and education services [7/11 FBIS]

Hizballah forces in Lebanon struck western Galilee with 27 missiles. No casualties were reported [7/10 FT]

Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners ended their hunger strike, which began on 18 June [7/10 WP]

Israeli security forces reported defusing a bomb placed near the Israeli settlement of Ganei Tal, in Gaza [7/10 NYT]

July 11 In Gaza, Palestinian police arrested 20 alleged HAMAS members [7/13 FBIS]

An Israeli soldier was sentenced to 14 days' imprisonment for refusing to serve in the Bethlehem area, in protest against plans for Israeli military evacuation of the area [7/13 NYT]

July 12 Israeli security forces arrested 40 Israeli settlers attempting to expand the settlement of Efrat, near Bethlehem [7/13 NYT]

Leaders of the Union of Rabbis for the Land of Israel stated that Israeli soldiers should refuse government orders to transfer West Bank military bases to the PLO [7/13 NYT]

In Hebron, Israeli police arrested US citizens Jeff Heie and Cliff Kindy after an altercation with Israeli settlers in which the settlers set upon the two when they attempted to deliver water to a Palestinian family [7/13 WP]

July 14 Israeli-Syrian security negotiations planned for the week beginning 17 July were canceled reportedly because of Syrian demands [7/15 WP]

July 15 In Gaza, Palestinian police officer Akram Ahmed, serving as a bodyguard to Palestinian chief justice Qusayy al-'Abadilah, was shot to death by unknown assailants [7/17 FBIS]

Central Asia and Transcaucasia

See also, Regional Affairs

1995

Apr 19 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved \$46 million to support economic stabilization in Azerbaijan [4/20 FT]

Apr 23 Russian-led Tajik government troops clashed with Tajik opposition forces attempting to cross from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. The government claimed to have killed five rebels [4/24 FT]

Apr. 30 Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev claimed that a referendum extended his term until the year 2000 [5/1 NYT]

May 10 Tajikistan replaced the Russian ruble with its own official currency, the Tajik ruble [5/11 WSJ]

May 14 In Kabul, Tajik government officials met with Tajik opposition leaders to discuss reconciliation [5/18 FBIS]

May 22 In Almaty, Kazakhstan, Tajik government officials met with Tajik opposition leaders to discuss reconciliation [5/23 NYT]

May 23 Tajikistan nationalized major natural-gas pipelines and electric power lines [5/24 WSJ]

Jun. 27 Despite protests from neighboring nations, Armenia reopened a nuclear plant that was closed in 1985 following earthquake damage [6/28 WSJ]

July 5 Armenia held its first post-Soviet legislative elections [7/6 FT]

July 7 Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosian's ruling party claimed victory in the 5 July elections. Observers claimed that the elections were marred by intimidation of opposition candidates and misinformation [7/8 WP]

Petroleum Affairs

1995

Apr 16 The Russian oil conglomerate, Lukoil, reached an agreement with Kazakhstan in which Lukoil agreed to produce and refine oil in Kazakhstan [4/17 WSJ]

Apr 19 The US oil company Exxon agreed to join an oil consortium led by British Petroleum (BP) to develop oil fields in Azerbaijan [4/20 FT]

Apr 25 Egypt and Israel agreed to build a natural-gas pipeline that would link Egypt's Timsah and Balantim offshore fields to Israel [4/26 FT]

Russia and Iraq agreed to cooperate on several joint oil and gas projects. The agreement did not include the export of petroleum [4/26 FBIS]

May 1 It was reported that Qatar had accepted a \$2-billion loan from Japan to construct a natural-gas plant [5/1 FT]

May 5 It was reported that Iran and Turkey had signed an agreement in which Iran would sell Turkey natural gas and the two countries would jointly construct a pipeline for the transfer [5/5 WSJ]

May 8 Armenian prime minister Grant Bagratian announced that Iran had agreed to supply Armenia with natural gas for 20 years and to build a pipeline between the two countries [5/9 NYT]

May 16 Iranian deputy foreign minister 'Abbas Mahiki cited treaties from 1921 and 1940 supporting a Russian claim that all Caspian Sea littoral states must approve any offshore oil development. This claim challenged development deals in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan [5/17 FT]

Jun 5• Aramco approved a \$2.5-billion plan to develop Saudi Arabia's Shayba oil field [6/6 WSJ]

Jun 13 Turkey and Kazakhstan agreed to build a pipeline across Turkey to carry Caspian Sea oil, particularly from Kazakhstan [6/14 WSJ]

July 5• Iran and Turkmenistan agreed to construct a natural-gas pipeline that would transport 8 billion cubic meters of gas from Turkmenistan by 1997 [7/6 WSJ]

July 13 The French oil company Total announced it was awarded the contract to develop Iran's Sirri oil field, on the border with Dubai, that Conoco had to give up on 14 March 1995 because of US economic sanctions [7/14 FT]

Regional Affairs

1995

Apr. 17 In New York City, Turkish prime minister Tansu Çiller announced that Turkey had begun withdrawing its troops from northern Iraq [4/18 NYT]

Bahrain and Jordan signed an agreement on trade protocol and cooperation [4/19 FBIS]

Saudi Arabia and Algeria reached an agreement to reschedule payment of \$500 million of Algeria's debt to Saudi Arabia [4/20 FBIS]

Apr. 18 In Kuwait, Tajik president Imamali Rakhmonov met with Kuwait's Shaykh Nasir Muhammad al-Ahmad al-Sabah to discuss bilateral relations [4/18 FBIS]

India, Iran, and Turkmenistan signed an agreement opening land trade routes between Central Asia and India [4/19 FBIS]

In Muscat, Iranian Admiral 'Ali Shamkhani met with Omani General Khamis bin-Hamid al-Kalbani to discuss cooperation between their armed forces [4/21 FBIS]

Kuwait and Tajikistan signed an investment accord [4/20 FBIS]

Egyptian and Saudi Arabian officials refused a Libyan request to fly pilgrims to Mecca over Egypt and to land in Saudi Arabia. Libya's proposal would have violated a United Nations (UN) ban on Libyan flights [4/19 NYT]

Apr 19 In 'Ayn Azenas, Algeria, Libyan president Mu'ammarr Qadhafi met with Algerian president Liamine Zeroual to discuss bilateral relations [4/20 FBIS]

Egypt and Israel signed an agreement pledging cooperation in the field of health [4/20 JP]

Apr. 20 Egyptian aircraft flew Libyan pilgrims from Libya to Jidda [4/21 NYT]

The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and Islamic Jihad denied involvement in the 19 April bombing of a US federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma [4/20 FBIS]

US officials stated that Saudi Arabia had refused to cooperate in the attempted arrest by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of a man charged with the 1983 bombing in Beirut that killed 241 US Marines. The suspect, believed to be 'Imad Mughniya, transited Saudi Arabia en route from Khartoum to Beirut [4/21 WP]

Apr 21• Algeria and Libya signed agreements on various projects in the fields of energy, hydrocarbons, telecommunications, and transportation [4/24 FBIS]

Apr 24• In Amman, Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres met with Jordan's King Husayn to discuss development of the Jordan Rift Valley [4/25 FBIS]

Apr 25• Turkish military sources announced that 20,000 Turkish troops had withdrawn from northern Iraq, while 12,000 troops still remained there [4/26 NYT]

Apr 27 Tunisia and Jordan signed agreements on various projects in the fields of agriculture, maritime commerce, tourism, and trade [4/28 FBIS]

Apr 29• Four former employees of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) appealed a \$1.8-billion settlement in a Luxembourg court. Following BCCI's collapse in 1991, a Luxembourg court approved the settlement plan in January 1995 [4/30 FT]

An official at the US-based Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) announced that the US private sector would provide \$250 million for a Middle East and North Africa investment fund [4/30 FT]

Apr 30• Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) sources reported that Turkish warplanes attacked nine villages in northern Iraq on 28 and 29 April, damaging buildings and wounding four people [5/1 FBIS]

May 1• In 'Aqaba, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin met with Jordan's King Husayn to discuss regional economic development projects [5/2 FBIS]

May 2 Israel and Jordan reached agreement on the transport of goods between Jordan and areas controlled by the Palestine National Authority (PNA) [5/3 FBIS]

May 4• Turkish defense minister Mehmet Golhan stated that Turkish troops had completely withdrawn from northern Iraq, where they had been carrying out an offensive against the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) since 20 March. The government claimed that the operation resulted in the death of 555 PKK members and 62 Turkish soldiers [5/3 FBIS, 5/5 NYT]

May 7• Saudi security forces were deployed in and around Mecca in response to threats from Iranian pilgrims to stage anti-US rallies [5/8 FBIS]

May 11 Egypt, Iran, and several other Arab states dropped demands to name Israel a nuclear state, and signed an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) [5/12 NYT]

In Washington, US intelligence officials stated that Iran, Iraq, Libya, the Sudan, and Syria were on a list of countries that sponsored terrorism. Iran was alleged to have provided \$100 million per year to terrorist activities aimed at its enemies and at derailing the regional peace process [5/12 NYT]

May 15• Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces had reportedly aided Afghan government forces in fighting Taliban forces in Afghanistan's western province of Farah [5/17 FBIS]

May 16 KDP spokesman Safin Dizayee stated that PKK fighters were returning to the Iraqi-Turkish border area and that the KDP was not strong enough to prevent PKK raids into Turkey [5/19 FBIS]

May 17 Afghan president Borhanoddin Rabbani met with Tajikistan's president Rakhmonov to discuss bilat-

eral relations and talks between Tajik government and opposition leaders [5/18 FBIS]

Pakistan and Iran signed an accord on maritime cooperation [5/18 FBIS]

May 20 Bahrain announced that it would establish diplomatic relations with Tajikistan at the ambassadorial level [5/22 FBIS]

May 22 Amir Shaykh Humayd bin-Rashid of 'Ajman and Amir Shaykh Hamad bin-Muhammad al-Sharqi of Fujayra, both of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), paid \$10 million in claims against them in the United States in connection with the BCCI failure [5/23 FT]

Senior Iranian officials, headed by 'Ali Khorram of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, met with Iraqi officials in Baghdad to discuss normalization of relations [5/23 FT]

May 23 In Heliopolis, Egypt, Turkmenistan's president Saparmurat Niyazov met with Egyptian president Husni Mubarak to discuss bilateral relations [5/23 FBIS]

In Samarkand, Uzbekistan, Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto met with Uzbek president Islam Karimov to discuss Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tajikistan [5/24 FBIS]

May 24 In Israel, Turkmenistan's president Niyazov met with Israeli prime minister Rabin to discuss regional relations. The two signed accords on education, investment, and tourism [5/25 FBIS]

May 29 In al-Qubba Palace in Cairo, Kuwait's Amir al-Ahmad al-Sabah met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss regional events [5/30 FBIS]

May 30 In Damascus, Kuwait's Amir al-Sabah met with Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad [5/31 FBIS]

Algeria and Uzbekistan agreed to increase their agricultural cooperation [5/31 FBIS]

May 31 In San'a, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat met with Yemeni president 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih to discuss bilateral relations [5/31 FBIS]

Jun 1 Pakistan and Kazakhstan signed accords pledging cooperation in fighting drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism [6/2 FBIS]

Iranian television reported that an Iranian border guard and four PKK members were killed when a PKK force tried to cross the border from Turkey to Iran [6/7 FBIS]

Jun 3 A UN spokesman stated that an Iranian pilot who had flown to Irbil, in northern Iraq, and crash-landed his helicopter, was in UN custody [6/6 FBIS]

Jun 4 Oman and Yemen submitted to the Arab League an accord demarcating their border [6/5 FBIS]

Jun 5 In Jidda, Yemeni president 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih met with Saudi Arabia's King Fahd to discuss bilateral relations [6/6 FBIS]

Jun 10 Iranian Brigadier General Najafi announced that Iran and Iraq had agreed to exchange documentation on prisoners of war (POWs) and to establish committees to search for remains of soldiers deemed missing in action during the Iran-Iraq war [6/12 FBIS]

Jun 12 An Iranian government source reported that 60 Iraqi refugees, fleeing the Iraqi military, arrived in Khuzestan Province, in western Iran [6/13 FBIS]

Jun. 13 Israel agreed to contribute \$3 million to Oman for a regional desalination research center [6/14 FBIS]

Iran and Jordan signed an agreement covering Iranian purchases of Jordanian industrial phosphate resources [6/14 FBIS]

Jun 15 In Amman, representatives of Egypt, the European Union (EU), Israel, and Jordan met to discuss economic development of the 'Aqaba region [6/16 FBIS]

Jun 18. At al-Muntazah Palace, in Alexandria, Qatar's Amir Shaykh Hamad bin-Khalifa al-Thani met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss bilateral relations, the status of Gulf relations, and the Arab-Israeli peace process [6/19 FBIS]

Iraq rejected a Kuwaiti mission to Iraq scheduled to discuss POWs in Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait [6/18 FBIS]

Iranian radio reported that Iran had promised \$50 million to Pakistan for reconstruction [6/21 FBIS]

Jun 20 In France, police arrested approximately 140 people suspected of participating in an arms supply network for the Algerian group Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and a support network for the Tunisian Islamic Front [6/21 NYT]

At Carthage Palace in Tunis, Qatar's Amir al-Thani met with Tunisian president Zine al-'Abidine Ben 'Ali to discuss bilateral relations [6/23 FBIS]

US Air Force Captain James Wang was acquitted by a US military court of negligent homicide for his part in a 14 April 1994 incident in which 26 people died when US warplanes shot down two US helicopters over northern Iraq [6/21 NYT]

Jun 21 The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that Iran and Pakistan had received missile guidance systems from China [6/22 NYT]

Turkey and Iran signed an agreement to cooperate on health issues [6/21 FBIS]

Jun 22 The Iranian Interior Ministry announced the beginning of a program to repatriate 400,000 Afghan refugees [6/23 FBIS]

Jun 24 In Egypt, Algerian president Zeroual met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss bilateral relations and regional issues [6/26 FBIS]

Jun 27 Sudanese sources reported that two Sudanese border patrol officers had been killed in a clash with Egyptian security forces in the Hala'ib area, on the Egyptian-Sudanese border [6/29 NYT]

Israel and Jordan signed a trade agreement covering terms of export, and research and development cooperation [6/27 FBIS]

Jun 28 In Khartoum, Sudanese authorities evicted the Egyptian military attaché and his staff and family from their residences [6/29 FBIS]

In an unidentified location, Algerian president Zeroual met with UAE president Shaykh Zayid bin-Sultan al-Nahayyan [6/30 FBIS]

Jun 29: Egypt expelled 70 Sudanese border guards from the disputed Hala'ib region [6/30 NYT]

In Abu Dhabi, UAE, Algerian president Zeroual met with UAE president al-Nahayyan to discuss bilateral relations [7/5 FBIS]

Jun. 30: Morocco and the Sudan signed an economic and cultural agreement [7/10 FBIS]

July 3: A US Navy spokesperson announced that the Fifth Fleet would be stationed in the Persian Gulf [7/4 NYT]

July 4: In Iran, Turkmenistan's President Niyazov met with Iranian president 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to discuss bilateral relations, regional issues, and Caspian Sea petroleum matters [7/5 FBIS]

July 5 Turkish officials reported that Turkish forces attacked PKK bases in northern Iraq, killing 57 PKK members. A KDP source stated that Turkish forces attacked 18 villages, wounded three civilians, and caused 3,000 Iraqi Kurds to flee [7/7 FT]

July 6: Iranian officials reported that 150 Afghan families had been repatriated [7/7 FBIS]

July 7 Turkish forces claimed to have killed 90 PKK fighters while losing five of their own troops in fighting in northern Iraq. The Iraqi Foreign Ministry condemned the invasion as a violation of Iraq's sovereignty [7/8 WP]

July 8 In Khartoum, Sudanese security forces arrested eight Egyptians working for the Egyptian Reinforced Concrete Works Company [7/10 FBIS]

July 9 Iranian opposition Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO) sources reported that missiles fired from Iran struck an MKO base in Ashraf, 100 miles northeast of Baghdad [7/10 FBIS]

Egyptian officials reported that they had interdicted bomb-making components being smuggled through the Cairo airport to the Sudan [7/10 WSJ]

July 10: Saudi Arabia and Oman reached an agreement delineating their mutual border [7/12 FBIS]

July 11 In Qatar, Yemeni president Salih met with Qatar's Amir al-Thani to discuss bilateral relations and regional issues [7/13 FBIS]

July 12: In Amman, Iraqi minister of industry General Husayn Kamil Hasan met with Jordanian minister of industry and trade 'Ali Abu al-Raghib to discuss bilateral relations [7/13 FBIS]

In Damascus, Yemeni president Salih met with Syrian president Asad to discuss bilateral relations and regional issues [7/13 FBIS]

Turkish officials announced that Turkey's offensive in northern Iraq against the PKK had ended. Turkey claimed to have killed 167 PKK members while 26 Turkish soldiers had been killed since the offensive began on 5 July [7/12 WP]

July 13. Representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey met to discuss a plan to link the power grids of the countries by 1997 [7/14 FT]

Sudan deported to Egypt four of eight Egyptians arrested since 8 July [7/13 FBIS]

July 14 In Alexandria, Yemeni president Salih met with Egyptian president Mubarak to discuss bilateral relations and regional issues [7/17 FBIS]

July 15: Egyptian news sources reported that an unspecified number of Egyptian embassy staff in Khartoum, including Assistant Consul General 'Ala' 'Abd al-Sadiq, had been assaulted by Sudanese security personnel [7/17 FBIS]

Afghanistan

See also, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, Regional Affairs

1995

Apr. 16 Taliban forces clashed with forces of Herat's governor general Commander Isma'il Khan near Farah Rud, in the west, killing at least 50 combatants [4/20 FBIS]

Apr. 18: Russian warplanes bombed areas of Badakhshan Province, on the Tajikistan border, killing and wounding an unspecified number [4/19 FBIS]

Apr. 20 Russian warplanes bombed areas of Badakhshan Province, killing 12 and wounding 16 [4/23 NYT]

Apr. 21. Iranian radio reported that Taliban forces were withdrawing from fighting government troops in the western province of Farah. The government claimed to have killed 200 Taliban members [4/24 FBIS]

Apr. 22 Taliban forces reportedly took control of Farah and the eastern province of Nimruz [4/24 FBIS]

Russian helicopters fired on the village of Maymay near the border with Tajikistan [4/23 NYT]

Apr. 28 Government radio reported clashes between government and Taliban forces near Delaram, Farah Province, which killed at least 24 combatants [5/1 FBIS]

May 1 Russian forces reportedly attacked Yalan, in the northern Taknor Province, killing three and wounding ten [5/4 FBIS]

May 2 In the western province of Ghowr, government and Taliban forces clashed. The government claimed to have killed 15 Taliban members [5/4 FBIS]

May 7: Taliban and government forces reportedly clashed in Farah Province [5/8 FBIS]

May 8. The government reported attacking Taliban forces in the Maydan Shahr region, southwest of Kabul, with tanks and warplanes [5/8 FBIS]

May 12: Government and Taliban forces clashed in Farah Province and both claimed to have conquered Ghowr Province [5/15 FBIS]

May 15 Government forces claimed to have cleared Farah Province of Taliban forces and successfully penetrated into western sectors of Nimruz Province [5/15 FBIS]

May 21 Government and Taliban forces clashed in Maydar Shahr. The government claimed to have killed 70 Taliban members [5/23 FBIS]

Jun. 2 Fighting was reported between government and Taliban forces in the Arghandeh area of Paghman District and in Dara-e Suf, both in the northern province of Samangan [6/5 FBIS]

Jun. 3: Government sources reported clashes with Taliban forces in Logar Province, near Kabul, in which at least 23 combatants died [6/5 FBIS]

Jun. 6: Government sources reported that government forces had clashed with the militia of General 'Abdul Rashid Dostam in Konduz Province, near the Tajikistan border [6/8 FBIS]

Jun. 9: Government radio reported that Pakistani-mediated talks between the government and Taliban had

resulted in a ten-day cease-fire and a prisoner exchange [6/12 FBIS]

Jun 10 Government radio reported clashes between government forces and Dostam's militia in Khejan, in the north [6/12 FBIS]

Jun 13. The government claimed to have killed five soldiers of Dostam's militia during clashes in Jowzjan Province, on the Turkmenistan border [6/13 FBIS]

In Jalalabad, east of Kabul, government officials met with Taliban leaders and former Prime Minister Gulboddin Hekmatyar to discuss ending hostilities [6/15 FBIS]

Jun 15. Taliban radio claimed that Taliban aircraft had shot down two government helicopters over Samangan Province [6/16 FBIS]

Jun. 16 Government radio reported that a warplane of Dostam's militia had bombed Kabul, killing four people. Taliban reported bombing the presidential palace [6/19 FBIS]

Jun 17 Clashes between Taliban and government forces near Baluchistan Province, Pakistan, reportedly left 70 government soldiers dead [6/19 FBIS]

Jun 19. Taliban radio reported clashes with government forces in Konduz Province [6/21 FBIS]

Jun 20. Taliban radio reported a clash with government forces in Samangan Province in which 15 government fighters were killed [6/21 FBIS]

Jun. 29. Warplanes of Dostam's militia reportedly bombed Kabul. No casualties were reported [7/3 FBIS]

July 3: Taliban radio reported clashes between Taliban and government forces in Samangan Province that resulted in the death of government General Mola Abdorrahman [7/7 FBIS]

July 15. Government and Taliban forces exchanged a total of 485 prisoners of war [7/18 FBIS]

Algeria

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1995

Apr 20 Security forces reported killing 105 "terrorists" throughout the country during the period 17-20 April [4/20, 4/21 FBIS]

Apr. 21 Police sources reported that Transitional National Council member Oukid Arezki was killed in Algiers by unknown assailants [4/24 FBIS]

Apr 22 Security forces reported the slaying of a female teacher in al-Harrach, east of Algiers [4/24 FBIS]

Apr 23 In Algiers, police reportedly arrested 'Abdelhamid Belhadj, the brother of Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) leader 'Ali Belhadj [4/24 FBIS]

Apr. 25 Security forces reported killing 52 "criminals" throughout the country during the period 22-25 April [4/24, 4/26 FBIS]

Apr 26 The government and Canada signed an agreement covering agricultural cooperation [4/28 FBIS]

May 2. Police reported killing 63 "terrorists" throughout the country during the period 26 April-2 May [4/27, 5/2, 5/3 FBIS]

The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) issued a statement threatening to kill women related to any government official [5/4 NYT]

May 3 In the Ayn Defla area, southeast of Algiers, security forces reportedly killed seven of the GIA's principal leaders [5/4 FBIS]

Security forces reported killing 11 "criminals" throughout the country [5/4 FBIS]

May 6. The GIA claimed responsibility for an attack on oil company employees that killed an Algerian, a Briton, a Canadian, two French, and a Tunisian [5/7 FT, 5/11 FBIS]

May 9 In Ghardaia, in the central part of the country, approximately 22,000 people marched to protest violence and to support democracy [5/11 FBIS]

May 12: The government signed a \$200-million European Currency Unit (ECU) loan agreement with the European Union (EU) aimed at sustaining Algeria's balance of payments deficit [5/15 FBIS]

Near Tizi Ouzou, east of Algiers, a bomb exploded killing one and wounding three others [5/15 FBIS]

May 15: Islamic militants were accused of killing two women in Brigui, in western Algeria [5/18 NYT]

May 16. In Tiaret, southeast of Algiers, unidentified gunmen shot to death a university official [5/18 NYT]

Niger and Algeria signed cooperation agreements in economic, security, and social areas [5/18 FBIS]

Unknown assailants killed television journalist Azzedine Sa'id in an eastern suburb of Algiers [5/17 FBIS]

May 20 Security forces reported killing 98 "terrorists" throughout the country during the period 5-20 May [5/8, 5/15, 5/22 FBIS]

May 21 Security forces reported that *al-Chourouk al-'Arabi* journalist Malika Sabeur was killed in Djaafria, in Boumerdes Province, by "terrorists" [5/22 FBIS]

May 22. The editor of *el-Tabayin* magazine, Bakhtu Benaouda, was killed by unknown assailants in an undisclosed location [5/23 FBIS]

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a three-year \$1.8-billion loan to the government [5/23 FT]

May 23 Security forces discovered and defused a car bomb near the Aurassi hotel, in the vicinity of the Ministry of Defense, in Algiers [5/25 FBIS]

May 25 A bomb exploded in a building in Algiers, wounding 37 people. Noone claimed responsibility [5/26 FBIS]

May 27: In Baraki, a suburb of Algiers, unidentified gunmen killed television journalist Hmaizi Mourad [5/29 NYT, 5/30 FBIS]

Security forces reported killing 59 "terrorists" throughout the country during the period 23-27 May [5/23, 5/30 FBIS]

May 30: The Ministry of Communications reportedly suspended the daily newspaper *Horizon* for "straying from the state-directed line of conduct" [6/5 FBIS]

Jun 3 Army officer Lembarek Boumaarafi was sentenced to death after being convicted of killing former Algerian president Muhammad Boudiaf on 29 June 1992 [6/4 WP]

Jun. 4. An unidentified group attacked security forces and destroyed several public buildings in Larbaa, near

Algiers An unspecified number of people were killed [6/7 FBIS]

Jun 6 In Milan, Naples, Pavia, and Rome, Italian police arrested 12 suspected members of the FIS and GIA charged with forging documents, plotting terrorist acts, and trafficking weapons [6/7 FT]

Jun. 7 Security forces reported killing 16 "terrorists" throughout the country during the period 3-7 June [6/5, 6/7, 6/9 FBIS]

In the al-Bryar district of Algiers, two French citizens were killed by unidentified assailants [6/7 FBIS]

The Ministry of Communication suspended the newspapers *al-Huriyya* and *la Nation* for one month and *al-Umma* for 15 days [6/8 FBIS]

Jun. 9 In Mostaganem and Tlemcen, in the western part of the country, an unspecified number of marchers gathered in support of Algerian president Liamine Zeroual. In Algiers, approximately 9,000 people attended a rally sponsored by the Contemporary Muslim Youth, the Ennahda party, the Human Rights League, the Movement for Democracy in Algeria, the National Liberation Front, the Socialist Forces Front, and the Worker's Party [6/12 FBIS]

Jun 12: Security forces reported that a Vietnamese citizen, employed as a lecturer at a local university, had been killed by unknown assailants in Cheib Muhammad, in Tiaret Province, southwest of Algiers [6/13 FBIS]

Jun. 15 Government sources reported that the government had resumed talks with jailed FIS leaders 'Abassi Madani and 'Ali Belhadj. Madani reportedly taped a message condemning violence against civilians [6/16 NYT]

Jun. 18 In Constantine, east of Algiers, radio journalist Ahmad Tacouchet was killed by unknown assailants [6/19 FBIS]

Jun 21 Security forces reported that a car bomb had exploded in Constantine, wounding 13 people [6/22 FBIS]

Jun. 26 Security forces reported killing 39 "terrorists" throughout the country during the period 20-26 June [6/26, 6/30 FBIS]

Jun 29 The government averted a strike by reaching an agreement with the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) over wages and hiring practices [7/3 FBIS]

July 1. Security forces reported killing 38 "terrorists" throughout the country during the period 27 June-1 July [7/3 FBIS]

July 2 President Zeroual replaced 'Abd al-Rahman Mizyan Sharif with Mustafa bin-Mansur as interior minister [7/3 FT]

July 8 Security sources reported killing 111 "terrorists" throughout the country during the period 2-8 July [7/10 FBIS]

In Algiers, a car bomb exploded near the Justice Ministry. No injuries were reported [7/12 FBIS]

July 9 A gas pipeline 90 km from Algiers and a gas distribution center in Blida exploded. No casualties were reported [7/12 FBIS]

July 11 Alleged FIS leader Shaykh 'Abd-al-Baqi Sahrawi was shot to death by unknown assailants in Paris [7/12 NYT, FT, FBIS]

President Zeroual stated that talks between the government and FIS leader Madani had failed to bring about reconciliation [7/12 FT]

July 15 Security forces reported killing 29 "terrorists" throughout the country [7/17 FBIS]

Bahrain

See also, Regional Affairs

1995

Apr. 17. An Interior Ministry spokesman announced that 150 people arrested in December 1994 and January 1995 for anti-government disturbances, related to the arrest of several Shi'ite clergymen, were released [4/18 WP]

Apr 25 A court sentenced a Shi'ite man, convicted of setting fire to a sports club on 28 February 1995, to ten years' imprisonment for political violence [4/26 FBIS]

May 1 A court sentenced ten people to prison terms ranging from three to seven years on charges of anti-government rioting, instigating riots, and damaging public installations [5/2 FBIS]

May 2 A court sentenced six people to prison terms ranging from one to five years for anti-government rioting, damaging property, and attacking police [5/3 FBIS]

May 4 Security forces clashing with anti-government protestors in Diraz, an island east of the mainland, killed one demonstrator [5/8 FBIS]

May 12 In Manama, security forces clashed with demonstrators, wounding an unspecified number [5/15 FBIS]

May 22 The opposition group Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain reported that police tortured to death Muhammad Shihab al-Furdan in prison in Manama [5/26 FBIS]

Jun 13 The government announced that it had released 200 people who had been arrested during unspecified anti-government demonstrations [6/16 FBIS]

Jun 25 The government resigned and Amir 'Isa bin-Salman al-Khalifa reappointed Shaykh Khalifa bin-Salman al-Khalifa prime minister [6/26 FBIS]

Jun 26 Prime Minister Shaykh al-Khalifa appointed the following to the cabinet

'Abdallah bin-Khalid al-Khalifa, *Justice and Islamic Affairs*

Muhammad bin-Mubarak al-Khalifa, *Foreign Affairs*

'Ali bin-Khalifa bin-Salman al-Khalifa, *Transportation*

Jawad Salim al-'Uraysid, *State*

Khalid bin-'Abdallah al-Khalifa, *Housing, Municipalities, and Environment*

Naji Jawad al-Bishri, *Public Works and Agriculture*

Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Karim Muhammad, *Finance and National Economy*

Khalifa bin-Ahmad al-Khalifa, *Defense*

Muhammad Ibrahim al-Mutawwa', *Cabinet Affairs and Information*

'Isa bin-'Ali al-Khalifa, *Oil and Industry*

'Ali Salih 'Abdallah al-Salih, *Trade*

'Abd-al-'Aziz bin-Muhammad al-Fadil, *Education*
 Faysal Rida al-Musawi, *Health*
 'Abdallah Muhammad Jum'a, *Electricity and Water*
 'Abd-al-Nabi 'Abdallah al-Shu'la, *Labor and Social*
Affairs [6/26 FBIS]

Cyprus

1995

Apr 18 Greek Cypriot officials announced a \$80-million plan to purchase 43 armored vehicles from Russia [4/21 FBIS]

Apr 23 Turkish Cypriot president Rauf Denktas won a runoff election against National Unity Party leader Derviş Eroğlu by capturing 62.5 percent of 91,000 votes cast [4/24 FT]

May 18: United Nations (UN) special envoy Joe Clark met with Greek Cypriot president Glavkos Kleridhis to discuss Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot talks [5/18 FBIS]

Jun 5: Greek Cypriot president Kleridhis stated that his government had agreed to purchase an unspecified number of Russian armored vehicles for \$68 million [6/6 FBIS]

Jun 12: The European Union (EU) approved a motion that Cypriot accession to the EU would not be tied to an agreement on a Turkish-EU customs union. It also recognized the Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate interlocutor with the EU [6/13 FBIS]

Jun. 23: The Czech Republic and the Greek Cypriot government signed agreements covering trade and visas [6/26 FBIS]

Jun. 28 Greek Cypriot defense minister Konstandinos Iliadhis stated that Turkish Cypriot forces were constructing fortifications in Nicosia [6/29 FBIS]

July 13 Greece donated 56 AMX-30 tanks to the Greek Cypriot government [7/14 FBIS]

Egypt

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs

1995

Apr. 16. A military court ordered the medical examination of seven defendants, accused of participation in the Islamist group Tala' al-Fath, who claimed they were tortured by police [4/18 FBIS]

Apr 18: In Kum Umbu, Upper Egypt, security forces killed three Islamists during a raid on their hideout [4/19 FBIS]

Apr 19. A court sentenced three men to death and six to life imprisonment with hard labor for the murder of a police officer in 1993 [4/20 FBIS]

Apr 22 In Markaz Mallawi, Upper Egypt, unidentified gunmen wounded five police officers [4/24 FBIS]

Apr. 25: In Minsha'at al-Mughaliqa, Markaz Mallawi, security forces reported killing a "terrorist" and a bystander in a shootout [4/28 FBIS]

In Hanna Adib, Upper Egypt, police reported killing one "Muslim militant" and wounding two other people after the militant fatally shot a Copt [4/26 FBIS]

Apr. 30. Security forces reported the arrest in Alexandria of 13 Muslim Brotherhood members accused of seditious acts [5/1 FBIS]

May 2: Police reported that Islamists fatally shot a police informant in the southern town of Mallawi [5/2 FBIS]

May 4 Security forces reported killing three "terrorists" during a clash in Cairo [5/5 FBIS]

May 10. Police reported killing "prominent terrorist leader" Hasan Hamid al-Sayyid Khayri in Alexandria [5/11 FBIS]

May 30: In al-Barajil, al-Minya Governorate, unknown gunmen killed one police officer and wounded three other people [6/2 FBIS]

May 31: A military court sentenced two men to death and 28 others to sentences ranging from life to one year's imprisonment for attempting to revive the al-Jihad organization [6/1 FBIS]

Jun 3: Meeting in Egypt, German chancellor Helmut Kohl and Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak discussed bilateral relations and trade [6/5 FBIS]

In Tanda, near Mallawi, security forces reported that "militants" had fatally shot nine people outside a mosque [6/5 WP]

Jun 8 Security sources reported that two police officers and five "terrorists" were killed when police attacked their hideout in Markaz Abu-Qurgas, in al-Minya [6/9 FBIS]

Jun. 14. A court annulled the marriage of Nasr Abu Zayd and his wife Ibtissam Yunus, ruling that abu-Zayd was an apostate and, therefore, could not marry a Muslim woman [6/15 NYT]

Jun 23 The government's chief prosecutor ordered an autopsy of Mustafa Muhammad 'Iraqi, who, authorities said, had died of a heart attack at Nadi al-Jadid prison several days before [6/23 FBIS]

Jun. 26 In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, President Mubarak's motorcade was attacked by unknown assailants en route to a meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Mubarak was unharmed, but Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Ambassador to Ethiopia, Yusuf Rajab Radi, was wounded, as were several Egyptian bodyguards. Two attackers and two Ethiopian police officers were killed [6/27 NYT, FBIS]

Jun. 27. President Mubarak stated that the Sudan was responsible for the 26 June assassination attempt against him in Ethiopia [6/28 WP]

In Asyut, Upper Egypt, unidentified gunmen shot to death two police officers, wounding two other officers and nine civilians [6/28 FBIS]

Jun. 28: In Burjaya, al-Minya, security forces reported killing a "terrorist" and a civilian in a shootout with the terrorist [6/29 FBIS]

Jun 29: Security forces reported killing two "terrorist" leaders in Awlad 'Azzaz and Markaz Suhaj, in Upper Egypt [7/6 FBIS]

July 1: In Ethiopia, Ethiopian security forces killed three men suspected of involvement in the 26 June assassination attempt on President Mubarak [7/2 NYT]

July 3 Ethiopian authorities identified five of the attackers on President Mubarak's motorcade on 26 June as Egyptian [7/5 WP]

July 4 The Islamic Group claimed responsibility for the 26 June attack on President Mubarak [7/5 NYT]

July 6 Security sources reported that Islamists killed six police officers in an attack in the southern region of Asyut [7/6 FBIS]

In al-Sahil, in Asyut, unknown assailants attacked a police vehicle, killing five police officers and wounding two police officers and a civilian [7/7 FBIS]

Police reported killing three "terrorists" in Bani 'Ubayd, al-Minya [7/7 FBIS]

July 9 In a case involving 18 alleged al-Jihad members, a court sentenced three to death, five to life imprisonment and hard labor, and eight to 15 years' imprisonment [7/10 FBIS]

July 12 Security forces reported killing one "terrorist" and arresting two others in Bani Suwayf, in Upper Egypt [7/13 FBIS]

July 15 Lawyers in a case involving 13 people accused of Islamic Group membership stated that the government had used torture on the defendants during interrogation [7/17 FBIS]

Iran

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Iraq

1995

Apr. 17 In New York City, US secretary of state Warren Christopher met with Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen to discuss China's plan to sell two nuclear reactors to Iran. Christopher failed to stop the deal, which the United States feared would increase Iran's ability to produce nuclear weapons [4/18 NYT, WSJ]

In New Delhi, Iranian president 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani met with Indian prime minister Narasimha Rao to discuss bilateral relations, oil, and regional issues [4/17, 4/18 FBIS]

Apr. 18 Iran and India signed agreements on cultural exchange, interdiction of drug trafficking, environmental issues, postal services, telecommunications, and tourism [4/19 FBIS]

Apr. 19 Israeli television and the Ankara-based newspaper *Cumhuriyet* reported demonstrations, looting, and riots in southern Tehran caused by escalating fuel prices and economic instability [4/20 FBIS]

State television announced that three US citizens were convicted of spying during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. US state department officials stated that they were unaware of any US citizens being tried in Iran [4/20 WP]

Apr. 20 Government officials eased restrictions on the use and transport of video cameras and video cassette recorders, but announced that satellite dishes would be confiscated and that the import and sale of satellite dishes was prohibited [4/21 FBIS]

In Tblisi, President Rafsanjani met with Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze to discuss bilateral relations [4/21 FBIS]

Apr. 21 A Norwegian police official stated that no connection to Iran could be found in the 1993 shooting injury in Norway of author Salman Rushdie's publisher William Nygaard [4/22 WP]

May 3 US officials announced that Russia planned to proceed with its sale of two nuclear reactors to Iran, but would not sell a gas centrifuge plant that would have given Iran access to enriched uranium used in nuclear reactors [5/4 WP]

May 8 The United States banned all trade between US companies and Iran [5/9 WSJ]

May 11 In Tehran, police arrested sidewalk money changers and seized their cash. The move was in conjunction with a law passed to stop devaluation of the rial, which had lost two-thirds of its value in two weeks [5/12 FT]

May 13 The Director of the Atomic Energy Organization, Reza Amrollahi, announced that the government had signed an agreement in which China agreed to provide Iran with two nuclear power reactors. Amrollahi stated that the reactors were not intended for the construction of weapons. Six more reactors were planned to be built within 20 years [5/14 NYT]

May 16 US officials in Warsaw confirmed that Poland had agreed to sell Iran 100 Soviet T-72 tanks for approximately \$30 million, despite US efforts to stop the deal [5/17 NYT]

May 20 The annual inflation rate hit a record-setting 58.8 percent [6/27 FT]

Jun. 9 Japan, which bought 17 percent of Iran's oil production in 1994, announced that it would not join a US embargo on Iran [6/10 NYT]

Jun. 10 In Tehran, the offices of the weekly newspaper *Peyam-e-Daneshju* were attacked by unidentified gunmen. The offices were ransacked before police captured three of the assailants [6/12 FBIS]

Jun. 29 Official sources reported that the Hor-ul-Horeizeh refugee camp for Iraqis, located on the southern border with Iraq, had been closed and its residents moved to the interior. Iraq had alleged that the camp was a base for Shi'ite cross-border attacks [6/30 NYT]

July 3 Norway announced it would recall its ambassador to Iran because of Iran's refusal to rescind its death warrant on British author Salman Rushdie [7/4 FT]

July 6 Exiled politician Karim Sanjabi died in Carbondale, Illinois, of unspecified causes. Sanjabi was foreign minister under Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan [7/7 NYT]

Iraq

See also, Regional Affairs, Iran, Turkey

1995

Apr. 16 Iraqi opposition sources reported that former Agriculture Minister Karim Hasan Rida was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for negligence of duty [4/19 FBIS]

Apr 17. President Saddam Husayn appointed Khalid 'Abd-al-Mun'im Rashid agriculture minister [4/19 FBIS]

In Irbil, in northern Iraq, at least three bombs exploded, killing two people and wounding five others [4/18 FBIS]

The government rejected a 14 April 1995 United Nations' (UN) plan to allow Iraq to sell \$2 billion worth of oil for humanitarian purposes [4/18 FT]

Apr 18 The government refused to allow a Polish diplomat to see David Daliberti and William Barloon, two US citizens arrested on 13 March 1995 and convicted on 25 March 1995 of illegally entering the country [4/19 NYT]

Two rockets were fired at the Baghdad offices of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), the Iraqi-based Iranian opposition group. No damage or injuries were reported [4/19 FBIS]

Apr 19 Government forces attacked villages in the al-'Amara marshlands, resulting in an unspecified number of casualties [4/20 FBIS]

Apr 27. Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) leader Necirvan Barzani announced that 200 KDP fighters were deployed on the Turkish border, near Derkare, to prevent Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) members from crossing the border [4/28 FBIS]

Apr 28 An estimated 100,000 people marched in Tikrit, north of Baghdad, in support of President Husayn on his 58th birthday [4/29 WP]

May 1. A Kuwaiti source reported that President Husayn's son, 'Udayy, was wounded in an ambush by an Iraqi opposition group called the Islamic Revolution of Iraq [5/1 FBIS]

May 3 Government and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) forces clashed near Qadir Karam in Karkuk. The PUK claimed to have killed eight government soldiers [5/4 FBIS]

May 13 The UN Security Council extended sanctions against Iraq in light of evidence that Iraq was not complying with UN resolutions [5/14 FT]

Interior Minister and half-brother of President Husayn, Wathban Ibrahim al-Hasan al-Takriti, was reportedly the target of a failed assassination attempt [5/22 FBIS]

The KDP unilaterally extended to 15 June the cease-fire between itself and the PUK in effect since 7 April [6/2 FBIS]

May 14 The Iraqi National Congress (INC) claimed 43 people, mainly military officers, were arrested in connection with a failed assassination attempt on President Husayn in Samarra, north of Baghdad [5/26 FBIS]

May 17 Unknown gunmen fatally shot two female officials of the MKO near Baghdad [5/18 FBIS]

May 20. In Ramadi, west of Baghdad, security forces clashed with tribesmen, leaving 30 dead and 100 wounded. The clash was sparked when officials returned the decapitated body of a Dulaymi tribal leader's son who had been killed on suspicion that he had participated in a failed coup attempt [5/30 FBIS, 6/2 WP]

May 22. Interior Minister Wathban Ibrahim al-Hasan was replaced by Muhammad Zimam 'Abd-al-Razzaq [5/23 FBIS]

May 24 Foreign Minister Hamid Yusuf Hammadi stated in a letter to UN secretary general Butrus Butrus-Ghali that the United States had used depleted uranium weapons against Iraqi troops in the 1991 Persian Gulf War [5/25 WP]

May 31. Opposition sources reported that a bomb in Basra had damaged a building of the Security Directory and killed or wounded an unspecified number of people [6/1 FBIS]

Jun. 1 UN special envoy Rolf Ekeus stated that Iraq had refused to account for 17 tons of material used in the manufacture of biological weapons [6/2 WSJ]

Jun 9: In New York City, US law enforcement officials arrested three men charged with selling eight tons of Ukrainian nuclear material to Iraq [6/9 NYT]

Jun 10 PUK sources reported that an artillery attack by KDP forces, violating the cease-fire, had killed four people at an unidentified location [6/13 FBIS]

The PUK and the KDP both issued peace plans intended to end intra-Kurdish fighting [6/12 FBIS]

Jun. 12. PUK radio claimed that its forces had repulsed government troops advancing on 'Uwayna, near Irbil [6/14 FBIS]

The PUK reported a clash with KDP forces in Walasin, in Sulaymaniyya Governorate [6/14 FBIS]

Jun 14 Shi'ite Iraqi opposition sources in Damascus reported that several Iraqi army units had clashed with each other in Abu Ghrayb, west of Baghdad. Members of the Dulaymi tribe were reported to be involved in the fighting. The US State Department confirmed the event [6/15 FT, WP, WSJ, 6/16 NYT]

Jun 19 Opposition sources said that the government arrested or executed approximately 150 soldiers and officers who participated in the 14 June rebellion in Abu Ghrayb [6/20 NYT]

Jun. 20 UN special envoy Ekeus reported to the UN Security Council that evidence suggested the Iraqi government was concealing data concerning its biological weapons program [6/20 WSJ, 6/21 NYT]

Opposition sources reported that Lieutenant General Iyad al-Rawi was arrested for refusing to accept an assignment as governor of al-Anbar Governorate, to the west of Baghdad, and that government troops had clashed with Al Bu-Nimr tribesmen in al-Anbar [6/21 FBIS]

Jun 30: Amir Muhammad Rashid was appointed oil minister, replacing Safa' Hadi Jawad [7/3 FBIS]

Opposition radio reported that several high officials, including Nuri Faysal Shahr and Brigadier General 'Abd al-Hadi Salih of the al-Anbar Governorate, had been arrested [7/3 FBIS]

July 1 In Baghdad, government officials stated to UN inspection commission chairman Ekeus that Iraq had developed lethal biological weapons in 1989-90, but that they had subsequently been destroyed [7/6 NYT]

July 2: KDP radio reported that 300 officers and al-Dulaymi tribesmen accused of participation in the anti-government uprising on 14 June had been executed [7/3 FBIS]

July 3. PUK and KDP negotiators in Tehran extended their cease-fire until 15 August [7/7 FBIS]

July 7: The KDP reported a clash with PUK forces near Shaqlawa, in northern Iraq, and claimed the PUK had violated the cease-fire [7/10 FBIS]

July 10: In Baghdad, unknown assailants killed three members of the MKO [7/11 FT]

July 11: PUK radio reported clashes between PUK and KDP forces near Irbil, and claimed that 40 KDP fighters had been killed. Iraq radio reported 40 civilian casualties [7/14 FBIS]

During a UN Security Council meeting to review sanctions against Iraq, US ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright stated that Iraq had enough biological weapons to kill tens of thousands of people. The UN Security Council retained the sanctions [7/12 FT]

July 13: Iraqi television reported clashes between PUK and KDP forces in Shahrbazur, near Irbil [7/14 FBIS]

Israel

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Lebanon

1995

Apr. 22: Police arrested Ofer Nimrodi, editor and publisher of the daily newspaper *Ma'ariv* on charges of wiretapping members of the media, politicians, and business people [4/25 FBIS]

Apr. 24: The Bank of Israel lowered interest rates by 0.8 percent to 14 percent despite pressure from the business sector to decrease interest rates by 2–3 points [4/25 FT]

May 15: Uzi Baram, minister of the interior, resigned from his post citing personal and family reasons. He continued in the post of minister of tourism [5/16 FBIS]

The Knesset rejected a no-confidence motion brought by the National Religious Party (NRP) and Tzomet. The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (HADASH) retracted its no-confidence motion [5/16 FBIS]

May 18: The government suspended sale of the state-owned Israel Chemical Company after the first round of bids had failed to meet the target price [5/19 FT]

May 29: The Knesset rejected, by a vote of 54–42, a no-confidence motion submitted against the government of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin [5/31 FBIS]

Jun. 1: The government signed two sections of an international treaty banning "inhumane" weapons. Under the treaty Israel would not use anti-personnel mines. The third section, which was not signed, would have prohibited the use of napalm [6/2 FBIS]

Jun. 6: Israel's Dead Sea Works and Volkswagen agreed to a \$600-million project to produce and sell magnesium from a Dead Sea plant [6/7 FT]

A vote over changes to the primary system in the Likud's Central Committee resulted in approval of a plan by Binyamin Netanyahu. A faction led by David Levy boycotted the vote [6/6 FBIS]

Jun. 7: The Movement for Israel and Immigration party was founded by Natan Sharansky and Yuli Edelstein [6/9 FBIS]

Jun. 13: The government approved \$560 million for expansion of Ben Gurion International Airport [6/14 FT]

Jun. 15: The Likud submitted a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Rabin [6/16 FBIS]

Jun. 18: Likud leader David Levy broke with the Likud and announced a new party called the New Way [6/19 NYT]

In Jerusalem, Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze met with Prime Minister Rabin, and Shevardnadze stated that Georgia would establish an embassy in Israel by 1996 [6/19 FBIS]

Jun. 21: The NRP submitted a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Rabin [6/22 FBIS]

Jun. 25: The Knesset rejected no-confidence motions submitted by the Likud and the NRP by a vote of 54 to 48 [6/29 FBIS]

July 2: Six towns near Jerusalem were evacuated when forest fires destroyed 2,500 acres of woodland [7/3 WSJ]

July 11: The government and Ukraine signed a trade and economic cooperation agreement [7/12 FBIS]

July 12: The NRP submitted a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Rabin [7/13 FBIS]

Jordan

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1995

Apr. 25: A court overturned a 26 February 1995 decision by the Press and Publications Department to suspend the weekly *Hawadith al-Sa'a* on licensing technicalities [4/27 FBIS]

Jun. 4: Security forces reportedly arrested at least three members of the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party (JDPUP) because of suspected affiliation with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) [6/6 FBIS]

Jun. 8: Security forces arrested journalist Faraj Shalhub at his home in the Suf refugee camp, reportedly for criticizing the deportation of Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) leaders [6/13 FBIS]

Jun. 17: The Jordanian Freedom (al-Hurriya) Party changed its name to the Progressive (al-Taqaddumi) Party [6/28 FBIS]

July 3: In Paris, King Husayn met with French president Jacques Chirac. Chirac stated that the European Union (EU) sought a greater political role in the region, commensurate with its financial contributions [7/4 FT]

July 10: Mohammad Ibrahim Abequa, convicted of murdering his wife in New Jersey on 4 July 1994, was convicted by an Amman court to 15 years of hard labor [7/11 NYT]

July 11: The Islamic Action Front (IAF), which vowed to reverse Jordan's peace treaty with Israel, did poorly in

national municipal elections, viewed as a referendum on the peace treaty [7/12, 7/13 FT]

Kuwait

See also, Regional Affairs

1995

Apr 20 The *Financial Times* reported that Kuwait's assembly had received a report alleging pervasive waste and corruption in the military [4/20 FT]

May 1: In Kuwait City, Vietnamese president Le Duc Anh met with Kuwait's Amir Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah to discuss bilateral relations [5/2 FBIS]

May 3 The government signed accords with Vietnam pledging cooperation in the fields of economics, science, and technology [5/3 FBIS]

May 20 A joint government-National Assembly committee was established to settle a dispute between the two parties regarding the Assembly's constitutional powers [5/23 FBIS]

May 21: As part of its privatization drive, the government sold 15.5 percent of the state-owned property management company, Kuwait Commercial Markets Complex [5/22 FT]

Jun 4 At al-Bayan palace, Bosnian prime minister Haris Silajdzic met with Amir al-Sabah to discuss bilateral relations [6/5 FBIS]

Jun 11 The cabinet decided to delay collection of \$15 billion in private and corporate debt the government had assumed in 1992 from creditors [6/13 FT]

Jun 18 In Kuwait, Malawi president Elson Bakili Muluzi met with Amir al-Sabah to discuss bilateral relations [6/20 FBIS]

Jun 20 The National Assembly ratified a law establishing free trade zones [6/21 FBIS]

July 4 The state-owned Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) concluded a deal with the Spanish government to resurrect the KIO's investment firm, Grupo Torras, which went into receivership in 1992 [7/5 FT]

Lebanon

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1995

Apr 17 In the 'Ayn al-Hilwa camp outside Sidon, in south Lebanon, supporters of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat clashed with Munir Misdah supporters, opposed to peace with Israel, leaving two combatants dead [4/19 FBIS]

Apr 25 In Bint Jubayl, in the Israeli self-declared "security zone," Hizballah claimed responsibility for a car-bomb attack on an Israeli army convoy that wounded nine Israeli soldiers, one South Lebanese Army (SLA) soldier, and 12 civilians [4/26 NYT, FBIS]

Apr 27 Parliament approved a law declaring as dead 17,000 Lebanese missing since the 1975-90 civil war [4/28 NYT]

Israeli forces shelled areas of the South including al-Nafakhiyya, Sirbbin, and al-Satuqi. Israeli warplanes staged mock raids over al-Nabatiyya and Iqlim al-Tuffah, also in the south [4/28 FBIS]

After the 25 April car bombing at Bint Jubayl, Israeli military and SLA units carried out operations in the "security zone" before reopening passages between the zone and northern Lebanon [4/28 FBIS]

Apr 29 Israel shelled areas of the "security zone," including the al-Litani River, al-Jabal al-Rafi', and Majdal Zun [5/1 FBIS]

May 1 Hizballah reported destroying a tank and wounding an unspecified number of Israeli troops at Bint Jubayl, in the "security zone" [5/2 FBIS]

May 2: The Islamic Resistance reported killing and wounding an unspecified number of Israeli troops in a clash near al-Jabal al-Rafi'. Hizballah and SLA positions exchanged rocket and artillery fire [5/2 FBIS]

May 4 Rockets fired from Lebanon by unknown forces wounded three Israeli civilians in Galilee, Israel. Israeli shelling in the "security zone" killed one and wounded two [5/8 FBIS]

Israeli and Islamic resistance forces clashed in the al-Zahrani area of the "security zone," resulting in the destruction of one Israeli tank and at least one Israeli casualty [5/4 FBIS]

May 7 Hizballah and Israeli positions in the "security zone" exchanged artillery fire. Hizballah reported losing two of its members in a clash with Israeli forces in Sujud in the "security zone" [5/8 FBIS]

May 9 Israeli warships reportedly forced Lebanese fishing boats to return to port in Tyre. Hizballah reported the death of two of its members in a clash with SLA forces in al-Ahmadiyya [5/10 FBIS]

May 18: Amal Movement sources reported clashing with Israeli forces near al-Dabsha and wounding several Israeli soldiers. Israeli warplanes flew over Beirut [5/19 FBIS]

May 20: Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri resigned his post [5/21 FT]

The Faithful Resistance reported losing one member in an attack on an SLA position in Sujud. [5/22 FBIS]

May 21 Rafik al-Hariri returned to his post as prime minister after having resigned on 20 May. [5/22 FT]

May 25: Lebanese president Ilyas al-Hrawi announced the new government

Michel al-Murr, *Deputy Prime Minister and Interior*
Michel Iddi, *Culture and Higher Education*

'Ali al-Khalil, *Expatriates*

Bahij Tabbara, *Justice*

Marwan Hamada, *Public Health*

Walid Junblatt, *Refugees' Affairs*

Muhsin Dallul, *National Defense*

Nadim Salim, *State*

Shawqi Fakhuri, *Agriculture*

As'ad Hardan, *Labor*

Faris Buwayz, *Foreign Affairs*

Ilyas Hubayqa, *Water and Electricity Resources*

Shahi Barsumian, *Industry and Oil*

'Umar Misqawi, *Transportation*

Anwar al-Khalil, *State for the Administrative Reform Affairs*

Nicholas Fattush, *Tourism*
 Mahmud Abu-Hamdan, *Housing and Cooperatives*
 Hagop Demerdjian, *Municipal and Rural Affairs*
 Fu'ad Sinyura, *State for Financial Affairs*
 Qabalan 'Isa al-Khuri, *State*
 Joseph Mughayzil, *Environment*
 'Abd al-Rahim Murad, *Vocational and Technical Education*
 Robert Ghanim, *National Education, Youth, and Sports*
 Farid Makari, *Information*
 Istafan al-Duwayhi, *Social Affairs*
 Al-Fadi Shalaq, *Post and Telecommunications*
 Yasin Jabir, *Economy and Trade*
 'Ali Harajli, *Public Works*
 Fayiz Shakur, *State* [7/26 FBIS]

May 28 In Bayt Lif, in the "security zone," a bomb exploded near an SLA position, wounding an SLA soldier and a civilian [5/30 FBIS]

May 29 Joseph Mughayzil, Minister of Environment, died of a heart attack [5/30 FBIS]

Jun. 7: In Paris, President Hrawi met with French president Jacques Chirac to discuss Israeli-Lebanese relations and French aid for rebuilding Lebanon [6/8 FBIS]

Jun 12: At 'Ayn al-Hilwa refugee camp, violence between supporters of PLO chairman Arafat and supporters of Khalid al-Shayib resulted in two deaths [6/13 FBIS]

Jun. 13 Fighting at the 'Ayn al-Hilwa camp between supporters and opponents of PLO chairman Arafat resulted in ten deaths and 30 people wounded [6/13 FBIS]

Jun 15 Israeli radio reported that Hizballah had fired rockets on Nahariya, in Galilee, wounding four people. Israeli warplanes retaliated by attacking the suspected launch site of Wadi al-'Izzayya, north of the "security zone" [6/16 NYT]

Jun 16 SLA sources reported clashes with Hizballah forces at Batir, Jizzin, Kurum al-Arz, and Tumat Jizzin [6/19 FBIS]

Jun. 18: Near Nabatiyya, in the "security zone," a Hizballah group ambushed an Israeli patrol. Three Israeli soldiers and two Hizballah members were killed [6/19 NYT]

Jun 21: Five SLA members were wounded when bombs exploded in Hula and Jizzin [6/22 FBIS]

Jun 23: One employee was killed and nine tourists were wounded when missiles fired from southern Israel struck a Club Med resort in northern Israel, near Rosh Hanikra. Hizballah claimed responsibility. Israeli warplanes attacked Hizballah targets in the "security zone" in retaliation [6/23 FBIS, 6/24 WP]

Jun 24: A court consisting of five judges, one from each main religious community, sentenced Samir Ja'ja', a leader of Christian forces during the civil war, to life imprisonment for killing a Christian politician, Danny Sham'un, his wife, and one of his children on 21 October 1990 [6/25 WP, 6/27 FBIS]

Jun 27 Islamic Resistance sources reported attacking two Israeli patrols on the Hula road in the "security zone," killing ten Israeli soldiers [6/28 FBIS]

Jun. 29 Hizballah leader 'Ali Sa'd was killed when his car exploded on a road south of Tyre [7/3 FBIS]

Jun. 30: Israeli shelling of Tibnin and Iqlim al-Tuffah resulted in the deaths of one Islamic Resistance member and one civilian [7/3 FBIS]

July 3: In two separate incidents in the eastern part of the "security zone," clashes between Hizballah and Israeli forces resulted in the deaths of two Israelis and the wounding of five others [7/4 WP]

July 8 Israeli shelling in southern Lebanon resulted in the deaths of two teenage girls [7/10 FT]

Libya

See also, Regional Affairs

1995

Apr 19 The United Nations (UN) Security Council eased its ban on Libyan air flights, allowing Libyan pilgrims to make the *hajj* to Mecca. Two Libyan airliners landed in Jidda, Saudi Arabia [4/20 NYT, WP]

May 4: An opposition group, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, reported that several high-ranking military officers had been removed from their positions or transferred due to security concerns [5/5 FBIS]

Jun 3 In Tripoli, Libyan president Alpha Omar Konare met with Libyan president Mu'ammar Qadhafi to discuss bilateral relations [6/5 FBIS]

Jun 6. A \$5.7-billion contract for the third stage of a water-distribution project was awarded to South Korea's Dong Ah Construction [6/7 FT]

Jun. 28: The opposition group Libyan Patriotic and Democratic Forces (LPDF) reported that three members of the Revolutionary Command Council, Army Commander Colonel Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabir, Chief of Intelligence Major al-Khuwayldi al-Humaydi, and Army Inspector General Colonel Mustafa al-Kharubi, had resigned from their posts [7/6 FBIS]

July 5. The opposition group National Front for the Salvation of Libya reported that security forces had conducted mass arrests in Benghazi, al-Bayda', and Tubruq in northeast Libya [7/6 FBIS]

Morocco

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Western Sahara

Q

1995

Jun. 3 The government rejected a new fishing agreement proposed by the European Union (EU) to replace an accord that expired 30 April. Approximately 650 Spanish fishing vessels were idle as a result [6/5 FT]

Jun. 10: Opposition leader Muhammad Basri, exiled in France since 1967, returned to Morocco [6/14 FBIS]

Pakistan

See also, Regional Affairs, Afghanistan

1995

Apr 16 Near Lahore, twelve-year-old Iqbal Masih, known for his denouncing of child labor practices in Pakistan, was shot to death by unknown gunmen [4/19 NYT]

Apr 17 In Karachi, Nadim Riyaz, a suspect in an 8 March attack which killed US consulate officials, was shot to death when he attempted to escape arrest [4/18 NYT]

Apr 19. Pakistan and Portugal signed agreements on investment and cultural exchanges [4/19 FBIS]

Apr 24. In Islamabad, Bangladeshi prime minister Begum Khaleda Zia met with Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto to discuss bilateral relations [4/25 FBIS]

May 15. In Lahore, demonstrators protesting the burning of a Kashmiri Muslim shrine by Indian troops, attacked the US consulate with bricks [5/16 FBIS]

May 21 The Interior Ministry announced that charges of abuse of office had been brought against former Pakistani prime minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif [5/23 FBIS]

May 22 In Karachi, Mohajir Qawmi Movement (MQM) demonstrations against police violence sparked fighting that left five police officers and 18 others dead, and at least 40 people wounded [5/23 NYT]

May 29. The government signed agreements with China covering border security, tourism, and trade [6/1 FBIS]

Jun. 1. In Karachi, two car bombs damaged a provincial Assembly building and a naval center, while rockets fired into a police station wounded two police officers [6/2 FBIS]

Jun. 2. In Karachi, at least 13 people were killed in violence between unidentified armed groups and security forces' [6/5 FBIS]

A Pakistani spokesman stated that the United States had agreed to attempt to revise the Pressler Amendment, which prohibits arms sales to countries with nuclear weapons programs, and would not sell arms or technology to India. The statement came after a meeting of the US-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group [6/5 FBIS]

Jun. 4. In Karachi, unidentified gunmen killed six people and burnt cars during violence between rival gangs in the immigrant community [6/5 FT]

Jun. 5 In Karachi, two police officers and six others were killed and 12 wounded in violence between unidentified groups [6/6 FBIS]

Jun. 8. The US House of Representatives approved a bill offering Pakistan non-military aid [6/9 WSJ]

Jun. 13. In Karachi, violence resulted in the shooting death of a naval officer and an MQM member [6/15 FBIS]

Jun. 14 The government announced that it would reduce its budget deficit from 5.6 to 5 percent instead of the 4 percent agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) [6/15 FT]

Jun. 15. In Karachi, an unidentified group of gunmen killed ten people during an attack on a government office building [6/16 NYT]

Jun. 23 In Karachi, police arrested an alleged Russian intelligence agent as he attempted to leave the country [6/28 FBIS]

Jun. 25 MQM members rampaged through Karachi, killing 33 people in retaliation for the rape of an MQM associate [6/26 NYT]

Jun. 26 MQM gunmen killed 22 people in Karachi in violence that closed the Karachi Stock Exchange. The MQM offered to end the violence if the government would release several imprisoned MQM activists [6/27 FT]

Jun. 27 Near Peshawar, in the North West Frontier Province, unidentified gunmen abducted three Germans employed in the area [6/28 FT, 7/13 FBIS]

Jun. 28. The government requested from Interpol the extradition of MQM leader Altaf Husayn, residing in London [6/29 FT]

Jun. 29 The government banned six Urdu-language newspapers for 60 days for "sensationalism" in their reporting in Karachi [6/30 FT]

July 3 A German engineer kidnapped in the North West Frontier Province on 25 June was released. Two Germans remained the captives of an unknown group [7/14 FT]

July 4 The government lifted a ban imposed on 29 June on six Urdu-language newspapers in Karachi, averting a threatened strike by newspapers throughout the country [7/5 FT]

Foreign Secretary Najmuddin Shaykh denied US reports that the government had obtained M-11 long-range missiles from China [7/5 WP]

July 5 In Karachi, violence between factions resulted in five deaths [7/6 WSJ]

July 6 In Karachi, violence between factions resulted in 12 deaths [7/7 FT]

July 7: An MQM-sponsored strike in Karachi shut down businesses [7/10 FT]

In Karachi, MQM leader Aslam Sabzvari died in police custody. Government sources said Sabzvari had died of "heart failure," but hospital sources said his body had torture marks [7/10 FT]

July 9 In Karachi, a strike sponsored by the MQM was extended to a third day because of the 7 July death of MQM leader Aslam Sabzvari [7/10 FT]

July 10 The government and Romania signed agreements on economic, investment, technology, and trade cooperation [7/12 FBIS]

In Islamabad, Romanian prime minister Nicolae Vacaroiu met with Prime Minister Bhutto to discuss regional issues [7/12 FBIS]

July 11. Moody's, the international credit rating agency, downgraded the government's foreign-currency debt rating [7/12 FT]

In Islamabad, government and MQM representatives met to discuss ending violence in Karachi [7/12 FT]

July 13 Two Germans were released by an unknown group after having been kidnapped on 25 June in North West Frontier Province [7/14 FT]

Eight people were killed in factional violence in Karachi [7/14 FT]

In Islamabad, talks between MQM and government representatives ended with a new round of talks planned for 16 July [7/14 FBIS]

Qatar

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs

1995

Jun. 27. Crown Prince Hamad bin-Khalifa al-Thani forced the departure of his father, Qatar's Amir Shaykh Khalifa bin-Hamad al-Thani [6/27 NYT]

July 3: Amir Hamad al-Thani issued a law establishing the Doha Securities Market [7/4 FT]

July 11: Amir Hamad al-Thani named himself prime minister and defense minister and announced the formation of the following cabinet

'Abdallah bin-Khalifa al-Thani, *Deputy Prime Minister and Chief of Armed Forces*

Hamad bin-Suhaym al-Thani, *Minister of State at the Amiri Court*

Hamad bin-Jasim bin-Jabr al-Thani, *Foreign Affairs*
Muhammad bin-Khalifa al-Thani, *Finance, Economy, Trade*

Ahmad bin-Sayf al-Thani, *State*

Hamad bin-'Abdallah al-Thani, *Minister of State for Defense Affairs*

'Abdallah bin-Khalid al-Thani, *Awqaf and Islamic Affairs*

Ahmad bin-Hamad al-Thani, *Municipal Affairs and Agriculture*

Muhammad bin-Khalid al-Thani, *Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs*

'Abdallah Salih al-Mani', *Communications and Transportation*

'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah Turki, *Education*

Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali al-Subay'i, *Electricity and Water*

'Abdallah Hamad al-Atuyya, *Energy and Industry*

Hamad 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Kuwari, *Information and Culture*

'Ali Sa'id al-Khayarin, *Public Health*

Najib Muhammad al-Nu'aymi, *Justice*

Ahmad 'Abdallah al-Mahmud, *Minister of State for Foreign Affairs* [7/11 FBIS, 7/12 FT]

Saudi Arabia

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Libya

1995

Apr. 23: The London-based *al-Quds al-'Arabi* reported that 500 people had gathered in front of Saudi Arabia's London embassy to protest the arrest of 300 'Ulama' (religious scholars) in Saudi Arabia [4/27 FBIS]

Jun. 3: The government arrested a Muslim cleric, Hammud bin-'Abdallah al-Sha'bi, reportedly for criticism of government human rights abuses [6/6 WSJ, WP, 6/9 FBIS]

Jun. 7: The US firm General Electric Power Systems announced that it had won a \$1.3-billion contract to provide Saudi Arabia with electrical-generating equipment [6/8 NYT]

Jun. 9. The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) reported that police had arrested three students of the Imam University in al-Qasim [6/30 FBIS]

Jun. 14 An Iranian source reported that an unspecified number of Shi'ite residents of 'Awamiyya, in the eastern region of the country, had been arrested when they protested confiscation of their land [6/16 FBIS]

Jun. 19 The government announced that it would purchase 61 airliners from US firms Boeing and McDonnell Douglas for \$6 billion [6/20 NYT]

July 5 The cabinet approved a development plan for the years 1995-2000. The official state news agency reported the plan relied heavily on private sector activity for economic growth [7/6 FT]

Sudan

See also, Regional Affairs, Egypt

1995

Apr. 18 South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) sources claimed that government warplanes had bombed SSIM positions on 17 and 18 April and that the government had violated the 28 March 1995 cease-fire 13 times [4/19 FBIS]

Apr. 23 The Foreign Ministry announced that Uganda had expelled an unspecified number of Sudanese diplomats [4/24 FBIS]

Apr. 26: In Nairobi, the SSIM and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) agreed to a cease-fire [4/28 FBIS]

May 1. The government signed an accord in which Russia agreed to finance a \$100-million dam on the Nile [5/2 WSJ]

May 9: Unidentified gunmen in the South released 21 of 22 United Nations' (UN) aid workers they had seized on 8 May [5/9 FBIS, 5/11 NYT]

May 17: Police arrested former prime minister and leader of the opposition Umma Party, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi [5/18 FBIS]

May 20: A spokesman for the SSIM, David Detrand, claimed that the government had violated the cease-fire by attacking Ulang on the Sobat River [5/25 FBIS]

May 25: The government agreed to extend the cease-fire, which began 28 March 1995, for two months. Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi brokered the extension during a meeting with Sudanese president 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir in Khartoum [5/26 FBIS]

May 30 The government reportedly withdrew the licenses of the daily newspapers *al-Fwa* and *al-Zalal* [5/31 FBIS]

The SSIM and SPLM agreed to accept federalism as the basis for peace negotiations with the government [5/31 FBIS]

May 31. The SSIM and the SPLM announced a two-month extension of the cease-fire [6/1, 6/2 FBIS]

Opposition sources claimed that the government had arrested approximately 200 opponents of the regime since 17 May 1995 [6/1 NYT]

Jun 13 The ministers of energy and mining announced the establishment of a Sino-Sudanese company to develop Sudanese oil and mineral resources [6/15 FBIS]

Jun 17 Nine opposition Sudanese organizations met in Entrea [6/20 FBIS]

Jun 28 The government closed its border with Ethiopia to private and passenger cars [6/30 FBIS]

July 9. Government news sources reported that SSIM and associated rebel forces had signed a peace agreement with the government and had relinquished control of the Fanjaf area, 500 miles south of Khartoum, to the government. The SSIM denied this report [7/10, 7/11 FBIS]

Syria

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1995

May 7 In Damascus, Vietnamese president Le Duc Anh met with Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad to discuss bilateral relations [5/9 FBIS]

July 15 The New York-based Human Rights Watch reported widespread abuses and torture inflicted upon political activists [7/16 WP]

Tunisia

See also, Regional Affairs

1995

Jun 3: In Tunisia, Gabonese president al-Haj 'Umar Bongo met with Tunisian president Zine al-'Abidine Ben 'Ali to discuss bilateral relations and African issues [6/5 FBIS]

Turkey

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs

1995

Apr 16 In the eastern province of Tunceli, 25,000 Turkish troops attacked a stronghold of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) in Ali Bogazi Ravine [4/17 NYT]

Apr 19 In Washington, US president Bill Clinton met with Turkish prime minister Tansu Çiller to discuss

bilateral relations. Clinton urged Çiller to pull Turkish forces out of northern Iraq, where they have been since the 20 March offensive against the PKK [4/20 NYT]

The Istanbul Security Directorate announced that 21 members of the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) were arrested for planning the assassination of Prime Minister Çiller [4/20 FBIS]

Apr 21 The government and Armema agreed to re-open an air route between Erzurum, eastern Turkey, and Yerevan, Armenia [4/24 FBIS]

Apr 22 Military sources said that 36 PKK members were killed when PKK forces attacked a military base in Tunceli Province [4/24 WP]

Apr 26: The government barred the Netherlands from bidding on defense contracts in response to Holland's refusal to ban a Kurdish parliament-in-exile at The Hague, established 12 April 1995 [4/27 FT]

Apr 27 The government accepted a \$500-million loan package created by the United States and Japan [4/27 FT]

May 3. In Salonika, Greece, Turkish government spokesperson Yıldırım Aktuna was pelted with rocks and lemons after referring to Greek Muslims as Turks [5/4 FT]

May 4 The parliament approved the sale of 49 percent of the state-owned Turk Telekom company [5/5 FT]

May 13: In Moscow, Prime Minister Çiller met with Russian president Boris Yeltsin to discuss bilateral relations. Russian prime minister Chernomyrdin promised to exclude PKK activities from Russia [5/18 FBIS]

May 16 Journalists Hidir Goktas and Metim Gulbay were sentenced to 20 months' imprisonment, and publisher Hasan Basri Ciplak was sentenced to five months, for quoting a jailed Kurdish member of parliament [5/17 WP]

May 25 In Batman, in the southeast, a bomb exploded at a bus stop killing eight people and wounding 16 others [5/26 NYT]

Jun 1 Greece's parliament ratified the international Law of the Sea, which makes it possible for Greece to claim up to 12 nautical miles of water from shore. The Turkish Foreign Ministry protested the act [6/2 NYT]

Jun 4 Prime Minister Çiller's True Path (DYP) party captured 40 percent of the votes in limited local elections [6/5, 6/6 FT]

Jun 7 Amnesty International representative Helmut Oberdiek was deported as a "*persona non grata*" [6/14 FBIS]

Jun 8. Parliament authorized a declaration of war on Greece should the government decide to go to war in response to Greece's 1 June signing of the Law of the Sea treaty [6/9 FT]

Jun 23 Minister of Culture Ercan Karakas resigned [6/26 FBIS]

July 3. A Turkish news source reported that PKK leader Iskender Yalcin had surrendered to Turkish forces in Tunceli [7/12 FBIS]

July 6. The government withdrew from parliamentary debate a package of constitutional reforms aimed at easing admittance into a European Union (EU) customs union [7/9 FT]

Author Aziz Nesin died of a heart attack in Cesme, along the Aegean coast [7/7 NYT]

UAE

See also, Regional Affairs

1995

Apr. 18 Police in Abu Dhabi arrested five Pakistanis attempting to smuggle hashish into the country in ketchup bottles [4/18 FBIS]

Jun. 7. In the UAE, Bosnian prime minister Haris Silajdzic met with UAE President Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nuhayyan to discuss the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina [6/8 FBIS]

Jun. 26: A court sentenced 15-year-old Filipino citizen Sarah Balabagan to seven years' imprisonment and fined her \$40,500. Balabagan was convicted of killing her employer, Almas Muhammad Balushi, on 19 July 1994 after he raped her [7/11 WP]

Western Sahara

1995

Jun. 7. The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) agreed to cooperate with a United Nations' (UN) referendum on Western Saharan independence from Morocco [6/9 FBIS]

Yemen

See also, Regional Affairs

1995

Apr. 29: Security forces reported arresting an unspecified number of Yemeni Opposition Front (MAWJ) supporters suspected of planning "activities detrimental to the country's security and stability" [5/2 FBIS]

May 27. In Aden, an unknown source caused an explosion in a weapons depot. One report said the explosion was caused by a rocket fired by an opposition group [5/29 FT]

Jun. 4: German authorities stated that Johannes Weirich had been arrested in Aden and extradited to Germany to face charges of attempted murder in connection with the terrorist Carlos the Jackal [6/5 NYT]

Jun. 13: Yemeni president 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih appointed the following cabinet members

Dr Muhammad Sa'id al-'Attar, *Deputy Prime Minister and Industry, Oil, and Mineral Resources*

'Abd-al-Rahman al-'Akwa', *Information*

Colonel Husayn Muhammad 'Arab, *Interior*

Dr Muhammad Ahmad Ifandi, *Supply and Trade* [6/14 FBIS]

July 2: Security forces uncovered and ended an attempt to hijack an Ethiopian airliner from San'a airport [7/3 FBIS]

July 11. India and the government signed a cooperation agreement covering cultural, economic, scientific, and trade fields [7/12 FBIS]



Book Reviews

Between Revision and Tradition in the History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Review Article by Muhammad Muslih

The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations, by Itamar Rabinovich Oxford and New York Oxford University Press, 1991 xi + 222 pages Notes to p 239 Bibl to p 245 Index to p 259 \$24.95

Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War, by Benny Morris Oxford, UK Clarendon Press, 1993 xvii + 428 pages Biogs to p 431 Bibl to p 437 Index to p 451 \$39.95

The historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict has undergone a significant transformation in the last decade, thanks primarily to Israeli academicians who either challenged or tried to correct and refine the Israeli semi-official version, which held the Arabs responsible for the non-settlement of the Palestine problem and its derivative, the Arab-Israeli conflict. These two books assess the accepted version of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although they do not focus on the same aspects of the conflict, both books offer fresh insights into the realpolitik that lies behind the facade of Arab and Israeli polemics.

Of the two books under review, *The Road Not Taken* has received the highest degree of attention and recognition in the literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are three reasons for the book's popularity among diplomats, historians, and journalists. First, it is written in a vivid, carefully argued narrative style, carrying the reader elegantly and swiftly from one set of secret Arab-Israeli negotiations to another. The narrative brings to light some important details about these negotiations. It also offers revealing depictions of the personalities involved in them. Here is what Itamar Rabinovich says of Israeli Premier David Ben-Gurion:

In 1949 David Ben-Gurion reached the pinnacle of prestige and power as the man who had led the Zionist movement and the Jewish community in Palestine to statehood and who had conducted the military and political campaign that culminated in the victory and formation of a state larger and more viable even than the one envisaged in late 1947 and much of 1948 (p. 31).

Muhammad Muslih is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of International Studies at C.W. Post College, Long Island University. He is the author of numerous books and articles on Middle Eastern politics, including The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). He is currently completing a book on Syria's foreign policy.

Here is his perceptive judgment of Syria's Prime Minister Husni al-Za'im

Zaim seems to have been a person of many contradictions. He radiated power and leadership but apparently was not very clever. He saw himself as a Syrian version of Ataturk, as a man who would take his country forward, but he was bogged down by his involvements and corruption and his lack of consistency and persistence (pp. 93–4)

Rabinovich's portrayal of Jordan's King 'Abdallah in the late 1940s and early 1950s is also perceptive

He was impulsive and impatient, and his eagerness to accomplish his purpose and to reach a settlement caused him more than once to overplay his hand. He could also be utterly pragmatic and change his mind while persuading himself that he was being persistent, thereby ignoring the maze of contradictions into which he had in fact maneuvered himself (p. 149)

The second reason for the book's merit, as the author himself states in the preface, is that the decisions made by Arab and Israeli leaders in 1948 and 1949 played a crucial role in shaping the lives of Arabs and Israelis for the next four decades. Third, the timing of the book's publication—when the Middle East peace process is underway, when the Soviet Union has collapsed, and when the United States is involved as never before in reshaping the Middle East following the crushing defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War—makes this a relevant book.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of *The Road Not Taken* constitute the heart of Rabinovich's book. They provide three case studies of Arab-Israeli negotiations from 1948 to 1952: attempts to arrange negotiations between the Israeli government of Ben-Gurion and Syria's Husni al-Za'im, the intermittent negotiations between Israel and King 'Abdallah, and the talks between Israel and pre-revolutionary Egyptian emissaries.

Rabinovich is concerned primarily with two essential points. The first relates to the Arab states and revolves around two questions: a) Were the Arab leaders ready to make peace with Israel? And b) if they were ready, were they strong enough domestically to face the opposition and stick to the deal? The second point is concerned with Israeli historiography and represents Rabinovich's attempt to evaluate the arguments of Israel's "new historians," the so-called revisionists, who claim through archives-based scholarship that opportunities for an Arab-Israeli peace were missed in 1948 and its immediate aftermath, primarily because Israel was neither ready for nor interested in making the concessions necessary for peace.

With respect to the first point, Rabinovich's narrative can be summarized as follows. There seems no doubt in the author's mind that 'Abdallah was sincere in seeking a settlement with Israel (p. 149). In return for peace, 'Abdallah initially demanded parts of the Negev or the Lod-Ramla area. But encountering stiff Israeli resistance to this proposal, the Jordanian monarch sought instead Israeli recognition of his annexation of the West Bank, in addition to a Jordanian-controlled corridor to the sea and access rights in and around West Jerusalem.

While Rabinovich is right and explicit on this point, he appears to be less explicit on the question of why Israel and Jordan failed to reach a peace agreement. In one section of the book, the author says: "The Israeli leadership was not at that time, however, interested in paying the price of a formal peace with Abdullah and argued that working only through him would have several other significant disadvantages. They therefore thought that for the time being an armistice agreement was preferable as an interim arrangement" (p. 114).

Yet, in other sections of the book, Rabinovich lays heavy emphasis on the problems raised by Jordanian negotiators and, in particular, on the weakness of 'Abdallah, the architect of the Jordanian negotiating position. "It is not a new idea," he writes in the conclusion, "to state that it was impossible to reach a peace agreement with Abdullah, who had lost control of his kingdom after the de facto annexation of the West Bank" (p. 220). Thus, Rabinovich leads the reader to conclude that Israel's strength and 'Abdallah's weakness were the principal impediments to an Israeli-Jordanian agreement. This is indeed the argument of revisionist Israeli historians, including Avi Shlaim and Benny Morris.

On the Israeli-Syrian front, Rabinovich devotes 45 pages to the Israeli-Syrian contacts of 1949. This is the best chapter of the book, and the conclusions which the author draws are more analytically focused than the pioneering works of Avi Shlaim and Yoram Nimrod.¹ After Za'im launched his coup d'état in March 1949, he sent messages to the Israeli government in which he "expressed his willingness to meet with Ben-Gurion, to enter into peace negotiations with Israel, and to settle 250,000 or 300,000 Palestinian refugees in northeastern Syria" (p. 69). This exchange of messages, through US and UN channels, unfolded in three phases between April and August 1949. Rabinovich argues that Za'im "undoubtedly wanted to end the active conflict and confrontation with Israel" for several reasons: a) His fear of renewed fighting with a militarily superior Israel, b) his interest in devoting Syria's resources to a program of social and economic reform rather than the confrontation with Israel, and c) his lack of interest in the cause of Arab nationalism, at the heart of which was the Palestinian question (p. 80).

Rabinovich concedes that Ben-Gurion showed little appreciation for Za'im's initiative. As a matter of fact, Ben-Gurion refused to meet Za'im in April-May 1949, suggesting to his representatives that there was no purpose to any such meeting unless Syria committed itself to withdraw to its territory as it existed before the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. From Rabinovich's perspective, it was not Ben-Gurion's refusal that destroyed the prospects for an Israeli-Syrian agreement. It was, first, the gap between the two parties that was unbridgeable. Za'im wanted an Israeli territorial concession on Lake Tiberias and the Jordan River, which was totally unacceptable to Israel "as it would spill over into the conflict over the waters of the Jordan River" (p. 109).

Second, the Israeli leaders did not take Za'im seriously because they believed that he was domestically too weak to stay in power if he were to reach an agreement with Israel. Third, the Syrian leader's preferences were totally inconsistent with the prevailing public opinion in Syria and the rest of the Arab world.

The story of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations is in some important respects similar, but the conclusion which Rabinovich draws is different. In return for an end to its war with Israel, Egypt demanded the transfer of territory in the Negev or in Gaza to Egyptian control. The Egyptians also demanded the Nitzana area and the appointment of an Egyptian military governor in Beersheba. Israeli leaders, enjoying a decisive military advantage, regarded these requests as unwarranted. They decided to reject them and opt for an armistice agreement instead (pp. 174-6). Commenting on the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, Rabinovich concludes that even though the conditions for peace between Egypt and Israel did not exist in 1949, the "similarity between [President Anwar] Sadat's policy and Egypt's conduct under the monarchy is considerable" (p. 221). Apparently, when he talks about similarity, Rabinovich has in mind the openness and intimacy which were created in the settings of Rhodes and Camp David. In the author's view, openness and intimacy are essential for successful negotiations. Indeed, they made the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli agreement possible.

Rabinovich explains that it is not his purpose to focus on revisionist historiography, or on what he calls the "new school" of Israeli historians who blame Israel for missed peace opportunities at the Arab-Israeli War's end and afterward. But the tenor of the argument, as well as the conclusions drawn from the three case studies, clearly suggest that Rabinovich wanted to respond to revisionist works, particularly the work of Avi Shlaim. He contends that their point of departure was political and moralistic rather than academic. He maintains that the revisionists reached their findings almost exclusively on the basis of Israeli and Western, rather than Arab sources, thereby offering unsubstantiated conclusions. Finally, he accuses the revisionists of having failed to understand that the weakness of Arab leaders in power between 1948 and 1950, together with Arab hostility toward Israel, precluded the possibility of reaching a peace agreement that would have been signed and implemented.

Though critical of the revisionists, Rabinovich does not belittle their contribution. The revisionists, he argues, "revealed significant weaknesses in the traditional historiography and orthodox version of Arab-Israeli relations that were dominant in Israel" (p. 219). He argues that one need not endorse all

¹ Avi Shlaim, "Husni Zaim and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria," *Middle East Forum*, Fall 1986, pp. 26-31; Yoram Nimrod, *Meeting at the Crossroads* (in Hebrew) (Tivon: Oranim Press, 1985).

the arguments made by revisionist historians in order to correct and refine the orthodox version of history. Thus, Rabinovich seems to take a middle path between the explanation suggested by the revisionists and a contrary position constructed by the old historians. He is implicitly rather than explicitly saying that Israel's inflexibility on the territorial question, as well as Arab weakness and rejectionism, were responsible for the failure of the post-1948 negotiations. Those who subjected Rabinovich's book to criticism, accusing him of trying to "shore up the crumbling walls of the Old Historiography,"² ought to give him more credit for the way in which he interpreted, with his fine sense of diplomatic history, the delicate political negotiations which took place between 1948 and 1950.

Israel's Border Wars by Benny Morris addresses a different aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Here, the focus is not on "missed opportunities," but rather on Arab infiltrations into Israel and Israel's responses in the years 1949–56. In Morris's view, the dynamic of the interaction between the two molded the nature of Arab-Israeli relations and created patterns of behavior that were to characterize the conflict for many years to come.

Morris gives perhaps the first cogent and elaborate explanation of this problem, basing his narrative on declassified American, British, Israeli, and UN archives. He makes three essential points. During the period covered in the narrative, most acts of Arab infiltration were motivated by economic and social reasons, rather than political or terrorist motives, in the cycle of violence and counterviolence, Israel's "free-fire" policy of retaliatory strikes had the most impact on the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and, in opting for a policy of disproportionate retaliation, certain Israeli leaders either actively sought war or were not averse to it.

Within the context of the historiographic debate underway among Israeli historians, these core claims should be seen as a refutation of the thrust of the old historians' position, which presented an essentially black and white picture of the history of Arab-Israeli relations. It is on these core claims that Morris's book differs most substantially from *The Road Not Taken*. While Rabinovich takes a middle path between the interpretations of the old and the new historiography, Morris tries to tear down the walls of the old historiography.

Morris's book is organized around three themes. The first (chs. 1–3) deals with Arab infiltration into Israel and the Arab states' policies towards infiltration. The second (chs. 4–8) covers the costs of infiltration to Israel and Israeli responses to infiltration. The third (chs. 9–12) deals with the slide to war and the general conclusions drawn from the narrative.

The significance of the first theme lies in the author's factual and analytic account of infiltrations and the apparent motivations behind them. This is a complicated matter, but Morris should be given credit for being the first historian to classify and identify motives for infiltrations. In this respect, the narrative is almost wholly new. The information appears to be substantially accurate, although the opening of Arab states' archives and the declassification of the protocols of Israeli cabinet meetings and the overwhelming bulk of Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) documents will give a more complete and accurate picture of the situation.

Morris outlines eight different types and motives of infiltration. Cross-border raids meant specifically to harm Israel, infiltration into Israel to reclaim possessions and crops (most common across the Gaza Strip-Israel border), infiltration for cultivation and grazing purposes, infiltration to visit relatives inside Israel, infiltration to resettle inside Israel, economically motivated raids involving theft and robbery from Jews, economically and socially motivated infiltration involving passage from Gaza to the West Bank, raids carried out for the purpose of smuggling, and maritime infiltration whose purpose was fishing (primarily in the case of Gaza Strip and southern Lebanese fishermen).

Morris concludes that economics and the desire to get reunited with one's family motivated the actions of the vast majority of infiltrators. This should not be surprising, since in most cases infiltrations into Israel were carried out by Palestinian refugees living in refugee camps near the border, separated from sources of income or from family members.

2. See Benny Morris, "A Second Look at the 'Missed Peace,' or Smoothing Out History: A Review Essay," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 1 (1994) p. 87.

Because the Arab states officially supported the Palestinians, it is sometimes assumed that they encouraged acts of infiltration. But, as Morris clearly explains, this was not the case. In fact, the Arab states bordering Israel went out of their way to curb infiltration. It was only after the Israeli raid against Egyptian positions opposite Kibbutz Mefalsim on 22 August 1955 that Egypt launched the first state-supported *fida'iyin* (guerrilla) campaign (p. 91). Lebanon effectively prevented infiltration during 1949–56 by ‘unofficial’ Lebanese-Palestinian squads and thus was not subjected to massive Israeli retaliations. Syria also exercised strict control of its border with Israel, preventing all ‘private’ infiltration, both economic and political.

The same cannot be said of Jordan, where massive infiltrations into Israel occurred in the years 1949–56 despite a Jordanian policy which was “consistent in attempting to halt infiltration because it provoked Israeli retaliation which, in turn, imperilled Jordan’s army, territorial integrity, and regime” (p. 70). Domestic politics, Morris suggests, played a crucial role in shaping Jordanian policy toward infiltration. When the regime in Jordan felt weak, as was the case of King Husayn’s early rule, it took a soft line with infiltrators.

Morris’s description of Israel’s responses to infiltration is informative. He tells us that Arab infiltration between 1949 and 1956 resulted in 264 Israeli civilians killed, 477 wounded, and 258 Israeli soldiers killed. This, according to Morris, does not include direct and indirect economic damage to property and produce. Also, it does not include the demoralization of border settlements and the strain on the development of these settlements (pp. 87–115).

The infiltration resulted in heavy retaliation by Israel. Morris cites the example of Qibya, a Jordanian village situated about midway between the Latrun Salient and Qalqilya. In mid-October 1953, IDF troops commanded by Ariel (Arik) Sharon launched a massive raid against Qibya killing 60 to 70 civilians, many of them women and children, and destroying at least 30 houses. The raid was provoked by a 13 October attack by infiltrators from Jordan against the Israeli settlement of Yehud, in which a mother and two of her children were killed. The Qibya atrocities brought down on Israel a wave of international revulsion. A day after the raid, Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett wrote in his diary: “Had I had a suspicion that there would be so much killing, I would have screamed [against the operation] to high heaven” (p. 247).

In evaluating the impact of the Qibya raid, Morris notes the following:

Qibya thus resulted in a portentous conceptual shift in the strategy of retaliation: after Qibya, the IDF struck at Arab military objectives rather than villages and towns. Qibya can thus be said to have led to that series of Israeli strikes against the Egyptian army in 1954 and early 1955 which, in turn, led to the Egyptian responses—Fedayeen attacks and the Czech arms deal—that eventually triggered the 1956 Sinai-Suez war (p. 262).

There is strong archival evidence in Morris’s book of a calculated Israeli plan to charge Arab governments with instigating and encouraging Palestinian infiltration. Morris gives us a clear description, consistent with that of Ehud Ya’ari’s 1975 pamphlet published in Hebrew under the title *Egypt and the Fida'iyin, 1953–1956*,³ of how Ben-Gurion ordered the Israeli raid on the Egyptian army camp in February 1955, despite the fact that Ben-Gurion knew that Egypt had consistently followed a policy of curbing private infiltration into Israel. Most historians agree that this raid played a major role in escalating the border warfare between Egypt and Israel.

In December 1955, Ben-Gurion authorized the launching of the Kinneret raid against Syria in order to draw Egyptian president Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir into war. Ben-Gurion thought that war with Egypt could be provoked by an attack on Syria, which had signed a defense pact with Cairo on 19 October 1955. Morris concludes that the main motive behind Israel’s strikes against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria was to cause a war “in which Israel could realize such major strategic objectives as the conquest of the West Bank or Sinai, or the destruction of the Egyptian army” (p. 179).

3 (Givat Haviva, Center for Arab and Afro-Asian Studies, 1975)

Morris is careful not to ascribe a unity of thought to Israeli policy makers. There were differences of opinion between hawks and moderates within the Israeli political establishment. The hawks were represented by Ben-Gurion and a large number of Israeli military officials, including Moshe Dayan. The moderates were represented by Moshe Sharett and the largely powerless foreign ministry. The balance of power was decisively in favor of the hawks, who were determined to sidestep the United Nations. They believed that Israel had to demonstrate its military power because the Arabs understood only the language of force. The moderates, on the other hand, feared that the excessive use of force would alienate Israel and undermine any prospects of peace with the Arab world.

Morris accompanies the discussion of Israeli retaliatory strategy with an account of atrocities committed by Israeli troops. This reflects the intellectual courage of the author. "The IDF's shoot-to-kill orders, minings, expulsion operations, and retaliatory strikes, all, to one degree or another, involved state-authorized or, at least, permitted killing of unarmed civilians. Together, they reflected a pervasive attitude among the Israeli public that Arab life was cheap (or, alternatively, that only Jewish life was sacred)" (p. 166).

As for the third theme, that of the slide to war, the bulk of the evidence offered by Morris seems largely to absolve the Arab governments of responsibility for sponsoring acts of infiltration. It also establishes the fact that the infiltrators, most of whom were Palestinian refugees, were motivated to a great degree by social and economic considerations, including the burning desire to re-establish themselves in their former homes inside Israel.

Viewed within this context, economically and socially motivated acts of infiltration become understandable. Morris seems to recognize this point. At the same time he tells us that these acts posed a threat to Israel's security in general and the border settlements in particular. His narrative shows that the hawks who dominated the policy-making process in Israel opted for a 'free-fire' policy of humiliating retaliatory strikes against Arab military and civilian targets to provoke the Arab states into retaliating, thus giving Israel the pretext to wage an expansionist war.

The direction of Morris's conclusions, however, is not completely consistent with the bulk of his evidence. While in the earlier chapters of the book he puts much of the blame for the war on a calculated Israeli policy of military escalation, the general thrust of his final chapter seems to suggest that the hostile regional environment in which Israel lived between 1949 and 1956 was equally responsible for Israeli actions. This does not take away from his honesty and moral courage, but it reveals how difficult is the path of a responsible historian who attempts to reach the truth and correct the historical account of the old Israeli historiography which put the blame on the Arab side.

In conclusion, the two books under review represent important additions to the literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both are innovative in their focus, rich in their details, and revealing in their insights. There certainly remains ample room for Middle Eastern historians to examine available archival materials and evaluate the findings of the two authors. In the final analysis, a more complete and definitive account of the Arab-Israeli negotiations can be written only when Arab states' archives are made accessible to interested researchers, and when Israel and the Western governments declassify the remainder of the relevant files.

EGYPT

Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo, by Diane Singerman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. xx + 272 pages. Notes to p. 314. Bibl. to p. 330. Index to p. 335. \$39.50.

Reviewed by Denis J. Sullivan

Formal political systems across the globe are increasingly under attack for their inefficiencies, abuse of power, and general neglect of societal interests. Not coincidentally, nongovernmental organizations, community associations, religious groups, non-profit organizations and other elements of "civil society" have become more important in filling in for the failed state. In addition to these

"formal" organizations and structures, societies rely heavily upon the informal linkages that bring households together as communities, often at odds with the formal political structures affecting their lives for good or ill. Thus, society functions—and does so quite effectively—informally even as it maintains and relies upon formal institutions.

As Hernando de Soto did for our understanding of the informal sector in Peru,¹ Diane Singerman has enlightened us about the "power of the popular sector" (p. 3) in Egypt. Singerman's work cuts across a variety of disciplines—comparative political science, anthropology and sociology, women's studies, and economics—and all are handled deftly. Singerman challenges Western social scientists, in particular, her fellow political scientists, to reframe their thinking on political participation. She prompts them to look beyond the elites, the formal institutions of governance and of opposition to government, in order to see the political import of the *private* domain as much as the public realm.

With an impressive analysis of the "politics of marriage and savings" and the "politics of reproducing the family" (especially chapters 2 and 3), Singerman substantiates one of her central arguments: to ignore the popular class, the *sha'b*, "is to distort the dynamics of state-society relations in Egypt and to underestimate the political awareness of vast segments of the Egyptian *sha'b*" (p. 40). In discussing the "familial ethos" of the *sha'b*—i.e., the "common worldview of the rights and responsibilities of individuals within the household and the proper boundaries of family authority and power within the larger community" (p. 49)—Singerman shares numerous examples of what gets publicly discussed and contested throughout *sha'bi* society in Cairo: issues of children, education, marriage (when, to whom, at what cost, etc.), and work. She argues that as these issues get repeated by the thousands throughout society, they influence economic, political, and social trends throughout the nation. If government continues to impede the *sha'b*'s efforts to satisfy their own basic individual, household, and community needs, government will face the political consequences.

Singerman extrapolates from her findings about the *sha'b* in Cairo to the nation overall. Given the relative homogeneity of Egyptian society, continuing migration to the capital (with the resulting "ruralization of Cairo"), and the demographic "weight" of Cairo, her argument that the socioeconomic and political concerns of Cairo's *sha'b* reflect national politics is reasonable and well documented.

Singerman provides insightful analyses on a host of complicated issues, none more so than her discussion of sexuality and gender relations. Ever the political scientist, she demonstrates the political significance of anthropological and sociological issues that others generally overlook: "[C]ommunities exert considerable individual and collective efforts to maintain communal norms of morality and to promote the common goal of reproducing the family. [S]exuality and gender relations, right or wrong, are as sensitive to the *sha'b* as national security is to the state" (p. 109). Singerman highlights the important, and largely underrated, role of women in sustaining the household and larger community. Women are leaders in informal savings associations (*gam'iyyat*) and they are business women (*dallalat*) who exploit deficiencies in the government distribution systems and provide services to their community. It is these informal networks that, like their formal counterparts, "articulate and aggregate the interests of their constituents" (p. 172).

Singerman defends networks, and even the clientelism supporting them, when she demonstrates how "networks can be a vehicle for those who are not supported by the immense resources of the state, to protect and further their interests in a more subtle, subterranean way, without attracting the notice of the state." In Cairo [these "reciprocity networks"] provide not only economic but political security" (p. 136). Again, she challenges her fellow Western social scientists to understand that, without such networks and clientelistic relations, the *sha'b* would not receive an equality of treatment—since the state certainly would not provide for people's needs—but a general neglect, or an equality of mistreatment. Chapter 5 discusses how these networks may become "formalized" as distribution networks such as private voluntary organizations (PVOs). These organizations provide important services to communities in the absence of effective govern-

1 *The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).

mental services. Often run by community leaders and economic and political elites, PVOs are monitored by the state, which requires them to be non-political and not-for-profit.

Singerman concludes her masterfully constructed tale with the perspective that to "understand state-society relations in Egypt more comprehensively, a study of sha'bi politics must be combined with an understanding of elite politics, the bureaucracy, Islamic activists, classes, interest groups, and the military, among other forces. These major actors in Egypt compete for power, legitimacy, and resources, and this study attempts to persuade others that the sha'b are also a major political actor in Egypt" (p. 271). Singerman is indeed persuasive. She excels at theoretical and comparative analysis as much as at detailing the empirical account of sha'bi society, economics, and politics. She has succeeded in giving us an accurate, compassionate, and (where appropriate) critical understanding of the sha'b. She is a superb writer and has produced an enjoyable, informative, and challenging piece of scholarship.

This work can contribute to a variety of graduate courses dealing with Middle East politics, anthropology, and sociology, as well as interdisciplinary programs such as women's studies. The introduction alone would be useful to any graduate seminar in comparative politics and in research methods. The book is relevant for those trying to make sense of the civil strife that has raged in Egypt in recent years between militants and the government's repressive elements, with innocent non-combatants caught in between. And, long after that civil strife has subsided, Singerman's work will remain an important source for understanding the resiliency, tenacity, and humanity of Cairene and Egyptian society.

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GULF RELATIONS

Crisis in the Arabian Gulf: An Independent Iraqi View, by Omar Ali. Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1993. xi + 154 pages. Bibl. to p. 163. Index to p. 168. \$49.95.

Reviewed by Amatzia Baram

Omar Ali's book is a polemical account of the crisis of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and a political manifesto. It provides insight into the way an Iraqi-Arab nationalist (apparently of a Sunni-Muslim background) outside the reach of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn views the Kuwait conflict, its historical background, and its immediate aftermath. Rather than a well-documented historical inquiry and analysis, this book is a document in its own right. It documents the anger, ambivalence, confusion, and hope of an Iraqi-American in the wake of the Gulf crisis. Although Ali is supportive of Iraq's historical claim to Kuwait, he is critical of Husayn's invasion. But, he is even more critical of Kuwait, the United States, and the West.

Contrarily, Ali shows no ambivalence in his support of the Iraqi-Arab side in the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran War, sometimes at the expense of historical accuracy. He mourns "the feebleness of the so-called Arab solidarity and the non-existence of a credible Arab political order" (p. 138). He confides that Saddam Husayn "and all other Arab leaders would sacrifice the Palestinian cause for the sake of preserving their absolute power" (p. 61), and offers a solution to Iraq's political problems, as well as to those of the Arab countries in general.

Ali's political leaning appears from the very first sentences in the preface. He correctly points out that, following World War I, the British and the French divided the Arab lands according to their imperial interests. Yet, he also claims that "the British separated Kuwait from Iraq" in order to make sure that Iraq, and the other Arab countries of the region, remain weak (p. ix). The term "separation" is misleading, since Kuwait, under the al-Sabah family, existed as an autonomous political entity within the Ottoman empire since the 1750s.¹ This was long before the British created the Iraqi state in 1920 out of the three Ottoman *vilayets* of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. Indeed, Ali himself mentions the 1913 British-Ottoman demarcation of the Ottoman-Kuwaiti

¹ See, for example, Richard Schofield, *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), pp. 1-49.

border, thus admitting that this political border preceded the existence of the Iraqi political entity (p. 2). Therefore, in 1920 the British decided on the perpetuation of the pre-war de-facto status-quo for Kuwait. While this did serve British interests, it is doubtful that it was meant, as Ali claims, to weaken Iraq. After all, the same British empire made substantial and successful efforts to secure for the fledgling Iraqi state the vilayet of Mosul, including the oil-rich Karkuk area. They prevented the French from annexing it to Syria (as should have been the case according to the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement) and, at the risk of war, they denied it to the Turks.

Ali's overall account of Iraq's geo-strategic position that resulted from British planning is far too melancholy. While Iraq does have a short coast line, it also has tremendous advantages, mainly huge oil reserves, much cultivable land, and, despite difficulties on the Euphrates River, an abundance of water.

Ali exposes an anti-Iranian bias in his discussion of Iraqi-Iranian tensions. He claims that "the Persians have always attempted to interfere in Iraqi affairs," even hundreds of years before Iraq came into political existence (p. 1). He states that, in the Iraq-Iran War, "the Iraqis as well as the Iranians used chemical weapons," and that the Iraqi use of poison gas started in 1988 (p. 128). He explains the Iraqi use of poison gas on Kurdish settlements in summer 1988 as a series of accidents (pp. 48, 128), although there is no doubt that the Iraqi regime's use of these weapons against the Kurds was deliberate, and that already in February 1984 (and possibly earlier) the United States had asked Iraq whether it had used chemical weapons.²

Ali's account of the Gulf crisis contains a number of wide-spread conspiracy theories, to

which the author ascribes great centrality. As he makes no attempt to authenticate them, this seriously undermines his account. Thus, for example, Ali repeatedly writes that Saddam Husayn's invasion of Kuwait was enticed by the United States in order to destroy Iraq's military and industrial power, thus serving American and Israeli interests. He is apparently confused when he defines Ambassador April Glaspie's "no opinion" statement in her 25 July 1990 meeting with Saddam Husayn as a "mistake," thus implying that she was not trying to "entice" Iraq to invade after all (pp. 88–9). In reality, all the available American material regarding the weeks preceding the invasion point to political misperceptions and miscalculations.³

Ali claims emphatically that Kuwait set out to provoke the Iraqis "to make it possible for the US to decimate Iraq's infrastructure" (p. 22). Provocation includes Kuwait's demand that Iraq repay loans and the threat to float or sell Iraq's loans on the international market. Also, Ali claims, the Kuwaitis deliberately offended the Iraqi president by suggesting, in the fateful Jidda meeting of 30 July 1990, that, to get the money, the women of Iraq should turn to prostitution ("Let the women of Iraq bring you money") (pp. 22–7, 71). In reality, however, there is no evidence that the Kuwaitis ever made such unwise threats and suggestions. Indeed, Kuwaiti sources deny the accusation flatly and claim that the Iraqi delegation came to Jidda with authorization only to receive total Kuwaiti capitulation over territory and financial aid. Ali himself admits (accepting the official Iraqi version) that Kuwait consented to pay \$9 billion out of the ten Iraq demanded. A \$9 billion gift can hardly be defined as provocation.

Whatever the case, it is very difficult to imagine that the Kuwaiti government was willing to risk national annihilation simply in order to provide

2 Memorandum from American Consul, Jerusalem, to US Secretary of State, Middle East Mission, Feb. 2, [Richard Murphy's] *Meeting with Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz Pipeline Follow Up*, 3 February 1984. Also see US Department of State Memorandum, *Curbing Proliferation of Chemical Weapons*, 19 June 1985, pp. 1, 6–9. Both unpublished documents have recently been declassified. The Iraqi use began in 1983, and in March 1984 the United States suspended shipments of possible chemical feedstocks to Iraq. See Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, *The Lessons of Modern War, vol. 2: The Iran-Iraq War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, and London: Mansell Publishing, 1990), pp. 185, 188.

3 See a study based on declassified US government documents and interviews: Amatzia Baram, "American Input Into Iraqi Decision Making, 1988–1990," in David W. Lesch (ed.), *The Middle East and the US: A Historical and Political Reassessment* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, forthcoming 1996), and Amatzia Baram, unpublished interviews with five senior Department of State officials who were closely involved in the pre-crisis decision making, Washington, DC: 21 April, 14 June, 11 and 17 August 1994, Tel Aviv: 29 March 1995.

the United States with an opportunity to cut Iraq down to size. The inclination to see the hidden hand of the West in every tragic or unfortunate development in the Middle East, although widespread, is misplaced. Human fallacy is, statistically-speaking, far more prevalent than ingenious socio-political engineering. Thus, more often than not, what appears to be a political blunder is, in all probability, just that.

When analyzing the American decision-making leading up to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Ali's account is for the most part sound. He suggests that, in addition to the liberation of Kuwait, the United States also had an undeclared agenda—to destroy the Iraqi war machine (p. 72). These observations are confirmed by interviews.⁴ Ali is highly critical of the destruction wreaked by the Allied airforces on the Iraqi civilian infrastructure. He admits, however, that the Allied forces were able to isolate Iraq and then carry out their plan due to "the arrogant inability of the Iraqi leadership to listen to reason" (p. 72, see also p. 113).

Ali's discussion of Iraq's decision making rests on less solid ground. He adopts uncritically the Jordanian version, according to which, immediately following the invasion, Iraq was ready to withdraw unilaterally, apparently back to square one. Conversely, Ali implies that after the annexation of Kuwait Saddam Husayn was ready to withdraw in return for the islands of Warba and Bubyah and the Rumayla oil field (p. 34). Be that as it may, it has to be emphasized that, before the war, the Iraqi regime never suggested any withdrawal. Indeed, Iraq could have presented the Allied forces with a *fait accompli*, withdrawing unilaterally while keeping the islands and the oil field. As this author was told by senior Bush administration officials in 1994, in all likelihood, this would have prevented an Allied forces offensive.

Finally, despite his criticism of the follies of Saddam Husayn and his regime, Omar Ali stops short of calling for their overthrow. Instead, he offers them a full pardon if they introduce democracy to Iraq. He refrains, however, from clarifying

to the perplexed reader the incentive for regime and president to step down voluntarily. Islam is a complementary solution Ali offers for the afflictions of Iraqi and Arab societies. As he sees it, this has to be a just, tolerant, and democratic Islam, unlike the examples of Saudi Arabia and Iran. But here, too, the discussion is so fleeting and superficial that it leaves the reader with more questions than answers.

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Iran and Iraq: The Threat from the Northern Gulf, by Anthony H. Cordesman. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. xi + 290 pages. Notes to p. 345. Select Bibliography to p. 357. Biographical Note to p. 358. Index to p. 380. \$64.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Reviewed by Michael Collins Dunn

Anthony H. Cordesman has become a one-man cottage industry in the field of Middle Eastern defense and security analysis. Only a year after his massive *After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East*,¹ he has produced another timely work, *Iran and Iraq*. While Cordesman naturally covers some of the same ground in the second book, he gives much greater detail, which has always been one of his trademarks.

As this reviewer was reading the book, Iraq captured two US civilians who inadvertently crossed the border from Kuwait. US Secretary of Defense William Perry visited Abu Dhabi and warned of Iran's build-up of antishipping and antiaircraft missiles and chemical weapons on islands near the Strait of Hormuz, and 35,000 Turkish troops began operating inside northern Iraq. Thus, there is really no room for disagreement that the Gulf is—and is likely to remain—a dangerous place and that both of the powers of the northern Gulf, Iran and Iraq, are potential sources of military confrontation for the southern Gulf states and the West.

4. Amatzia Baram, unpublished interviews with a senior and a very senior Bush administration Department of State official, Washington, DC, 14 June and 17 August 1994.

1. (Boulder, CO and San Francisco: Westview Press, and London: Mansell, 1993).

Cordesman's books are difficult to review in a conventional way because they are packed with data, as anyone who has read even one of them knows. *Iran and Iraq* is no exception: it is filled with data, tables, charts, chronologies, and summaries of technologies and capabilities. The data is drawn from a wide variety of sources, all meticulously cited. Even if one disagrees occasionally with one of the author's conclusions, he has assembled the data to support them.

- Cordesman is sometimes weaker on the analysis of the internal politics of Iran and Iraq, or the historical and personal aspects of their relations with the other Gulf states. But there are plenty of books that provide that sort of information, and few that assemble in one place the data needed to make a realistic assessment of military capabilities and threats. Op-ed pieces, and similar discussions, often debate issues involving chemical weapons capabilities or nuclear proliferation with little understanding of the technologies involved. Cordesman pours in the data to inform the debate.

While one could conceivably take issue with certain points, Cordesman has used his mass of information to offer a generally balanced assessment. Though emphasizing containment and deterrence of both the northern Gulf states, he does not seem to have in mind "dual containment" as it is currently practiced. Near the end of the book he offers this reminder:

At the same time, military containment and limits on the transfers of arms and technology should not mean trying to isolate Iran and Iraq politically, culturally, and economically. Any effort to totally isolate Iran or Iraq, or treat them as pariah regimes in every sense of the term, is almost certain to back-fire. It may well trigger many lower level military and political actions by Iraq and Iran. Most important, it will punish peoples for their leaders, and remove outside forces of moderation and change (p. 289).

Cordesman recognizes both the necessity for and the limitations of military power. And he recognizes the importance of both a Western readiness to use force when necessary to defend vital interests in the Gulf, and a flexibility of response.

Using force simply for demonstrative purposes simply leads to future conflict. Winning another Desert Storm is infinitely preferable to losing another Desert Storm, but it is not preferable to the kind of more limited military action that will both achieve political objectives and avoid large scale conflict. As is the case in most regions, it is necessary to be strong and decisive, but the tactics of Sun Tzu are preferable to those of Clausewitz or Douhet (p. 290).

Like all of Cordesman's books, this one belongs on the reference shelf of anyone dealing with, or even occasionally interested in, issues relating to the military capabilities of Iran and Iraq.

Michael Collins Dunn is editor of The Estimate.

IRAN

After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic, by Anoushiravan Ehteshami. London and New York: Routledge, 1995. xv + 221 pages. Bibl. to p. 234. Index to p. 244. \$65 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Reviewed by Sepehr Zabih

Since 1979 the Iranian Islamic Republic has gone through three distinctive phases. Up to the mid-summer of 1981 the radical clerics, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, monopolized power to the exclusion of secularist and leftist nationalist forces. By mid-summer the decisive battle against these forces was won. The elected non-cleric president was forced into exile, and the leftist Islamic Mojahedin were wiped out. Cleric personalities who opposed the emergence of a theocratic autocracy in place of the defeated monarchical one were silenced.

Then followed eight years of Khomeini's absolutism. He governed Iran through the unparalleled turmoil of war with Iraq. He quarrelled with the United States on the US Embassy hostage crisis and on alleged Iranian support for Hizballah's terrorism. In addition, he continuously battled domestic dissident forces. This phase ended with Khomeini's death in June 1989, which came almost a year after his acceptance of UN Security

Council Resolution 598, ending the war with Iraq. The third, and present, phase began with cosmetic changes in the country's constitution, but very little alteration of the *fiqh*-based (Islamic jurisprudence) theocracy.

Anoushiravan Ehteshami prefers the term "republic" to "theocracy." In point of fact, the practice of dividing the tenure of republican regimes is designed to emphasize continuity over change in these regimes. France is the most prominent example of a democratic republic, having maintained five republics since 1779. In the Middle East, the Turkish republic and more recently the self-proclaimed Islamic Republic of Iran represent this attempt to maintain continuity. Normally, the death of a leader or the violent overthrow of a government by a coup or revolution signifies the end of one republic and the beginning of another. The continuity of these political systems has very little to do with their popular support or democratic nature. In the case of Iran, there is neither popular support nor democracy. The Iranian republic has progressively deviated from democracy, thus rendering theocracy a more apt characterization of the political system than republic.

No matter what designation is preferred, the 16 years of Islamic theocracy, divided between the Khomeini and post-Khomeini eras, deserve careful analysis. In three chapters Ehteshami examines political succession, the emergence of the second republic, and the leadership's hold on the reins of power. Other chapters focus on Iran's regional, foreign, and security policies, with attention given to the post-Khomeini republic's policies.

The analyses of the crisis of succession after Khomeini's death, the acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 598, and the abandonment of war-time confrontational policy are thorough and perceptive, as is the author's contention that the end of the Iran-Iraq War was also the end of the First Republic. It may be that the end came a year later when Khomeini died and presidential elections along with approval of constitutional amendments inaugurated a new chapter in the Islamic theocratic system. Ehteshami believes that in 1989 the leadership assured a smooth transition by, among other things, opting for a single *faqih* (supreme jurist) in order to maintain stability after Khomeini's demise.

Some of the intriguing questions Ehteshami raises relate to whether the Iranian revolutionary experience has fulfilled its agenda, and whether the Iranian case can offer a viable model to developing countries. To answer these queries he probes the Iranian model in four areas—foreign policy, revolutionary internationalism, economic trade policy, and domestic politics (p. 202).

His verdict on these questions is a mixed one. He believes that the uniqueness of the Islamic Republic's absolutism is its profound ideological opposition to Western democratic principles (p. 216). While recognizing its relevance and impact on the region despite its exclusiveness, he contends that the Iranian model was not successful because it was unable to secure harmony and social reconciliation as demanded by the anti-Shah revolutionary movement.

This is the latest addition to a continuous flow of works on revolutionary Iran. Both Iranian and non-Iranian anthropologists, historians, political scientists, and sociologists have worked to produce scores of volumes in order to understand one of the most complex revolutions of this century. This work was produced by a Western-trained Iranian scholar.

The author's extended bibliography indicates comprehensiveness, although this reviewer was struck by a number of glaring omissions. Ehsan Naraghi's *From Palace to Prison: Inside the Iranian Revolution* is a must for students of the Iranian revolution.¹ Assudollah Alam's memoirs are equally indispensable to the understanding of the Shah's mindset.² Although Ehteshami's book deals with post-Khomeini developments, these works contribute to background analysis of the causes of the emergence of Islamic autocracy.

As to documentation, the practice of citing only the authors' names in the text and the rest of the reference in the bibliography is a bit inconvenient. Footnotes or endnotes are generally preferable, particularly for works that rely heavily on multi-language sources. The author's reliance on personal interviews with government and non-government officials is rewarding. The interviews would have been more credible if interviewees

1. Tr. by Nilou Mobasser (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994), p. 142.

2. *The Shah and I: Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court* (New York: IB Tauris, 1991).

were identified when critical matters, such as military action against the regime in 1980, were cited (p. 15)

On the whole, this is a well-researched and well-presented book on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Government agencies and students of comparative revolution and politics can greatly benefit from it.

Sepehr Zabih, Visiting Scholar, Hoover Institution, Stanford

IRAQ

The Shi'is of Iraq, by Yitzhak Nakash. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. xvii + 281 pages. Appends to p. 287. Bibl. to p. 302. Index to p. 312. \$35.

The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi'as, by Joyce N. Wiley. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992. ix + 153 pages. Appends to p. 166. Gloss to p. 171. Bibl. to p. 181. Index to p. 191. \$30.

Reviewed by Robert Fernea

The Shi'is of Iraq is an excellent study of this religious group situated in the social history of southern Iraq from the mid-18th to the mid-20th centuries. The book concludes with an epilogue concerning the impact of the 1991 Gulf War on Iraqi Shi'ism. Rather than studying Shi'ism in Iraq from the perspectives of Iranian Shi'ism or the Sunni majority in Baghdad, Yitzhak Nakash develops and retains a localized perspective, giving particular attention to the rise of Shi'i strength in the cities of Najaf and Karbala', and to the political and economic ties between the leadership in these communities and the tribal societies in their hinterland. In so doing, the author reveals the distinctive nature of Iraqi Shi'ism and shows how it came to be part of the social, political, and economic movements that shaped the culture of the modern Shi'is in Iraq.

The titles of the four parts of this book indicate the breadth of its coverage: "The Formative Years," "The State and the Shi'is," "The Transformation of Rituals and Religious Practices," and "The Decline of Financial and Intellectual Insti-

tutions." Each of these sections maintains an impressive quality of scholarship. The book is based on about 150 citations from works in Arabic and Persian, most of which have not been previously included in a study in English, as well as a great many official publications, dissertations, local and foreign journals, and works in European languages. The author draws upon particular cases, situations, and descriptions of local practices in a manner that gives the tensions and conflicts of this 200-year period a vivid, detailed articulation. We are shown how vital the shrine cities of Karbala' and Najaf were as cultural, economic, and political centers in this period. The rise and fall of the two cities is a sub-text within the narrative.

The conversion to Shi'ism of the Sunni tribes that moved into southern Iraq from Arabia is one of the most interesting events that the author discusses. He clearly states his opinion that this conversion was largely the result of the stresses of sedentarization: "Tying individual tribesmen to water and small pieces of land, agriculture fragmented the tribal community" (p. 39). The Shi'i Sayyids, regarded as descendants of the Prophet, came from Karbala' and Najaf and settled on Sunni tribal lands. As they converted the tribesmen, the Sayyids simultaneously acted as agents for their patron shaykhs. Sayyids were often literate and, as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, were believed by some to have supernatural powers. Their approval of and participation in ceremonial events sanctioned these occasions. As personifications of the religious/political authority of the shrine cities, at a time when Ottoman authority was declining in the area, the Sayyids helped bridge the cultural space between the Persian-dominated urban centers and the rural Arab tribal regions south of Baghdad. Of course, this space was literally connected by pilgrimages, by trading, and by the burial of corpses that brought Shi'i converts to the urban centers, activities which the author describes well.

Under the British mandate, the Persian presence in Najaf and Karbala' radically declined. In the 1920s Iranians lost virtually all the extra-territorial privileges and immunities they had enjoyed under the Turks. By that time, however, Shi'i ceremonies had become well established and were a sign of resistance to outside domination whether by Turks, the English, or Sunni Iraqis.

The poetic genres of the *Muharram* observances celebrated the ideals of tribal society and the grievances that developed around the theme of the battle of Karbala', the central myth of Shi'i society in Iraq. The author shows particular sensitivity in his description of the distinctive ways in which 'Abbas, son of the Imam 'Ali, came to embody Arab tribal ideals of manhood in Iraqi Shi'ism in ways which fused tribal and religious discourse.

This text describes the society of southern Iraq which this reviewer attempted to study in the 1950s. Reading this book was most satisfying, not because I agreed with all aspects of the author's interpretation, but because so many of the significant problems that he explores seemed unapproachable 40 years ago. Today, anyone with an interest in the culture of southern Iraq—historian or social scientist, theologian or diplomat—will find reading this well-written and well-documented study a rewarding experience.

Unfortunately, *The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi'as* will not offer the same degree of satisfaction to students of that religious group. The text is concerted with religious events, personalities, and issues which some readers may struggle to place in a general framework of understanding. The narrative tends to swing between highly specific statements, e.g., "a study of kinship ties in Iraq showed that the percentage of families living in extended-family households dropped from 82 percent in the 1940s to 34 percent in 1975" (p. 103), to the highly theoretical, e.g., "fundamental social transformation involves changes in power relationships and in social status, in the sense that status is an effective claim to social esteem in terms of positive or negative privileges" (p. 104). One needs considerable background to place both kinds of statement in proper perspective. In addition, some of the generalities are over-stated and often draw on old stereotypes. This criticism notwithstanding, *The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi'as* provides detailed information about the positioning of the Shi'is in Iraq since the 1958 revolution, adding an understanding of the more recent past to the history begun in *The Shi'is of Iraq*.

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ISRAEL AND ZIONISM

Israel's Leadership: From Utopia to Crisis, by Jacob Abadi. Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press, 1993. ix + 173 pages. Gloss to p. 178. Bibl. to p. 187. Index to p. 199. \$55.

Israel: Politics, Myths and Identity Crises, by Akiva Orr. London and Boulder, CO: Pluto Press, 1994. Distrib. by Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 170 pages. Index to p. 180. \$66.50 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Reviewed by Asher Arian

These two books deal with important topics and supplement the already burgeoning literature on Israel. Jacob Abadi and Akiva Orr identify their respective topics, as even more than important, they regard them to be of "crisis" magnitude. The authors are probably correct about the significance of their subjects, however, neither book deserves a place on the "must read" list.

Abadi deals with leadership in an Israeli polity that has produced both "transformational" and reactive decision makers. The classic question of whether the situation makes the leader, or the reverse, is especially relevant in Israel, since leaders such as David Ben-Gurion, Menachem Begin, and Yitzhak Rabin have taken unexpected decisions. Elections determine who the policy maker will be, but they do not determine the direction policy will take. One of the fascinating paradoxes of democratic theory is that if public opinion is equally divided, politicians may ignore it with impunity. Leaders may decide as they see fit, since elections are virtual lotteries in which the two sides cancel each other out.

Abadi provides a thumbnail sketch of the backgrounds and a highly selective portrait of political events in the lives of ten leaders: Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, Vladimir Jabotinsky, Menachem Begin, Levi Eshkol, Moshe Dayan, Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Yitzhak Shamir. This heavy diet is spiced lightly with insights from the abundant political leadership literature, but even this faint seasoning is not applied in a systematic or compelling manner. Thus, the bulk of the book is replete with details that seem to have been chosen more because they

were available than because they fit some overarching theme. The result is a treatment that is too compact for the novice and too thin for the initiated.

Abadi cannot be faulted for not having foreseen that Rabin would join the ranks of "transforming" leadership by recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993. His treatment of Rabin's first term as prime minister, however, tends to be so static and predetermined that we would not have expected Rabin to have the personality requisites to grasp and shape an opportunity. Not that the facts are wrong, but the brush with which Abadi paints his portraits is so thick that subtleties are precluded. Abadi introduces some of the concepts used by psycho-historians and political biographers, but tends to avoid their application when discussing the subjects of his study.

Abadi's book is supportive of Israel in general, and the Labor party in particular. Orr's point of departure is very different. A Jewish Israeli, Orr is a self-proclaimed anti-Zionist (p. 73). His book—an anthology of articles he has written—is highly critical of the rationale of Israel's existence and the policies of all of its governments. Unlike the Abadi volume, Orr's book lacks tight construction, is much less focused, and mixes facts, analyses, and biases in an unpredictable manner.

But his topics are also the stuff of which crises are made. Questions of identity go to the heart of the ideological debates in and around Israel. What is a Jewish state? What relationship should there be between Judaism and Israel? What relationship should there be between Israel and the Palestinians? Who is a Jew? What role should the state play in defining religion? What of the rights of those belonging to other religions, of those who define their religion differently, of those who prefer no religion, or even of those who oppose religion? Questions of identity and ideology are numerous.

This anthology covers 20 years of Orr's writing. Hence, the effect that emerges is kaleidoscopic in nature, resulting in a blurred sense of immediacy. Many tributaries flow through this volume, but do not merge into a gushing stream of convincing argument.

Midway through the book a clear statement of Orr's theme is offered, but organizational problems arise. The Kastner trial of 1955 raised issues

concerning Jewish political leadership in Europe and in Palestine during the Holocaust and later attempts by the dominant party in Israel to cover up that role. A long 35-page section in this short book addresses the trial, preceded by a discussion titled "Lies and Myths." These are placed between chapters on Palestinian refugees and the *Intifada* (uprising) on one side, and the politics of ethnic identity, on the other. But the point is clear. One Israeli protagonist is quoted as saying to another, "That is perhaps the worst tragedy that has happened to us, the senses have been dulled, the national body doesn't respond normally even to the most painful blows" (p. 115).

Orr's book uses a wide range of anecdotal, historical, literary, and social psychological sources, and provides a strong point of view. But it lacks the power of a polemical broadside. Because Orr lets out too much of the historian and sociologist in him, and because the articles span such a long period, it is very hard to focus passion. Moreover, since Orr has already found Israel guilty of a whole series of transgressions, evidence is not particularly relevant. Analyzing the "upcoming" 1984 elections, for instance, Orr writes that "If the Shamir faction, the hard-line faction gets a majority, then the old humanist conception [regarding the Palestinian issue] is dead and finished. If Peres's lot gets a majority it means we are dealing with hypocrites" (p. 69). Damned in either case, the Israeli electorate of 1984 split evenly between the two rivals, leading to the establishment of the National Unity government and the rotation of the prime ministry between Shamir and Peres. Even given Orr's biases, he must have been surprised by that result.

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SUDAN

Requiem for the Sudan: War, Drought, and Disaster Relief on the Nile, by J. Millard

Burr and Robert O. Collins. Oxford, San Francisco, and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. xiv + 313 pages. Notes to p. 348. Bibl. to p. 357. Index to p. 385. \$64.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Reviewed by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban

Two well-qualified experts, Robert Collins, a noted historian of southern Sudan, and J. Millard Burr, the coordinator of the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) "Operation Lifeline Sudan," have teamed up to provide this documentary study of the political and human rights disaster that plagues the contemporary Sudan. The book's title suggests the authors' conclusion—the death of the Sudan—which they reach after considering various topics in nine chapters.

Documentation and analyses of relevant subjects are treated with careful detail. The authors discuss the worsening politics of the past decade, highlighting a tantalizing democratic period (1985–89) that ends with the eventual return of the military "solution" to the civil war. They address the hope of a new southern-based movement—the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA)—which in 1983 addressed issues on a comprehensive level of a united Sudan, only to devolve into separatist tendencies after the military's return in 1989. *Requiem for the Sudan* also examines the massive starvation in the southern and border areas and the frustrated international response, including Operation Lifeline, which itself ends up on the firing line and in retreat. It describes the large-scale displacement and battering of refugees from the civil war and the embarrassment to the Sudanese government of conditions in camps and shanty towns that surround the capital of Khartoum. The book notes the increasingly clear human rights disaster, including the revival of slavery in the south and political torture of dissidents in the north. These did not begin with the Islamist junta after 1989, but they were exacerbated by it. Finally, the inability, or, cynically, the disinterest, of the political forces within the Sudan, Africa, and the West to mount any successful peace effort, even to the minimal level of regular cease fires, leads to the inevitable conclusion of a requiem for the Sudan.

On the battlefield, the civil war of attrition has had no clear victor—neither the Khartoum government, nor the SPLA. The latter was never able to secure any of the major southern towns to establish a separate and independent political entity outside that of the Sudanese government in the north. The authors conclude that this second period of civil war (1983 to the present) is essentially evolving like the first (1955–72). There has been no decisive turning point, while the Sudan remains a state but not a nation, and the south a region but not a state. Meanwhile, 1.3 million southerners have died and millions more have become displaced. The violence and "ethnic cleansing" have spread to other historically discriminated areas, such as the Nuba Mountains outside the south.

Some politicians and long-time outside observers, in despair, are prepared to agree with the SPLA separatists and argue for a dissolution of the geographical entity known as the Sudan, Africa's largest country. Public statements often note the artificial boundaries created by the English colonial power, as well as the inequitable treatment accorded the northern and southern region before independence in 1956. The subsequent failure to build a stable nation-state and protracted civil wars do not lead to optimistic conclusions, as the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia showed.

There is exhaustion on all sides, with external parties and humanitarian agencies overwhelmed by the war, and internal political forces unable to reconfigure the Sudan to form a workable secular democracy. The latter is a necessary condition for the Sudan's endurance as a state with its significant non-Muslim population. This book is not for those who wish to save the Sudan, but it does provide the sad litany of events leading to the loss of hope and is among the most authoritative accounts of recent events.

Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban is Professor of Anthropology at Rhode Island College. She is the author of Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1987), and a co-author of Historical Dictionary of the Sudan (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1992). She is a founder of the Sudan Studies Association.

TURKEY

Turkey and the Holocaust: Turkey's Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933–1945, by Stanford J Shaw. New York: New York University Press, 1993. xiii + 305 pages. Bibl. to p. 330. Appends. to p. 424. \$50.

Reviewed by Erik J. Zürcher

This new book by Stanford Shaw consists of two separate studies. The larger one (of over 200 pages) is about the role played by the Turkish diplomatic service in saving Turkish Jews in occupied France, and in the puppet state of Vichy. The other is a much smaller one (of about 50 pages) on the attempts by Jewish organizations based in Turkey to save Jews from Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In the first part, titled "Turkey's role in rescuing Jews from the Nazis," Shaw relates how the Turkish government and its representatives in France consistently opposed German and French persecution of Jews with Turkish citizenship. The position of the Turkish diplomats was that since Turkish law did not allow discrimination on the basis of creed or race, such discrimination of its citizens in a foreign country was also unacceptable. In taking up this position, Turkey went further than most countries, which accepted that in German-occupied Europe, and in the German vassal states, the law of the land should prevail. The Turkish diplomats often worked quickly and managed to intervene successfully. If the Jews concerned could be shown to have valid Turkish citizenship papers, they were usually surrendered to the Turkish authorities on condition that they be repatriated to Turkey forthwith.

Although the number of people concerned was small within the context of the Holocaust as a whole, or even of the Jews of France, it was still much larger than is generally known. According to Shaw, there lived in France about 10,000 Turkish Jews (over 3,000 in the Paris region alone), most of whom had migrated to France after World War I. There was also a significant group of people of Turkish-Jewish extraction, who had been naturalized as French citizens.

When the situation of the Jews in France grew rapidly worse, many of these tried to recover their Turkish nationality. After initial hesitation, the Turkish consuls in France often offered assistance to these people. Shaw does not specify how many people were saved by repatriation to Turkey, but one can infer that the number probably lay somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000.

Shaw has documented his story extensively. Indeed, about half of the text consists of reproduced documents (in translation). While over 90 percent of the text deals with the situation in France, there is a five-page passage at the end on "Turkish assistance to the Jews of Greece under Nazi occupation." Here Shaw's chronology seems to be shaky. He states that "after Turkey joined the Allies . . . , German planes bombed the Turkish consulate [in Rhodes]" (p. 253). "During the next six months the forty-two Jewish Turks were subjected to constant harassment by the Gestapo" (p. 254), but "finally early in January 1945 [the German commander] ordered the remaining Jews to go to Turkey" (p. 254). Since Turkey declared war on Germany only on 23 February 1945 and since the war ended slightly over two months later, Shaw's account would appear to be inaccurate.

The second part of the book, titled "Istanbul activities in rescuing European Jews from the Nazis," deals with the much better known story of how Jewish (Zionist) organizations based in Istanbul tried to save people by bringing them out of Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe and transferring them to Palestine. While Turkey allowed immigration and settlement of European Jews only "if their employment was needed by the departments and institutions of Turkey" or "if their economic utility was recognised by the authorities" (p. 262), it did decide in January 1941 to allow Jews who held valid third country entry documents to use transit facilities through Turkey. This allowed the Jewish groups to save more than 16,000 Jews officially, and, under cover of this official rescue operation, possibly up to 75,000 people unofficially.

The book is introduced by a short history of Turkish policies towards the Jews in the 1933–45 period and ends with a conclusion, a bibliography, and twelve appendices. There are also a number of relevant illustrations.

Although *Turkey and the Holocaust* presents a solid and well-documented study of Turkey's wartime policies, it is marred by the author's constant tendency to overstate his case. A reasonable conclusion after reading the book would be that the Turkish government acted not heroically, but certainly comparatively decently, while being in a very delicate and difficult position. For Shaw, this apparently is an incomplete conclusion. He depicts the attitude of the Turkish government as one of secret cooperation with the Allies, and the Turkish treaty of friendship and cooperation with Nazi Germany, concluded in 1941, as nothing more than an attempt to keep the Germans at bay. According to Shaw, support for Nazi ideology and Nazi policies in Turkey was limited almost exclusively to immigrants from the Turkic areas in the Soviet Union.

Both points are exaggerated. Until at least 1943, under the political leadership of Premier İsmet İnönü and his minister of foreign affairs Numan Menemencioğlu, Turkey's policy towards Nazi Germany was one of benevolent neutrality (Turkey continued throughout this period to export to Germany chromium and copper, which were vital for its war industry). Pro-Nazi sentiments were also more widespread than Shaw implies. One has only to think of the exploits of Nuri Kılıçlı (younger brother of the former Unionist war minister, Enver Pasha) to drum up support for the Germans among the Turkish peoples in the Caucasus and the Crimea, and of the official visits (at the invitation of the Germans) to the Eastern Front by Turkish generals such as Hüseyin Erkin and Ali F. Erdem. Fiercely anti-communist Kemalist leaders such as Chief of Staff Fevzi Çakmak were not unaffected by German propaganda either. While it is true, as Shaw states, that the Turkish government moved against the Pan-Turkist and pro-Nazi activists, he neglects to mention that it did so only in 1944, once it was quite sure Germany was losing the war.

One can certainly agree with Shaw that the international situation imposed neutrality on Turkey (although the German army never came to within 40 miles of Istanbul as Shaw says on page 38), but this neutrality was hardly a secret contribution to the Allied war effort.

In his evaluation of the Turkish position, Shaw at times seems inconsistent. He is surely right when he says that the Jewish groups in Istanbul

could not have been active without the tacit agreement of the Turkish government. But if that is true, by the same token it must be true that pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic activists and newspapers such as the influential *Cumhuriyet*, could also operate only because the Turkish government let them. If İnönü's government is to be praised for the one, it must also be blamed for the other.

Erik J. Zürcher, Professor of Ottoman and Turkish History, University of Amsterdam

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Israel and Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan, by Aryeh Shalev. Oxford, San Francisco, and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. 207 pages. Notes to p. 227. About the Author to p. 228. Appends to p. 260. \$32.50 paper.

Reviewed by Helena Cobban

General Aryeh Shalev's long career in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) included service on the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, 1949-52, and as chief intelligence officer for the IDF's Northern Command, 1957-59. It is disappointing to find that his book on security issues in the current Israeli-Syrian negotiations is such a slight, sloppily compiled volume. The book has one unintended virtue: it provides a valuable case-study of why military-technical analysis, taken alone, is an insufficient discipline with which to address issues of war and peace.

Shalev's account is studded with chunks of military analysis. One 15-page chapter provides a hillock-by-hillock description of the Golan Heights' topography. There are maps galore, and tables charting force structures and the security 'value' of this and that. But Shalev's ignorance of, and inattention to, Syria is truly mind-boggling.

In the weeks after Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad decided that Syria would participate in the 1991 Madrid negotiations, think-tanks everywhere were crammed with Israelis asking whether this move represented a 'strategic' or merely a 'tactical' shift in Asad's thinking. In the years since then, several Israelis have come up with answers marked by some familiarity with Syrian

political life. Not Shalev! He states the question clearly, on page 12, and then quotes the view of only one supposed authority to back up his own simplistic judgment that the Syrian shift "does not seem to 'be' strategic. The 'expert' in question? The perennially pessimistic, anti-Arab Eli Kedourie

On one of the pitifully few other occasions where Shalev admits of the importance of Syrian politics, he offers a glib judgment on which groups inside Syria might oppose any concessions in the peace negotiations. "The Ba'ath Party and nationalist groups would almost certainly object to concessions" (p. 62). Has he even glanced at changes in Syrian politics since the 1950s? There is no indication in the footnotes that he has paid more than passing heed to the works of experts like Patrick Seale, Raymond Hinnebusch, or Moshe Ma'oz.

Shalev's dismissal of human, social, or political factors in his analysis is evident in the tiny chapter on the Druze who stayed on the Golan under Israel's occupation. He lists four reasons why most of them resisted the offer of Israeli citizenship that was pressed on them in 1980 (p. 96). But all these reasons are related to the idea of external coercion! He admits of no possibility that any of the Druze might still feel a genuine patriotic attachment to the polity in whose history their community has played such an important role.

Is it any wonder that the recipe for peacemaking that results from such a non-humanist approach is one burdened down with caveats, conditionalities, lengthy probationary periods, and, above all, Israeli military hardware?

At the end of the book, Shalev describes the four *seriatim* phases through which he believes an Israeli-Syrian settlement should pass, though he strongly resists the idea of fixed time-tables. Syria would have to commit, on its own behalf and on behalf of the Palestinians and other states, to all kinds of 'normalization' moves early on during this process, whereas Israel's withdrawal provisions would be weighted toward the end of the process. By the end of the second phase, Syria should have established diplomatic relations with Israel, rewritten school textbooks to reflect acceptance of Israel, and resettled all the Palestinian refugees in Syria. But only at the very end of the fourth phase would Israel complete the withdrawal of its troops—to a final line three to four kilometers east of the present

international boundary—and, finally, dismantle the Jewish settlements on the Golan.

Many other Israeli analysts have a far better-informed, more balanced, and above all realistic view of the reciprocities that building a true peace with Syria will entail. Even Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin seemed, by early 1995, to have moved considerably beyond the doom-laden (and doomed) vision of Shalev. In the end, though, this book is a sad one. If this volume is the best that one of Israel's long-time 'best and brightest' can produce, then the situation is worse than anyone thought.

Helena Cobban is the author of The Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1991).

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Blood into Ink: South Asian and Middle Eastern Women Write War, ed. by Miriam Cooke and Roshni Rustomji-Kerns. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. xxvi + 237 pages. Bibl. Note to, p. 238. \$59.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Reviewed by Marilyn Booth

The editors of this anthology remark that "in South Asia and the Middle East, women live battles and violence not as a constant state of alert and destruction, but as a charged normality" (p. 8). These stories, memoirs, poems, and excerpts of novels by women from a wide range of Asian societies, inscribe war not as a far-off front but as daily life, as something that must be both lived and resisted. Translated from Arabic and Hebrew, Punjabi, Hindi, and Urdu, Farsi and Pushto, and in some cases written originally in English, the texts are organized by the editors into sections on "Remembering" and on "Waging Peace."

Yet, as Cooke and Rustomji-Kerns note, acts of recollection and the work of reconciliation overlap. Moreover, either may entail an acceptance of involvement in violent exchanges. Women recognize that if their part in armed conflict is to be acknowledged and if new understandings are to challenge "the cohesion of male-dominated war myths" (p. 8), their participation in war calls for

their own writing of war experience. In those heretofore dominant myths, women look on in silence and children are invisible. But the writings in *Blood into Ink* subvert, even as they invoke the old mythologies of male heroism and presence, female invisibility and acquiescence. In Palestinian writer Nuha Samaral's short story—"Two Faces, One Woman"—a woman whose husband heads for Paris in the thick of war fashions a new identity to survive. "Now that the man had gone she could stop lying" (p. 126). In Krishna Sobti's Hindi story—"Where is my Mother?"—a child's understanding of war confounds a soldier's lone attempts to make amends for his participation in war.

Breaking the taboo of silence and demolishing the conventional wartime gender ascription of roles, the selections in this anthology also question literary genre boundaries, as the editors' choices confront issues of canonicity, conventional academically defined "area studies" boundaries, and closed circles of identity politics. Cooke and Rustomji-Kerns see their collection as a working anthology for dialogue among warring factions of academe. Even if their choices and, in particular, their labelling and arrangement of sections signal some political preferences, they neither privilege nor reject constructed categories, like that of the "naturally peace-loving" female.

Like so many anthologies now coming out that seek to decenter, shift, or demolish familiar edifices, this one will surely spark classroom discussion. The introductions to individual texts are useful in this regard. Bibliographic information, however, whether in introductions or at the end of each section, is sometimes inadequate. It provides no guide, for example, as to whether other works by these writers are available in translation. (It is unfortunate that source titles are given only in translation and not in the original.) Some information is incomplete or ambiguous—and not just out of political exigency. When was Fadwa Tuqan's poem written or first published? When and where did Shukria Raad's story appear? These are not academic quibbles but details that contribute to an understanding of the political work that each text represents in its own society. For, after all, as we academics in the West debate our categories, we must acknowledge that the truly important work these powerful literary pieces accomplish—

the dialogue they force—is not primarily that of the "front" of Western academe.

Marilyn Booth is an independent scholar and translator affiliated with the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

The Early Novels of Naguib Mahfouz: Images of Modern Egypt, by Matti Moosa
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994
xiii + 292 pages. Notes to p. 304. Select Bibliography to p. 312. Index to p. 322. \$39.95.

Reviewed by Hilary Kilpatrick

When Nagib Mahfuz was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1988, his name was hardly known outside the Arab world. Professor Matti Moosa has sought to remedy this situation with a general book in which he aims "to introduce to the Western audience Naguib Mahfouz and his principal works, examining his treatment of social, political, and religious themes against the background of twentieth-century Egypt" (p. xi). He describes his approach as historical rather than literary, concentrating on how Mahfuz "reflects the ethos of the Egyptian society as he lived in it and witnessed it" (p. xi). He recommends Mahfuz's work especially to "those who seek a deeper understanding of Arabic and Islamic thought and institutions, and particularly to those who would understand the long, tortuous course of Egypt's relations with the Western world and the Egyptians' struggle to escape British hegemony" (p. xi).

The book consists of five chapters that discuss Mahfuz's early years, his three historical novels, the five realistic novels depicting pre-revolutionary Cairo, the *Trilogy*, and *Awlad Haritna* (Children of Our Neighborhoods), respectively. The remaining two-thirds of Mahfuz's literary oeuvre is passed over in silence, without any justification of the exclusion of novels like *Al-Liss wa al-Kilab* (The Thief and the Dog), *Tharthara Fawq al-Nil* (Adrift on the Nile), or *Yawma Qutila al-Za'im* (The Day the Leader Was Killed) from the category of his principal works.

The examination of the novels is exceedingly traditional, amounting to a summary of the plot, a discussion of the characters and their motivations,

and a commentary on themes and motifs relating to the cultural, intellectual, political, and social history of Egypt. Moreover, these three elements are intertwined with each other, thus detracting from the clarity of the exposition. The author's approach to the analysis of the characters is simplistic. He does not allow for the possibility that Mahfuz is intentionally portraying inconsistent attitudes and behavior, nor that he is resorting to irony. Rather, he takes Mahfuz to task for not having thought out his characters' actions properly. Furthermore, some of these criticisms are based on faulty reading of the texts.

In the light of the author's statement of intent, one might have expected the relating of Mahfuz's novels to the social and political situation in Egypt to be more successful. But themes such as the role of the Turkish-Egyptian aristocracy, the British occupation of Egypt, and Egyptian responses to the occupation are dealt with piecemeal as they occur in the different novels. This makes for a repetitive discussion and prevents these themes from being examined in depth. Women's emancipation, an issue in Egyptian society throughout the 20th century, is treated in Mahfuz's novels of this period either directly, as in the character of Sawsan Hammad in the *Trilogy*, or by implication, as in the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of polygamy in *Khan al-Khalili*. But Moosa does not enlighten the reader as to the importance of the subject, even missing the opportunity to point out how Surah 4:3 in the Quran, which he quotes, has furnished a major argument to campaigners against polygamy.

Although this book purports to address a general readership, it assumes that the readers do not need to have the early 20th-century Egyptian critic, thinker, and poet 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad identified, and that they will instinctively grasp the literary and cultural roots of his views on fiction (pp. 15–19). Likewise, it assumes that readers are familiar with the Basran philosophers known as the *Ikhwan al-Safa'*, here designated as the Brothers of Sincerity (p. 82), and that they are well informed about the intellectual, political, and social conditions in Egypt at the time of Mahfuz's youth. The book leaves it to the readers to fill in all that the very sketchy introduction to Mahfuz's early years does not tell them.

Another puzzling feature of this book is that it takes little account of earlier studies which, if not intended for a general readership, are, nonetheless, well worth consulting. The references it gives are often misleading, for they tend to indicate not where other scholars express the same view as Moosa, but only where they are talking about the same work. It takes no account of the valuable research that already exists. The statement that Mahfuz's style is "interspersed with colloquial Egyptian" (p. xi), for instance, could only have been made in ignorance of Sasson Somekh's careful and penetrating analysis of the Egyptian laureate's use of language.¹

Beyond the objections that can be levelled at this book for not fulfilling conventional scholarly criteria, it has an even more disturbing feature. Literature deals with the human condition, and any author who receives the Nobel Prize for Literature must be assumed to write of the human condition in such a way that his or her message transcends the boundaries of a specific national or linguistic community. The impression left by *The Early Novels of Naguib Mahfouz*, however, is that Mahfuz's oeuvre has only a curiosity value for "Western" readers. It is a source of information about a particular period of Egyptian history, but nothing more. Yet, so long as non-Arab readers approach modern (or, indeed, classical) Arabic literature in the conviction that it has nothing to tell them about their own condition, they will miss one of the all too rare opportunities for authentic inter-cultural communication that are necessary in a polarised world.

To end on a more positive note, German-speaking members of the Western audience are well-served with a general introduction to Mahfuz's work in Hartmut Fähndrich's concise and thoughtful book.² In English, Somekh's thorough study of Mahfuz's early work is unequalled. A book of the same standard on the whole of Mahfuz's oeuvre, however, has yet to be written.

Hilary Kilpatrick is one of the editors of the *Journal of Arabic Literature*.

1 *The Changing Rhythm: A Study of Nagib Mahfuz's Novels* (Studies in Arabic Literature Supplements to the *Journal of Arabic Literature* 2) (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973).

2 *Nagib Mahfuz* (Munich: edotopm text + kritik, 1991).

Of Cities and Women (Letters to Fawwaz), by Etel Adnan Sausalito Post-Apollo Press, 1993 114 pages \$11 paper

Paris When It's Naked, by Etel Adnan Sausalito Post-Apollo Press, 1993 115 pages \$13.50 paper

Reviewed by Diana Abu-Jaber

It is sometimes said that in order to be a "great writer," one must also be a "great human being." Both concepts, however, are elusive and difficult to define.

Yet, the impression one gets upon reading Etel Adnan's two volumes, *Paris When It's Naked* and *Of Cities and Women*, is of coming upon that rare example of a great soul. The pleasure of reading these works is that of encountering a true teacher or courageous witness to both internal and external worlds.

While depicting a lively, often provocative, range of experiences, the tone of these works remains serene and clear-sighted. Both volumes offer in their thoughtful analysis something like the solace of prayer.

Of Cities and Women is a collection of correspondence, loosely organized around the topic of "feminism," that reads like an extended meditation on the experience of exile. From Barcelona to Skopelos, these letters trace the author's travels and reflections as each city becomes a kind of hand mirror to the psyche, a locus of new understanding. Each place seems to bear its own innate character, its own style of women, its unique insight into the mysteries of existence.

Of Barcelona, Adnan says, "I found the women of this city free, which is to say that they appear to have control over their bodies and their movements" (*Cities*, p. 2). Of women in Marrakesh, she says, "Poor, they walk bent, hidden—they seem embarrassed, as if they had to justify their own existence" (*Cities*, p. 3).

Adnan reads the figures of landscape, nation, art, and street as easily as words on a page. In *Cities*, she continually draws startling yet graceful connections between these elements, showing her readers how to find the essence of a country in a Cézanne mountain, how to understand exile by contemplating the composition of a buffet. Adnan's use of language reflects this poetic process of "decoding." She arrives at deeply original

insights on the nature of feminism, politics, and loss through concise description and observation.

Adnan's writing is lovely. In *Paris*—less a travelogue than an internal mapping—her style moves deeply into the realm of the senses. She writes, "I saw, mainly, the harbor of Antwerp, the sky, a luminous greyness so similar to the painted skies stored in the Louvre. The water, particularly, was flat, and shivering, soft, translucent colors moving gracefully, imperceptibly" (*Paris*, p. 13).

Paris is written with the intimate textures and details of the everyday-life at home, in a place that is not home. Every part of the daily experience reveals the struggle with dispossession, displacement, and the struggle to live fully and spiritually in a city as aloof and complex as is Paris. She writes, "Paris is receding North as do its sister-cities of Berlin and Warsaw. We're at the beginning of some private ice-age, the somnolence of winter will conduct us into the northern fields of solitude where we will forget the interplays of life and death and subsist in darkness, on very little, indeed, very, very little" (*Paris*, p. 49).

The tone shifts between the two works, from the energy of travel in *Cities*, to a more melancholic, stately mood in *Paris*. The latter work would have been difficult, even anguishing, to read had her perceptions not been so consistently direct, honest, and fearless. Adnan strips away the superficial distractions, false promises, and clichés to bring her steady gaze to bear upon the deepest meanings of life.

Both *Paris When It's Naked* and *Of Cities and Women* ultimately draw their strength from the texture of daily encounters and the surprises of everyday life. When the author takes her reader on one of her meditative strolls around Paris, or on an excursion to Greece, she exposes the texture of the life around her. She says of Paris, "There's a quietness of the spirit in the cheapest hotels" (*Paris*, p. 77).

These books add up to more than the sum of their parts. The joy of reading both volumes derives from the great perceptions of Etel Adnan's eyes and the generosity of her heart. It is the joy of reading the work of a great soul.

Diana Abu-Jaber is the author of the novel Arabian Jazz (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1993). She teaches English at the University of Oregon.

The Village Novel in Modern Egyptian Literature, by Ami Elad Berlin Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1994 150 pages Appends to p 178 Bibl to p 195 Index to p 204 n p

Reviewed by Trevor J LeGassick

This work examines a genre of considerable importance in the fictional literature of Egypt in the 20th century—the village novel. In the introduction, Elad comments on the role of the village in international fiction, and suggests stages in its development in Egyptian literature up to 1985, at which year this study ends. The first chapter examines the social, political, and economic factors that led to the increasing attention given to the village in Egyptian fiction. It summarizes the literary characteristics of this genre, gives bibliographical details of some prominent authors, discusses the extent to which their fiction represents their personal experiences, and comments upon the complications presented in these works by the discrepancies between spoken and written Arabic.

The next three chapters center on three specific texts to which Elad assigns special significance. These detailed discussions begin with Muhammad Husayn Haykal's *Zaynab*, proceed to 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sharqawi's *al-Ard* (The Land), and conclude with Muhammad Yusuf al-Qa'id's *Yahduth fi Misr al-An* (Its Happening in Egypt Now). Elad gives bibliographical information, outlines the plots, and analyzes form and subject matter. He concludes with a six-page summary of the main points he has made. Eight appendices offer synopses and comments on a variety of other novels Elad considers significant, along with lists that categorize works by the geographical locales in which they are set. Elad also provides a list of the works in this genre available in English translation.

This book is a useful introductory text. It is careful and economical in its wording, and the analyses and assessments are well reasoned. While Elad's concise assembly of extensive material is impressive, much of his discussion differs little from the conclusions reached elsewhere by others, both in English and Arabic. His final chapter, centering on the controversial and innovative work of al-Qa'id is, in contrast, original and, therefore, particularly valuable.

The work is well presented, with only a few typographical errors. The only statement of fact open to disagreement may be the date of 1914, twice given for the first publication of *Zaynab*. Hamdi Sakut established in his 1971 dissertation that reviews of *Zaynab* had appeared in Egyptian journals in the fall of 1913.¹ One might also take exception to Elad's contention that *Zaynab* "had achieved general and immediate acclaim in the Arab world" (p. 81) and that "the pioneering *Zaynab* had in fact been welcomed with disproportionately great interest in its time" (p. 81). Sakut and Hamilton Gibb report little early enthusiasm for the work, which seems, in fact, to have disappeared from Egyptian consciousness until its republication in 1929 following renewed interest because of its appearance that year on the screen, as one of the earliest Arabic movies.²

Trevor LeGassick, University of Michigan

MODERN POLITICS

The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941–1950, by Daniel Silverfarb. New York: St Martin's Press, 1994. xiii + 234 pages. Notes to p 291. Bibl to p 300. Index to p 306. \$49.95.

Reviewed by Michael B. Bishku

This book is a continuation of Daniel Silverfarb's earlier study of Anglo-Iraqi relations covering the years 1929–41.¹ In the future, he hopes to complete another volume bringing his account up to the 1958 Iraqi revolution. Silverfarb's work focuses on the important issues that affected bilateral Anglo-Iraqi relations from 1941–50, a time when Britain exercised a certain amount of influence over Iraq. This volume begins with the British reasserting their dominance over Iraq following the spring of 1941 military operation against the short-lived pro-German government of

1 *The Egyptian Novel and Its Main Trends from 1913–1952* (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'anif, 1971).

2 Hamilton A.R. Gibb, *Arabic Literature*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).

1 *Britain's Informal Empire in the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

Prime Minister Rashid 'Alī. The book covers, in detail, the diplomatic, economic, and strategic developments in Iraq through December 1949. Chapters 7–16 cover the years following the Second World War. Silverfarb notes that since Wm. Roger Louis, author of *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951*, devoted “a relatively small amount of attention” (one chapter of 38 pages) to Iraq in his well-known 800-page work,² chapters 7–16 of *British Ascendancy* are designed to fill this gap (p. 80). As Louis is currently working on a second volume concerning Britain’s involvement in the Middle East through the 1958 Iraqi revolution, it will be interesting to compare his account to Silverfarb’s anticipated volume. It is likely that this time Louis will devote more attention to Iraq.

Silverfarb writes with a great deal of clarity, not only with regard to political issues, but also about economic and military matters. Additionally, he is very thorough in his utilization of British government documents, especially those of the Foreign Office. He presents an enlightening description and analysis of Great Britain’s policy towards Iraq, and to a lesser degree of the positions and actions taken by the Iraqi government. With regard to the latter, Silverfarb also relies on Iraqi memoirs written in Arabic.

Given recent events involving Iraq, the two chapters on the 1943–45 Kurdish revolts and the territorial dispute over Kuwait and the port of Umm Qasr are of particular interest. While British officials were sympathetic to Kurdish grievances regarding discrimination, they gave military supplies and advice to the Iraqi government in its operations against Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani, as they did not like Barzani’s attempt to maintain local autonomy. While the Foreign Office supported a pro-Iraqi interpretation of the border with Kuwait, a line approximately two miles south of Umm Qasr fort, it opposed Iraq’s claims to the islands of Bubiyan and Warba, which constitute a portion of Kuwaiti territory.

Silverfarb also devotes two chapters to the negotiations and collapse of the 1948 Treaty of

Portsmouth, which was to replace the 1930 Treaty of Alliance. Under the terms of the Treaty of Alliance, Iraq was required to fully consult with Great Britain on all matters of foreign policy, to lease two air bases to Great Britain, and to provide the British military with assistance and facilities in times of war. Iraq negotiated the Treaty of Portsmouth with the British government in order to modify the 1930 treaty. The new treaty called for the sharing of the two air bases as well as a joint defense board, and eliminated the provision requiring consultation on foreign affairs. Strong popular opposition within Iraq precluded the submission of the treaty to the Iraqi parliament. Silverfarb points out that the Treaty of Portsmouth’s defeat

was significant because it revealed how narrow was the base of support for the British connection. [A]side from some small minority communities such as the Assyrians, this base appeared to consist essentially of the royal family, a few prominent politicians, and a small group of other wealthy individuals (p. 155).

Following World War II, Britain lacked the economic resources or any other means of finding supporters outside of the unpopular and corrupt ruling class.

On another note, Silverfarb makes a brief mention of the Iraqi government’s treatment of its Jewish community during 1948–51. This topic is referred to on pages 52, 150, and 189–90. (The book’s index gives the wrong page numbers.) And, an endnote related to that subject (note 86, p. 247) states: “I am treating this question in a separate article.” Silverfarb does not mention that the issue of the Jewish community in Iraq was discussed by British and Iraqi officials in 1949, something that this reviewer has written about in detail.³

This matter aside, *The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East* is an excellent book, well-researched and well-written, and an important contribution to the study of Great Britain’s involvement in the modern Middle East. It is also

2. *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, The United States, and Post-war Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). [For a review of Louis’s book, see *The Middle East Journal* vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 1985).]

3. Michael B. Bishku, “The Other Side of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Great Britain and the Issue of Iraqi Jewry Prior to ‘Operation Ezra and Nehemiah,’” *Studies in Zionism* 12, no. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 29–41.

interesting on the issue of local collaboration as an element in Western imperialism

Michael B. Bishku, Department of History, University of North Florida

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

L'Islam laïque, ou le retour à la Grande Tradition, by Olivier Carré. Paris: Armand Colin, 1993. 151 pages. Notes to p. 165. Contents to p. 167. n.p. paper.

L'Islam: politique et croyance, by Maxime Rodinson. Paris: Fayard, 1993. 327 pages. Bibliography to p. 330. Contents to p. 333. FF130. paper.

Reviewed by Sergei Grietsky

The Iranian revolution, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from his residence in a Paris suburb, generated great interest in the relationship between Islam and politics on the eve of the next century. Olivier Carré and Maxime Rodinson approach the subject from different angles.

Carré brings to the discussion a historical perspective to describe the relationship. His conclusion is that modern Islamic political figures and thinkers (Hasan al-Banna, Khomeini, Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Rashid Rida, and others) have broken with the grand tradition of separating Islam from politics. Carré finds this separation in existence from the 11th until the end of the 19th century. In Carré's assessment, that period in Islamic political philosophy and history corresponds to the period of secularization in Europe. On that basis he concludes that "it is wrong and dangerous to pretend that it is in Islam's nature to mix the religious and the political, even if today this appears to be the dominant doctrinal tendency in Islam" (p. 35). Unfortunately, he does not produce convincing evidence to substantiate such a stunning claim. Carré essentially excludes the Prophet Muhammad, the "rightly guided" caliphs, and Muslim political tradition up to the 10th century from the Islamic mainstream tradition. He acknowledges that the Prophet left behind a theocratic system of government, which subsequently became deeply institu-

tionalized in Islam. Apparently, however, he regards this system as having nothing to do with the nature of Islam nor being representative of Islam, calling it the "short tradition" or "deviance" from Islam. At the same time, Carré does not name any state in Islamic history that exemplifies the separation of religion and politics, referring only to theoretical elaborations. Even dealing with community, which he considers to be the nucleus of Muslim society and the cornerstone of the grand tradition of Islam, Carré admits that, unlike political philosophy, it has been preserved intact since the days of the Prophet, and that its members treasure their allegiance to their confessional community above all else. The latter fact, to a great degree, accounts for the failure of pan-Arabism, especially in multi-confessional societies like Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. Even class interests in Lebanese cities, Carré says, rarely prevail over those of a community.

L'Islam laïque leaves the impression that the author's theorization was guided more by the Western perception of the role religion plays and should play in Western society, than by an objective assessment of Islamic political tradition. This becomes obvious on p. 137, when Carré urges Muslims to adopt a quietist approach, i.e., perform only ethical, educational, and charitable functions, and not be engaged in politics. In Carré's view, in the 21st century, Islam should become "post-Islamist," thus admitting that secularization lies ahead of Muslim society, and not somewhere behind.

Rodinson's book, *L'Islam politique et croyance*, is a collection of articles examining various aspects of Islam. Rodinson tries to find traces of secularization in the activities of those leaders, political parties, and movements of modern political Islam that advocate a return to Islam as it was practiced in the days of the Prophet. He considers the protest movement engulfing the Islamic world to have little to do with original Islamic doctrines, which, he says, cannot provide comprehensive explanations. Rodinson postulates that the subordinate socio-political status of the modern Islamic world explains the revolt against Western hegemony, Western material goods, and the Westernized political elites favored by the West. This revolt could only be draped in an Islamic garb.

Rodinson emphasizes the fundamental difference between Christianity and Islam in their

attitudes toward the state. The founder of Christianity never intended to establish a state and preached acceptance of the existing state structures. Despite several attempts by the Church in the course of its formation to influence, or even dominate, the state, even at the height of its power in the Middle Ages the Church never equated itself with the state and existed as a parallel ideological structure. Islam, on the contrary, "presents in itself not just an association of believers, recognizing the same truths, but a society in its entirety" (p. 30). According to Rodinson, "The community of believers at the same time was a political structure, State" (p. 31). It was simultaneously *din* (religion) and *dawla* (state). Like Carré, Rodinson singles out community as the socio-political cornerstone of Muslim society, and attributes the tenacity of Islamic fervor to the community's endurance and survivability through changing times. Islam provides the ideological form of the community's identity, and currently, asserts Rodinson, belief in God has been largely replaced by belief in Islam, certainly not in words, but in actions (p. 113).

It is only natural that a "Muslim community-state" will hold to Islam, pursuing two goals: socio-economic development and real independence, and preservation of identity vis-à-vis Western hegemony. To succeed, Islamic political activists, disillusioned with their countries' experiments with Western and Marxist models, turn to the grandeur of their past for inspiration in building a perfect and just society in this life. It is hard to imagine that to achieve this goal Islamists at this stage would resort to political quietism, which seeks to reach the same goal through individual piety in everyday life. On the contrary, they are uniting to form various political organizations, which present political programs, list their objectives, run in elections, etc. Although their platforms may be expressed in religious terms, at the same time they fall short of being theological: "a mullah, be he imbued with the most sublime, divine thoughts, if he joins political games, he becomes nothing but a specific case of a tribune" (p. 320). This, in Rodinson's judgement, probably signals better than anything else the gradual evolution toward secularization. Such a convinced fundamentalist and anti-Westerner as Khomeini supported having a constitution, referendums, and elections, in which he was

influenced neither by the Quran nor the *hadith* (sayings of the Prophet). Another sign of this evolution is that Islamists denounce Christian missionaries not on the basis of being propagators of erroneous theological doctrine, but as "agents of imperialism" (p. 230). Yet, Rodinson concludes, this does not mean that fundamentalism will not become stronger in the future.

Both of these books are thought-provoking. They will contribute greatly to a discussion and debate, and perhaps even to a better understanding of the many aspects of political Islam.

Sergei Gretskey, Department of Politics, Catholic University of America

Shi'ite Islam: Polity, Ideology, and Creed,

by Yann Richard. Translated by Antonia Nevill. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, US: Blackwell, 1995. xiii + 217 pages. Chronology to p. 219. Glossary to p. 225. Bibliography to p. 232. Index to p. 241. \$54.95 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Reviewed by Manochehi Dorraj

Shi'ite Islam has been the object of intense scholarly scrutiny in the last 16 years. While many academics have used elaborate theories and methodologies to demystify Shi'ite revivalism and militancy, others have employed a mixture of historical and scholarly accounts to illuminate its evolution and cultural and political attributes.

Yann Richard's contribution belongs in the latter category. While his book has certain stylistic similarities to Roy Mottahedeh's seminal work, *The Mantle of the Prophet*,¹ in many regards it is also distinctively different from the latter. While Mottahedeh focused on the making of an enlightened Shi'ite clergy and, through the narrative of his socialization, eloquently told us the intellectual history of the Iranian Revolution, Richard's book encompasses observations on the total development of Shi'ism as a faith. Richard concentrates on pristine Shi'ism, traces its evolution through the Middle Ages, illuminates its development in Iran, and dissects its revolutionary transformation. He also describes the Shi'ite

1 (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1985).

communities outside Iran and assesses the place of women in the Shi'ite culture

Free from jargon, this is a well-written, readable, informative, and accessible book that can benefit both the general reader and the expert. The book is particularly strong in its discussion of popular Shi'ism and revolutionary theory in Iran. Richard knows the literature and is quite adept in sifting through varying intellectual trends in contemporary Iran. While he attempts to humanize political Shi'ism, his study is sustained by critical observations and admonitions about theocracy. He is wary of the dangers lurking in the metamorphosis of a sacred faith into a state ideology.

Overall, the author's analysis is informed by a judicious appraisal of Shi'ite mystical and spiritual tradition and its political transformation in recent history. Hence, unlike many dry academic accounts of the subject matter, Richard's narrative is engaging, provocative, and intimate. The author is well-versed in the Shi'ite political culture, theology, and intellectual history. This enables him to blend personal observations with theory construction and scholarship. The result is an erudite presentation of Shi'ite social and political life. This comprehensive introduction to Shi'ite Islam is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the subject.

Manochehr Dorraj, Department of Political Science, Texas Christian University

PRE-20TH CENTURY HISTORY

Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt's Waning as a Great Power, by Carl F. Petry. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. xv + 226 pages. Appendix to p. 251. Sources to p. 263. Index to p. 280. \$19.95.

Reviewed by Weston F. Cook, Jr.

After nearly a decade of study, Carl Petry has written an elegant and judicious analysis of politics and society under the last Mamluk sultans, al-Ashraf Qaytbay (872–902/1468–96) and Qansuh al-Ghawri (906–22/1501–16). Despite exten-

sive research, including a meticulous combing of *waqf* (Islamic trust) documents from the era, his stated aims are cautious. Petry has sought to clarify the events and processes at work in Egypt during the last half-century of Mamluk rule, to analyze the interplay of ruling policy, patronage, and crises in Mamluk society, and to reveal the mindset of an elite military caste whose power had begun to unravel under new strategic, commercial, and demographic duress. Petry is extremely successful at this task.

This book provides a brief but precise guide through the cavalcade of wars, mutinies, revolts, and conspiracies of the Sultanate's last years. Petry's discussion of the Mamluk "world view"—how the ruling caste understood Egypt as a fulcrum of power between Africa, Asia, and Europe—is crisp and lucid. It is well worth the price of the book. Viewing themselves as the heirs of the Mamluk slave-soldier champions who rescued 13th-century Islam from the Mongols and the Crusades, they saw Egypt as both the hub and fulcrum of the globe. As a self-renewing elite, the Mamluks saw themselves as a military caste closed to the Egyptians under their protection, and thereby entitled to the privileges of power, property, and domination. Ironically, in their last century, they expended their energies on fighting each other in ever-shifting factions. In response, civilians developed a myriad of passive resistance strategies to protect their assets from Mamluk depredation.

The standard view of decline in medieval Egypt is derived from the following image. The predatory Mamluk state was run by a parasitic bureaucracy under self-indulgent rulers. It was fractionated by self-seeking soldiers made obsolete by gunpowder technology. Productive classes were oppressed into passivity or pointless riot by an exploitative state. Finally, the international arena fell under the control of aggressive sea-going mercantilism and powerful, coherent land empires, all modern and "superior" to Mamluk medievalism. Petry does not posit a dramatic revision of this paradigm, but instead offers a sophisticated and fascinating series of insights into how Mamluk society worked.

Survival for the Sultan meant first assuring that the Mamluk army and its retainers enjoyed the wages, resources, and style of life that marked them as superior to all others in society. In spite of

rivalries among Mamluk families, army units, generations, aspiring sultans, and provincial garrisons, Mamluk cadres had a remarkable talent for coalescing against the Sultan if he asserted his nominal command too regally, or against ordinary folk if their resentment against their predatory Mamluk protectors became too vigorous. Taxation traditionally depended upon bureaucrats in the towns—often ‘*ulama*’ (Islamic scholars)—and army expeditions into the countryside that were virtually mafia-style shake-downs of the peasantry (Parallels with contemporary Wattasid Morocco are intriguing.) These old methods, however, had, by the mid-15th century CE, become insufficient to provide sultans with the revenue they needed. In conjunction with other economic set-backs, social unrest was increasing in response to economic dearth. This economic challenge, in many ways, was little different from the crisis confronting aspiring absolutists in Western Europe—the state needed money, not just to pay its bills, but to raise itself above dependency on the society it intended to dominate more effectively. Finding that money proved disruptive to the existing social order and morale.

Petry has uncovered a myriad of strategies the last sultans devised to win autonomy from their Mamluk colleagues and become rulers in fact as well as in title. The author reveals new material on the ingenuity both sultans showed in manipulating the *waqf* (religious property) endowment systems, creating the outlines of a personal treasury insulated from the grasp of the Mamluk ranks by Islamic law. The analysis is detailed, careful, and convincing. In addition, both sultans raised up a civilian cadre of “bureaucratic entrepreneurs,” men devoted as professional co-conspirators to finding new sources of funds for their patrons. Like the “self-made” civil servants of early modern Europe, they tended to come from lower-, middle-, and working-class origins, and circumventing the rules was part of their charter. Indeed, graft, blackmail, and corruption were part of their work, but that work—so long as the lion’s share of its gleanings went to the Sultan—was well rewarded. Careers in government were lucrative and dangerous. Death or exile frequently fell on those clients who became too wealthy, too injudiciously rapacious, or too independent in their loyalty. Here, Petry proves himself not just a master historian, but a first-rate storyteller as well.

This book brings great credit to SUNY Press’s new Medieval Middle East Series and makes an important acquisition for libraries and individuals interested in the many areas Carl F. Petry analyzes.

Weston F. Cook, Jr., Pembroke State University

Recent Publications

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, volumes 1–4, ed. by John L. Esposito. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Vol. 1: xiii + 466 pages. Vol. 2: 476 pages. Vol. 3: 475 pages. Vol. 4: 460 pages. Contribs. Synoptic Outline Index. \$395 collection. These four reference works define and analyze a multitude of elements related to the Islamic world (not limited to the Middle East). Entries, often stretching for pages, are written by intellectuals and academics specializing in Islamic and Middle Eastern affairs. Topics are arranged alphabetically and cover items ranging from the ‘Abbasid Caliphate to Zurkhanah. The vast subject matter includes biography, economics, gender, geography, history, human rights, law, literature, mysticism, political and social movements, religious practice and ritual, and science. Entries are followed by cross references and extensive bibliographies. Some entries are accompanied by illustrations and photos. The *Encyclopedia*’s senior consultant was Albert Hourani of the University of Oxford. The writing is sophisticated enough for the expert, yet tailored for the general reader. (JR)

United States Official Documents on the Armenian Genocide, vol. III: The Central Lands, compiled by Ara Sarafian. Watertown, MA: Armenian Review, 1995. vii + 157 pages. Appends Index. \$15 paper. This is the third volume of a five volume compilation of State Department documents of the Armenian genocide. This volume contains reports filed between 1915–17 by Leslie A. Davis, the American Consul at Harput. Davis witnessed much of the systematic destruction firsthand and relied on trusted informants for the remainder. The documents provide a detailed description of the effect of the Ottoman policy of deportation and extermination of the Armenian people. (MMc)

Annotations were prepared with the assistance of Joy Hester, Mike McCarthy, Muhammad Mushih, Jordan Rankin, Gregory M. Saiontz, and Irene Vavulitsky.

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, ed by Yaacov Ro'i. London: Frank Cass, 1995. xiii + 330 pages. Contribs. Gloss. Index. \$47.50. This book describes the challenges presently faced by the Muslim states of the former Soviet Union as they struggle between the opposing legacies of oppression, colonialism, and de-Islamization by the Russians, and localism, tribalism, and Islam predating the Russian conquest. The fifteen chapters give overviews and commentary on the area as a whole and describe problems particular to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. (IV)

EGYPT

Egypt from Monarchy to Republic: A Reassessment of Revolution and Change, ed by Shimon Shamir. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. v + 352 pages. Index. \$59.95. This book is a collection of essays by intellectuals and scholars discussing the transformation in Egyptian society brought on by Jamal Abd al-Nasir's coup d'état in 1952. Prior to 1952, Egypt was dominated by landed pashas, British interests, and foreign communities. The analysis is a retrospective study of 40 years of historical change in the economic, political, and social development of Egypt under Nasir, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. The essays are divided into four categories that explore issues of state and politics, economic and social patterns, the role of intellectuals, and of foreign relations. (GS)

IRAN

Democracy Betrayed: A Response to the US State Department Report on the Mojahedin and the Iranian Resistance, by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, Foreign Affairs Committee, 1993. vii + 384 pages. Notes. Appends. \$15.95. This book is a response to a US State Department report on the People's Mojahedin of Iran. The authors take the position that the current leadership of Iran is engaged in continuing human rights abuses, and that the State Department report is too complimentary of the Tehran government. They discuss the recent history of dissent in Iran, supporters of the Iranian resistance in the US Congress and in the academic community, and the general philosophy of the People's Mojahedin. (MMc)

IRAQ

Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds, by Human Rights Watch/Middle East. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995. v + 373 pages. Append. Notes. Gloss. Bibl. Index. \$35. This is a narrative account of the 1988 Anfal Campaign in Iraq to exterminate the Kurds. The book analyzes many Iraqi government documents, ten of which are included

in the appendix. The major conclusion of the book is that this campaign, which was responsible for the deaths of 50,000–100,000 people, can be classified as "genocide." (GS)

ISRAEL AND ZIONISM

Israel. The First Decade of Independence, ed by S. Ilan Troen and Noah Lucas. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. xv + 779 pages. Contribs. Index. \$19.95. This collection of over 30 essays by scholars and intellectuals reexamines the first decade of Israel's existence in light of new archival materials that have recently been released for public scrutiny. The essays address a wide range of issues, including political representation of the Holocaust, social and economic concerns, literature and the arts, physical planning, immigrants, the Arab minority, and the Jewish diaspora. The essays provide different perspectives that challenge traditional representations of this critical period in Israel's development. (GS)

Israeli Judaism: Studies of Israeli Society, vol. VII, ed by Shlomo Deshen et al. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995. xii + 386 pages. Bibl. Contribs. \$21.95. This book is divided into six sections covering multiple facets of Judaism and Israeli culture. Topics include an introduction to the study of Judaism, the political dimensions of Israeli Judaism, the traditions of ultra-orthodoxy and nationalist orthodoxy, and Sephardic Judaism. The work is a compilation of previously published articles. (IV)

Jewish State or Israeli Nation?, by Boas Evron. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana State University Press, 1995. vii + 269 pages. Notes. Index. \$29.95. This book, written by an Israeli, is an evaluation of Zionism. The book explores Jewish history and argues that Judaism comprises a religious community that is not compatible with a secular, democratic state. Evron argues for changing the Israeli state to a more democratic, secular, and territorial state that could accommodate a significant non-Jewish minority. (GS)

PAKISTAN

Undermining the Center: The Gulf Migration and Pakistan, by Jonathan S. Addleton. Karachi, Pakistan and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. xiv + 232 pages. £18. This study assesses the causes and effects of the migration of Pakistanis to other states in the Middle East. Specifically, Addleton examines migration during the 1970s and 1980s, the domestic conditions that encouraged emigration, and the causes of the huge demand for labor in the Middle East. The study also looks at the results of large-scale emigration on the economy of Pakistan and on Pakistani society. (MMc)

SAUDI ARABIA

The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud, by Said K. Aburish. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. vii + 328 pages. Bibl. Index. \$24.95. Aburish seeks to prove that the Saudi monarchy has been corrupt and greedy since its founding. The book provides a detailed account of questionable behavior by the royal family, involving such activities as the illegal execution of prisoners, irresponsible use of funds, procurement of prostitutes, drinking alcoholic beverages, and gambling. Aburish concludes that these indiscretions will lead to the collapse of the Saudi state, which will result in world-wide instability as the future of Saudi oil becomes uncertain. Aburish also emphasizes that the West, by supporting the Saudi government, is burning its bridges with the Saudi people as well as with the rest of the Arab and Muslim world. (JH)

SUDAN

Sudan: State and Society in Crisis, ed. by John O. Voll. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, and Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1991. xi + 170 pages. Contribs. Index. \$10.95 paper. This collection of essays examines the development of economic and political conditions in Sudan from independence in 1956 to the military coup of June 1989. The authors begin each chapter by identifying various problems that the modern Sudanese state has faced. Topics examined include the tension between parliamentary democracy and military rule, Islam as both a unifying and a dividing force, and the problem of refugees fleeing war and famine within Sudan and in neighboring Chad and Ethiopia. After discussing each issue, the authors then suggest solutions. (MMc)

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations, 1973-1993, ed. by Barry Rubin et al. New York: New York University Press, 1994. v + 244 pages. Contribs. Index. \$35. This compilation of essays by prominent political figures analyzes the Middle East since the October 1973 war. The book examines the monumental changes in political relations that have taken place during this period, including the changing relationships of both the United States and Russia with Middle Eastern states. It highlights the strikingly similar political promise that both the 1973 war and the 1993 Declaration of Principles brought to the Middle East peace equation. The essays explore such issues as the inevitability of the October 1973 war or the possibility that it could have been avoided. Central to the book's basic themes is the irony that the peace process which followed the October war came only as a product of the war. (GS)

Israeli-Palestinian Security Issues in the Permanent Status Negotiations, by Jeffrey Boutwell and Everett Mendelsohn. Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of

Arts and Sciences, 1995. 124 pages. Select. Bibl. \$10 paper. Based on the sessions of the Study Group of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, this book presents a detailed view of the obstacles to reaching a settlement from both the Israeli and Palestinian perspectives. It proposes methods of overcoming the problems. The authors focus on a range of topics affecting a possible agreement, including security, Palestinian self-determination, the status of Jerusalem, water rights, and the role of other countries in the region. (JH)

The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime, 1949-1955, by Aryeh Shalev. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, and Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post, 1993. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Study no. 21. 255 pages. Notes. Appends. \$32.50 paper. Shalev examines the early years of the Israeli-Syrian relationship, with a focus on the armistice regime. Particular attention is paid to the elements of the conflict, the methods used to reduce tension, and the lessons that may be drawn to facilitate the ongoing Israeli-Syrian peace talks. Shalev concludes that the next settlement between Israel and Syria must be more complete and permanent than the 1949 Armistice Agreement. His work is based on declassified official records, interviews, and the author's own experience as commander of the Israeli delegation to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (MM).

The Long Armistice: UN Peacekeeping and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1960, by Nathan A. Pelcovits. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. xvi + 264 pages. Notes. About the Author. Index. \$59.95. Pelcovits discusses the role of the United Nations as "guardians of the Arab-Israeli stalemate" between 1948 and 1960. He highlights Israel's tensions with the international peacekeepers. He analyzes US policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the preference of the Eisenhower administration to use the United Nations as an instrument for "countering Soviet penetration and safeguarding U.S. interests without the need for direct intervention" (pp. 121-2). Narrative is based on documents, interviews, and the author's own experiences in the US Department of State. (MM)

BIOGRAPHY

The Passion of al-Hallaj: Mystic and Martyr of Islam, by Louis Massignon. Translated and ed. by Herbert Mason. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. xxxi + 292 pages. \$16.95 paper. The seven chapters of this book deal with the life and controversial death of Hallaj, a tenth-century Sufi mystic and martyr. These chapters are minutely divided into sub-categories which detail a biographical outline, his years of apprenticeship, including his teachers and friends, his travels and apostolate, zealous preaching and political indictment in Baghdad, the court of justice, and the actors in the drama, the trials, and the martyrdom. The work contains illustrations taken from Persian and Arabo-Persian miniatures of the 14th-18th centuries. (IV)

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Islamic Economic Systems, by Farhad Nomani and Ali Rahnema. London: Zed Books, 1994. xiv + 222 pages. Bibl. Index. \$60 cloth, \$25 paper. Nomani and Rahnema examine Islamic economic theories and how those theories are applied in contemporary Islamic societies. Case studies include Iran, Libya, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. (MMc)

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE, AND ARTS

The Eye of an Ant: Persian Proverbs and Poems, tr. by Fatollah Akbar. Bethesda, MD: Iranbooks, 1995. 102 pages. \$10 paper. In this selection of couplets and short poems, the translator has been able to "render" traditional Persian poems into English so that rhyme and meter, but not the literal meaning, are preserved. There are 282 poems, each conveying some piece of wisdom or pithy advice to the reader. The morals of the poems range from the insightful "A snake will dispose of its colorful skin / But never the character it has within," to the cryptic "I'm no head of an onion / I'm not even a core / I'm virtually a nobody / There's nothing I'm for," to the silly "Where there's a bear / One gets a scare." (MMc)

Islamic Tiles, by Venetia Parker. New York: Interlink Publishing Group, 1995. 128 pages. Maps. Select. Bibl. Index. \$16.95 paper. This book documents 1000 years of tile production in a geographic area extending from Iran to Turkey. Starting with a discussion of craftsmen and techniques, the author then traces the development of Islamic tiles from ninth-century Iraqi glazed earthenware, through the influence of Chinese ornamentation in the 15th–17th centuries, to the highly intricate 19th-century Turkish style. The book features 43 color and 71 black-and-white illustrations, drawn mainly from the Department of Oriental Antiquities at the British Museum. (MMc)

Middle Eastern Tales, by Samyr Souki. New York: Vantage Press, 1994. 120 pages. \$15. "This is not a history book written by a historian," (p. 2) writes Samyr Souki in the prologue to this volume. Rather, this collection represents "a series of stories told by a traveller, who recounts what has remained vivid in his mind" (p. 2). The 27 tales contained in this volume are noteworthy not only for their literary value, but also because Souki's encounters with and knowledge of noted Middle Eastern figures are reflected in the stories. The titles vary from "Black-Market Translator" and "The Muslims of Russia," to "Count Folke Bernadotte" and "Tokyo and the Neutral Zone." (IV)

The Native Informant and Other Stories, by Ramzi M. Salti. Colorado Springs, CO: Three Continents Press, 1994. vi + 101 pages. Synopses. About the Author. \$12 paper. This collection of six short stories addresses issues of marginalized groups in the Arab world, such as feminism, homosexuality, and victims of violence in southwest Asia. On a general level these stories parse "the seemingly conflictual relationship between notions

of Arabness, Islam, and the West" (p. vii). Themes include religious intolerance, the subjugation of women, homophobia, domestic violence, Western and Eastern concepts of terrorism, and the negative stereotype of Arabs in the United States. (GS)

The Photography of Kamil Chadirji: Social Life in the Middle East, 1920–1940, ed. by Rifat Chadirji. Surrey, England: LAAM, 1991. 83 pages. \$40 cloth, \$24.95 paper. This book is a collection of Iraqi architect Kamil Chadirji's photographs of Middle Eastern society. Chadirji is affiliated with Harvard University's Graduate School of Design and the Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His photographs, all in black and white, capture images predominantly in Syria and Iraq. (GS)

Poet and Hero in the Persian Book of Kings, by Olga M. Davidson. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994. xiii + 197 pages. Append. Bibl. Index. \$39.95. This study addresses the *Shahnama* (Book of Kings) of Abu al-Qasim Ferdowsi, one of the premiere examples of Persian epic poetry. Davidson discusses the literary as well as historical details that make this work unique. Two chapters, "the poet and his poetry" and "the hero," discuss the problem of maintaining an oral-history tradition in book form. (IV)

Psalms Poems by Mahmud Darwish, tr. by Ben Bannani. Colorado Springs, CO: Three Continents Press, 1994. 70 pages. About the Tr. \$12 paper. This is a collection of 17 poems written by one of Palestine's most well-known living poets. Bannani writes in the introduction that while many call Darwish the "poet of the Palestinian resistance," his poems are not as political as they are personal. The themes of love, pain, and death appear frequently alongside Darwish's extensive use of imagery from the natural world. (MMc)

Sutra and Other Stories, by Simin Daneshvar. Tr. by Hasan Javadi and Amin Neshati. Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 1994. 189 pages. \$24.95. This is a collection of six stories translated from Persian. The stories range from comedy to tragedy, with Daneshvar exploring many of the themes recurrent in her nearly five decades as an author—sexual and racial identity, the relations between social classes, and the workings of dreams and the subconscious. (MMc)

Three Dynamite Authors, ed. by Donald E. Herdeck. Colorado Springs, CO: Three Continents Press, 1995. vii + 132 pages. Notes. Contribs. \$16 paper. This book is a compilation of ten bio-critical essays from the works of authors Derek Walcott, Najib Mahfuz, and Wole Soyinka. The work is an attempt to inform a broader audience about these three non-Western artists. (GS)

MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Democracy, War, and Peace in the Middle East, ed. by David Garnham and Mark Tessler. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995. v + 294 pages. Contribs. Index. \$15.95 paper. This book is an analysis of both the theoretical and practical possibilities for democracy in the Arab states. Essays explore the ways in

which democratization of the Arab world might affect the current Arab-Israeli conflict (GS)

Ethnic Politics, by Milton J. Esman. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1994. 277 pages. Bibl. Index. \$37.50 cloth, \$14.95 paper. Esman explores the roots and dynamics of ethnicity in contemporary conflicts. He evaluates four ethnic conflicts, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While Esman ultimately concludes that "the complexity of the circumstances in which ethnic politics are played out and the number of variable factors that affect processes and outcomes preclude the development of general theory," he does suggest that "partial theory explanations" are illuminating in the difficult task of managing the "ineluctable reality of ethnic solidarity" (p. 267) (GS)

Mass Resistance in Kashmir. Origins, Evolution, Option, by Tahir Amin. Islamabad, Pakistan: Institute of Policy Studies, 1995. 173 pages. Bibl. Index. \$10 cloth, \$8 paper. This study is an effort to understand the historical origins, the development, and the nature of the protracted Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan by reconstructing post-partition (1947) history. While addressing such questions as the nature of the dispute, the nature of past efforts to resolve it, and the reasons such efforts failed, the author concludes that although the Muslim world is capable of solving the dispute, it does not fully understand the issue or have the "vision" to properly solve it (GS)

The Middle East Military Balance, 1993-1994, ed. by Shlomo Gazit. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, and Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post, 1994. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. 575 pages. Appendixes. Gloss. Chron. Abbrevs. Tables. Figs. Maps. Contrbns. np. This report assesses the military situation in the Middle East during 1993 and half of 1994. It covers strategic developments that affect the Middle East military equation. These matters include, among others, a look at the peace process, the role of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy in the Middle East, regional terrorist activity, the Middle East arms race, prospects for arms control, and the effect of Israel's "qualitative edge" on arms control efforts. Sections by Zeev Eytan present data on military forces and state infrastructures in the region (GS)

Middle Eastern Security Prospects for an Arms Control Regime, ed. by Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler. Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co., 1995. vii + 199 pages. Documents. Notes. Index. \$35. This collection of essays deals with the security issues confronting Middle Eastern countries after the US-Soviet Cold War. The book addresses such topics as the role of the United States and Russia in a multipolar world order, the threat of nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation in the area, and the containment of ballistic missiles. These factors are examined in the context of past history and the relevance of the present, with a discussion of the likelihood of achieving future regional security (JH)

Perceptions de sécurité et stratégies nationales au Moyen-Orient, ed. by Bassma Kodmani-Darwish and May Chartoumi-Dubarry. Paris, Milan, and Barcelona: Masson, 1994. 234 pages. Bibl. 170FF paper. Beginning with the diplomatic settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a backdrop, the eight chapters in this book

address the new strategic arrangement in the Middle East. While it might seem that the peaceful resolution of the long-summering regional conflict would make the region more stable, the editors point out that there remains a confusion concerning future partnerships and alliances. Topics explored include "The Politics of Egyptian Security," "The Perception of Threat and Strategic Approach in Israel," and "Syria: Old Dilemmas, New Strategies" (MMc)

Pioneers of Islamic Revival, ed. by Ali Rahnama. London: Zed Books, 1994. v + 279 pages. Index. \$59.95 cloth, \$25 paper. This book provides a "balanced account" of the contributions of nine 19th and 20th century Islamic thinkers whose works stressed the application of Islam to practical problems in the contemporary world. The book examines the lives of Muhammad 'Abdu, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Hasan al-Banna, Ruhollah Khomeini, Abu al-A'la Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Musa al-Sadr, and 'Ali Shari'ati whose contributions in the economic, political, and religious spheres have "played a crucial role in reviving Islam as a potent political force" (p. 2) (GS)

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Chapters on Marriage and Divorce. Responses of Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Rahwayh, tr. by Susan A. Spector. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993. xiii + 278 pages. Appendix. Bibl. Indices. \$40 cloth, \$15.95 paper. This translation describes the nature of Quran-based law as it applies to the primary areas in which it has not been superseded by Western legal codes: marriage and family life. Three chapters of compilations, those of Abu Dawud al-Sijistani, 'Abdallah b. Ahmad b. Hanbal, and Ishaq b. Mansur al-Kawsaj, are preceded by an introduction that places these jurists into a historical context (IV)

Crisis and Reaction. The Hero in Jewish History, ed. by Menachem Mor. Omaha, NE: Creighton University Press, 1995. xii + 306 pages. \$27.50. This collection of papers was compiled from presentations made at a symposium of the Philip M. and Ethel Klutznick Chair in Jewish Civilization at Creighton University in October 1993. The 16 essays embody the symposium's exploration of "the dialectic between the heroic individual and his time" (p. xii). The papers illuminate the history of Judaism in the context of the ancient paradigm of "the Hero" (GS)

Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook and Jewish Spirituality, ed. by Lawrence J. Kaplan and David Shatz. New York and London: New York University Press, 1995. xiii + 346 pages. Bibl. Indices. \$55 cloth, \$20 paper. This is an analysis of the major teachings and works of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935). The book is divided into three major areas—"Rav Kook and the Many Streams of Jewish Tradition", "Faith, Culture, and Pluralism: The Perspective of Harmonism", and "Zionism, Messianism, and the State of Israel." Each section of the book is comprised of a series of essays by various

scholars in the disciplines of Jewish studies, philosophy, politics, and religious studies (GS)

PRE-20TH CENTURY HISTORY

Aspects of Ottoman History: Papers from Ciepo IX, Jerusalem, ed. by Amy Singer and Amon Cohen. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1994. 332 pages. Summaries. Contributor p. The contributors to this volume discuss the idea of a distinct entity known as the "Ottoman city." The 26 chapters are organized into four sections: towns, early Ottoman history, international relations, and literary, administrative, and other sources. The chapters are culled from the over 120 papers presented at the Ninth Congress of the Comité International des Études Pré-ottomanes et Ottomanes (CIEPO), which convened in Jerusalem in July 1990 (IV).

Black Corps d'Elite: An African Slave Battalion of the Second Empire in Mexico, 1863–1867, by Richard Hill and Peter Hogg. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995. v + 214 pages. Appendix. Sources. Index. \$29.95. This is a historical account of an Egyptian-Sudanese conscript battalion sent to Mexico to assist the French expeditionary force in France's 1863–67 campaign to conquer Mexico. The authors explore not only the reactions of Mexican and French soldiers to the participation of the Muslim battalion, but also the impressions of American and European circles to the uncommon but—according to the author—important event in African-American relations (GS).

Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts, 1596–1950, by Karel Steenbrink. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 1993. 170 pages. Bibliography. Index. \$29.95. Steenbrink uses primary sources in order to shed light on the nature of the colonial and post-colonial relationship between Holland and Indonesia. The author proffers a detailed history of the colonial period in seven chapters: "Starting-points and Explorations," "The First Encounters: Muslims as Respected Heretics," "The Theological Homefront: Muslims as Detestable Heretics," "Company Directors in 'Natural Hostility' towards 'Untrustworthy and Fanatic Muslims,'" "The Advisors: Holle, Hurghronje and Hazeu: Tutors to 'Members of a Backward Religion,'" "The Age of Mission (1850–1940) and the Muslims: Between Anticipation and Accommodation," and "Indonesian Reactions to the Christians' Arrival." The final chapter, "Lessons from the Past?," addresses concerns after the 1945 Indonesian independence (IV).

Mongols and Mamluks: Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 1260–1281, by Reuven Amitai-Preiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. ix + 272 pages. Maps. Tables. Gloss. Bibliography. Index. \$59.95. This is a historical analysis of the 21-year war between the Mamluk state, located in what is now Egypt and Syria, and the Ilkhanid Mongols of Persia. Amitai-Preiss examines many facets of the 13th-century conflict, including its historical background, efforts at diplomacy, and the course of the war itself (MMc).



HIGHLIGHTS FROM ST. MARTIN'S PRESS

QADHAFI'S LIBYA, 1969-1994

EDITED BY DIRK VANDEWALLE

Qadhafi's Libya, 1969-1994 is a fresh and enlightening look at the highly volatile country of Libya and its charismatic leader, Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi. Although much attention has focused on the more spectacular exploits of the Libyan government, the internal politics of the country remain largely unexplored. This volume assembles a group of scholars who have studied the political and socioeconomic progress of the Libyan government since Qadhafi assumed power in 1969. Revealing the contradictions between the regime's rhetoric and the day-to-day reality of life in Libya, they explore the tensions and inconsistencies between the aspirations of this self-styled revolutionary state and its complete dependence on the international economy.


October 1995 • 304 pp • \$49.95 cl

LYAUTEY AND THE FRENCH CONQUEST OF MOROCCO

WILLIAM A. HOISINGTON, JR.

Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco looks at the career of Marshal Louis-Hubert Lyautey (1854-1934), France's first resident general in Morocco and the most famous of France's 20th century overseas soldier-administrators. Lyautey popularized the notions of "peaceful penetration" and "indirect rule" as part of a grand colonial design of military pacification, economic development, political modernization, and social betterment. During his 13 years as resident general, he boldly promoted France's actions in Morocco as the "highest form" of imperialism.

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Abbreviations

A./a, Asia, Asian, Asiatic, Asie, asiatique, etc
Acad, Academy
Admin., Administration, Administrative
Aff., Affairs
Afr./afr, Africa, African, Afrique, africain, etc
Amer, America, American, etc
Ann., Annals, Annales
Annu, Annuaire
Anthrop./anthrop, Anthropology, Anthropological, Anthropologie, anthropologique, etc
Assoc, Association
B., Bulletin
BSOAS, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
C., Central
Cah., Cahiers
Comp, Comparative
Contemp./contemp, Contemporary, contemporain, etc
Cult, Culture, Cultural
Cur, Current
D, Deutsch, etc
Dept., Department
Dev, Developing
Develop., Development
East., Eastern
Econ /écon, Economics

Economie, économique, etc
For., Foreign
Fr./fr, France, French, français, etc
Geog /géog., Geography, Geographic, Geographical, Géographie, géographique, etc
Hist /hist, History, Historical, Histoire, historique
IBLA, Institut des belles Lettres arabes
IJMES, International Journal of Middle East Studies
Inst., Institute, Institut, etc
internac., internacional
Internat /internat., International, international, Internationale, etc
internaz, internazionale
J., Journal
JPS, Journal of Palestine Studies
Lit., Literature, Literary
Lab., Labor, Labour
Mag, Magazine
Maj, Majallah, Majallat
Med /Méd, Mediterranean, Méditerranée, etc
MEJ, Middle East Journal
MERIP, Middle East Research and Information Project
MESA, Middle East Studies Association
Mid, Middle

Mod /mod., Modern, moderne, moderno
Nr, Near
O, Orient, Oriental, Orientalia, oriental, oriente, etc
Org, Organization
Pak, Pakistan
Polit /poht, Politics, Political, Politique, politique, Politica, etc
Probs., Problems
Quart, Quarterly
Rel., Relations
Rep, Report
Res, Research
Rev, Review, Revue, Revista
Riv, Rivista
S, School, Schools
Sci., Science, Sciences, Scienze, etc
Soc./soc, Society, Social, Societe, social, etc
Sociol./sociol., Sociology, Sociological, Sociologica, Sociologie, sociologique, etc
Stud, Studies, Studia
Supp, Supplement
Univ, University, Université, etc
US, United States
Z, Zeitschrift

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American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Herndon, VA
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Annals of the Japan Association for Middle East Studies Tokyo, Japan
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MERIP Middle East Report, Washington, DC
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